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ABSTRACT 
 
Sexual harassment has emerged as a widespread problem facing women in public 
space in Egypt. Activism to combat sexual harassment began in 2005. However, just 
prior to and in the years following the January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution, which 
witnessed an increase in the collective sexual harassment, assault and rape of women, this 
activism has increased. Subsequently, scholarly attention to sexual harassment and public 
sexual violence has also expanded. Much of the attention in scholarly analyses has been 
directed toward politically motivated sexual violence, focused on understanding the state 
commissioning of sexual violence against female protestors to drive them from protest 
participation. There is an emerging critique of activist approaches that seems to ignore 
the politicalized nature of sexual harassment to focus instead on “cultural” targets. The 
early work of the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) and current work of 
HarassMap have been criticized for depoliticizing sexual harassment by failing to include 
an analysis of state-commissioned sexual violence in their work.  Similarly, both have 
been accused of expanding the scope of the security state by calling for increased 
policing of public space to protect women from “culturally-bad” men.  
With data collected through one year of participant observation with HarassMap, 
interviews with activists from eleven anti-sexual harassment initiatives and advocacy 
NGOs, and community-level surveys with non-activist individuals, this dissertation 
argues that “cultural” work undertaken through the community-based approaches by 
entities like ECWR and HarassMap is, in fact, an inherently political process, in which 
political engagement represents both an attempt to change political culture and state 
practice and a negotiative process involving changing patriarchal gender norms that 
 ii 
underpin sexual harassment at a society-wide level. New conceptualizations of sexual 
harassment promoted by anti-sexual harassment initiatives and NGOs in Egypt frame it 
as a form of violence against women, and attempt to make sexual harassment an offense 
that may be criminalized. Yet, this dissertation contends there is a tension between 
activist and widespread public understandings of sexual harassment, predicated on the 
incomplete framing of sexual harassment as a form of violence. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
SCENE 1: Attaba Girl, 1992 
 Late one evening in March 1992, a young girl and her mother boarded a bus in the 
busy Cairene neighborhood thoroughfare of Attaba Square. Prior to entering the bus, a 
young man caught the girl’s eye and she smiled his way. Once on the bus, the young 
man, along with three other men, attacked the girl, pinning her down and raping her in 
front of a busload of witnesses. The passengers did not intervene, but according to the 
Chicago Tribune the police were able to arrest two of the rapists (Al Hayat 1992; 
Chicago Tribune 1992).   
 
SCENE 2: Black Wednesday, 2005 
 In May 2005, female activists congregated in front of the Press Syndicate offices 
in downtown Cairo to protest the referendum to amend Article 76 of the constitution. The 
amendment would allow a multi-party Presidential election, yet it set strict terms that 
made it a requirement for all candidates to obtain endorsements from within the 
parliament run by the National Democratic Party (NDP, of Hosni Mubarak) in order to 
run. Many feared the amendment only strengthened NDP control of the government and 
was a move by Mubarak to pave the way for his son, Gamal, to follow in the Presidency. 
The female protesters standing in front of the Press Syndicate that day were sexually 
harassed and assaulted by security forces and state-hired baltigiyya, or thugs. One 
protestor reported that some of these thugs penetrated her with their fingers. In 2011, 
after a five-year investigation instigated by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 
(EIPR), the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights found the Egyptian 
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government culpable in the mass sexual assaults of female protestors (EIPR 2011; 
Langohr 2013; Radwan 2011; Stacher 2005; Stilt 2006).  
 
SCENE 3: Eid, 2006  
 In October 2006, on the first day of the three-day Eid al-Fitr holiday following the 
end of the Islamic holy month, Ramadan, scores of young men were shut out of a 
downtown movie theatre showing a film directed by the now infamous director, Sobky, 
and featuring the well-known dancer/actress, Safinaz. In a rage, the young men began to 
prowl the streets of the downtown area (wusṭ al-balad), sexually harassing any young 
women they could find. Large groups of young men harassed and assaulted smaller 
groups of women and girls. Video footage of this mob sexual harassment was caught on 
mobile phones and was widely distributed via YouTube. Mob sexual harassment has 
since become a yearly holiday ritual (Al-Malky 2007; Otterman 2007; Rizzo et al. 2012). 
 
SCENE 4: Tahrir Square, 2011-2013  
 In November 2012, composer and activist Yasmine el-Baramawy joined the 
thousands of protestors in Tahrir Square standing against the regime of the Muslim 
Brotherhood President, Mohamed Morsy. Before realizing it, el-Baramawy found herself 
surrounded by a sea of men, between the ages of 18-40, closing in on her. Some, she told 
Australian Women’s Weekly, looked like thugs and others looked like normal people. El-
Baramawy’s attackers pushed, grabbed, hit, kicked, fondled her body, and cut her clothes 
from her body. They dragged her along the ground naked, pinned her down by her hair 
beneath the wheels of a car, and then tied her to the hood of the car while driving into 
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another nearby area. Throughout her ordeal, her attackers simultaneously told her they 
would protect her even as they assaulted and raped her, shouting to the crowd when they 
drove away with her that she had a bomb strapped to her body. According to Australian 
Women’s Weekly, a later physical examination found that she had been penetrated anally 
with a knife. A group of neighborhood women rescued El-Baramawy after more than an 
hour (AWW 2013; Hafez 2014; Langohr 2013; yNet 2013).  
----------- 
This ethnography explores the role of grassroots activism in reshaping social 
perceptions and behaviors around taḥarrush ginsy, or sexual harassment, in Egypt. In 
part, it interrogates the unfolding narrative of sexual harassment in order to make visible 
various constructs that have, at once, facilitated and hindered efforts to foment social 
change. The above scenes are instructive in this analysis. They represent well-known and 
frequently recounted markers in the history of public sexual violence (al-ʿunf al-ginsy) in 
Egypt. More specifically, these events are critical features in the emerging discourse on 
taḥarrush ginsy by activists and scholars, often recounted as evidence of the growing 
problem of taḥarrush ginsy and they highlight the range of behaviors that have been 
subsumed within the term  “sexual harassment” in Egypt. The Attaba Girl case, along 
with the similar 1985 Maadi Girl case, where a young woman and her boyfriend were 
kidnapped and the woman raped while her boyfriend was forced to watch, made national 
headlines at their respective times (Dupret 2007). Both cases incited public outrage and 
fears of disintegrating moral values. Both have also served as almost mythic reference 
points in the murky development of what has been seen by activists as a long and 
widespread, if not endemic, problem facing Egyptian women.  
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Black Wednesday signified the first identifiable point in the evolving narrative of 
sexual harassment in Egypt when sexual violence became a problem for women in public 
space. More than 500 women joined in demonstrations organized by the pro-democracy 
movement Kefaya to stand in solidarity against the corruption of the Mubarak regime 
(El-Mahdi 2010; Sika 2014; Shorbagy 2007). In the protests, state hired baltigiyya 
(thugs) and state security forces sexually harassed and assaulted female protestors. State 
sponsored sexual violence spurred the first joint campaign bringing together activists, 
journalists, and Islamists to speak out against politically motivated sexual violence, 
referred to as “The Street is Ours,” (al-shāraʿ linā) and included entities such as the 
Egyptian Center for Women’s Right (ECWR), the Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal 
Aid (CEWLA), and the New Women’s Research Center (Abdelmrahman 2015; Schemm 
2005). Additionally, the violence fueled the establishment of other initiatives, such the 
Association of Egyptian Mothers founded by Cairo University political scientist, Heba 
Raouf, and the National Apology Campaign to stand in solidarity with the victims of 
politically motivated sexual violence (Baheyya 2005; Howeidy 2005). In late 2005, 
ECWR founded the first community-based program focused on combatting sexual 
harassment in the streets, which was separate from “The Street is Ours” campaign that 
addressed state violence, yet was closely titled “Making Our Streets Safe for Everyone.”   
The Eid mob sexual harassment was the first mass incident of public sexual 
violence that was videotaped and distributed online by Egyptian bloggers, Wael Abbas 
and Malek X (Rizzo et al. 2012). In the discourse on sexual harassment in Egypt, it has 
served as a critical turning point when the Egyptian public began to question whether 
sexual harassment was a problem within their society. According to Al-Malky (2007) 
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traffic on the blog sites, while comparatively small, jumped to 750 comments from 30 
comments per day, 8000 views per day for Malek X, and 60,000 views of Abbas’s video 
over a one-week period. The Eid example was not simply a case of a violent state 
oppressing opposition, or a political act disconnected from the wider system of social 
norms. Instead, it was seen as symptomatic of the widespread social practice of sexual 
harassment, which was, partially, enabled by an illegitimate state that was itself a 
harasser and that had not adequately enforced legal punishments for those who harassed. 
Moreover, the Eid incident has been viewed as a precursor to the mob violence that came 
to mar the Tahrir Square protests instigated by the January 2011 Egyptian Revolution.  
With the onset of the January 25, 2011 Revolution, sexual harassment, assault and 
rape became more violent, and some activists have argued more prevalent, in the Tahrir 
Square protests (Ahmad Zaki & Abd ElHamid 2014; Hassan 2014; Tadros 2013a). 
Following the first anniversary of the Mohamed Mahmoud clash in November 2012, 
when the Egyptian state violently clamped down on protestors on Mohamed Mahmoud 
Street adjacent to Tahrir, activists noted a change in the collective assaults that occurred, 
with hundreds of men isolating and attacking lone women. Nehad Aboul Qomsan, 
Director of the Egyptian Center For Women’s Rights (ECWR) stated, “We call them the 
circles of hell,” which was made all the more possible with the absence of police in the 
square between November 2011 to July 2013 (FIDH 2014: 11). The extreme violence and 
impunity with which mass sexual harassment, assault and rape occurred in this period 
were viewed as an outgrowth of this already long, yet not fully understood, history of 
sexual harassment that was prevalent in the streets on a daily basis and at other protest 
sites. Acts of sexual violence that occurred in Tahrir Square were argued to be the 
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continued, yet escalating, political practice of quelling opposition at protests and in 
detention settings (FIDH 2015). Moreover, Tahrir has been seen as the extreme result of 
unfettered practices of public sexual violence in the country, prompting increased NGO 
activism focused on combatting the structural system of gender-based violence, as well as 
new forms of volunteer activism specifically targeting sexual harassment in the streets. 
The ambiguities, tensions, and activism that have arisen around the narrative of 
these acts of sexual violence serve as the framework for this ethnographic exercise. This 
project examines the discursive and mobilizational practices that have configured 
taḥarrush ginsy, as well as the scope of activism that has sought to bring about its end, in 
particular ways. Situating anti-sexual harassment activism within transnational spheres of 
governance, where NGOs and initiatives serve as key mediators between international 
women’s rights discourses and local norms, this dissertation further interrogates how 
notions of sexual violence and women’s rights have been/are being contested and 
reshaped in the pre-and-post-Revolutionary Egyptian context. As part of this, the project 
investigates the strategies employed by social initiatives to fashion and promote a new 
vision of what constitutes sexual violence and social responsibility, as well as public 
understandings of taḥarrush ginsy. In so doing, this project seeks to make sense of how 
grassroots initiatives drive change and considers challenges to their strategic approaches.  
 
Framework: Ambiguities and Tensions 
The introductory scenes above draw attention to important ambiguities that exist 
within the discourse of sexual harassment as a form of sexual violence in Egypt. These 
ambiguities provide the starting point of the ethnographic account that follows in this 
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dissertation. Among them are 1) the lack of clarity around, but an apparent overlap in, the 
social and political nature of sexual harassment, the relationship of which is critical to 
understand when considering social and political interventions designed to combat the 
problem in Egyptian society; and concomitantly, 2) a lack of clarity in how sexual 
harassment, as taḥarrush ginsy, is conceptualized, where its’ very definition and 
constitutive acts are being actively negotiated within and between civil society, the 
public, media, and government. Exploring the tension between social and political forms 
of sexual harassment is of vital import, particularly when sexual harassment in either 
form is used as a springboard for assessing and criticizing grassroots anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives and their long-term impact. Moreover, new conceptualizations of 
taḥarrush ginsy are linked to the transnational field within which anti-sexual harassment 
activism occurs. New ethics on violence and criminality are being mapped onto local 
discourses of sexual harassment, which is diffusing unevenly into the country. This 
section looks first at what is social or political about taḥarrush ginsy, in Egypt, as it has 
been understood since Black Wednesday and since civil society activism began in 2005.   
In her examination of the role of men in three “effective” initiatives working to 
combat sexual harassment in Egypt, Tadros (2014) argues that there are two kinds of 
gender-based violence in operation in the current context. Drawing on Caroline Moser’s 
(2001) continuum of gendered violence, which attempts to build a holistic understanding 
of sexual violence as having political, social and economic facets, Tadros outlines the 
shape of politically motivated and socially motivated assault/gender violence in the 
country. Accordingly, she employs Moser’s definition of socially motivated sexual 
violence as “violent acts committed by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain 
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or to obtain or maintain social power. This would be manifest at the interpersonal level 
through spousal abuse or sexual harassment in the street by gangs, thugs or various public 
actors (Tadros 2014: 10, citing Moser 2001: 36). She goes on to define socially motivated 
sexual harassment as practices that include groping, touching, and the removal of 
clothing that is becoming more daring in the post-Revolutionary period (Tadros 2014: 
10). This differs from politically motivated sexual violence, where the act of violence 
includes sexual abuse, torture and rape. Tadros asserts that this form of sexual violence is 
patterned, it occurs primarily in protest spaces, and it is intentionally commissioned and 
implemented by political entities in order to maintain political power.   
The distinguishing features between both are the intentionality behind the 
violence, whether officially planned in a politically charged context or spontaneously (if 
regularly) occurring in the course of daily life, as well as accountability in who is 
engaging in such violence, whether the state or the average individual. There is a sense 
that politically motivated sexual violence, particularly in the post-2011 Revolutionary 
context, is somehow more violent, though perhaps not more serious, than its socially 
motivated counterpart, and that the attentions directed at reform should center on the 
political system that enables such sexual violence to continue both in the political and 
social spheres. Within this framework, Tadros analyzes three “effective” anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives, Harakat Bassma (Imprint Movement), Shoft Taharrush (I Saw 
Harassment), and OpAntish (Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment), whose work cuts 
across the socially motivated to politically motivated spectrum. Harakat Bassma and 
Shoft Taharrush focus their efforts largely on socially motivated street sexual harassment, 
though Shoft Taharrush is also actively engaged in addressing political violence in 
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protests, while OpAntish emerged specifically in response to the crisis of sexual assault 
and rape in Tahrir Square. Tadros does not provide a discussion of how socially and 
politically motivated sexual violence is differentially addressed by these initiatives, i.e. 
whether each type of sexual violence necessitates a specific set of strategic approaches, 
and if certain approaches are better than others in facilitating change.  
It is also not clear in her discussion if these initiatives have a unique philosophical 
approach to ending sexual harassment and/or what makes their activities more effective 
than those of the other initiatives that have also sprung up. Tadros outlines several criteria 
for her selection of the three initiatives noted above, including that they must have 1) 
emerged in the post-Revolutionary period, 2) be “informal” (unregistered), 3) must focus 
on public sexual violence, whether the focus is on the street or the structural system, i.e. 
seeking legislative changes, which presumes that street activism does not challenge the 
structural system, 4) they must involve men in activism, 5) be ongoing and 6) be 
“effective,” i.e. they provide positive reinforcement, they are able to recruit many 
volunteers, and they also engage with the media. Within this framework, there are no 
explanations of why initiatives, such as Ded el-Taharrush or Tahrir Bodyguards, both of 
whom may be said to meet the above criteria and are equally as prominent, were not 
included. For that matter, the social initiative, HarassMap, was excluded, though 
HarassMap fails to meet one of the criteria above – they formed 3 months prior to the 
Revolution. Until 2015, when they formally submitted their NGO registration 
application, they met the other criteria and have been one of the leading entities in the 
fight against sexual harassment in the post-Revolutionary period. Tadros’s analysis 
provides very detailed and cogent examinations of the activities of Harakat Bassma, 
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Shoft Taharush and OpAntish, but does not explore the foundations upon which each of 
these entities seeks to foment sociopolitical change and upend gender inequality. A 
philosophical ethic, or even a theory of social change, underpinning the strategic choices 
made by these initiatives is missing in the discussion on effectiveness. 
Tadros’s analysis elides some key aspects of sexual harassment in Egypt, i.e. that 
the lines between politically motivated and socially motivated sexual harassment, as she 
has defined them, are porous. For example, activists note that socially motivated sexual 
violence, what Tadros (2013b) also refers to as everyday forms of sexual harassment that 
exists on the streets and occurs on a daily basis, is planned, especially around the 
holidays. The Eid example discussed above was the first in what is now a regularized 
practice in many of Egypt’s cities - in a sense, this may be viewed as a pattern of sexual 
violence that occurs around the holidays (rather than protest), but is not a tactic by the 
state to maintain political power.  
Activists, and even non-activists who are asked, widely believe that many young 
men learn harassing behaviors from older male family members, who might purposefully 
take them out to sexually harass women and girls in the street. Growing numbers of 
reports from victims/survivors via social media and open-source platforms also illustrate 
that socially and politically motivated sexual harassment are often described in similarly 
violent terms, and both may include physical assaults and rape. Additionally, and Tadros 
does note this, the line between socially motivated and politically motivated sexual 
assaults in the Tahrir mob attacks was often blurred. Langohr (2013) discussed Egyptian 
activists’ beliefs early in the Revolution that mob assaults were politically commissioned. 
However, activists now argue that this was not singularly the case and that attacks may 
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have been instigated by state-hired baltigiyya (thugs) but average men were quick to join 
in the fray (Interviews Hussein El-Shafei and Amal El-Mohandes). The sheer size of the 
mobs that arose in Tahrir raised doubts later on that not all participants in sexual attacks 
and rapes were paid by the state, and that many were also opportunists.  
Tadros’s distinction of politically and socially motivated gender-based violence, 
on the one hand, attempts to clarify some of the ambiguities around sexual violence in 
Egypt. However, the basis of this attempt is to make visible the role of the state in 
perpetrating sexual violence against its female citizenry. Moser (2001) noted that sexual 
violence has typically been situated within the realm of the social, thus ignoring its’ 
political and economic implications. In essence, Tadros provides a historic corrective to 
the problem of viewing sexual violence in Egypt as grounded solely in the everyday 
facets of life, which was largely the case prior to the Revolution, and argues that the state 
is highly implicated in acts of sexual aggression toward its’ citizenry.  
In her examination of the effect of political affiliations and sensitivities of average 
individuals on their perceptions of who was committing acts of sexual violence, she 
noted, “Pre-orchestrated and politically motivated sexual assault intended to [intimidate] 
female protestors from expressing their opposition in public spaces have been muddled 
with socio-economically motivated incidents of sexual harassment” (Tadros 2013b: 3).1 
Here, the lack of clear boundaries between socially motivated and politically motivated 
sexual violence in the minds of politically minded average individuals, in addition to their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In particular, Tadros was concerned that those who were supportive of and had voted for the Muslim 
Brotherhood President, Mohamed Morsi, were more inclined to victim-blame and less inclined to see the 
Brotherhood government as perpetrators of sexual harassment. In general, she argued that those individuals 
that were more supportive of Islamist politics were blinded from seeing Islamist political actors as 
implicated in sanctioning politically commissioned sexual violence. Instead, the Islamist rhetoric was to lay 
responsibility for assault on women themselves.	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political bias, obscures the role of the state in reproducing this violence. In the 
Revolutionary context, the distinction between social and political has been vital given 
the way the government sought to clamp down on protests, and therefore a transition to 
more democratic political practices, through attacks on the respectability of female 
protestors (Amar 2011). This tactic represents a shift in state approaches to managing 
protests.2 Yet, a counter-argument can be made that by distinguishing socially and 
politically motivated sexual violence in order to make visible the state as harasser, 
socially motivated sexual violence perpetrated by average individuals in the street 
becomes a practice derivative of state violence, i.e. the state sets an example and creates 
the system of impunity that, in turn, allows (maybe encourages) people to misbehave.  
Missing in Tadros’s analysis is an exploration of the integrated nature of socially 
and politically motivated sexual violence in Egypt, and consequently what this means for 
anti-sexual harassment activism, for which Moser (2011) advocates. She stated, “…those 
concerned with ‘societal violence’ – such as robbery, crime and gender-based violence – 
tend to compartmentalize their knowledge,” meaning that those viewing sexual violence 
as socially – or even politically – motivated ignore that sexual violence is both at the 
same time (Moser 2011: 33). While Moser herself was concerned with sexual violence 
deployed in conflict situations, what can be extrapolated from her statement is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Amar (2011) argues that in the pre-Revolutionary period, state tactics toward managing protest included 
portraying protestors as baltigiyya, or thugs, in a process he called the “baltagi-effect.” Using the rhetoric 
of thugs undermining the national security of the country, the state could suppress protestors through 
arrests and detention. In the post-Revolutionary period, the expansive participation of women in protests 
made it challenging for the state to claim that protests were largely comprised of thugs. Amar argues that 
the state instead used thugs to push women from protest by attacking their respectability through sexual 
harassment., assault and rape. What is not clear is if the state assumed that pushing women from protest 
would suppress Revolutionary protest overall, or if pushing women out of protest would then allow them to 
revert to the tactic of managing largely male dominated protests through the baltagi effect. 	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looking at sexual violence as either strictly social or political (or economic) obscures the 
linkages between them. 
Tadros argues that both social and political forms of gender-based violence stem 
from the same system of norms and values that informs behavior, and that both ultimately 
serve to maintain patriarchal power. It may be possible to say that delineating the realms 
within which sexual violence occurs, whether social or political, are crucial in order to 
devise appropriate strategies to bringing about a reduction or an end to their occurrence 
within each realm. On the other hand, distinguishing forms of gender violence along a 
social and political axis is problematic and reinforces a fissure between the social and 
political spheres. By separating sexual harassment and other forms of gender-based 
violence along social or political lines, this in turn emphasizes the social and political as 
separate, rather than mutually constitutive, worlds. More importantly, such distinctions, 
which are intended to highlight state transgressions, ascribe primacy to the political 
sphere in forging social and cultural practices. This fissure complicates how grassroots 
anti-sexual harassment interventions, focused largely on the socially motivated, everyday 
forms of sexual harassment rather than the politically motivated forms of sexual violence, 
are also politically engaged, i.e. that their social interventions are political.  
This dual system of sexual violence in Egypt does not account for anti-sexual 
harassment interventions that take place and generate changes within overlapping social 
and political fields. Moreover, the fissure that separates socially and politically motivated 
sexual violence has helped to generate criticisms of some anti-sexual harassment 
activism. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, there is a belief that 
some anti-sexual harassment activism has failed to address the structural system of 
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gender-based violence by failing to hold the state accountable for its use of sexual 
violence and that civil society entities, by focusing on everyday street sexual harassment, 
are complicit in reproducing neocolonial notions of unruly Arab men (Abu Lughod 2013; 
Amar 2011)3. Such forms of activism are not viewed as complementary to political 
advocacy that is typical of women’s rights NGOs (al-Ali 2000). This criticism of anti-
sexual harassment efforts overlooks key contextual factors and internal dynamics among 
social/political actors within Egyptian NGOs and initiatives that influenced the choices of 
anti-sexual harassment activists, as well as the changes this activism has gone through 
between 2005 to today. This ethnography seeks to provide greater insight into some of 
these issues and to problematize the social/political distinction of sexual violence.   
Differences in how taḥarrush ginsy is defined and the shifting terminological 
borders around everyday sexually harassing acts (typically identified with a range of 
behaviors like catcalls, stares, following, touching) and assault and rape serves as another 
area of ambiguity made evident in the introductory scenes.  While it may seem a rather 
dubious, and perhaps even unnecessary, task to make distinctions between various forms 
of sexual violence, this dissertation argues that it is, in fact, a crucial tension that must be 
explored, side by side with notions of socially and politically motivated sexual violence, 
in order to better understand the continued divergence between civil society and public 
conceptions of sexual harassment. Much of the anti-sexual harassment discourse 
prevalent in civil society identifies sexual assault and rape, which feature prominently as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Amar notes how media representations of frenzied mobs of Arab men, particularly with the attack on 
CBS correspondent Lara Logan, drew on “Orientalist tropes of the ‘Arab Street,’” in which Arab men were 
portrayed as predatory and undisciplined (2011: 301). Asef Bayat’s (2003) more detailed discussion of the 
“Arab Street,” which Amar references, argues that the “Arab Street” had become code in Western media 
and political spheres for “an abnormal mindset, as well as a strange place filled with angry people” and 
which was “almost exclusively described in terms of ‘mobs, riots, and revolts.’” 	  
 15 
aspects of politically motivated sexual violence, and every-day forms of sexual 
harassment in the street as equivalent in severity and subsumes them both within the 
terminological rubric of taḥarrush ginsy. In other words, the conflation of very violent 
forms of sexual assault and rape with far less violent everyday harassment as taḥarrush 
creates a conceptual conflict for the public that do not see equivalency between the two. 
Additionally, since the Revolution, taḥarrush has been used synonymously with ʿatadāʾ 
el-ginsy (sexual assault), el-ʿunf el-ginsy (sexual violence), within civil society and the 
media, contributing to public resistance to conceptualizations of taḥarrush as including 
everyday behaviors and as a crime.  
Associated with this conceptual conflict between civil society and public 
definitions of sexual harassment are the transnational norms and values that infuse civil 
society discourses. ECWR, in some of the initial civil society research that was 
conducted on the phenomenon of street sexual harassment in Egypt, defined it as 
“unwanted sexual conduct deliberately perpetrated by the harasser, resulting in sexual, 
physical, or psychological abuse of the victim, regardless of location…” (Hassan et al. 
2008). In a conference report, ECWR stressed sexual harassment to be primarily a social 
and psychological phenomenon, though they claimed it did have other dimensions (Aboul 
Qomsan 2009). They did not include rape, sexual assault, or mob assault in their list of 
actions that constituted sexual harassment (despite the fact that their two reports were 
issued well after the first Eid mob harassment that took place in 2006), nor did they focus 
on politically motivated violence, but specifically highlighted the uneven relations of 
power within which sexual harassment is embedded. This definition of sexual harassment 
as an uneven arrangement of power, where men were able to target women for sexual 
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harassment, mirrored that of American and, to some extent, European feminist arguments 
that sexual harassment is a form of gendered power, or sex discrimination that violates 
women’s economic rights (Bakker 2007; Zippel 2006).  
The definition of sexual harassment promoted by the social initiative, HarassMap, 
which launched in late 2010, more directly pulled from UN definitions (and was, in fact, 
taken from the UN website), that similarly stated: 
Sexual harassment is any unwelcome words and/or actions of a sexual nature that violate a 
person’s body, privacy, or feelings and make that person feel uncomfortable, threatened, insecure, 
scared, disrespected, startled, insulted, intimated, abused, offended, or objectified. Sexual 
harassment can take many different forms and include one or more types at one time: ogling, 
facial expressions, catcalls, comments, stalking or following, sexual invites, unwanted attention, 
sexual photos, online (harassment), phone calls, touching, indecent exposure, threats, sexual 
assault, rape, mob attacks (HarassMap 2014). 
 
The inclusion of assault, rape and mob attacks occurred as a result of the Revolution. 
Their website goes on to call all forms of sexual harassment a crime. The feminist group, 
Nazra for Feminist Studies, employed HarassMap’s definition of sexual harassment in a 
document generated for the joint campaign, ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak (Fix It In Your 
Head/Get It Right), which was conducted during the International 16 Days of Activism to 
Combat Gender Violence from November 25-December 8, 2013. Nazra’s use of the 
definition, however, was amended to exclude sexual assault, rape, and mob attacks. The 
goal of the ṣallaḥha campaign, at least for participating groups like HarassMap, was to 
clarify terminologies, where anti-sexual harassment efforts sought to highlight taḥarrush 
as simply everyday sexual harassment separate from sexual assault and rape. 
 These definitions hint at how anti-sexual harassment activism engages with 
transnational fields in order to effect change on the ground. A wealth of literature exists 
on the role of NGOs and civil society entities in mediating transnational rights based 
 17 
discourses, serving as norm entrepreneurs and as critical entities that facilitate the norm 
socialization process (Starchursky 2013; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse & Sikkink 
1999). A more thorough discussion of these concepts will follow in Chapter 3, however, 
of import here is that NGOs and other civil society initiatives are theorized as operating 
in a middle space that helps to connect global and local systems of norms. A number of 
social scientists argue that certain discursive framing practices aide in this process, 
including resonance, radicalization and vernacularization (Feree 2003; Levitt and Merry 
2009). However, those examining these processes largely view domestic socialization in 
relation to legal structures and the way in which states adopt more equalizing and 
democratic principles with respect to human and women’s rights. Here, domestic 
socialization is often synonymous with legal reform, whereby changes in legal structures 
somehow impacts changes in cultural practice. In this vein, social change is frequently 
analyzed as a top-down process.  
 Egyptian anti-sexual harassment NGOs and initiatives have long been engaged 
with transnational human rights regimes in how they have conceived of and defined 
sexual harassment, as well as new social norms around sexual harassment. The framing 
of sexual harassment as violating/a violation, a power imbalance, and, most importantly, 
a crime, intersects with globalized perspectives that increasingly place violence against 
women at the forefront of transnational women’s rights activism (Merry 2006 & 2009). 
An important aspect of this global activism is promoting more equitable politico-legal 
frameworks and state adherence to international conventions, such as CEDAW (the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). With 
respect to this, Hassan et al (2008) and Rizzo et al. (2012), in their detailed examination 
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of the ECWR campaign, also noted additional frames in Egyptian anti-sexual harassment 
activism that focus on security and the responsibility of the state in ensuring both legal 
protections and police protection in the street. Such frames have been very prevalent in 
much of the activism that has occurred since the Tahrir attacks began. 
 Despite this activism, how civil society frames and discourses have both drawn on 
and redefined localized notions of sexual harassment, namely how taḥarrush ginsy 
became the sexual harassment recognizable today, has not been explored. Activities, 
events, and even strategic approaches have been highlighted for a number of NGOs and 
initiatives, namely ECWR, HarassMap, Shoft Taharrush, and Harakat Bassma, which are 
often examined independent of the larger scope and history of the movement against 
sexual harassment itself, and are increasingly conducted within the framework of 
revolution, state violence, and technological activism. Yet, the process of norm mediation 
and the decisions made by anti-sexual harassment actors with respect to building and 
promoting new social norms, and mobilizing for change is still unclear. This project 
draws on theories of international norm mediation to address these processes and 
interrogates how anti-sexual harassment activism is constructing sexual harassment in 
particular ways. Along with this is a focus on bottom-up forms of change that emphasizes 
how grassroots anti-sexual harassment initiatives are attempting to refashion social 
perceptions and behaviors.  
In addition, this ethnographic analysis interrogates how the Egyptian public has 
understood taḥarrush ginsy over time and how this coheres, or not, with civil society 
frames of taḥarrush. As evidenced by the definitions above, the differing actions 
connected with sexual harassment are not consistent between civil society organizations, 
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nor have they been uniform over time. Regarding HarassMap’s inclusion of sexual 
assault, rape and mob harassment in their definition of sexual harassment, this occurred 
not because HarassMap activists lack any vision for distinctions or boundaries between 
various sexually violent behaviors. In fact, HarassMap was a joint partner, along with 
Nazra for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), and Tahrir 
Bodyguard, in the ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak campaign.  As already noted, the purpose of 
ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak was to solidify definitions and more concretely delineate what was 
and was not taḥarrush ginsy. However, HarassMap’s claim to fame, so to speak, was 
their open-source crowd-map, powered by Ushahidi (Howe 2006). HarassMap was one 
of the first to employ this form of technology to a social/political problem in Egypt4, and 
certainly one of the first in the world to do so for a longstanding problem and not a crisis 
situation, for which the potential of crowd-mapping was lauded (Goodchild 2010; Hester 
et al. 2010; Kahl et al. 2012). Because of this, HarassMap sought to utilize their crowd-
map to give victims/survivors of multiple forms of sexual violence a means to speak up 
and voice their experiences.   
Despite this, HarassMap’s incorporation of these multiple forms of sexual 
violence through their online platform both reflects and helps to reproduce continued 
public confusion of what constitutes taḥarrush ginsy, as well as continued denial that 
taḥarrush ginsy represents a real societal problem. In the Attaba Girl case, the article that 
appeared in Wasat Magazine in 1992, archived online by the Saudi owned Al Hayat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See Meier 2011 for a discussion of U-Shahid, the first open-source platform to map political corruption in 
Egypt. U-Shahid also employed Ushahidi technology and launched operations months prior to HarassMap, 
though HarassMap began talks with their technological partner, Nijel, about implementing a crowdmap to 
map sexual harassment in Egypt in 2008, and spent 2009-2010 in developing and financing a crowdmap 
project.	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news, interchangeably utilized the terms taḥarrush, ʿatadāʾ (assault), and ightaṣab (rape) 
to describe the attack on the young girl. Here, there was no separation between these 
three terms; the use of taḥarrush was synonymous with the use of ightaṣab (rape). Since 
the Revolution, articles exploring the historic trajectory of taḥarrush ginsy and public 
sexual violence from Attaba to Tahrir are sometimes more careful in terminological use, 
but the Attaba rape still marks the first referenced and much discussed case of taḥarrush 
ginsy in Egypt (HarassMap FB 2013; Montasir 2012). The examples at the beginning of 
this chapter all highlight how differing forms of violence tell the story of taḥarrush ginsy 
in Egypt, which was starkly visible in numerous workshops and press conferences that 
took place during the course of the research for this project. Likewise, the array of 
sexually violent behaviors that were prevalent in Tahrir Square is an essential part of how 
taḥarrush ginsy is understood. In many ways, whether intended (and wanted) or not by 
activists, the story of sexual violence – all forms of this - has become the story of 
taḥarrush ginsy in Egypt.  
While NGOs focused more broadly on gender-based violence and political 
advocacy strive to separate the different forms of sexual violence, such work is 
challenged by historic understandings of the terms that have come into play in anti-sexual 
harassment activism.  This ethnographic account, therefore, additionally investigates 
public perceptions of taḥarrush ginsy and where these perceptions do or do not align with 
civil society discourses. Furthermore, it explores the conceptual shifts around the term 
taḥarrush ginsy and links such shifts both to various highly publicized events, as well as 
to the transnationally inspired activism of the NGOs and initiatives most active in anti-
sexual harassment work.  
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Research Questions 
Three research questions were central in the design and data collection process of this 
ethnographic project. Each question engages with the ambiguities and tensions detailed in 
the discussion above to provide a picture of how grassroots activism is shaping new 
notions of taḥarrush ginsy, promoting it as a problem in Egyptian society, and then 
devising strategies to combat it. These question include: 
 
1. How do anti-sexual harassment organizations talk about sexual harassment and 
other forms of sexual violence in training sessions, workshops, information 
sessions, reports and various media outlets/forums? 
 
This question arose primarily to explore the way in which NGOs and social initiatives 
working to combat sexual harassment engaged with transnational human and women’s 
rights regimes, and how new discourses around women’s rights and sexual violence were 
constructed within the local sociocultural and political context of both pre and post-
Revolution Egypt. How do the transnational and local intersect in new conceptualizations 
of taḥarrush ginsy? In particular, this question investigates the discursive practices of 
anti-sexual harassment organizations and the framing techniques - not just the frames 
themselves - employed to better understand the process of conceptual reformulation with 
respect to sexual harassment. Underpinning this question is a critical need to understand 
how sexual harassment is constructed as a violent practice in Egypt and what this has 
meant for women’s access to public spaces.  
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2. How do anti-sexual harassment organizations mobilize the public against sexual 
harassment? 
 
A number of the key ambiguities/tensions discussed above serve as the foundation for 
this question. It addresses not only the deployment of new discourses of sexual 
harassment to change social perceptions, but also the tangible activities that anti-sexual 
harassment organizations engage in to change social behaviors. The question explores 
both the social and political dimensions of anti-sexual harassment activism and considers 
why such distinctions are problematic, without specific consideration of how they are 
integrated. Included here is an examination of the targets of anti-sexual harassment 
activism and key philosophical and strategic approaches to combat the problem. 
Moreover, along with the first research question, this question attempts to make visible 
how anti-sexual harassment initiatives actively implement transnationally informed 
programs and activities, circulate new definitions of sexual harassment, and motivate 
people to act in ways that run counter to historic values and norms.   
 
3. How do local people understand sexual harassment, or taḥarrush ginsy, and how 
does their understanding align with, or conflict with, the discourses of anti-sexual 
harassment organizations? 
 
This question is directed at the ambiguities inherent in the various meanings and uses of 
the term taḥarrush ginsy, and at how local people have employed the term over time. The 
question probes into historic frames around taḥarrush ginsy that anti-sexual harassment 
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organizations have drawn on and/or challenged in order to reshape norms, perceptions 
and behaviors. These historic frames are critical, as they also shape the tensions that exist 
between civil society entities and the public, as anti-sexual harassment organizations have 
sought to reformulate social norms. Included here is an analysis of how local people 
define and talk about taḥarrush ginsy, and where civil society and public discourses may 
or may not overlap with each other. One caveat to note here is that this question does not 
examine if civil society discourses are causally linked in shaping public perceptions, per 
se. However, knowing how the public perceives taḥarrush ginsy will provide insight on 
whether civil society mediated discourses are visible in Egyptian society and how public 
sentiments may diverge from that of anti-sexual harassment groups. 
In the course of field research, additional questions arose. These are important for 
understanding not only the construction of sexual harassment as a problem in Egyptian 
civil society discourses, and Egyptian society overall, but also for serving as the 
framework for situating anti-sexual harassment activism. The analysis in this dissertation 
seeks to also address these questions: 
1. What social, economic and political factors have been expressed as contributing 
to the growth of the problem of sexual harassment in Egypt? 
2. How did the Revolution impact both discourses and activism around sexual 
harassment? 
3. What is the relationship of taḥarrush ginsy with other terminologies that fall 
within the rubric of sexual violence, in particular muʿāksa (flirtation)?  
4. How do sexual harassment norms, both historic and newly constructed, cohere 
with the structural system of gender norms in Egypt? 
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Methodological Approach 
Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted over one year, between 2013-2014, on 
location in Cairo, Egypt. Multiple methodological approaches were undertaken in an 
effort to explore the research questions outlined above.  
 
Participant Observation 
In the design of this research, the original goal was to conduct participant 
observation with three NGOs and/or social initiatives most active in anti-sexual 
harassment work and to compare discourses and strategies. Early in the research process 
it became apparent that many of the NGOs with gender-violence programs were either 
not very active on the issue of sexual harassment or they did not have specific 
programming agendas with respect to sexual harassment. For instance, prior to my arrival 
in Cairo, I contacted ECWR and received tentative approval for research with their 
organization. However, through various conversations with anti-sexual harassment 
activists following arrival in country, including the most recent (former) project manager 
of ECWR’s sexual harassment program, it became clear that ECWR’s program, which 
essentially started the civil society movement against this problem, had become inactive. 
The downsizing of staff, including the loss of key individuals that previously started and 
managed the program, contributed to a decline in ECWR’s preeminence in anti-sexual 
harassment work.  
Additionally, Nazra for Feminist Studies and the Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights (EIPR) were both approached. Nazra has been active on the issue of gender 
violence, yet their work overall has focused on supporting local women human rights 
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defenders (WHRDs). This work only nominally included sexual harassment. The work 
that did occur on sexual harassment took place during joint ventures or was focused more 
specifically on the politically motivated sexual violence that occurred in Tahrir during the 
three years of protest. Moreover, Nazra maintained a strict privacy policy to protect the 
identities of individuals that participated in programming and/or provided testimonies 
about their experiences of sexual violence. Because of this, they did not allow 
ethnographers to observe operations. Similarly, at the time of this research, EIPR’s 
gender program consisted of a single individual, and the scope of this individual’s work 
went beyond sexual harassment. Like Nazra, EIPR often participated in joint activities 
focused on sexual harassment, but they did not run specific activities to combat the 
problem in Egypt. 
 My primary site of participant observation, therefore, was with the independent 
initiative, HarassMap. Launched in October 2010, HarassMap has been the preeminent 
initiative focused solely on combatting sexual harassment in Egypt. It was co-founded by 
four individuals, three of whom had been former employees at ECWR. These three 
individuals founded and ran ECWR’s sexual harassment program until 2008, when two 
of them separated from ECWR over differences that arose in the running of the program. 
HarassMap, in some ways, grew out of ECWR work, but in other ways moved beyond 
what ECWR would have been capable of and interested in. In addition to this, some 
amount of participant observation was also possible with the volunteer initiative, Ded El-
Taharrush (Anti-Sexual Harassment Movement), which was closely aligned with 
HarassMap. Ded el-Taharrush’s founder was a HarassMap employee. HarassMap also 
served as a consultant in the formation of Ded el-Taharrush, and many of the ventures 
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undertaken by Ded el-Taharrush occurred in collaboration with HarassMap. Having said 
that, Ded el-Taharrush maintained a different philosophical approach to anti-sexual 
harassment work, and members were not eager to be seen as an extension of HarassMap. 
Observation opportunities, however, were not regularized with Ded el-Taharrush and 
occurred only when notifications of meetings and events were provided.   
It is important to note here that participant observation within NGOs has been a 
frequent occurrence for anthropologists, however, there has been little theorizing about 
best practices in the way such work should be conducted. In her discussion of the 
ethnography of NGOs, Markowitz (2001) emphasized her approach of “following the 
project” and exploring how and why projects evolve over time, as well as searching for 
links with other organizations or entities. However, this approach is predicated on work 
within an NGO that maintains a suite of different programs that may not all focus on the 
same issue. In the Egyptian case, women’s rights NGOs usually run multiple programs 
that do not all center on gender-based violence. For instance, ECWR’s main platform was 
the political participation of women at all levels, from local councils to national 
government. Yet, they also operated programs focused on raising awareness around 
female genital mutilation/circumcision (FGM/C), running legal clinics, and providing 
access to basic services. Nazra for Feminist Studies also runs multiple programs, 
including advocacy, documentation, networking, and research, to support women human 
rights defenders, combat gender based violence, and build a feminist movement in Egypt. 
EIPR is organized into four main units, which include Civil Liberties, Criminal Justice, 
Economic and Social Justice, and Democracy and Political Rights. Their gender program 
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falls within the Civil Liberties unit. Each of these NGOs works across numerous issue 
areas, and fit well within the type of NGOs Markowitz referred to in her paper.  
HarassMap, on the other hand, is one of the few single-issue entities to have 
arisen in Egypt’s civil society. The entire organization revolves around combatting sexual 
harassment. Toward that end, they developed four main units, each of which is 
responsible for differing facets of combatting sexual harassment. This will be discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say, this generated an initial confusion and 
lack of certainty in how to begin the process of participant observation. Many of the staff 
members did not work from HarassMap’s offices on any regularized schedule, except for 
one day a week when everyone was required to attend a mandatory staff meeting. Much 
of their work was completed off-site in coffee shops, at home, or in the offices of other 
entities (partners and collaborators). Even when in the office, it was unclear what access 
there would be to meetings. Moreover, despite HarassMap being known for their open 
door policy with respect to community volunteers participating in various programmatic 
activities, there was initial distrust from some staff members regarding the presence of a 
foreign researcher hanging around the office, watching and asking questions. Other staff 
members appeared to have little concern with this. 
The approach to participant observation undertaken was a modified version of 
Markowitz’s “follow the project,” whereby I instead “followed the units” within 
HarassMap. Staff meetings became a regular feature of the observation process, as well 
as any and all other meetings that each unit allowed. Observations took place in cross-
unit meetings and even external meetings with partners and collaborators that I was given 
permission to attend. I attended all activities and events that were organized by individual 
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units and/or jointly by multiple units, or that differing units were invited to participate in 
by other entities. For instance, I observed street outreach days that were within the 
purview of the Community Outreach Unit, the marketing focus group sessions that were 
organized by the Marketing and Communications Unit, the research focus groups 
operated by the Research Unit, university training sessions run by the Safe Areas unit, as 
well as the HarassMap Training Academies that were joint ventures between all units to 
train new community captains, and more. Through this approach, I got to know the inner 
workings of the individual units, how they collaborated with each other and external 
partners, as well as the tensions that exist between them. Such an approach allowed me to 
explore the factors that informed strategic approaches, decision-making, messaging, as 
well as the areas of coherence and incoherence in the development of anti-sexual 
harassment discourse and praxis.  
Additionally, upon beginning participant observation, I was immediately enlisted 
by HarassMap to provide assistance on a number of projects that had become problematic 
for them. Namely, I was asked to work with the Research Unit on their second and third 
annual reports; the second having problems with data quantified from their open source 
map, and the third needing analysis and write-up. Similarly, I was asked to meet with all 
units and write-up a preliminary mid-term evaluation for the International Development 
and Research Center (IDRC), whose funding had provided for staff salaries. At a later 
point, I was also asked to become an official research consultant with HarassMap on an 
IDRC funded study, which examined the use of crowdsourcing (or open sourcing) as a 
viable data collection strategy for sensitive topics. This project comparatively examined 
data generated from crowdsourcing, surveys, interviews and focus groups to determine 
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whether the anonymity provided by crowdsourcing facilitated the submission of more 
sensitive information about sexual harassment by individuals, versus in person methods. 
This degree of involvement in HarassMap generated another set of tensions for me: 1) 
would my participation as a volunteer or a paid consultant compromise my ability to 
remain as objective as possible, and 2) would my participation influence the operation of 
activities and events such that it would compromise my data set? 
Questions about the ethics of becoming too involved, in many ways of seeing 
myself as an actual staff member versus a researcher, and the cost of the access that my 
insider status afforded me once I became a consultant weighed on me throughout the 
course of the data collection process. In his discussion of ethical concerns that arose in 
the course of carrying out participant observation as an ambulance worker, O’Neill 
(2001) recounted his own fears about the nature of his responsibility to the patients that 
he was interacting with. He described one incident where he and his informant EMTs 
responded to an emergency at a home where a newborn infant had stopped breathing. He 
provided assistance to the other EMTS throughout the process of pre-arrival prepping, 
assisting the infant, and then transporting the infant to this hospital, but began to question 
his methodological approach in the face of the extreme health situations to which he was 
a witness, i.e. would he be interfering and/or contributing to serious mistakes that could 
cost lives? O’Neill’s concerns had far more serious implications than mine, but his 
resolution to this question of responsibility was instructive: “Whatever my roles or 
responsibilities as a researcher these were secondary to my roles and responsibilities as a 
human being” (2001: 227). Similarly, I asked myself throughout the participant 
observation process, where I could help, shouldn’t I? Was it appropriate to just observe 
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and not also “give back?” Ultimately, my resolution to these questions was that giving 
back to HarassMap was thoroughly appropriate, given the way in which the team 
welcomed me into their fold. Moreover, the activities I was asked to engage in were not 
those that would, in any way, contribute to or alter programs, practice or messaging.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 I conducted semi-structured interviews between December 2013 and March 2014. 
Because original plans for participant observation did not occur as intended, interviews 
became an important avenue through which to learn more about programs, activities, 
strategic approaches, philosophical underpinnings of anti-sexual harassment work, 
targets, donor funding, and collaborations between anti-sexual harassment entities. 
Additionally, interviews provided details about the history of sexual harassment activism, 
personal reflections about the political, economic, and social milieu within which sexual 
harassment was occurring, and even the personal histories of the individuals themselves, 
i.e. what motivated them to become involved in such work. Interviews were carried out in 
both English and/or Arabic, depending on the preference of the activist interviewed. The 
choice to use English for interviews with activists was decided upon because much of the 
activism that was occurring on the issue also took place in English5. Often, campaigns 
were dually conducted in English and Arabic, and in the case of HarassMap at the time of 
this research much work started in English and was then translated into Arabic.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Most activists working in civil society were fluent in English, which may support analyses of the class-
based nature of civil society activism, where activists came from privileged families and, often, obtained 
advanced degrees from abroad (Abdelrahman 2004). However, even when conducted in English, interviews 
and personal conversations were inevitably laced with Arabic to discuss many of the ideas and concepts 
circulating on the issue of sexual harassment and gender violence.  
 31 
A total of 23 interviews were conducted with activists working in NGOs, 
initiatives and even government agencies central to anti-sexual harassment work. In some 
cases, individuals that were approached did not follow through with interview 
scheduling, but most had become used to being interviewed and did not have a problem 
with it. Activists that were interviewed were members or affiliated with the Egyptian 
Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), HarassMap, Nazra for Feminist Studies, the 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Torture, Ded el-Taharrush (Anti-Sexual Harassment Movement), Harakat 
Bassma (Imprint Movement), Shoft Taharrush(I Saw Harassment), Tahrir Bodyguards, 
Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment, Thawrat Al-Banette (Girl’s Revolution), The 
National Council for Women’s Ombudsman’s Office, and Tahrir Academy. In terms of 
the sampling within each organization, most HarassMap members were interviewed. 
Otherwise, directors, program managers, and individuals that were responsible for sexual 
harassment work were approached and interviewed. The sample includes many of the key 
players in anti-sexual harassment work in Egypt. 
 
Surveys 
 Neighborhood surveys were conducted in order to derive information on public 
perceptions of taḥarrush ginsy for comparison with civil society discourses on sexual 
harassment.  A convenience sample was taken of three communities in the Cairo 
metropolitan area, which provided culturally rich data on perceptions of sexual violence 
along a number of theoretically informed lines. The choice of a convenience sample was 
made because random samples within neighborhoods are difficult to obtain in Cairo. 
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Census information and even neighborhood maps are notoriously difficult to locate in 
Egypt, especially for informal areas of the city where there are no known state accounting 
of residences (Elyachar 2003). Moreover, snowball samples of neighborhoods would 
have required assistance from NGOs that would have located willing participants. An 
approach relying on NGOs would have generated a sampling bias that, in turn, might 
have compromised any comparative analysis of NGO and public discourses of sexual 
harassment. Instead, smaller cross-sections of the city were chosen and a venue-based 
convenience sample was taken in order to test for variation in perceptions between 
genders, age groups, and class. Three target neighborhoods were chosen based on 
socioeconomic level in order to control for class. These are as follows: 
 
Masakan Zilzal, Low Income – Masakan Zilzal is a lower socioeconomic neighborhood 
in the southwest Cairene area of Qatamiyya (sometimes spelled Katemeya). Qatamiyya 
itself is a large area that straddles the outskirts of Cairo and the 5th settlement area (el-
tagammʿu el-khāmis) of New Cairo, where the new American University in Cairo (AUC) 
campus exists. Because of its sheer size, Qatamiyya is comprised of smaller 
neighborhoods that run the socioeconomic gamut, from poor to conspicuously wealthy. 
Masakan Zilzal is one such poor neighborhood that borders another famous (or infamous) 
informal Cairene area, Manshiyet Nasr. Manshiyet Nasr has been well-known for both its 
unregulated housing, which has made headlines in Egypt over the years for various 
building collapses, as well as for housing the, essentially, low-caste population of zabālīn 
(garbage collectors).  
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The original intention of this project was to work inside of Manshiyet Nasr. However, 
a number of reasons precipitated a slight change in venue. One of these reasons was that 
this project employed field team members to collect the surveys in the street, both males 
and females to speak to male and female respondents. Given the sensitive nature of the 
topic, and what had been witnessed among NGOs and initiatives of not wanting the issue 
to be seen as one inspired by Western discourses, it was decided that dissociating the 
street surveys from, minimally, the visual presence of a foreign researcher would be 
prudent. This was done to facilitate more honest survey responses from respondents. As 
part of this, field team members were chosen from both professional research and non-
professional backgrounds. Those that had non-professional backgrounds were asked to 
work in their home neighborhoods. The male fieldworker chosen to work in the low-
income area was from Qatamiyya and knew Masakan Zilzal well. The female fieldworker 
was a graduate student and professional researcher. The two worked together to collect 
street surveys from neighborhood residents. 
Additionally, there were some safety concerns working in Manshiyet Nasr, given that 
the informal nature of the area also meant, in some cases, the lack of paved roads and 
sanitary conditions. Masakan Zilzal presented itself as a better alternative, given that its 
residents were similarly economically disadvantaged, yet the neighborhood was slightly 
more regulated, meaning that the roads were paved with most of the buildings likely 
constructed along approved city codes (though even in many formal neighborhoods in 
Cairo, illegal building was/is common). There was more of a sense of security for the 
field team going into Masakan Zilzal versus Manshiyet Nasr. The change did not 
negatively impact research goals, so it was made accordingly.   
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Shubra Masr, Middle Income – Like Qatamiyya, Shubra is similarly a very large area to 
the north of Cairo, bridging the downtown area with the outskirts of the city heading 
toward the Nile Delta governorates of Qalyubiyya (technically still considered part of 
Greater Cairo), Sharqiyya and Ismailia. Like Qatamiyya, Shubra also maintains distinct 
neighborhoods that crosscut class, though it does not contain the same very wealthy 
neighborhoods of Qatamiyya. Toward the north, in Shubra Al-Khayma, which is fairly 
industrial, many of the residents originated from the Delta cities and settled in the area, 
maintaining ties to both Cairo and their smaller home cities or villages in the Delta. For 
the purposes of this research, Shubra Masr, closer to downtown, was chosen at the 
suggestion of research colleagues at HarassMap. It represented the more middle income, 
working to professional class residents that were called for in the research design of this 
project. Professional fieldworkers were hired from the Cairo office of the Population 
Council to complete the street surveys in this neighborhood.  
 
Masr El-Gedida (Heliopolis), Upper Income – Masr El-Gedida is a wealthy neighborhood 
located to the northwest of Cairo, near the Cairo International Airport. Unlike Qatamiyya 
and Shubra, Heliopolis was vastly different in that it had been a historically master-
planned suburb, designed for the wealthiest of Egypt’s local and ex-patriot residents in 
the 19th century. Its main architect was a European businessman who styled Heliopolis, in 
many ways, after the capitals of Europe. Colonial architecture with high walls and domed 
facades, wide avenues lined by trees, and a system of turn-arounds connecting streets in 
concentric rings, feature large in this neighborhood. Moreover, the current presidential 
palace, and the facilities of the military and many other official agencies are located in 
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Heliopolis. Residents of Heliopolis are more privileged than their neighbors in Shubra 
Masr and Masakan Zilzal.  
 In the original design of this project, the intention was to survey the upper income 
area of Zamalek. As with the lower income area of Manshiyet Nasr, a change in venue 
was decided upon based on the feedback of fieldworkers. Located on Gezira Island, 
Zamalek, like Heliopolis, has been home to Cairo’s wealthiest. It has also been home to 
many embassies and ex-patriots, including foreign students renting apartments or living 
in the dormitories maintained in the neighborhood by AUC. Neighborhood streets are 
much more narrow, winding, and also quiet, without the bustling activity noticeable in 
Heliopolis. The largest question identified by fieldworkers would be their ability to 
simply locate people on the street without frequenting coffee shops or bookstores. 
Fieldworkers felt that Heliopolis would be somewhat easier to work in. Again, since the 
socioeconomic levels of the neighborhoods were commensurate, the change in venue was 
made to ensure the adequate collection of street surveys.  
In addition to controlling for class, surveys also controlled for gender and age. In 
each neighborhood, surveys were distributed equally to men and women. Moreover, two 
age groupings were decided upon. General groupings of “young” and “older” were 
chosen, where young corresponded to ages 18-25 and older to 26-40. These age 
groupings were decided, loosely, upon age groupings that were noted in the Population 
Council’s Survey of Young People (SYPE 2011). The research team at HarassMap 
employed these SYPE age groupings in their study on crowdsourcing. HarassMap’s age 
groups, however, were broken into five-year increments. Considering the smaller sample 
taken for this project versus HarassMap’s project, as well as time limitations on data 
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collection, age groupings in five-year increments were not possible. Moreover, 
HarassMap included individuals under age 18 in their study, whereas this project had not 
sought IRB permissions to work with underage youth. For this reason, age groupings 
were conglomerated into the two main categories noted above.  
 A total of 156 paper surveys were collected across all neighborhoods. In each 
neighborhood, that was 52 surveys, 26 of which derived from men, and 26 from women. 
Among men and women, 13 each were collected for each age grouping. The table below 
provides a visualization of the sampling distribution: 
Total Number of Surveys = 156 
Masakan Zilzal = 52 Shubra Masr = 52 Masr El-Gedida = 52 
Males = 26 Females = 26 Males = 26 Females = 26 Males = 26 Females = 26 
Young 
= 13 
Older 
= 13 
Young 
= 13  
Older 
= 13 
Young 
= 13 
Older 
= 13 
Young 
= 13 
Older 
= 13 
Young 
= 13 
Older 
= 13 
Young 
= 13 
Older 
= 13 
 
Guest et al. (2006) found that a sample size of 13 is sufficient to detect key themes from 
open-ended interview data. As a form of structured interviews, Guest et al.’s findings are 
equally applicable to surveys. Thus, it was determined that the proposed sample size was 
large enough to detect differences in themes within and across neighborhoods, as well as 
across class, age and gender. Additionally, it is important to note that on the advice of 
HarassMap colleagues, having a manageable number of open-ended surveys would make 
analysis less time consuming and feasible within the timeframe of this research.  
Surveys were anonymous. However, it was important to voice record them. There 
was one critical reason for this, related to this researcher’s limitations. All surveys were 
conducted in Arabic. While my ability to speak colloquial Arabic was sufficient to carry 
out interviews and observe at trainings, meetings, and other events, I did not have the 
ability to read handwritten print in Arabic. A system needed to be developed to obtain 
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people’s comments in a digital format to facilitate the analysis of surveys, as well as to 
maintain the integrity of the research design, which called for a convenience sample. 
Moreover, asking people in the street to stop for more than a few minutes to fill out a 
paper survey about sexual harassment was not feasible, given that people were on the go 
and would likely be impatient. Surveys contained ten open-ended questions. Asking 
people to write out their responses would likely have taken an excess of ten minutes, in 
addition to not being legible for this researcher. Also, asking field team members to write 
out participant respondents would have contributed to interviewer bias, and legibility 
would still have been an issue in this case. Instead, I decided that the field team members 
would only survey those willing to be voice recorded (personal identifiers were not asked 
of these participants). Following the taped survey interviews, field team members then 
transcribed them into Word. Each 5-7 minute survey resulted in 20-30 minutes of 
transcription time and 1-2 pages of text.  
 
Archival Data 
 Data generated from Arabic discussion boards, social media forums, and blog 
sites provided a longitudinal view of public perceptions and terminological uses around 
taḥarrush ginsy. Here, online spaces where discussions about taḥarrush ginsy occurred 
were used as a proxy to obtain historic information on people’s opinions, thoughts, and 
fears around sexual harassment, as well as the changing nature of the conversations on 
the issue. Online data was intended to better understand the discursive evolution around 
sexual harassment and how transnationally inspired civil society activism impacted the 
shape of this discourse. Toward this end, it was critical to collect information that 
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spanned the period prior to the beginning of anti-sexual harassment activism in 2005, as 
well as after. This allowed for a view of prevalent themes around the use of the term 
taḥarrush ginsy, shifting terminological use over time, as well as the identification of 
points in time where shifts occurred and possible factors contributing to those shifts.  
 Data for a twelve year time period, 2000-2012, was collected. Search terms that 
were utilized in this endeavor were, specifically, “el taḥarrush el-ginsy” and “taḥarrush.” 
The use of “taḥarrush” (harassment) without the qualifying “al-ginsy” (sexual) was also 
used to explore whether the historic use of taḥarrush could include discussions of a 
sexual nature (as opposed to other forms of non-sexualized harassment, such as police 
harassment). Unfortunately, paid search tools that have been developed for media 
analysts to crawl through social media forums were not available for this part of the 
project. Therefore, Google was employed as the primary (and free) search engine to 
locate discussion board and blog posts. Google had the advantage of being more powerful 
than other search engines for crawling the deep web, while also allowing for the 
refinement of searches (Madhavan et al. 2008). Searches were completed in a year-by-
year fashion. When this part of the project initially started, it was possible to use search 
functions to locate just the discussion board and blog sites. At the end of 2013, Google 
updated its search functions. Following this change, searches pulled from the entire web 
and hits had to be individually reviewed to ensure that they derived from a discussion 
board or blog site, and that they were the posts of individuals expressing their personal 
views on taḥarrush ginsy.  All posts were logged into a spreadsheet and the post itself 
was copied and pasted into a separate Word document. This allowed for greater ease later 
on with respect to coding and analysis. When all posts were entered into the spreadsheet, 
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a second search was run just on the discussion forum sites that were well represented in 
the posts that already been pulled. Five Egyptian discussion forum sites were crawled to 
locate additional posts that Google was not able to locate. In total, more than 230 posts 
were collected from, mostly, discussion forums.  
 Additionally, posts on taḥarrush ginsy were elicited from Twitter. Keyword 
searches have become relatively easy in Twitter, unlike with Facebook, and they 
generated a wealth of posts. An important note here is that hashtag searches were not run 
in Twitter because the keyword searches revealed that people tweeting about sexual 
harassment were using a wide range of hashtags, depending on where their tweets were 
directed. Examples include #masr, #Egypt, #arabspring, #saudi, #feminism, #halt3alim 
(did you know), in addition to #SexualHarassment,  #EndSH and more, etc. A hashtag 
search, therefore, might have led to the extraction of tweets from threads promoting a 
particular perspective. Searches in Twitter were modified slightly to search for “el- 
taḥarrush el-ginsy fi maṣr” (sexual harassment in Egypt), to pull any discussions of 
sexual harassment in Egypt. Whether this modification was appropriate or not is still not 
fully clear. While it was important to collect tweets that were not only “preaching to the 
choir,” so to speak, it was imperative to find a way to better refine some of the 
information that was generated because Twitter contained so much data.  In the long run, 
it turned out that there were several problems with Twitter that have challenged the 
viability of the data it generated for this portion of the research. The largest of these 
problems was that Twitter did not launch operations until 2008 – three years following 
the beginning of anti-sexual harassment activism in Egypt. When the Twitter data was 
compared to the discussion board/blog post data, it became apparent that key shifts in 
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discourse had already occurred well before 2008. Moreover, tweets are generally limited 
in the number of characters allowed. This meant that there were many tweets that were 
not very useful. Many were often re-tweets of news articles, with little commentary, or 
they were commentary that provided too little text, and/or the tweet was from an NGO or 
initiative advertising an event or activity that did not provide information on people’s 
perspectives, sentiments or opinions. As with the discussion forums/blog sites, more than 
270 tweets were collected for the years 2008 to 2012.   
 
Positionality and Reflexivity 
 My engagement with anti-sexual harassment activism in Egypt has been a long 
time in the making. The idea for this research project, in some ways, took root before 
such activism began in 2005. In that year, a little more than a year after the completion of 
my MA in archaeology, I took time off to explore options both for moving forward in 
academia and on what kinds of research would be interesting if I were to try and proceed 
in such a career field. I was facing a small personal crisis of relevancy when I finished 
my MA and, like many socially conscious young people, I was concerned with engaging 
in work that would help solve some of the very real problems in the world. By 2005, I 
was already long preoccupied with Egypt. I studied abroad at the American University in 
Cairo in the late 1990’s, worked at the Giza-Saqaara-Bahariya Inspectorate Office under 
the direction of the then-Director General, Zahi Hawass, worked on a field excavation 
with the Giza Plateau Mapping Project under the direction of Dr. Mark Lehner, and had 
been married to an Egyptian for six years by the time I returned to Egypt in 2005. After 
graduate studies, I felt compelled to return to Egypt to live for some time in order to, both 
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to ensure that my five-year old son maintained exposure to Arabic, but to also figure out 
what I wanted to do with myself. 
 NGOs and women’s rights activism were issues that I was developing a growing 
interest in since my marriage. On a short trip to visit family in Cairo in 2004, I sought out 
the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), with vague notions of doing volunteer 
work to gain a sense of how civil society and women’s advocacy NGOs operated in 
Egypt. ECWR was then located in a high rise on the other side of Roda Island from my 
home neighborhood of Manial al-Roda. I met with Nehad Aboul Qomsan, the Director of 
ECWR, who kindly – and without seeming to think twice, much to her credit – allowed 
this strange young girl to come into the organization and, essentially, putter around and 
help out wherever possible. My work with ECWR began the following year in 2005, 
under the direction of Rebecca Chiao, who was then the International Relations Officer 
and who had been working on implementing an internship program in ECWR. When I 
arrived in the summer, there were already 3-4 interns working for ECWR on a variety of 
issues, and sexual harassment was not yet a project that ECWR developed. Instead, I 
became involved in other programmatic areas, including research on female genital 
mutilation/circumcision (FGM/C), comparative research on Arab women’s political 
participation, and I was also tasked with looking into the UN structure and how ECWR 
could go about seeking consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.  
 It was the FGM/C project in particular that first fomented within me questions 
about NGO frames and messaging, the effectiveness of NGO work, and whether local 
attitudes around the practice were in any way shifting based on the awareness trainings 
that entities like ECWR organized. I sat through one memorable training session in 
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Shubra el-Khayma where the trainer, a medical doctor, went over largely medical 
information that covered female physiology, what female circumcision was, and what 
complications could arise from female circumcision. She also attempted some limited 
discussion about the lack of religious basis for the practice, but in general there was a 
great deal of visible boredom from the audience. I had doubts about how effective this 
training was. Moreover, at some points in the sessions, there seemed to be a small degree 
of contention between audience members and the doctor about when female circumcision 
might be necessary. Speaking with one of the ladies in the training session, I discovered 
that they worked for another community-based organization that operated in Shubra and 
as part of their professional development they attended trainings such as the one offered 
by ECWR. ECWR, incidentally, was also involved in helping such community-based 
organization to build capacity. It was clear to me that there was disagreement about what 
constituted a problem even within activist fields, and that perhaps the way in which 
NGOs constructed their messages was somehow not resonating with those they were 
seeking to sway.  
 FGM/C, in particular, has long been a highly problematic issue area in Egypt, 
very much linked to larger historic norms of marriageability and familial honor, and the 
focus of intensive interventions from international development agencies (Refaat et al. 
2001). Sexual harassment, on the other hand, at this time was not even part of the 
discourse. Anecdotally, everyone understood that there was a problem of women being 
accosted in the streets, yet it was not considered serious enough to warrant activist 
attention (and was not yet named taḥarrush ginsy). As a student living in the AUC dorms 
in Zamalek between 1998-1999, I was subject to numerous personal experiences of being 
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stared at, catcalled, followed (both by men on foot and in cars), having one young man 
attempt to pull me in his car, being touched and grabbed, and more. At the time, I can’t 
say with certainty that I actively thought of such acts as sexual harassment, and coming 
from a context where such street behaviors were not evident, there was admittedly some 
minimal amount of thrill to be the seeming object of attention. As a young college 
student- even until I started working for ECWR 6 years later - I did not think about the 
implications of such forms of public sexualized behavior and/or why it seemed so 
prevalent in the Egyptian context. However, some of the scarier incidents that I 
experienced taught me quickly to adjust my comportment in public. These incidents 
drilled within me a measure of anxiety that led me to behave in certain ways in public. 
For example, always wearing headphones and listening to music in the street to avoid 
hearing people, walking faster to my destination, and either staring at the ground or, if I 
was looking forward, to act as if no one was there, even if I was being harassed. This 
actually had the negative effect of also making me slightly less observant of those around 
me because I was working too hard to ignore them, which was the cause of other smaller 
problems. These sorts of behaviors were evident in Cairo’s streets for a very long time 
before ECWR decided to informally (and then formally) try and do something about it.    
 In the fall of 2005, I became involved in the early stages of ECWR’s work on 
sexual harassment. Initially, electronic surveys were distributed and collected to 
document people’s experiences of sexual harassment. This first phase, which continued 
well after my departure from ECWR in mid-2006, was an attempt to empirically and in 
somewhat grounded fashion explore what people were saying about the phenomenon, to 
move beyond anecdote and to more systematically gain insight into what the problem 
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was. At the same time, the program began to organize information sessions on the 
university campuses to open a dialogue about sexual harassment. The first of these, 
which I was involved in obtaining permissions for and attending, occurred on AUC’s 
Greek campus and a later session was held on the Main campus in Tahrir Square (this 
was before AUC moved to New Cairo). Additional sessions were held at Cairo 
University, which I was also involved in helping to organize but could not attend. ECWR 
members believed that the Cairo University sessions would be more contentious than 
those held at AUC. In fact, the initial permissions we sought from Cairo University were 
denied due to concerns about the nature of the topic, and ECWR did not want to have a 
foreign presence associated with the program in this particular setting. 
 I left Cairo in 2006 but remained in contact with Rebecca Chiao afterwards. Here 
and there, I continued to follow developments with the sexual harassment project. In 
subsequent years, activism on the issue continued to grow, though it seemed only a 
peripheral “problem” that received nominal attention from the NGO sector, at least until 
the Revolution. Following the Revolution, the nature of civil society engagement on 
sexual harassment changed in dramatic ways. In the design of this project, it seemed a 
particularly good moment to step back from the severe violence that was capturing global 
attention and to revisit the questions that had caused some consternation for me years 
earlier. Given my own anthropological training on development and NGOs, much of 
which has been highly critical and has seen development work as constructing and 
reproducing certain problematics in the world and NGOs as elite entities implicated in 
perpetuating neocolonial practices, I admit that I entered into my research with some 
degree of cynicism that the work of Egyptian civil society was too enmeshed in the 
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transnational to make any difference in the lives of local people. However, my fieldwork 
experiences helped to temper my cynicism and to see more of the middle ground within 
civil society activism. Despite the class implications of civil society work, the activists 
engaged in anti-sexual harassment activism have been tireless, hard-working and 
dedicated, many of whom physically put their lives on the line in Tahrir Square to save 
and assist victims of mob violence. These activists readily understand the problems 
facing civil society activism and seek ways to engage all sectors and all levels of their 
society on this problem, including government, corporate, rural, poor, middle class, 
wealthy, men and women alike. Coming out of this research, I am far more inspired by 
the possibilities around current activism, despite the situation of civil society between the 
transnational and the local. This ethnographic account attempts to balance critical 
reflections on civil society activism around sexual harassment, looking positively at 
approaches but also seeking to identify challenges in efforts toward social change.  
 
Argument and Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation situates sexual harassment and anti-sexual harassment efforts 
within the larger system of gender, transnational women’s rights, and social movement 
activism in Egypt. Drawing on cultural politics, international relations, social movement 
and feminist theories, this dissertation makes several inter-related claims.  
First, I argue that the phenomenon of street sexual harassment in Egypt represents 
the reproduction of gendered bodies within a patriarchal system of gender built around 
heteronormative sexuality. In other words, I argue that sexual harassment is a process that 
maintains and reminds people about their “feminine” and “masculine” identities and 
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roles. Patriarchy informs the practice of sexual harassment, but sexual harassment also 
helps to reproduce the patriarchal gender system by gendering people’s bodies and roles 
in ways that privilege the heteronormative pair in Egyptian society.  
Second, I argue that grassroots anti-sexual harassment work that focuses its 
efforts at the community level takes place within a larger sphere of transnational activism 
focused on violence against women. In particular, anti-sexual harassment work promotes 
sexual harassment as a form of violence against women and attempts to disrupt the long 
held system of gender that discriminates against women. As is prevalent in transnational 
feminist activism, anti-sexual harassment discourses challenge victim blaming, normative 
masculinity, and actively promote sexual harassment as a crime, but in ways that only 
limited engage state and legal institutions, if at all.  
Third, I argue that the work of community-based anti-sexual harassment 
initiatives focused primarily on combatting everyday sexual harassment, such as 
HarassMap, is a political process with political effects. Community-based anti-sexual 
harassment activists do not necessarily promote their work as political. However, this 
dissertation takes as its starting point the integrated nature of social and political realms, 
arguing that processes that involve the negotiation of cultural norms and structural 
realities are inherently political. I also contend that through a focus on the mobilization of 
bystanders and building critical mass, the work of entities like HarassMap does have 
intended, long-term effects for political culture. The political, therefore, has two specific 
meanings in this dissertation, both as a negotaitive process involving the creation of new 
social norms and as a reference for political culture.  
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Finally, I argue that public perceptions of taḥarrush ginsy only partially align 
with anti-sexual harassment efforts to link sexual harassment with everyday forms of 
sexual harassment, such as catcalls, staring, following & stalking, etc. Public perceptions, 
instead, are informed by historic understandings of taḥarrush as a very violent form of 
assault and even rape, usually targeting children. Here, the public draws a distinct line 
between verbal and physical forms of sexual harassment, largely associating taḥarrush 
with the physical.  The public does accept taḥarrush as a form of violence against 
women. However, they generally do not accept that taḥarrush includes everyday forms of 
sexual harassment. Moreover, among those members of the public that are more open to 
redefinitions of taḥarrush, they tend to portray and describe everyday forms of sexual 
harassment in violent terms that mirror descriptions of assault and rape.  
With these arguments in mind, the following chapters deconstruct various facets 
of sexual harassment in Egypt, how it produced as a problem through the discursive and 
mobilizational techniques of Egyptian civil society, and how the public still differs in 
their estimation of taḥarrush ginsy.  
 This first chapter provides a framework for the ethnography presented in this 
dissertation. It opened by laying out several key events in the history of sexual 
harassment in Egypt that arose in personal discussions and interviews with activists, in 
workshops, in the news, and even in reports and academic pieces. The “truth” underlying 
these events with regard to how people characterize sexual harassment is not necessarily 
the concern of this project, i.e. it is not the purpose of this project to convince anyone that 
a problem truly exists. Instead, it is the telling of these events of sexual harassment, the 
way in which they live in the imaginations of activist and non-activist Egyptians, that is 
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of primary concern.  More specifically, this ethnography focuses on how this narrative of 
sexual harassment has been constructed in particular ways and how activism both 
facilitates and is impacted by unfolding aspects of this narrative. In other words, the goal 
of this project is to explore how sexual harassment as a problem is produced through 
activist discourses and mobilizational strategies, and how their own narratives challenge 
these activists. Chapter 1 highlights a number of ambiguities in this discourse, around the 
social and political nature of sexual harassment and, therefore, anti-sexual harassment 
activism. In addition, the tensions and interplay between transnational and local 
influences on sexual harassment discourses, along with the lack of terminological clarity, 
are similarly detailed. These ambiguities and tensions underpin the research questions 
that are outlined in this chapter, along with the methodological approaches undertaken to 
shed light on these issues. Ensuing chapters examine each one of these aspects. 
Chapter 2 argues that sexual harassment in Egypt is an expression of a hetero-
normative gender system in operation in the country and serves to remind both men and 
women of their place within this system. This argument unfolds through an analysis of 
the history and critique of sexual harassment and anti-sexual harassment activism, 
followed by an examination of gender norms and legal structures in Egypt. Chapter 2 
begins with a literature review that offers a dual perspective on sexual harassment. It 
intertwines history and critique by highlighting key events that define sexual harassment 
and sexual harassment activism in the country. The chapter then explores academic 
arguments around these events. Here, both the everyday forms of sexual harassment and 
the politically commissioned violence are woven together in a single narrative that 
underscores the complexity of public sexual harassment and sexual violence in Egypt. 
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Exploring these forms of violence together makes possible the ability to also examine 
critical debates around the potentially depoliticizing tendencies of anti-sexual harassment 
activism that are important in later chapters. The chapter further looks at the rise of the 
independent initiatives, which are at the forefront of activism on the issue and highlights 
the pre-eminent initiative, HarassMap, which has been instrumental in shaping the larger 
movement against sexual harassment.  
The discussion in Chapter 2 moves into salient aspects of historic gender norms 
within which the phenomenon of sexual harassment is situated and that the initiatives 
seek to combat, focusing on sentiments of honor and shame vis-a-vis women’s bodies. In 
particular, Chapter 2 underscores important notions about the danger of female sexuality 
and the need to control women’s bodies and, therefore, lineage, which was historically 
the role of families.  Here, female sexuality has two facets: it both incites male desire but 
is also largely passive in nature, meaning that women are made responsible for 
unleashing male sexuality but are themselves denied the ability to feel sexual desire. 
Women in public are viewed as pushing the boundaries of acceptable codes of modesty, 
but they exist in a liminal state, where the family does not have the same level of control 
over their bodies. Their public presence is the potential cause of chaos and, as such, the 
control over their bodies is expanded beyond the family to the community at large. This 
control, though, occurs in a system where sexuality itself can only be appropriately 
expressed through marriage, which affords both men and women sexual release and 
children. Marriage systems privilege the male-female binary, which, in the current state 
of economic decline is challenged in Egypt. Since men and women are unable to marry 
early, male sexual release is expressed through sexually harassing behaviors directed at 
 50 
women that reaffirm the binary structure.  Lastly, the chapter briefly touches on the legal 
framework around gender-based violence and sexual harassment in the country, which is 
embedded in this system of honor and shame.  
Chapter 3 sets the framework for an argument that further unfolds in Chapter 5, 
which is that anti-sexual harassment work that takes place at the level of community or 
the street is a political process with political effects. Here, relevant background and 
theory on the larger context within which anti-sexual harassment activism unfolds is 
canvassed. This chapter begins by exploring transnational women’s rights activism and 
the role of Egyptian women’s advocacy NGOs in this activism. How violence against 
women arose as an organizing frame arose is a further theme. In particular, the UN World 
Conferences of the 1990s, both the Human Rights Conference in Vienna and the 
Conference on Women in Beijing, were critical forums through which the focus on 
gender violence emerged. The engagement of Egyptian NGOs was fomented through 
these conferences, as well as the Conference on Population Development in Cairo, where 
they played a key role. NGOs are recognized as key mediators of international rights-
based discourses, and that mediation involves constructing and discursively framing new 
norms in particular ways. New norms that engage with already existing normative 
structures are viewed as “resonant” and having more success in taking hold with people. 
Though scholars have argued that resonance reproduces problematic norms that 
mediators seek to eliminate, thereby making radical frames a better approach, Chapter 3 
argues that civil society activists promote some mix of resonant and radical frames. 
 Yet, despite their role as norm mediators, NGOs in Egypt operate within a 
repressive, corporatist environment. Chapter 3 highlights how state control of all 
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associations in Egypt was manifest through Law 32 of 1964, which gave the government 
broad powers to dissolve NGOs, to sit on their boards of directors, and control their 
funding sources. As noted in Chapter 2 with respect to criticisms of ECWR’s approach, 
NGOs have only limited ability to challenge corrupt state practices, including their use of 
sexual violence at protests and detention settings. Political advocacy, in which women’s 
rights NGOs have long engaged, is possible only to a point and certainly not viable if it 
threatens state legitimacy. However, political advocacy is the preferred method of 
operation for many human and women’s rights entities, in part because many activists 
view structural change as possible only through the development of new institutional 
(political and legal) arrangements. Egyptian civil society entities generally engage in top-
down processes of change, which necessitates political and legal reformulations first. In 
turn, political and legal change makes possible wider social change within the population. 
Entities, like HarassMap, argue the reverse. They contend that political change cannot 
precede changes in social perceptions and behaviors, because the government is already 
corrupt, patriarchal and has no incentive to change. Therefore, they focus their efforts on 
building a critical mass of bystander publics that will adopt new norms of social 
responsibility and will later demand the change they want from the government.  
 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 answer the three specific research questions guiding this 
project.  Chapter 4 addresses the first research question of this project, regarding how 
anti-sexual harassment initiatives talk about sexual harassment. This chapter delves into 
the discursive processes of the anti-sexual harassment initiatives. It draws on theory 
outlined in Chapter 3 regarding resonance and radicalization to better understand how 
anti-sexual harassment discourses engage with and challenge long held gendered norms 
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in Egypt. Chapter 4 identifies seven primary themes in anti-sexual harassment discourses, 
the norms that are evident in these themes, and how those norms are framed by anti-
sexual harassment initiatives. These themes disrupt victim-blaming that makes women 
responsible for their sexual harassment, reorient blame for sexual harassment on men and 
male privilege, undercut common stereotypes that center on peripheral reasons for why 
sexual harassment occurs, advocate for the need to create safe spaces that protect women 
in public places, promote sexual harassment as a crime, and implore people to not stand 
on the sidelines and to speak up and intervene when they witness sexual harassment. This 
chapter also explores three specific framing techniques through which anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives seek to sway public opinion. They include associating new norms 
with long held norms that are more resonant in local society. Despite academic theorizing 
that resonant norms may only reproduce problematic practices, these associations bring 
together disparate social values. For instance, anti-sexual harassment activists argue that 
the public regularly intervenes in cases of theft, where whole neighborhoods will join 
together to apprehend a pickpocket or get a thief to the police, yet they fail to do so with 
harassers. Initiatives, therefore, seek to associate theft of property with violations of 
bodily integrity, thus inciting people to speak up. In addition, other techniques involve 
turning long held beliefs into myths and seek to build a rational discursive evidence base 
through which to prove the existence of sexual harassment. 
Chapter 5 explores the second research question in this project, regarding the 
mobilizational strategies employed by anti-sexual harassment initiatives to encourage 
people to speak up against the problem. It argues that the community-based activism of 
anti-sexual harassment activists, which include refashioning the nature of social 
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perceptions and behaviors of bystanders, is a political process. Engaging with theory on 
the cultural politics of social movements, this chapter highlights a disjuncture between 
the social and political in much of the theory that addresses social movements. Political 
culture is often not viewed as the result of a complex set of cultural negotiations, and 
cultural negotiations are often not seen as political in orientation. Even academic analyses 
on Egyptian civil society, NGOs and social movements tend to focus on top-down, state-
centered vision of change. Only recently has the street as a site of sociopolitical 
negotiation been promoted. Asef Bayat (1998 & 2009) demonstrates how poor people’s 
movements in Iran and other parts of the Middle East have the ability to mobilize large 
swaths of individuals through a process he calls “quiet encroachment.” In his analysis, he 
describes how poor Iranians were able to attain the services denied them by the state 
through a variety of informal acts, from squatting to tapping illegally into municipal 
water sources, as well as through organized protest.  
Turning toward the community-based activities of HarassMap, Chapter 5 
identifies three mobilization tactics undertaken to target bystanders and build a society of 
responsible citizens that look out for neighbors and will later demand political change. 
These tactics include organizing monthly street campaigns and various training 
workshops in order to build volunteer community teams all over Egypt. These volunteer 
teams of concerned individuals carry out the work of convincing neighbors to speak up 
against sexual harassment. Additionally, creating safe areas, schools and universities has 
emerged as a major focus of anti-sexual harassment initiatives. Local businesses in a 
neighborhood are encouraged to become role models for other businesses in the area, 
developing policies designed to keep everyone safe in the business’s local area. This is 
 54 
similarly the case with schools and universities, where volunteer teams are built and 
trained to advocate for perception changes and school policies. Lastly, technology is also 
a mobilization tool that assumes great importance in anti-sexual harassment work. The 
new norms and frames discussed in Chapter 4 are usually deployed via online spaces, 
such as social media sites. However, through open-source crowd-mapping platforms, the 
public itself is engaged to create new narratives of sexual harassment.  
Chapter 6 engages with the final question of this research project, regarding how 
members of the public speak about sexual harassment. It interrogates public perceptions 
of taḥarrush ginsy, past and present, in order to assess how they may or may not align 
with discourses promoted by anti-sexual harassment initiatives. There were two primary 
approaches to assessing public perceptions: a social media analysis and survey analysis. 
The chapter begins with a longitudinal assessment of public perceptions, analyzing posts 
from online Arabic discussion forums and blog sites over a twelve-year time span, from 
2000-2012. This timeframe was chosen because it both predated the first anti-sexual 
harassment campaign implemented by ECWR and it goes as far back as the Arabic 
Internet allows on discussions of taḥarrush. Posts pre-dating 2000 were not available 
through the search method employed. Posts were collected from across the region, which 
allowed for a comparative analysis of discursive trends in Egypt vis-à-vis their neighbors. 
Findings in this analysis highlight that conversations on taḥarrush across the twelve-year 
time span demonstrate two trends. Prior to 2006, posts from across the region show a 
primary focus sexual violence in the private sphere, centering on the molestation and rape 
of children with some attention to the sexual harassment of women in private space, 
usually within the context of incest and family violence. After 2006, online posts from 
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Egypt dramatically shift and increase in volume, revealing a primary focus on the sexual 
harassment of women in public space. In this year, there is a noticeable shift in 
discussions of taḥarrush in Egypt that is linked to the 2006 Eid mob harassment. From 
this time, Egyptian posts center almost exclusively on women in the public space, while 
conversations region-wide demonstrate the continuation of a dual focus on children and 
then women. 
I assess current public perceptions of taḥarrush through analysis of survey 
findings that underscore several key tensions between civil society discourses and public 
perceptions. On the one hand, there is widespread belief within the public that taḥarrush 
is a very problematic issue in Egypt, though many view this as recent and the result of the 
Revolution. Eleven themes emerged in the way people initially defined taḥarrush. People 
appeared to equally include the physical and verbal in their personal conceptions of 
sexual harassment. There were a range of behaviors people included, such as rape/assault, 
stalking/following, annoying/bullying, gazing, getting too close, and generic movements. 
People also saw taḥarrush as immoral/abnormal, a violation of rights, and associated 
with male lust and sexual repression. These themes varied across gender, class and age 
groups. Interestingly, when asked about the concept of muʿāksa (flirting), very few 
people saw muʿāksa as a form of taḥarrush. When defining taḥarrush vis-à-vis muʿāksa, 
new distinctions appeared that made visible how people see taḥarrush as largely 
connected to the physical, whereas muʿāksa is seen as overwhelmingly verbal. Yet, there 
was a great deal of terminological confusion in that violent verbal harassment, i.e. words 
and comments that were filthy and provided a sense of the body being invaded, could 
also be viewed as taḥarrush. Moreover, discussions of muʿāksa demonstrate far more 
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variability than description of taḥarrush, including associations with assault. This 
indicates that anti-sexual harassment efforts focused on reframing taḥarrush similarly 
require new formulations around the sister concept of muʿāksa. 
 Chapter 7 reflects on the arguments made in this dissertation. More importantly, it 
considers the future of anti-sexual harassment activism. Based on findings in this 
dissertation, Chapter 7 considers three avenues for continued success of community-
based anti-sexual harassment activism. Moreover, it reflects on the current political 
situation in the post-Revolutionary period, which has grown increasingly repressive with 
the re-establishment of military rule.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EGYPT 
Public, or street, sexual harassment in Egypt has received increasing attention 
from scholars since the January 2011 revolution. Post-2011 analyses primarily 
demonstrate two different threads in the conversation on sexual violence and social 
activism to combat sexual harassment in the country. The first thread has begun to 
examine sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence that are politically 
commissioned and/or that occurs largely in protest settings.  Driven predominantly by 
those with specific interests in feminist politics and security studies, this thread in the 
discussion on sexual harassment in Egypt has been concerned with several issues. These 
include the nature of feminist political challenges to state sanctioned violence, the 
motivations and role of men in anti-sexual harassment activism, the way in which sexual 
harassment discourses have been co-opted by the state in the securitization of the country, 
the exclusion of women from political participation through attacks on female 
respectability in public, and the role of civil society entities in reproducing neocolonial 
notions of unruly Arab men (Ahmed-Zaky & Abdelhameed 2014; Amar 2011; Langohr 
2013 & 2014; Tadros 2013 & 2014). Part of this discussion has also included concerns 
about the depoliticization of sexual harassment discourses from both civil society entities 
and the public itself, an issue to be further examined later in this chapter. 
  The second thread in the academic conversation on street sexual harassment in 
Egypt comes from those with an interest in social movements and digital activism. Here, 
this discussion follows on the heels of the larger debate that occurred on the role of 
technology in fomenting the revolutions that recently swept across North Africa and the 
Middle East (Aouragh & Alexander 2011; Khamis & Vaughn 2013; Lim 2012; Lynch 
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2011; Tufexci & Wilson 2012). This thread explores how NGOs and some of the new 
independent initiatives that arose in the post-2011 political vacuum employed technology 
to combat gendered (patriarchal) norms. The social initiative, HarassMap, features large 
in some of these studies because of a unique approach they employ, the Ushahidi crowd-
mapping platform, a system that combines GIS mapping and SMS technology, to 
encourage members of the public to report sexual harassment. HarassMap then makes 
these reports publicly, though anonymously, available online (ElSayed 2013; Rabie 2013;  
Skalli 2014; Young 2014). These studies look at how technology is used to mobilize and 
incite social and political change. Youth activism is a critical component of this thread in 
the literature, as well as how a new breed of youth activists is eschewing feminist 
approaches in favor of activism underpinned by a human rights-based ethic that is seen as 
more gender inclusive.  
 An examination of the sexual politics of sexual harassment itself and its relation 
to the wider system of gendered norms in Egypt is missing from these analyses. Sexual 
harassment has not yet been scrutinized through the lens of patriarchal structures of honor 
and shame that help to govern women’s bodies. Honor and shame, underpinned by 
notions of respectability, modesty and the danger inherent in female bodies and sexuality, 
represent another critical facet in how sexually violent practices must be understood. 
While the gendered nature of violence, as well as its link to patriarchal control, is widely 
appreciated, the focus on political violence has somewhat blurred how sexual violence, 
including sexual harassment, is a widespread act of gendering that occurs within society 
as a whole, and that this gendering takes place within a system that privileges a certain 
male-female dynamic. Everyday sexual harassment, in addition to state-sponsored sexual 
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harassment in Egypt, is one means that maintains the gendered status quo and reproduces 
heteronormative gender relations. It is the heterosexual unit and how men and women 
alone struggle over sexuality that continues to be naturalized through acts of sexual 
harassment. The persistence of sexual harassment is made possible by inherent notions of 
honor and shame that are encoded in legal practice and that have gone unchallenged in a 
more systemic and expansive way that includes political, social and economic activism. 
 In this chapter, I discuss the history of anti-sexual harassment activism along with 
the theoretical debates that surround this activism and how sexual harassment is/has been 
understood in Egypt. This chapter further examines of a number of social initiatives 
seeking to combat sexual harassment, with a particular emphasis on HarassMap, whose 
strategic approach toward combatting gendered norms and refashioning the nature of 
social behavior with respect to sexual harassment is important given its theoretical 
grounding. Additionally, I show how sexual harassment exists within the system of 
gendered norms in Egypt, which are also underpinned by Islamic precepts that evolved 
from earlier tribal and pre-Islamic practices. Concomitantly, I investigate the complex of 
honor and shame, along with how gender violence and sexual harassment serve to 
reproduce a particular dynamic of sexuality, predicated on heterosexual normativity. 
Finally, this chapter concludes by highlighting how norms of gender and sexuality are 
encoded in gender violence legislation in Egypt.   
 
The Problem of Sexual Harassment in Egypt: History, Theories and Debates 
In late 2005, the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), a woman’s rights 
advocacy NGO, began an informal program aimed at combatting the problem of sexual 
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harassment, or what they termed taḥarrush ginsy, in the streets. Until that year, ECWR’s 
work largely centered on increasing the political participation of women in government, 
at local and national levels. Toward this end, ECWR ran numerous training workshops to 
teach female candidates techniques for running campaigns. Additionally, ECWR’s work 
extended into research and report writing on women’s political participation in Egypt and 
the Middle East. Other programming areas included assisting women with access to basic 
services, female genital mutilation/circumcision (FGM/C), and legal advocacy, which 
many other women’s rights entities also attended to, including high profile NGOs such as 
the Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) and Al-
Mar’a Al-Gedida, or the New Women’s Research Center (Al-Ali 2000; El-Kholy 2002). 
In general, much of the early sexual violence programming that took place in Egypt 
focused more specifically on FGM/C, or female genital mutilation/circumcision, which 
was linked to reproductive health issues that became salient and received the bulk of 
funding beginning in the mid-1990’s (al-Ali 2000; Seif el-Dawla 2000). Domestic 
violence, frequently referred to as intimate partner violence (IPV) in Egypt, and torture 
also emerged as issues in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, which fell within the purview of 
El-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture. El-Nadeem, 
founded in 1993, has long documented the use of sexual abuse and rape against both men 
and women in prison (Abdel Aziz 2007). Sexual harassment, however, was not yet a 
widely recognized problem even when ECWR began its informal work.  
In early 2005, prior to the formation of ECWR’s anti-sexual harassment program, 
female activists protesting outside of the Press Syndicate offices in downtown Cairo were 
sexually harassed and assaulted by police forces and state hired “baltigiyya,” or thugs 
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(Al-Nabaa News 2005; Langohr 2013; Radwan 2011). As Chapter 1 noted, this incident 
became iconic, a posteriori, in marking the acknowledged beginnings of the problem of 
sexual harassment in the country. Following the event, reactions were swift from 
prominent activists, scholars, and civil society organizations in forming a short-lived 
movement against political violence, The Street is Ours (al-shāra’ linā), and condemning 
state efforts to silence dissent, and more specifically for doing so through assaults 
designed to curtail women’s participation in the public sphere (Adly 2013; Nazra Joint 
Statement 2012). At the time, however, there was no clear definition or 
conceptualization, both within civil society and the public-at-large, of what sexual 
harassment, as taḥarrush ginsy, was. An article released on the incident in June 2005 by 
Al-Nabaa News referenced the Black Wednesday attack as both taḥarrush and htkʿirḍ, a 
term often translated as “indecent assault” (Al-Nabaa News 2005). As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, htkʿirḍ is deeply inhered with cultural connotations of honor and 
shame and is employed in the Egyptian penal code, Article 267, to signify rape. Around 
the Black Wednesday incident, both taḥarrush and htkʿirḍ were utilized interchangeably 
in the article to reference the attacks on female protestors, which also likened the 
indecent assault on women as an assault on the nation. Arabic news agencies similarly 
aligned taḥarrush with ightaṣab, also a term for rape but with connotations of usurpation 
and violation that are not grounded in notions of honor, in the Attaba Girl case more than 
a decade earlier (Ball 2012). Yet, any connections between political and everyday public 
practices of sexual violence were not part of the discourse on gender, sexuality and 
violence in Egypt. As an everyday occurrence, sexual harassment was not a visible 
problem until ECWR began its campaign at the end of 2005.  
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ECWR’s anti-sexual harassment campaign started informally as a fact-finding and 
awareness-raising mission that was largely implemented by a new corps of interns and 
volunteers. It primarily focused on everyday public sexual harassment and was not 
immediately concerned with politically motivated or commissioned sexual violence. The 
International Relations Director at the time, Rebecca Chiao, served as the primary lead on 
the project, which had no program manager, staff or funding until later in 2007 when it 
received a UN Population Fund (UNFPA) grant to undertake a scientific research project 
to better understand the scale of the problem of sexual harassment. Chiao also founded 
and was in charge of a new internship program through ECWR that allowed students and 
interested individuals an opportunity to participate in civil society work. In the initial 
stages of the ECWR project, these interns and volunteers distributed and collected paper 
surveys and organized university campus information booths to begin a dialogue with the 
public about the issue of sexual harassment. Efforts became more formalized in 2007, 
when UNFPA funding allowed ECWR to hire a program manager and a research team. 
Rizzo’s (2008 and 2012) analyses of ECWR’s anti-sexual harassment campaign noted a 
number of pertinent issues with respect to the approaches, both philosophical and 
mobilizational, that they undertook to combat the problem.  
Rizzo argued that ECWR was oriented toward facilitating cultural change. She 
noted that scholars frequently focus on the political or governmental targets of social 
movement work, yet highlighted how non-institutional targets are often left unexamined. 
With reference to the women’s and gay and lesbian movements, she stated, “While they 
did target the government for policy change, this was not their main concern; they were at 
least as interested in raising consciousness of the issue and achieving social change” 
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(Rizzo 2008, citing Van Dyke 2005).  Here, she contended that ECWR’s work was 
similarly directed toward changing social perspectives and behaviors on the issue of 
sexual harassment. In an interview with ECWR’s director, Nehad Aboul Qomsan, she 
also asserted ECWR’s position that sexual harassment was a largely social problem, 
which was similarly indicated in their conference report on sexual harassment in the Arab 
region (Interview 2014; ECWR 2009). The report acknowledged sexual harassment to be 
a multi-dimensional phenomenon, but it argued that the most salient of these dimensions 
were its social and psychological aspects.  
Given this position, Rizzo additionally argued that ECWR was forced into a 
balancing act. On the one hand, ECWR felt compelled to maintain its legitimacy with the 
public by preserving its independence from state interference. Yet, in Egypt’s politically 
repressive environment, ECWR was also pressured to assure its endeavors were non-
threatening to the political order. Scholars of NGOs have long noted how they require 
sympathetic space offered by states in order to operate, and that states remain the ultimate 
arbiter of permissible civil society activity within their borders, regardless of considerable 
theorizing about the “death” of the state within the context of increasing transnationalism, 
economic restructuring in the developing world that has compromised state welfare 
practices and subsidies, and the growing assumption of state functions by NGOs (Fisher 
1997; Mercer 1999; Murdock 2003; Raustiala 1997). Rizzo offers a cogent point that the 
political context within which ECWR operated was critical for understanding the 
decisions it made regarding anti-sexual harassment efforts. She maintains that ECWR 
sought to balance its’ risk by focusing on cultural rather than political targets. 
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Yet, despite its “culturally” focused work on sexual harassment, ECWR as an 
advocacy NGO did not shy away from making limited demands and placing the 
responsibility for women’s security in public on the state. In their now famous 2008 
report, Clouds in Egypt’s Sky, which gained more notoriety for being the first study to 
provide evidence of how many women suffered sexual harassment in Egypt, ECWR 
partially framed sexual harassment as one of lax security and legal enforcement in the 
country (Hassan et al. 2008). Within the report, ECWR urged the state to design a new 
law that would “define and criminalize” sexual harassment and to set new regulations for 
police and legal procedures. Essentially, ECWR called on the state to increase efforts 
toward managing the problem of sexual harassment, even as it focused its work at the 
community level. A number of scholars have noted tensions in this early anti-sexual 
harassment work in Egypt, identifying certain organizations as complicit in advocating 
for expanding repressive state measures and others as more adept at challenging the 
gendered politics of the state and the image of Egyptian women as the “hypervisible 
…subjects of piety, self-policing, moralization and cultural security’ (Amar 2011: 309).  
Amar argued that organizations such as ECWR were implicated in promoting “the 
quasi-racialization and parahumanization of working-class, male youth in urban Egypt” 
or vilifying Egyptian men as unruly and as hypervisible mobs in need of policing (2011: 
315). By calling on the state to police such men, these NGOs were obfuscating how the 
state itself was involved in gendering respectability politics. Amar argued that the 
Egyptian state attempted to drive women from public participation by undercutting their 
respectability within a patriarchal structure that defined this respectability in particular 
ways. Entities such as El-Nadeem, he argued, countered this gendered state practice by 
 65 
exposing and denouncing the state’s use of such sexually violent tactics, both against 
women and men. Moreover, he asserted, such organizations, that also mobilized gender 
and class specific protests, were subverting long held notions of female respectability – 
that women could be visible, recognizable and respectable while participating in public 
life (and protest, more specifically). El-Nadeem and other such entities de-linked sexual 
harassment from the problem of masculinity in Egypt, and reframed it as “the particular 
perversion practiced by the repressive security state” (Amar 2011: 313). 
Abu Lughod (2010 & 2013) proffered a similar argument by raising concerns that 
ECWR’s campaign, in effect, depoliticized the problem of sexual harassment. As part of 
her exploration of the circulation of women’s rights discourses in Egypt, Abu Lughod 
cited ECWR’s campaign as an example of the commercialization of rights. She 
maintained that the commercialization of rights was occurring within a larger system of 
transnational activism that has, perhaps, fetishized violence against women and has 
created a new class of individuals profiting off of local problems (and potentially local 
suffering). This was in large part due to ECWR receiving corporate sponsorship for new 
technological approaches to combatting sexual harassment, and for entering a new SMS 
reporting platform in a USAID backed Net-squared competition in 2008. Moreover, she 
connected ECWR’s campaign, subsequently named “Making Our Streets Safe for 
Everyone” (and later just called “Safe Streets”), to the earlier short-lived campaign “The 
Street is Ours,” arguing that ECWR appropriated the name but not the political approach 
of its predecessor. ECWR’s approach differed because it focused solely on anonymous 
men and not the state (2010: 14).  In so doing, ECWR failed to address the structural 
system within which gender violence in Egypt existed, which was facilitated by an 
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uncaring, harassing state. Like Amar, Abu Lughod’s critique of anti-sexual harassment 
discourses heightened concerns that the activism of entities like ECWR was reinforcing 
neocolonial images of bad Arab men and not looking at the larger problem of sexual 
violence, in which the state was insidiously implicated. 
While Abu Lughod acknowledged the everyday sexual harassment of women in 
Cairo’s streets, the above critique elides a number of issues. The first is that public sexual 
harassment was a phenomenon that Egyptian women overwhelmingly began to speak up 
against as anti-sexual harassment efforts grew. Despite later academic fears of creating 
bad Arab men, ECWR activists believed they were meeting a social need presented to 
them by constituents that something had to be done about the way in which women’s 
daily activities were hindered by harassing men who, perhaps, did not understand the 
impact sexual harassment had on women. ECWR focused on a range of sexually 
harassing behaviors prevalent in the streets, such as stares, comments, catcalling, and, in 
many cases, improper touching, particularly on transportation. They did not target but did 
not exclude politically commissioned sexual harassment in their work. ECWR’s goal, as 
conveyed by Aboul Qomsan, was to criminalize these behaviors and to re-orient social 
perceptions that they were, somehow, non-threatening, non-problematic, and the normal 
actions of libidinous men unable to marry in a sexually repressive society. ECWR also 
sought to eliminate victim-blaming beliefs that women were responsible for the sexual 
harassment they experienced.  
However, Peoples noted that a problem with ECWR’s attempt to criminalize 
sexual harassment was the lack of distinction between street sexual harassment and 
sexual harassment, in which sexual harassment that does not occur in public space may 
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be punishable as “sodomy” (2008: 5-6). She questioned that street harassment, which 
included physical touching but was largely non-physical in nature could be prosecuted as 
sodomy. Moreover, People’s advanced an argument that anti-sexual harassment 
initiatives later challenged. According to Peoples, there was a crisis of masculinity in 
Egypt resulting from declining economic conditions and the inability for men to perform 
culturally prescribed “masculine” roles by marrying, having children and carrying the 
responsibility of maintaining a home. Accordingly, Peoples identified development 
policies in the period of structural adjustment that have worsened Egypt’s economic 
situation as disrupting traditional family structures, or patriarchal connectivity. Both she 
and Ilahi (2008a) highlighted how public sexual harassment allowed men to perform their 
masculinity in new ways for each other. ECWR members who later founded a new social 
initiative, HarassMap, eschewed such arguments centered on the crisis of masculinity as 
excuses justifying male behavior.  
Additionally, the arguments offered by Amar and Abu Lughod overlook other 
facets of state-civil society relations and civil society activism in Egypt that informed 
ECWR’s anti-sexual harassment campaign. Chief among these is how NGOs are largely 
silenced, restrained or co-opted by the state in Egypt’s corporatist political environment 
(Bianchi 1989). Abdelrahman noted that within this environment, advocacy NGOs are 
the most active in challenging corporatist structures, however, “…their ability to achieve 
any meaningful political and social change remains very limited and their ad hoc 
interventions are insubstantial” (2004: 138). Referring back to Rizzo’s argument, NGOs 
walk a tight line in the degree to which they are able to challenge state practices, 
particular if those challenges undermine state legitimacy. Moreover, intra-civil society 
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bickering and mistrust, or the lack of civility within Egypt’s civil society, also played a 
role in the drive to work at community levels (Al-Sayyid 1995). ECWR activists that 
were invested in anti-sexual harassment efforts were dismayed and concerned about what 
they viewed as corruption and the lack of transparency in NGO practice, as well as the 
ineffectiveness of advocacy methods within a political structure that only disenfranchised 
NGOs. Because of this, there was a push within ECWR to maintain a “cultural” rather 
than a political approach to sway the “hearts and minds” of the people, though after 2008 
this approach took a drastic change. 
ECWR’s initial mobilizational approach was unique in that work was located at 
the community and street levels, raising awareness through the use of art, music, and 
other means at cultural centers, universities and other public venues (Rizzo 2012). 
Moreover, ECWR actively engaged news and social media in its campaign, with Aboul 
Qomsan appearing on talk shows and radio call-in shows, creating public service 
announcements, and working with online entities, such as Masrawy, that maintained a 
special section on their website devoted to anti-sexual harassment efforts (Rizzo 2012: 
469). These activities occurred in conjunction with ECWR’s advocacy-based methods of 
conducting research, lobbying and advocating for new laws and better enforcement. In 
2008, ECWR’s study, Clouds in Egypt’s Sky, was released and gained widespread global 
attention for documenting, for the first time, that sexual harassment in Cairo’s streets was 
a wide scale problem, with 86 percent of Egyptian women and 93 percent of foreign 
women surveyed indicating that they had experienced public sexual harassment (Hassan 
et al. 2008).  Yet, as ECWR gained increasing amounts of attention, and as the sexual 
harassment program became more formalized within the organization, with funding and 
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new staff, ECWR’s strategic approach to the issue began to change. According to 
Rebecca Chiao, community-based approaches waned as ECWR returned solely to the 
advocacy-based methods it was used to (Interview 2014). After 2008, its’ anti-sexual 
harassment efforts stalled, though, in this year, ECWR issued a press release regarding 
the first successful court case against sexual harassment. The case of Noha Rushdie was 
prosecuted under Article 306 of the penal code, centered on  “khadsh hayā’,” or the 
offense of modesty (Muslimah Media Watch 2008).  ECWR called for continued 
dialogue and argued that the case set a legal precedent around the criminality of sexual 
harassment. However, staff that had been critical in driving ECWR’s anti-sexual 
harassment efforts, including Rebecca Chiao and Engy Ghozlan, moved on to other 
endeavors, thus impacting ECWR’s pre-eminence in this work.  
In 2008, not long after leaving ECWR, Rebecca Chiao was approached by NiJel, 
an organization that was known for assisting other NGOs with implementing 
technological strategies for solving various local problems. A NiJel employee, who was 
living in Cairo and whose wife experienced frequent sexual harassment in the street, 
proposed a unique online crowd-mapping platform through Ushahidi, an organization 
that had developed GIS and SMS technology to map environmental and political crises. 
This open source, mapping program, which would allow any member of the public to 
contribute to data generation, symbolized a turn in international development practices, 
which increasingly centered on technology, the data revolution, and citizen participation 
as solutions to the problems of globalization and the failures of large-scale development 
projects (Castells 1996; Escobar 1995; Schmidt & Cohen 2013). Chiao, who moved on to 
Ashoka Egypt (and later Injaz), and Ghozlan, who took a position with GIZ, had both 
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moved on from anti-sexual harassment activism, but they sent NiJel’s idea to ECWR for 
potential development and implementation. The platform was entered into the Netsquared 
competition, where it ultimately lost. ECWR, whose advocacy strategies did not include 
digital activism, did not take the project further, leaving Chiao and Ghozlan wondering if 
they should develop the platform in their spare time. Through the end of 2009 and most 
of 2010, Chiao and Ghozlan, along with former ECWR colleague, Sawsan Gad, and 
UNFPA partner, Amel Fahmy, who was involved in funding ECWR’s Safe Streets 
program, worked with NiJel to develop the crowd-mapping system and to explore options 
for registering a new entity, which they called HarassMap.  
These four co-founders of HarassMap felt it important to continue where ECWR 
left off with its community based work. However, in an interview, Chiao noted that the 
technological aspect of their work was a “bonus” to offline work in neighborhoods to 
change societal attitudes around sexual harassment (February 2013). Initially, Ushahidi 
was seen as providing a means to target neighborhoods for community outreach, as the 
mapping system would begin to highlight “hotspots” of sexual harassment. Political and 
legal advocacy on gender and sexual violence, including sexual harassment, was already 
occurring with a number of NGOs, including ECWR. In 2008, 16 NGOs formed the 
Taskforce for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence, coordinated by the New Women 
Foundation, whose mission was, in part, advocating for and drafting amendments to 
penal code articles centered on gender-based violence (FIDH 2014). What did not exist 
was a concomitant community-level initiative focused on changing social perceptions, 
which the HarassMap co-founders felt to be of vital importance.  
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Underpinning HarassMap’s community approach, in part, was concern that 
changing political and legal structures without also changing societal norms would be 
insufficient to end public sexual harassment. Notwithstanding the Rushdie case, 
enforcement of the law on sexual harassment cases was, and still is, highly problematic. 
ECWR’s 2008 study indicated that 97 percent of Egyptian and 87 percent of foreign 
women surveyed did not report sexual harassment to the police (Hassan et al. 2008). This 
finding was later reconfirmed by the 2014 HarassMap study that showed only 2 percent 
of their study sample reported sexual harassment to the police (Fahmy et al. 2014). 
ECWR’s study further indicated that police tended to mock women filing reports, that 
women did not believe the police would help them, and that foreign women identified 
police officers as harassers. According to Chiao, effective enforcement of the law 
depends on the police believing something wrong has been done. Here she claimed that 
belief in the wrongness of certain actions stem from social roots and that police officers 
themselves are no different from other members of their society who do not always know 
or believe in the law (Interview 2012). 
 In October 2010, just three months prior to the January 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution, HarassMap informally launched its online crowd-mapping platform. The 
immediate responses crashed the fledgling website, and hundreds of individuals sent in 
emails indicating interest in participating in anti-sexual harassment work. Persistent 
problems with the technology, as well as the continuously growing response from the 
public, stimulated a revision in practice where the idea of “hotspots” became obsolete. 
Instead, HarassMap chose to deploy volunteers in their home neighborhoods to begin the 
work of convincing neighbors, community members and friends to speak up against and 
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not accept the practice of sexual harassment in the streets. Another part of the 
philosophical underpinnings of HarassMap’s community approach was that, regardless of 
the numerous excuses that were given for why public sexual harassment occurred, the 
ultimate reason for the existence of the practice was that people allowed it to continue. 
Either people did not speak up against the practice when witnessing it, for a variety of 
reasons, or victims themselves were too afraid and ashamed to voice their experiences or 
were deliberately silenced. HarassMap attributed public inaction and apathy in speaking 
up against sexual harassment to decreasing levels of social responsibility in Egyptian 
society and that people, particularly since the Revolution but even prior to it, increasingly 
did not care about each other. Victim-blaming excuses that laid the responsibility for 
sexual harassment on those who suffered it, primarily women, were viewed by 
HarassMap as forms of violence aimed at maintaining the heteronormative gender order. 
Community outreach, therefore, as it evolved since 2010, was designed to have 
volunteers convince those they knew, whether directly or indirectly through community 
ties, to change their perspectives on sexual harassment and to see it (with all of facets) as 
a crime, to intervene, and to question gender stereotypes and that which constitutes 
“normal” gendered behavior.  
 On January 25, 2011, tens of thousands turned out in Tahrir Square to protest the 
brutal police state of Hosny Mubarak and his National Democratic Party, including large 
numbers of women (Khalil 2011; Rashed 2011; Zuhur 2014). In the first 18 days of 
protest, activists initially noted the absence of sexual harassment, with many referring to 
Tahrir as a “harassment free zone” (Langohr 2013). However, on February 11, 2011, the 
day Hosny Mubarak stepped down, CBS correspondent, Lara Logan, was surrounded by 
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a swarm of 200 male protestors, separated from her crew, and raped (Replogle 2011).  
Logan’s case was the first in what would become a regular practice of mob, or collective, 
sexual assaults over the period of 2011-2013. A number of high profile incidents became 
iconic of the sexual violence targeting women in the square, including the “Blue Bra 
Girl”  (sett el-banāt) incident and the case of Samira Ibrahim (Hafez 2014; Seikaly 2013). 
The “blue bra girl” was an unknown female protestor who was captured on video being 
dragged through Tahrir by state security forces until her black robe (ʿabāyah) was pulled 
up to reveal her blue bra, after which her body was stomped by one of the soldiers 
dragging her. Samira Ibrahim gained widespread notoriety for taking the government to 
court after she was arrested in Tahrir, along with 17 others, during the March 8 Women’s 
Day march, tied to International Women’s Day, and subjected to a virginity test (kashef 
el-ʿadhariyya). The practice of virginity testing was supported by then General el-Sisi as 
a necessity to protect the military from allegations of rape (Daily News Egypt 2011).  
Yet, underpinning the virginity tests was a belief by military officials that women at the 
protests were already disreputable and likely to not be virgins. An anonymous military 
source noted at the time that the female protestors were not like “your daughter or mine,” 
as many of them camped out with men in Tahrir (Hafez 2014: 174; Langohr 2012: 22). 
Langohr (2013) described how sexual violence became regularized in protests 
from mid-2011, but that November 2012 marked a shift in activist approaches in dealing 
with protest violence. Protests against the Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohamed 
Morsy, which marked the Mohamed Mahmoud anniversary, witnessed the assault and 
rape of activist Yasmine El-Baramawy, discussed in one of the opening scenes in Chapter 
1, and 17 other women, some of them with knives (El-Sheikh & Kirkpatrick 2013).  
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These cases demonstrated a new phenomenon of organized attacks that concerned gender 
violence and anti-sexual harassment activists. This was eventually termed the “Circle of 
Hell,” where hundreds of men would form concentric rings around a single woman, 
assaulting and raping her continuously for up to an hour (FIDH 2013). Langohr explored 
activist’s perceptions of who was behind these attacks. Many initially agreed that they 
were instigated by hired baltigiyya (thugs). Perceptions would later change that these 
mobs represented a mix of state hired and average individuals.  
As the Revolution started and the reality of violent sexual harassment and assaults 
in Tahrir Square became known, increasing numbers of individuals looked for the means 
to volunteer and/or to do something more substantive against the phenomenon. 
Meanwhile, scholars honed in on issues pertaining to politically commissioned sexual 
violence and new uses of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Despite 
problems with HarassMap’s technology, which existed at the time of data collection for 
this project, a number of scholars began exploring how digital activism, more specifically 
crowd-mapping or crowdsourcing, allowed activists to challenge the patriarchal gender 
order (ElSayed 2013; Rabie 2013; Skalli 2014; Young 2014). Skalli, in particular, noted 
that newer generations of post-Revolution activists eschewed feminist labels to their 
gender activism, even if they were feminists in their own personal politics. She argued 
that many of these youth activists, including HarassMap staff and volunteers, found more 
resonance in a human rights-based identity, in part, because it was more gender inclusive, 
thereby allowing greater numbers of men into the movement. She highlighted the 
ambivalence among many newer activists toward prior feminist approaches in favor of, 
what she called, “Everyday Feminism” that focused more on everyday lives and not just 
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in political processes (2014: 255). Moreover, she maintained that technologies, like 
crowd-mapping and social media, offered new venues through which to challenge 
patriarchal norms that shamed and silenced women. This analysis compellingly argued 
that post-Revolution activists were not ignoring structural gender inequalities by focusing 
on public sexual harassment rather than politically commissioned sexual violence. 
Beginning in 2012, other independent (non-registered), volunteer initiatives arose 
in addition to HarassMap. Many of these entities began their work online but the more 
prominent initiatives located their work primarily in the streets. As discussed in Chapter 
1, Tadros (2014) examined three such initiatives: Harakat Bassma (Imprint Movement, 
hereafter, referred to just as Bassma), Shoft Taharosh (I Saw Harassment), and Operation 
Anti-Sexual Harassment (Opantish for short). Bassma was noted for their highly 
regimented street patrols, uniforms and lines of command, which Tadros likened to the 
army (2014:13). Such militarized forms of activism seemingly filled a void left by the 
lack of security following regime change, as well as the lack of concern by police and 
security forces when they became operational again. Bassma, for its part, publicly 
regarded their role as supporting and not usurping police functions. More recently, they 
have actively engaged with police forces when conducting outreach, stating that their 
greater mission is opening a dialogue with people about the issue of sexual harassment.  
The phenomenon of mob sexual assaults in Tahrir galvanized activists to also 
organize in order to intervene and help women to safety. OpAntish emerged in response 
to the “Circles of Hell” that became prevalent in Tahrir Square after November 2012, the 
first anniversary of the Mohamed Mahmoud clash, when police violently suppressed and 
killed almost 50 protestors (Taha & Kortem 2013). They formed as a coalition of activists 
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from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Nazra for Feminist Studies, 
HarassMap, and others interested in rescuing women from mob assault. Activists devised 
teams with differing functions designed to facilitate the identification, extraction and 
escape of women from mob violence. These were the control room team that coordinated 
the process, the intervention team that physically pulled women from the mobs, and the 
safety team that waited in cars to drive women wherever they wanted to go, including 
hospitals that often left seriously injured women unattended for hours (Tadros 2014).  
A philosophical approach to OpAntish work, which differed from other similar 
entities, was that female activists were an integral part of intervention in Tahrir. 
Intervention teams were a gendered mix, even though female OpAntish activists 
themselves were harassed and assaulted. However, Saad Zaghloul from Bassma noted 
that women in this situation were obstacles to intervention because they were targets for 
the mobs (Interview 2014). Other entities, such as Tahrir Bodyguard, which started with 
all male patrols but later changed tactics when they noticed that victims often did not 
trust male activists, and Ded el-Taharrush (Anti-Harassment Movement), which never 
formally participated in Tahrir (like Bassma) but had team members present, all also 
agreed that female activists were detrimental to intervention teams because male 
colleagues would be divided in their loyalties to their colleagues and the victims they 
were seeking to rescue. Such sentiments were noted by scholars and raised concerns 
among activists that this represented a paternalistic practice and reinforced notions that 
women were in need of saving. Scholars have cited changing perceptions within Tahrir 
Bodyguard that women were integral in interventions. Yet, they have not addressed the 
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gendered implications of these sentiments, often choosing instead to highlight the 
prominent roles women play within these organizations.  
 Finally, Shoft Taharush also formed in 2012 around the use of street patrols 
during the Eid holiday (Tadros 2014). Like HarassMap, Shoft Taharush was highly 
prominent in its street and media campaigns to raise awareness against the issue of sexual 
harassment, but also provided self-defense workshops for women to protect themselves 
against street violence. It differed from most other independent initiatives in that its 
strategic repertoire to combatting sexual harassment was far more mixed. As a subsidiary 
of ACT, an NGO whose larger mission is supporting and helping other civil society 
organizations build capacity, Shoft Taharush has been most visible in its political and 
news media advocacy against sexual harassment. They developed closer relations with 
the Ministry of Interior and the police, particularly around the 2014 development of 
Sexual Violence units inside of the ministry and several police stations that Shoft 
Taharush was allowed to monitor. Their mission is tied more to the larger issue of 
women’s overall participation in the public sphere and politics, with its Director, Fathi 
Farid, often promoting another ACT initiative, Women in Parliament, and speaking about 
women’s representation in government.  
 Beyond these movements, there has been little examination of the street activism 
that has arisen since the end of 2010, the way in which sexual harassment in Egypt was 
promoted as a problem, its complex nature, and its place within the gender order. Most 
agree it to be an aspect of patriarchal control but have not drawn on feminist scholarship 
that posits sexual harassment as a gendering process that maintains heteronormative 
social roles (Epstein 1997). Tadros (2013 a and b, 2014) offered some of the first analysis 
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that attempted to more clearly delineate politically motivated and socially motivated 
sexual assault, and Langohr (2013) also mentioned the connection between the more 
violent forms of protest sexual harassment and the less violent everyday forms present in 
the street. However, much of this discussion is still concerned with state tactics and raised 
additional fears that the depoliticization of sexual harassment has results in public 
perceptions that sexual harassment is a “social problem that requires social interventions” 
(Tadros 2013a: 5). The fear is that social interventions, without the concomitant political 
analysis, simply reinforce institutionalized patriarchy.  
 One additional event occurred in mid-2014 that was critical in the discourse 
around sexual harassment in Egypt. Following the subsiding of much, but not all, of the 
protests between the years 2011-2013, sexual harassment rose to the fore as a national 
problem after the mass sexual harassment of a female student in the College of Law at 
Cairo University (Mada Masr 2014). Mobbed by a group of young men after entering 
campus, the student was forced to hide in the bathroom until the police could escort her 
out of the university. While leaving, a throng of onlookers, many of them men, watched 
and catcalled the student. Cairo University’s president, Gaber Nasser, blamed the young 
woman for shedding her ʿabāyah (black robe) when entering campus in violation of 
university policy – underneath, she wore pants, a long-sleeved shirt, and a hijāb, or 
headscarf, that he claimed were inappropriate (Lynch 2014). What resulted, though, was 
a concerted effort by a concerned group of Cairo University faculty members, in 
conjunction with initiatives, like HarassMap and Shoft Taharush, to develop a policy for 
combatting sexual harassment at the university.  
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The widespread public outcry also forced the government to denounce the event 
and to begin working on a new law that would incorporate taḥarrush ginsy into the legal 
infrastructure, but this was done with limited or no consultation with women’s advocacy 
organizations. From 2008, the Taskforce for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence pushed a 
draft amendment that set better definitions and punishments for various forms of gender-
based violence (FIDH 2014). A number of NGOs in this taskforce, such as ECWR and 
El-Nadim, promoted their own versions of the draft law, each with different foci, such as 
sexual harassment (ECWR) and domestic violence (El-Nadim). Until 2014, there was 
little movement on the amendments, though there were several discussions between the 
Taskforce and government entities, such as the National Council for Women (NCW), 
over the years. Following the Cairo University incident the government moved quickly to 
issue a new amendment to Article 306 of the penal code that, for the first time, added and 
defined taḥarrush ginsy in the law. However, women’s advocacy groups criticized the 
law for narrowly framing the problem within the context of stalking and following, as 
well as for solely emphasizing the sexual motivations behind sexual harassment (El-Rifae 
2014). Despite it serious shortcomings, the law offered community-based initiatives, like 
HarassMap, some degree of ammunition in their messaging around the criminality of 
sexual harassment.  
 
HarassMap: Ending the Social Acceptability of Sexual Harassment in Egypt 
 Few organizations were directly addressing the issue of sexual harassment when 
HarassMap officially “launched” in late 2010. ECWR was unique in operating a specific 
program that targeted this phenomenon, though other civil society entities were also 
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actively working to combat gender-based and sexual violence. NGOs, like the Al-Mar’a 
Al-Gedida, ADEW, EIPR and Nazra, also strove to adequately define and combat gender 
violence in their work, but sexual harassment did not arise as a specific focus until after 
the Revolution. Even then, sexual harassment was not within the purview of work for 
most formal NGOs with more expansive missions around gender-based violence. Sexual 
harassment became a feature of the larger issue of sexual violence that these entities 
sought to eliminate, with particular emphasis on the political implications around 
taḥarrush ginsy. The Taskforce for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence incorporated the 
issue of sexual harassment in their agenda of amending the penal code articles. Yet, the 
Taskforce’s mission was broad-based legal reform on all forms of gender-based violence. 
Public sexual harassment was not a focal point until HarassMap formed and undertook 
approaches unique for gender activism in Egypt. 
 Digital approaches in particular raised HarassMap’s profile to transnational levels, 
especially among international organizations that set HarassMap up as a model and a 
leader in local initiatives making innovative use of technology to combat gender 
violence. Employing the Ushahidi online platform, HarassMap was one of the first 
initiatives in Egypt to use crowdsourcing, and more precisely crowd-mapping, to bring 
sexual harassment into the public discourse. Crowdsourcing is defined as a method of 
employing an expanded network of individuals to generate information and develop 
solutions to solve a variety of problems (Barbier et al. 2012; Fahmy et al. 2014; How 
2006). Underlying crowdsourcing is the notion that the public itself can contribute new 
information and provide new ways of understanding a particular issue. Crowd-mapping 
offers an additional spatial plotting of incidents on a map using precise latitudinal and 
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longitudinal coordinates. Through Ushahidi, which utilized GIS mapping technology 
built around Google Maps, HarassMap allows public members to point to a location on a 
map to identify where they either experienced or witnessed sexual harassment, as well as 
to upload a description of the incident that occurred. This map and the stories are publicly 
available for all to contribute to and use as a resource for understanding sexual 
harassment. Moreover, in partnership with a local telecom, the public can send an SMS 
that would also plot to a position on a map.  
HarassMap maintained several goals with respect to Ushahidi. The first was the 
creation of a wider public dialogue on the problem of sexual harassment. At the time that 
HarassMap launched their interactive map, there was still widespread disbelief and non-
acceptance that taḥarrush ginsy was a real phenomenon in Egypt. Crowd-mapping was 
intended to help break the silence around sexual harassment and give people an 
anonymous method for voicing their experiences. Second, crowd-mapping was also 
intended to inform a community-based approach and highlight specific areas of Cairo that 
could be targeted for street campaigns. As already mentioned, this facet of HarassMap’s 
objective with crowd-mapping eventually shifted as problems with Ushahidi maintenance 
and SMS failures plagued the co-founders and staff members between 2011 and 2013, 
and as increasing numbers of volunteers made it possible and necessary to redesign the 
way in which community outreach programs were organized.  
Despite online work, community outreach served as the primary methodological 
approach in HarassMap’s strategic repertoire. In the first year of operation, the co-
founders recruited 300 individuals across several governorates to run street campaigns. 
These numbers increased to 500 in 2012, 800 in 2013 and more than 1300 in 2014, with 
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volunteer teams in 23 of 27 governorates. HarassMap co-founders, and later hired staff, 
trained a corps of community captains. These were individuals that went through training 
in HarassMap’s philosophy and methodology for changing social perceptions. Captains 
would then be responsible for recruiting their own team of community volunteers that 
would run weekly or monthly street outreach campaigns, and would also participate in 
various events where HarassMap wanted to have a presence to spread their message. As 
HarassMap increasingly became more professionalized, these trainings were turned into 
weeklong camps, which they called HarassMap Academy, where prospective captains 
would sit through a number of workshops on gender theory, myths around sexual 
harassment, running street campaigns, role-playing, team-building, and practice runs in a 
selected neighborhood where HarassMap staff would observe and offer feedback. In 
addition, HarassMap operated mobile training sessions, where staff members would 
travel across governorates to follow-up with local teams, offer additional trainings, and 
observe street operations. The purpose of these teams was to have Egyptians take direct 
control of the issue and convince their neighbors, one individual at a time, to stand up to 
sexual harassment.  
As the number of volunteers continued to grow, so did HarassMap operations. 
The co-founders realized early that the work they wanted to do to combat sexual 
harassment was not something that could be done on a part-time basis. In 2011, the 
Canadian-based International Research and Development Center (IDRC) approached 
Chiao about funding HarassMap work. Without formal registration, and without an actual 
staff to undertake work, HarassMap was unable to accept external donor funding. Chiao 
and Ghozlan spent 2009-2010 exploring the option of formal NGO registration, but 
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various hurdles prevented them from going that route. After launch, they instead chose to 
formally incubate with another NGO, Nahdat el-Mahrousa, whose mission was to help 
start-ups build capacity. Once incubated, HarassMap was able to accept IDRC funding 
under the control of Nahdat el-Mahrousa, which managed formal compliance with 
government regulations around foreign funding. Two of the four co-founders quit their 
full-time jobs to concentrate on building HarassMap. In 2012, when IDRC funds 
disbursed, they designed four internal units and hired new staff to run them. 
Community Outreach was one of these units, and the others, in part, were meant 
to help facilitate the work of this unit in the streets. Additionally, HarassMap built a 
Marketing and Communications Unit, responsible for streamlining their message, 
managing their online presence, and developing new messaging campaigns. IDRC funds 
were provided in order to run a specific research project that explored the efficacy of 
crowdsourcing, which required a new Research Unit. The Research Unit, though, as it 
developed also took on the mission of devising monitoring and evaluation methods to 
assess the progress of HarassMap’s work overall, as well as to manage the Ushahidi map 
and analyze the data it generated. As new ideas and goals were being developed around 
changing social perceptions and behaviors with respect to sexual harassment, HarassMap 
also eventually built a fourth unit called Safe Areas (SA), which included a sub-program 
called Safe Schools and Universities (SSU). A fifth unit also exists, referred to as Global 
Replication, but contained no staff members other than Chiao. Because of the 
international attention HarassMap received, including winning the World Summit Youth 
Award, numerous requests came in from individuals in other countries looking to 
implement Ushahidi to similarly combat sexual harassment and sexual violence. Chiao 
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consulted with teams that replicated HarassMap’s format in places like Morocco, Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine, India, Indonesia and more. 
HarassMap’s belief around sexual harassment was that it had become a socially 
accepted practice in Egyptian society. Social, political or economic reasons underlying 
the growth and persistence of sexual harassment, including state sanctioned violence, 
were viewed as rationalizations that denied the problem as a crime and a violation of 
rights. One of HarassMap’s first messaging campaigns deployed via social media in 2012 
was “byitḥarrash lih?” (Why Does He Harass?). Simply referred to by staff as the “The 
Myths Campaign,” it involved countering 10 prominent myths around why sexual 
harassment existed, including the phenomenon of delayed marriage, sexual repression in 
Egypt’s conservative society, and female dress. In a Tedx Talk conducted by Chiao in 
2012, she noted that every myth or stereotype promoted around sexual harassment that 
either laid blame on the victim or, somehow, mitigated the responsibility of the harasser 
was nothing more than an excuse that reproduced the problem. Here, everyone was 
socially responsibility to control themselves and to speak up if they saw someone being 
sexually harassed in public. As part of this philosophy, HarassMap argued that historic 
social values respecting women’s integrity were no longer adhered to and that people 
ultimately allowed the practice to continue by failing to speak up when necessary. They 
promoted the notion that communities were much more integrated in the past. 
Accordingly, social responsibility was viewed as eroding, where people no longer 
worried about their neighbors and community. Within this framework, countering the 
bystander effect and reintroducing new norms of social responsibility became a central 
feature of HarassMap’s community-based approach.  
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In addition, community outreach work sought to frame sexual harassment within 
the context of gendered norms in Egypt. A regular feature of the biannual HarassMap 
Academies, offered in the spring and fall of each year, was a 90-minute workshop called 
“The Gender Box.” In this workshop, community captains were enjoined to explore 
culturally defined roles for men and women, as well as the violence that each experienced 
for not adhering to those roles. Underpinning this was the goal of getting people to 
understand how gendered roles and violence, such as sexual harassment, results from 
patriarchal structures that privilege the masculine over the feminine. For the final 25-
minute segment of the workshop, where the facilitator covered the root causes of gender-
based violence, the guidelines stated: 
“The rule is that men who are expelled from the hegemonic masculine are attributed feminine 
traits related to their gender expression and sexual orientation, whereas women who are expelled 
from the hegemonic feminine are attributed traits related to their honor and are subjected to 
relatively more graphic forms of violence. Facilitator starts explaining that the root causes of 
violence against women and girls are a combination of harmful gender beliefs and patriarchy” 
(HarassMap Gender Box Workshop Guidelines) 
 
Moreover, at the HarassMap Academy in the fall of 2014, the Director of the Community 
Outreach Unit introduced the concept of “al-miʿyāriyya al-ghayriyya” 
(heteronormativity) for the first time with the newest cohort of community captains. The 
workshop stressed the power imbalance (“al-ʿaylaqāt al-quwiyya”) between men and 
women, the way that patriarchy sets up a binary system of gender (“al-nizām al-
thinnā’iy”), as well as notions that a woman with uncontrolled sexuality will not be 
approved of within the culture. Hence, sexual violence serves as a means to control 
women’s bodies and sexuality, as well as to maintain the social order where only two 
recognized genders (male and female) exist within a structure that privileges (and 
regulates) sexual relations between men and women. HarassMap, for its part, sought to 
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frame sexual harassment, and all forms of sexual violence for that matter, within this 
normalized gendered context. They urged community captains to draw on these ideas to 
combat victim-blaming rhetoric used to excuse sexual harassment and to convince 
neighborhood residents (get them to agree) to intervene if they witnessed such practices.  
 
Gender and Sexuality in Egypt 
In the planning stages of a new campaign that HarassMap intended to launch, a 
series of focus group sessions were held with both men and women in Cairo, the upper 
Egyptian town of Mansoura, and the Delta city of Tanta. The campaign aimed at 
reshaping values that prevented people from intervening when witnessing street sexual 
harassment, and the focus groups were designed to build the specific features of 
campaign messaging. The purpose of these sessions was to gain a better understanding of 
the values Egyptians from various classes, ages, and contexts held dear, how they viewed 
the issue of sexual harassment, and what factors would encourage or prevent them from 
speaking up against cases of sexual harassment that they witnessed. Organized by a 
marketing research firm, which conducted the work for a reduced rate given that the 
participating facilitators were personally interested in the issue and wanted to support the 
anti-sexual harassment efforts of initiatives like HarassMap, the first of these sessions 
was held in Cairo with four unmarried, urban, middle class women between the ages of 
20-22. The facilitator of the focus group, whom HarassMap staff was told was one of the 
best in the firm, was an upper-middle class, married woman in her mid-to-late forties, 
with a gregarious nature suited to exciting people into conversation.  
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The two-hour discussion that unfolded in this first focus group, along with the 
post-session debrief between the facilitator and HarassMap staff, helps to illuminate 
important aspects of gendered norms underlying female sexuality and street sexual 
harassment in Egypt. This session primarily explored the experiences of sexual 
harassment – initially referred to by the facilitator and participants as muʿāksa (flirtation) 
in Arabic, and later as taḥarrush ginsy as the conversation wound through various themes 
– that the young girls and their friends faced on a daily basis. It canvassed their 
perspectives on why sexual harassment occurred, what the appropriate responses were, 
what freedoms women had in public, and how men should behave. Additionally, the 
young girls were asked what values they felt were missing in society today and their 
perspectives on why most people did not speak up to help when witnessing a woman get 
sexually harassed. What developed as the conversation explored these issues in detail was 
a degree of restrained tension between the moderator and participants, as well as the 
evident dominance of certain voices over others among the participants, where some 
participants appeared more reticent to speak about their experiences and others had fewer 
problems in this regard.  
Deliberations about the kinds of actions that constituted public sexual harassment 
were a prominent feature of the conversation, where comments and words received a 
great deal of attention. Comments arose at several points in the dialogue and were 
broached in differing ways. Initially, the moderator encouraged the girls to identify 
harassing behaviors. Participants went back and forth on the kinds of comments that 
constituted sexual harassment, with vulgar comments distinguished from compliments. 
Compliments were not viewed as a form of sexual harassment, though all of the 
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participants seemed to agree that “shatīmah” (cursing) was unequivocally problematic. 
At one point, the moderator asked a participant, who spoke about her brother, if he 
harassed girls in the street, but the young girl immediately denied that he did. Instead, she 
noted that her brother might comment on the beauty of a girl in a polite way, where he 
might state “masha’allah aleyki” (masha’allah being a term demonstrating appreciation 
or awe with respect to God’s will/creation), which could never be construed as annoying 
or insulting. At a later point in the conversation, the moderator then asked what sort of 
behaviors personally bothered or did not bother the individual participants. Here, 
compliments again arose, where two of the four girls, who were most dominant in the 
conversation, noted that they might enjoy the polite words and stares of young men, if 
those stares were not directed at their bodies but their faces. Some of the participants 
noted that men were free to stare and that could not be stopped, but stares at the chest – 
common especially for girls whose chests were “full” - or other areas were discomforting. 
Among the most vocal in the group, there were some differing perspectives on 
women’s responses to being sexually harassed. There was general agreement that 
responses were absolutely required for a girl and that remaining silent after being 
harassed was not acceptable. In this case, silence was taken for (an unofficial form of) 
consent, where a girl was not openly stating but passively allowing a man to harass her. 
In fact, failing to respond was noted as contributing to continued sexual harassment as a 
man might be goaded to try and force a response from the girl. One participant argued 
that responding even if it made a girl look foolish was imperative, where her idea of 
responding included yelling, fighting and even hitting.  Another participant, however, 
while in agreement that a response was important so as to show that a girl did not want 
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such sexual harassment, argued that not all men understood what they were doing and 
how sexual harassment affected women. In this case, speaking politely but firmly was 
also raised as a more appropriate course of action. This participant indicated that her 
sister actually urged the opposite, that she not respond to a harasser because to fight back 
was to also encourage continued sexual harassment, i.e. that ignoring it and moving on 
was the best way to stop the harassment whereas to counter it would be to incite an 
interaction that would potentially make the situation worse since a girl could never know 
how a man might act if she were to respond or fight back. 
During one segment of the conversation on comments as a form of sexual 
harassment, the discussion flowed into a debate about women’s rights when it came to 
how to dress in public. The below dialogue took place between the most dominant 
participant in the focus group and the facilitator (with the transliterated Arabic included): 
Participant:  I always hear comments, always when I’m walking – I get a lot…  
(lezam asmaʿ commentat, lezam wa ana mashya…bakhud kateer) 
Facilitator: Why do you think you hear comments? Is it, for example, that your pants are too 
tight?  
(Tiftikry bitakhdy commentāt lih? Hal, messalin, bantaloonik dayiq ziyada?) 
Participant: Ah 
Facilitator: You know this? (ʿarfa keda?) 
Participant: Ah 
Facilitator: Then why do you wear them? (Ṭub, matilbisiy lih?) 
Participant: I won’t change it (Mish haghayaru) 
Facilitator: But why? (Ṭub, lih?) 
Participant: I’m going to do what I want, not for your sake or because you are weak 
[reference to a masculine you]. I won’t change myself, I’m not your business. 
Also, I know this is my time and later the way I dress will change, naturally. 
(Ana hʿamel illy ana ayyizza, mish ashān khatrak, ashān khater nefsak daīfa. 
Ana mish maghayara min nefsy, la’, malaksh dawa bāya…ana ʿarfa ana ‘ada 
fatrity, bʿad keda libsy hyitghayr, tabi’iy).   
Facilitator: So you’ll pass through your time, you mean you’ll get married and grow older… 
(Hatʿady fatritik, aṣdik hatgawizy, hatikbary, wa hatitgizy…) 
Participant:  I’m taking my rights. I won’t have my rights effected because of you [masculine 
you] (Bakhud haq’y…mish ha’athr fi haqqa ashān khater inta) 
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Here the facilitator linked the participant’s experience of sexual harassment to the way 
she dressed, despite the fact that earlier in the conversation the girls noted that all women 
in Egypt, regardless of how they dressed, experienced sexual harassment. Following this, 
the participant continued to argue that all individuals had the personal freedom to choose 
what they wore and how to dress. She questioned why it was forbidden/shameful (haram) 
for her to wear what she wanted, to have to change her choice of clothing, but it was not 
forbidden/shameful for men to sexually harass.  
 Throughout this conversation, a number of dynamics were at work that helped to 
shape the focus group session in particular ways. While the participants and the facilitator 
appeared to be of commensurate class backgrounds, the age differences between them 
was fairly significant, likely at least twenty years. They all dressed in similar Western-
style clothing, though the young girls all wore headscarves (hijāb) while the facilitator 
was unveiled. The facilitator’s gregarious nature helped to keep the conversation flowing, 
but her line of questioning often demonstrated an underlying conservatism, as well as 
inherent assumptions about the nature of sexual harassment and gendered norms. For 
instance, in the beginning when the participants had not yet warmed to each other, the 
facilitator attempted to goad them into discussing their personal experiences of sexual 
harassment by stating, “Come on, you’re all young and beautiful. Of course, you have 
been harassed.” This statement underscores a widespread stereotype in Egypt that public 
sexual harassment is a phenomenon experienced by younger women, and that, as a 
corollary, it is a transitional stage linked to immaturity and the lack of sexual awareness 
or appropriate sexual outlets. Moreover, it became clear that at least two of the four 
participants dominated the conversation, while the other two did not offer up much of 
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their own perspectives. What was not clear, however, was if these non-dominant 
participants had differing opinions and felt cowed into silence by the dominant 
personalities around them, or if they held any personal beliefs that prevented them from 
speaking up on such a sensitive subject (participants were not provided prior information 
by the marketing research firm of the focus group topic).  
 HarassMap staff members, for their part, observed the focus group session from 
the next room, separated by a one-way mirror. A post-focus group debrief was held in 
this room, where HarassMap and the marketing firm staff discussed lines of questioning 
that worked, ways to tweak the questioning, the goals of the sessions overall, and salient 
themes evident from the session. In this debrief, the facilitator’s conservative views on 
sexuality became far more apparent. She ridiculed statements made by the dominant 
participant in the group, and also appeared to be put off by the participant’s comportment. 
The participant often laughed, or tittered, while relating certain events. An example was 
when the participant discussed how her “ṣāḥib” (boyfriend) would not defend her when 
she was sexually harassed in public, with him often claiming that he was unaware of her 
being harassed. She did so in laughing terms, while also making claims that such men did 
not demonstrate valued qualities associated with “rigulla” (manhood or masculinity). To 
HarassMap staff, the facilitator indicated her belief that the girl was “mabsuta” (happy or 
self-satisfied) and that she, as well as all of the girls in the session, enjoyed sexual 
harassment. She noted that the girls said one thing but that their description of their 
actions and beliefs indicated something else. For instance, the fact that the dominant 
participant willfully refused to change her style of clothing, despite believing that it 
contributed to sexual harassment, bolstered the facilitator’s assumption that the girl 
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“nāzla tit’ākis” (went out to be sexually harassed). Here, the girl chose to dress in 
particular ways to deliberately attract male attention. The facilitator argued that the girl’s 
statement of being free (hurra) to dress as she wanted was problematic – “mafish hāga 
ismaha inti hurra, ihna fi balad islamiyya” (there is no such thing as you are free, we’re 
in an Islamic country) – and that a “bint hurra” (a free girl) was “ayb” (shameful) in this 
society. Moreover she continued to mock the participant by stating that her boyfriend 
would never marry her, nor would any other man, for that matter.  
 This exchange between the facilitator and participants, as well as the facilitator 
and HarassMap staff, underscores a number of facets of gender, sexuality, and sexual 
violence in Egypt that are linked to patriarchal control of the female body. This includes 
women’s comportment and their outward presentation of self in public, and the denial of 
female desire. In the above vignette, the dominant girls in the focus group were verbally 
assured, perhaps even felt to be “know it all’s” by the facilitator, and were seemingly 
amused or unabashed by their experiences of sexual harassment and their appearance in 
public space. Laughing while recounting stories and the lack of humility or self-
censorship with respect to forms of dress were viewed almost as an affront by the 
facilitator. The girls’ inability to perform their victimhood in certain ways left them 
vulnerable to ridicule and attack by the facilitator, albeit indirectly behind their backs. In 
the protected setting of a market research firm where the facilitator and participants, 
while possibly of the same social class, were not of the same neighborhood locale, such 
disparagement (unknown to the participants) had little effect on their social standing and 
respectability. However, in most neighborhoods of Cairo, the circulation of such 
sentiments among neighbors, friends and kin can have a detrimental effect on women’s 
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respectability and, ultimately, their marriageability. A number of scholars have examined 
the issue of female respectability and marriageability, noting that marriage, and 
parenthood, are highly valued practices that most Egyptians strive to attain in order to 
become adults and complete/full individuals in society (El Kholy 2002; Hoodfar 1997; 
Singerman 1989). Therefore, how women and girls present their experiences of sexual 
harassment, and likely any form of sexual violence, impacts how the community at large 
perceives them, and what their options will be after the event.  
 The participants’ description of women’s comportment when responding to 
sexual harassment demonstrated the highly contentious way in which women negotiate 
their respectability in public when such events occur. The focus group participants all 
noted that women and girls must respond when sexually harassed in order to avoid any 
public criticism that they welcomed the attention. However, perspectives on the nature of 
this response differed in that some of the girls thought a fighting response important, 
perhaps in order to publicly demonstrate their outrage and distress, while others felt that 
respectability could be maintained through “’adab” (politeness). Nonetheless, one 
participant noted that her sister’s advice was exactly the opposite, that ignoring the sexual 
harassment and moving on was a better approach because engagement here could also be 
seen as a form of inappropriate interaction that would stimulate the men to continue. In 
both scenarios, women were the ones enjoined to protect their bodies in ways that also 
kept them above reproach as having incited the violence they experienced. In this way, 
they could similarly maintain their reputations and preserve their prospects for the future.  
 Additionally, the above example draws attention to another aspect of gender and 
sexuality in Egypt. While women’s bodies are sexualized and are seen as inciting men to 
 94 
sexually harass, women themselves must demonstrate a lack of sexuality in public in 
order to maintain their respectability. When the participants noted that they enjoyed 
comments and, sometimes, the stares of young men, this ignited the ire of the facilitator, 
who argued that the girls enjoyed being harassed. The combination of dressing in 
inappropriate clothing, along with the admission of enjoying polite comments and stares, 
were signals to the facilitator that the girls were themselves displaying inappropriate 
sexual inclinations and were of loose respectability and morality, hence the caution that 
no man would marry them. For HarassMap staff, on the other hand, there was some 
degree of belief in the naiveté of the young girls. Accordingly, the young girls accepted 
the compliments of young men, falsely thinking that such compliments demonstrated a 
more sincere and genuine interest. In this case, the girls were failing to see how they were 
being objectified and inappropriately sexualized. In a conversation following the debrief, 
the HarassMap Director of Marketing and Communications further noted, though, that 
much of the sexual harassment that occurred in the street was not complimentary (it was 
disgusting, as she put it), and that it was also an expression of male mistrust of female 
sexuality and the need to control this sexuality through the act of shaming women.  
Underlying the sentiment of impropriety, and even naiveté, however, is the lack 
of discourse on how the female body is a desiring entity, and that respectable women can 
(and should, perhaps, be free to) express their sexuality in public space. Feminist theory 
notes the gendered nature of public and private, where sexuality, particularly that of 
women and homosexuals, is limited to private spaces and the public is controlled and 
orderly, with properly behaved individuals (Duncan 1996: 130). Yet, patriarchal, 
heterosexual norms are infused in public practice and legal code, thus making the public 
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a site of heterosexual normativity (Duncan 1996; Valentine 1996). The heteronormative 
public in the Middle East is a space for men to express their sexual frustration through 
acts widely deemed complimentary, flirtatious, or playful with women; acts often 
excused as “boys will be boys” by Egyptian society. Women, on the other hand, are 
expected to cover their bodies, not turn the attentions of libidinous men, and not display 
any flirtatious or sexual inclinations of their own. In other words, the public space 
provides no room for female sexuality and there has not yet been a discourse that public 
female sexuality is not, in some way, transgressive (Donnan & Magowan 2012).  
This is not to suggest that women enjoy being sexually harassed, that sexual 
harassment might be a form of sexual interplay between men and women, or that sexual 
harassment does not carry with it very serious and negative impacts on those who 
experience it. The above example is, in part, meant to demonstrate how sexuality politics 
in Egypt continues to reproduce notions of what it means to be a woman/female/feminine 
(and even man/male/masculine), where there is no appropriate expression of female 
sexuality in public. Also, anti-sexual harassment activists who are attempting to highlight 
the nature of patriarchal control over women’s bodies, disrupt gender binaries, challenge 
victim-blaming proclivities in Egypt, and to force accountability on (male) perpetrators 
and not (female) victims of sexual harassment have incompletely analyzed gender 
constructs in devising their messages. Anti-sexual harassment discourses have not 
broached the larger issue of female sexuality outside of its control by patriarchal society. 
In this way, activist challenges to patriarchy have not fully delinked women’s sexuality 
strictly from the private sphere, thus leaving women in public as desexualized entities 
fighting off the loose sexualization ascribed to them by patriarchal society. 
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The Complex of Honor and Shame 
 The control of female sexuality, including the (self) policing of women’s behavior 
and the desexualization of women in public, is rooted in historic notions around honor 
(ʿirḍ and sharaf) and shame (‘ar and ayb) in Egypt. Classic texts, such of those on the 
Kabyle tribe of Algeria and the Awlad Ali Bedouin of Egypt, highlight the importance of 
both concepts with respect to the maintenance of the social order in tribal society, 
including familial and interpersonal relations (Abou-Zeid 1966; Bourdieu 1966). 
According to Bourdieu, notions of honor are embedded in social systems where the 
personal sense of self is largely understood through the perceptions of others: 
“The point of honor is the basis of the moral code of an individual who sees himself always 
through the eyes of others, who has need of others for his existence, because the image he has of 
himself is indistinguishable from that presented to him by other people. ‘Man is through men; God 
alone,’ the proverb runs, ‘is God through himself’…Respectability, the reverse of shame, is the 
characteristic of a person who needs other people in order to grasp his own identity and whose 
conscience is a kind of interiorization of others…Defined essentially by its social dimension, 
respectability must be conquered and defended in the face of everyone…” (Bourdieu 1966: 211).  
 
In this context, honor can be acquired and ascribed, attained and lost, according to how 
individual public comportment and the family to which one is born is perceived by the 
wider society. Reputation and respectability, therefore, become key aspects in the 
maintenance of honor and the avoidance of shame associated with misconduct. Here, 
respectability may be viewed as a process through which women must demonstrate their 
modesty and physical separation from men through particular forms of outward covering, 
as noted by both Hoffman-Ladd (1987) and Abu Lughod (2002). It is important to note 
here that honor and shame are concepts that crosscut religion and can be found among 
Muslim and Christian populations throughout the Middle East. Dodd (1973) argued that 
there is no specific Islamic injunction regarding honor that can be found in the Qur’an, 
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and that honor is a secular value inherited from pre-Islamic Arab culture (44). 
Nonetheless, he stated, Islamic ethical precepts tied to sexuality and women’s bodies can 
be seen as bolstering pre-Islamic constructs of honor and shame. This is critical to 
recognize because a wealth of literature has examined women’s sexuality in Islamic 
societies, where paternalistic discrimination is evident. Yet, this paternalism, as well as 
sexual violence linked to Islamic norms that help to regulate sexuality, is not unique to 
Islamic contexts.  
In tribal Arab societies, honor is both maintained by the individual, usually men, 
and by the group, or family. An individual’s loss of honor is reflected as the family’s loss 
of honor, which may be difficult to regain depending on the nature of the offense that 
compromised familial honor to begin with. Members of the family are implicated in the 
monitoring of its other members, and selves, to ensure respectable comportment in public 
and that there can be no slander against the individual, and therefore the family. This 
extends to women, for whom the largest offense to familial honor is the loss of virginity 
through pre-marital sexual relations, the lack of chastity, and even the hint of sexual 
impropriety (Kozma 2011). Abou-Zeid (and other authors since) explored how the honor 
of the family is closely tied with the honor of women (ʿirḍ) in Arab societies, though it is 
unclear whether women, like men, can maintain ʿirḍ or are simply vessels for it. Abou 
Zeid claimed that the home (bayt), inclusive and representative of the family, is sacred, 
private, and the refuge of women (harīm). The sacredness of home is matched by the 
sacredness of women’s bodies, therefore entrance into the home is highly restricted and 
the assault on women is the assault on the family as a whole. Accordingly, not only is the 
family responsible for protecting and controlling female sexuality to avoid gossip, 
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slanderous accusations, and the shame (‘ar) that goes hand in hand with this, but women 
are themselves responsible for restricting their behavior and preserving their bodily 
integrity. Honor lost through sexual misconduct cannot be easily regained. According to 
Abou-Zeid, among the Bedouin, it was not uncommon for women of questionable 
reputation to disappear and for families to regain honor lost through the sexual 
(mis)conduct of one of its women by “getting rid of her” (1966: 253). 
 Outside of the tribal context, honor, shame, and respectability remain important 
concepts in the regulation of urban social relations (Dodd 1973). While tribal societies 
were not strictly sex segregated, the division between men and women was typically 
more rigid than in contemporary urban contexts where women are indelible features of 
public life. Here, historic codes of honor are challenged by a number of factors, including 
changing family structures, the disconnection of families to their extended rural kin 
network, exposure to new norms of gender and sexuality through media, the increasing 
normalization of public gendered interactions, and the wide degree of individual 
mobility, where policing family members becomes more difficult as they move about the 
city. Dodd (1973) argues that despite the seeming challenges presented by urbanization, 
monitoring and behavioral control continues to persist at neighborhood levels, where 
most people spend their lives interacting regularly with their community neighbors. The 
community itself becomes a fictive kin network, supplanting the historically extended 
tribal or rural family. Communities are a vital force behind the surveillance of its 
members and the maintenance of individual and familial respectability and honor. 
Women’s comportment still remains a central facet in the maintenance of family honor. 
The urban context has generated more nuance in the discursive uses and understanding of 
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ʿirḍ, yet women’s uncontrolled sexuality is still critically linked to the loss of honor.  
Given this, women’s public behavior in the urban context must still conform to social 
norms that help to preserve their reputation and respectability.  
 Chief among these social norms is modesty, or “hayā’” (Hoffman-Ladd 1987). 
Like honor, modesty is a conceptually fuzzy term, with undoubted age and class-based 
implications. However, as demonstrated in the above example of the HarassMap focus 
group, it generally includes a range of behaviors centered on women’s externalized 
bodily display, represented through physical forms of dress, and their internalized 
behavioral sensibility, as exemplified by certain qualities of comportment, such as 
shyness. A great deal of scholarly attention focuses on how women in public, or in view 
of any man that is not a close blood kin (maḥram), are enjoined to protect their physical 
beauty or charms (mafatin, zinā) by covering their bodies and donning the veil (hijāb). 
Multiple analyses explore the complex nature of veiling practices and changes in 
women’s dress that have taken place over the last century, particularly in relation to the 
women’s movement in Egypt where the symbol of change was the iconic figure of Hoda 
El-Sharaawi, noted for publicly removing her face veil (Badran 1996; El-Guindi 1999; 
Macleod 1987; Mernissi 1991; Rugh 1986; Zuhur 1992). Salient among these analyses 
are how veiling redefines public space.  
El-Guindi (1999) argued that codes of modesty as theorized within Muslim 
societies represent a form of ethnocentric understanding of the division of space into the 
binary public-private. She notes that the boundary between the public and private is 
actually porous, where veiling converts public into private spaces, protecting the sanctity 
of women’s bodies when not at home. Scholars of women’s public participation in the 
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region proffer similar arguments, maintaining that the veil signals women’s respectability 
within the context of shifting socioeconomic practices that challenge their traditional 
roles at home (Macleod 1987). However, the reverse is also postulated with respect to the 
home, which can be converted from private to public through the use of mashribiyya, or 
wooden, latticework screens that either cover windows or are erected as stand-alone 
screens within the home. These mashribiyya allow women to see out but not be seen, and 
does not confine women from public interactions. In her analysis of women’s dress in 
Egypt, Rugh (1986) highlighted how modesty garments, inclusive of dresses, robes and 
lengthier forms of head coverings, not only protect women from strangers, but also allow 
for a range of signaling tactics that help to define space in particular ways. Here, clothing 
styles themselves signify when space become contentious for women. Women cover or 
refuse to remove their outer modesty garments when in the presence of those that are not 
maḥarim (singular maḥram). Similarly, particular styles and movements of clothing may 
also subtly indicate a woman’s availability with respect to marriage, where “fitted dresses 
and bright colors, a shy demeanor, and industrious, sensible attention to tasks at hand, 
graceful adjustment of drapes and scarves, are all irresistible inducements to the 
romantically inclined young man” (Rugh 1986: 148). A woman demonstrates her interest 
by coyly covering and partially withdrawing, but it should not necessarily be assumed 
that a woman signaling her availability is similarly expressing sexual inclinations, as 
partner preferences may be made based on a range of variables that are contingent to the 
individuals involved and the context in question. Having said this, coyness as described 
by Rugh may offer potential insights into how women negotiate sexual boundaries. 
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Ultimately, though, modesty, and therefore respectability and honor, are generally 
preserved through the act of covering, or hiding, the body and, in many cases, the head.  
The religious, specifically Islamic, basis for both veiling and the maintenance of 
female modesty and respectability has been extensively covered in the academic 
literature. This section does not canvass the whole of this topic, and instead centers on 
several concepts crucial to understanding the regulation of women’s bodies and sexuality 
in the Middle Eastern context. The first is the notion of zinā, which may be interpreted in 
one of several ways, including as a woman’s physical adornment, i.e. parts of their bodies 
considered private, or as illicit, pre-marital sexual relations. Hoffman-Ladd cited 
Qur’anic passages central to, and highly debated, around the control of women’s 
“adornment,” including verse 24:31: “Tell the believing women to avert their eyes and to 
preserve their chastity and not to show their adornment (zinā) except that which appears 
(ma zahara minha), and to draw their shawls over their bosoms and not to show their zinā 
except to their husbands…” (1987: 29). Interpretations of this verse and that which 
constitutes zinā are contentious, particularly in relation to veiling practices and whether 
the protection of female modesty extends to the covering of the hair. Hoffman-Ladd notes 
that the face, hands, and feet are minimally referenced by the statement “that which 
already appears.” Notwithstanding the issue of hijāb, many interpret from this passage 
that physical modesty for Muslim women in public includes the covering of the body 
from the neck to ankle, and the wrists, usually in loose clothing that conceals the form.  
In addition to zinā, the related concept of ʿawra is similarly important. Like zina, 
ʿawra is also defined as the intimate parts of the body, but extends to nakedness, and is 
applicable both to men and women. The same verse quoted above continues on to say 
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that the only men to whom women may display their zina are those men maḥarim to her, 
including fathers, brothers, sons, nephews, male slaves/attendants that “lack vigor,” and 
children that know nothing of women’s nakedness (ʿawra). Other verses include those 
enjoining all Muslims to cover their private parts to protect them from evil (Quran 7:26), 
as well as more specific versus encouraging the same just for women in order that they be 
protected (Quran 33:59). Varying translations of the Quranic verse 7:26 interpret private 
parts instead as “shame,” where private parts/shame is mentioned in the Quran with the 
term sawa’, which translates to wickedness, damaging, and harmful. According to Ball 
(2012), the connotations around ʿawra with respect to women include shame and the 
need to conceal. This refers not just to the private parts alone but also extends to the 
entire body of a woman, as well as her voice.  “While the term therefore applies most 
usually to the genitals as those parts associated with sexual arousal or intercourse, the 
term operates as a powerful motif for conceptions of female sexuality in traditional 
patriarchal arenas of the Arab world, in which female sexuality is deemed a private rather 
than public matter” (Ball 2012: 73). While the Quran speaks similarly to men of the need 
to cover and maintain modesty, little analytic attention is directed at the issue of male 
modesty. Within this framework, women’s bodies, and even their voices, assume 
connotations of shame and wickedness that, therefore, require concealment.  
Furthermore, Mernissi (1987) theorized what she sees as the Islamic view of 
male-female dynamics and female sexuality overall. She argues that there is an explicit 
and an implicit theory of female sexuality operating in Muslim societies, where the 
explicit theory views men as aggressive and women as passive, and the implicit theory 
sees the subjugation of women as a necessary practice to protect society from the 
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destructive power of women’s sexuality (1987: 30-34). Accordingly, women’s sexuality 
is active and underlying the seeming inequalities between male and female sexuality is an 
inherent awareness that women also are sexual beings, with sexual desires no different 
than that of men. Her argument - and that of other scholars, for that matter - is that 
Islamic precepts enjoin both men and women to enjoy each other, but within tightly 
delineated strictures. She employs zinā in its other sense, that which refers to the illicit 
nature of sexual interactions, and maintains that pre/non-marital relations became highly 
problematic and sinful in Islam (also, Ali 2006). Here, marriage is a means of avoiding 
the sin of zinā. However, marriage and the system of modesty and honor within which 
women became subjugated, she argues, were designed to control rampant female 
sexuality supposedly existent in the pre-Islamic period. Drawing on Freud, she further 
contends that there is fear in Islam (and any patriarchal society) of this image of the 
aggressively sexual female who disrupts the social order, driving society into fitna, or 
chaos. The sexually uncontrollable woman is also one for whom paternity cannot be 
assured. Mernissi only extends her argument on paternity to the issue of divorce, where 
women go through a waiting period (idda) to ensure they have not been impregnated by 
their former husbands before taking a new husband, as the marital bed is, historically, 
what determined patrimony in Islam (Hasso 2011). The control of women’s bodies and 
sexuality through codes of modesty intended to protect female and family honor 
developed in response to the prevention of fitna and to maintain the social order.   
 The intent of this discussion is not to imply any overly deterministic notions 
around systems of honor, modesty codes or the way in which religion governs, or 
oppresses, women’s sexuality. Many Muslim women are deeply committed to their faith 
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and female Muslim scholars attempt to look beyond misogynistic readings of religious 
text, doctrine and jurisprudence to highlight the far more inclusive nature of divine 
messaging and Islamic practice, contesting many of the above precepts that constrain 
women’s participation in religion and society (Barazangi 2004; Barlas 2002; Wadud 
1999). Accordingly, modesty may work more as the way in which women improve upon 
and demonstrate their piety and faith in God, rather than as the instantiation of codes of 
honor that subjugate women to male control (Boulanour 2006). Moreover, how such 
tenets work in practice is often incoherent, with many other factors, such as education, 
new forms of consumerism, and transnational rights activism, playing a role in shaping 
norms around female sexuality, male-female dynamics, and women’s public participation 
(Dodd 1973; Kozma 2011). This discussion was simply intended to highlight prevailing 
notions that have circulated, in shifting and inconsistent fashion, within many Arab 
societies, and which play a role in the way violence has played out in the lives of many, 
but particularly for women.  
 
Gender Violence, Sexual Harassment and Heteronormativity 
 Gender violence as a concept arose in the 1970’s within the context of the second 
wave feminist movement in the West, which, in part, targeted critical issues of violence 
facing women worldwide, including rape, domestic abuse, and workplace sexual 
harassment (Baker 2008; Merry 2009). New analyses on gender at this time, began to 
explore the nature of gendered power and patriarchal control that facilitated women’s 
unequal status and vulnerability to violence in multiple spheres. The family was noted as 
a critical component here. Millet (1969) argued that the family was a “mirror” of society, 
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both reflecting on and reflective of social practice. She noted that the family instituted a 
great deal of power over its members, particularly female members since men retained a 
privileged position, with the father serving as the family’s central figurehead. This was 
also because, according to Millet, reproduction and socialization were the primary 
functions of families, and, for this reason there remained a need to legitimate women and 
children through their connection to men in the family (1969: 35). Though not expressly 
stated, the sense here is that paternity was a central concern of the patriarchal family unit, 
and control of women’s sexuality, in part, helped to guarantee the integrity of the 
patriline, as well as male investment in the family that drew on male economic power. 
Socialization served to reproduce patriarchal practice, but methods of control, force and 
violence were also part of the self-regulation of this system. Millet theorized that the use 
of sexual force was particular to patriarchal control, where shame is often associated with 
sexual aggression (1969: 43-46). Like Millet, Merry (2009) also noted the way in which 
practices of gender violence resulted from localized familial configurations and patterns 
of marriageability in each culture. Here, the boundaries between family and community, 
as well as the significance attached to female chastity and virginity with respect to marital 
practices, similarly played a role in how the control of female bodies, or the violence 
enacted upon women, played out.  
 In this period of second wave feminism, analyses centered on varying aspects of 
sexual violence, which helped to foment the rape and battered women’s movements 
(Rose 1977; Tierney 1982). Sexual harassment, with an emphasis on workplace forms of 
harassment, also came into consideration at this time. Growing out of the rape crises 
movement of the 1970’s, sexual harassment gained legal momentum through the 1980s 
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and 1990s, primarily in the United States where anti-sexual harassment activism and laws 
were most active and progressive. With respect to anti-sexual harassment activism, 
scholars have argued that the US women’s movement was particularly successful because 
of the broad-based nature of its activism, which included blue and white collar female 
workers, as well as the participation of African American women who pursued numerous 
legal cases against their employers. Coupled with the expansive nature of sexual 
harassment activism was the relative receptiveness of the political structure, coming off 
of the heals of the civil rights movement, in helping to reform legal and corporate 
structures to create safer environments for female workers (Baker 2008; Morewitz 1996; 
Zippel 2006). Additionally, Baker highlighted the multiple strategies employed by 
feminist activists, from community-based to political activism to change perceptions at 
multiple levels of society.    
Sexual harassment in US law, underpinned by feminist theorizing on violence as 
an expression of gendered control, came to be viewed as a form of sex-based 
discrimination that impacted women’s economic rights and was codified in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As such, sexual harassment was an act of discrimination 
targeting women because of their sex as female (and not necessarily motivated by sexual 
inclinations). The law noted that men as a group did not similarly suffer this form of 
gendered control, even though individual men might suffer sexual harassment (Baker 
2008; MacKinnon 1979). Referred to as quid pro quo sexual harassment, women suffered 
under the threat of the loss of their jobs by not submitting to the sexual demands of 
bosses. “Many feminists argued that sexual harassment was an issue of violence against 
women. They borrowed from anti-rape theory the idea that rape was a matter of power, 
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not sex, and applied this perspective to sexual harassment, arguing that sexual harassment 
was primarily motivated by men’s desire to control women...” (Baker 2008: 94). Legal 
definitions were later expanded to include hostile work environment in situations where 
women did not lose their jobs, but continued to suffer discrimination for refusing sexual 
advances.  
In contrast to the situation in the United States, Zippel noted that anti-sexual 
harassment legislation in the European Union, along with concomitant legal protections 
for women, were more problematic because EU law was not grounded in feminist notions 
of gender. Instead, she argued that the EU took a more expansive view of sexual 
harassment, which was predicated on an equitable notion of the rights of all individuals. 
Unlike in the United States, sexual harassment was defined as economic discrimination 
rather than sex discrimination, which left open the possibility that it was not sex-specific. 
Female victims of sexual harassment could be counter-sued by their harassers in court, 
thus hindering women from speaking up (Zippel 2006). 
 Early work on sexual harassment in the US and Europe centered rather narrowly 
on the workplace and women’s economic rights. Analyses continued to highlight 
women’s vulnerability in male dominated work environments and how patriarchy 
conditioned silence – or even passive (forced) consent - from women, or placed blame on 
them when harassed (Cairns 1997; Thomas and Kitzinger 1997). Street sexual 
harassment, or public forms of sexual harassment, received lesser degrees of attention but 
also generated continued theoretical insights into the nature of gendered violence. Like 
workplace sexual harassment in the early years of activism, defining the forms of public 
behavior that constituted street sexual harassment were difficult, perhaps more so because 
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the effects were often psychological and did not, seemingly, directly challenge women’s 
economic livelihoods as with workplace sexual harassment. In particular, the notion of 
sexual harassment as a form of sexual terrorism arose as a salient method of framing the 
seriousness around the problem (Ilahi 2008b; Kissling 1991; Larkin 1997). Kissling 
(1991) noted that generating fear was a critical facet of patriarchal control in public, 
while others highlighted how the aggregate experiences of constant public sexual 
harassment were, in fact, threatening to women’s well-being. For the Egyptian context, 
Ilahi (2008b) underscored the view of women’s sexuality as a source of fitna (chaos) that 
needed to be reigned-in to maintain social order. Other analyses explored sexual 
harassment as produced within and reproducing a heteronormative gender division.  
 In her analysis of sexual harassment faced by members of the LGBTQ 
community, most especially that experienced by young gay men, Epstein (1997) took 
issue with historic feminist approaches that denied the biological implications around 
male-female interactions and posited sexual harassment strictly within heteronormative 
gender relations – as only male power and control over females. She noted that 
heterosexuality assumed normative status, i.e. all individuals were automatically assumed 
to be straight. Current analysis only interrogated sexual harassment as the expression of a 
particular heterosexual power imbalance, and did not theorize how it, in turn, reproduced 
the heteronormative gender order. Sexual harassment was constructed within a 
framework where it was “seen to be simply the expression of men’s (biological) needs to 
pursue potential sexual partners in the search for immediate sexual satisfaction” (Epstein 
1997: 158). Epstein challenged theorizing that distinguished the sexual harassment of 
women from that of men, as if these acts of violence were rooted in separate 
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problematics. Instead, she argued that the sexual harassment of both young girls and boys 
underscored how sexual harassment served as a gendering tactic, or “the production of 
heterosexual girls and boys” (Epstein 1997:162). Sexual harassment was naturalized as 
the actions of real men, and accordingly, she argued, young gay men that were harassed 
were bullied into more culturally accepted masculine behaviors or denied their humanity.  
 The issue of the reproduction of heteronormative gender relations finds resonance 
in the Egyptian context, where the male-female marital unit is privileged. As discussed 
above, marriage provides the only acceptable outlet through which men and women in 
Egypt are able to express their sexuality. Homosexuality, while widely existent, has been 
viewed as a perversion, and state interventions with respect to homosexuality treat it as a 
threat to Egyptian national identity (Pratt 2007). The family, therefore, built around 
heterosexual pairings, serves as the critical foundation for the regulation of sex, sexual 
norms, and is invested in ensuring the marriageability of daughters. The honor of the 
family is intimately tied to perceptions of the sexual behavior of its female members. 
Through codes of modesty, which inform a variety of public practices, families seek to 
enforce and women seek to maintain their respectability and reputations to avoid the 
shame attached to sexual transgressions. Forms of sexual violence, such as sexual 
harassment, serve to maintain control over, primarily, women to shame them, and more 
pertinently, to remind them of their appropriate (female) roles in society. Akin to Pratt’s 
(2007) argument regarding the torture of homosexual men in Egypt, sexual harassment 
assuages gendered insecurities in a social, economic and political context that appears to 
threaten the family unit; a context where marriage is made increasingly difficult and 
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livelihoods more challenging to maintain. In this scenario, sexual harassment in Egypt, 
whether everyday or politically commissioned, affirms the heteronormative order.   
 
Gender Violence and Honor in Egyptian Law 
 Honor and modesty are concepts articulated in articles of the Egyptian penal code 
that punish gender violence offenses. The Taskforce for the Prohibition of Sexual 
Violence in Egypt that was founded in 2008 has been particularly concerned with a 
number of issues evident in these laws. In an interview with a former Taskforce 
participant from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Magda Boutros, she 
noted that one of the most significant of these issues is better defining differing aspects of 
gender violence, including providing a more expansive understanding of what constitutes 
rape and eliminating the deep connotations of honor and shame within the wording of the 
various articles that punish it (Interview 2014). Boutros’s assessment was echoed by 
Amal ElMohandes, Director of the Women Human Rights Defenders program at Nazra 
for Feminist Studies, which has also worked as part of the Taskforce to advocate for 
changes in both the existing penal code and family code (Interview 2014).  
Spread across two separate sections of the penal code, there are four specific 
articles that define and punish crimes of sexual violence. These four articles employ 
terms that connote shame arising from violations of honor and modesty and link them to 
the moral order. Part 4 of the penal code, titled “Htk al-ʿirḍ wa ifṣād al-akhlāq” and 
translated as Indecent Assault and the Corruption of Morals, punishes the crimes of rape, 
incest, child molestation, and adultery and connects them all within a system of moral 
decay. These are visible in the below three articles: 
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Article 267 – Whoever lies with a woman without her consent (waqa ‘ontha bi ghir redaha) shall 
be punished with permanent or temporary hard labor. If the felon is from the victim’s ancestors, or 
is a paid servant to her or to the aforementioned persons, he shall be punished with permanent 
hard labor.  
 
Article 268 – Whoever indecently assaults a person by force of threat, or attempts such assault, 
(Kul min htk‘ird insaan bilquwwa aw biltahdeed) shall be punished with hard labor for 3 to 7 
years. If the victim of said crime has not attained complete 16 years of age, or the perpetrator of 
the crime is among those prescribed in the second clause of  
 
Article 278 – Whoever commits in public a scandalous act against prudency  (fe’lan fadehan 
mokhelan bi al-haya’) be punished with detention for a period not exceeding one year or a fine not 
exceeding three hundred pounds.  
 
The term “htkʿirḍ” in Article 268, perhaps the most widely understood term for 
rape, draws on historic notions of the honor (ʿirḍ) of the family, in which the control of 
women’s sexuality is tantamount. Rape, translated as the “indecent assault” against a 
woman, is popularly considered shameful not only of the women but of their family 
(Shaalan et al. 1983). As noted by activists like ElMohandes, the phrase “waqa ‘ontha bi 
ghir redaha” in Article 267 is also considered highly problematic by activists because it 
limits the victims of rape strictly to women (‘ontha), eliminating the possibility that men 
may also be raped. According to the Nazra, FIDH, Uprising of Women in the Arab World 
study, this phrasing in the penal code “does not comply with international norms and 
jurisprudence,” which “defines rape in a gender-neutral way” (2013: 39). Similarly, the 
term haya’ (modesty, translated in English here as “prudency”) in Article 278 is linked to 
the system of honor, where honor is maintained through the modesty of women. The term 
haya’ here is situated within a context where violations of women’s modesty are 
considered scandalous, or lewd, acts (fe’lan fadehan), thus deterring women from 
wanting to prosecute crimes that may be viewed as a scandalous loss of their modesty. 
 The fourth of these articles exists in Part 7 of the penal code, centered on Slander, 
Cursing and the Divulging of Secrets. Article 306 illegalizes any “outrage to one’s honor 
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or dignity/modesty,” or khadsh el-hayāʾ.  This law is understood to mean that any 
sexually deviant act perpetrated within the sightline of a woman– an act that embarrasses, 
offends and psychological harms a woman - is criminal. Moreover, modesty here can be 
extended to what a woman hears, also signifying behaviors now thought of as verbal 
harassment (FIDH 2013). As already noted for the Noha Rushdie case above, prior to 
2014, Article 306 served as the legal basis for prosecuting crimes of sexual harassment, 
when they (limitedly) occurred. 
Activists note that the framing of these laws prevents women from seeking legal 
redress out of larger fears that they will be viewed as “tarnished” (FIDH 2014: 19). 
Currently, Egyptian law only recognizes rape as the penile penetration of the female 
vagina, thus eliminating the possibility that men can be victims of rape and that it is 
perpetrated by objects other than the penis. It normalizes male-female sexual interactions 
and punishes those that transgress the honor of women, and their families. Expanding and 
neutralizing the language, therefore, have been critical in making the law more equitable 
and encouraging women (and men) to seek legal remedies when their bodies are violated.  
Until 2014, the lack of legal stipulations for sexual harassment meant that 
offenses, when tried were done so within this framework that implied women’s ruin. 
However, following the Cairo University incident, the government of El-Sisi approved an 
amendment to Article 306 on modesty, which added taḥarrush ginsy to the legal lexicon 
for the first time. The amendment states: 
Article 306a - To be punished by prison a duration not less than 6 months and a fine not less than 
3000 Egyptian pounds and not to exceed 5000 Egyptian pounds, or one of these two punishments 
all those who confront others in a public space a private one or where one is present with 
permission by making forward actions, insinuations or hints that are sexual or pornographic 
whether by signals, words or action and by any means including wired and wireless 
communication methods. And punishment is by prison not less than a year and a fine not less than 
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5000 Egyptian pounds and not to exceed 10000 Egyptian pounds and by one of these punishments 
if the crime is repeated by the perpetrator via following or stalking the harassed. 
 
Article 306b - It is considered sexual harassment if the crime referred to in Article 306 (a) of this 
law is committed with the intention of the perpetrator receiving from the harassed benefit of a 
sexual nature, and the perpetrator is punished by prison not less than a year and a fine not less than 
10000 Egyptian pounds, and not to exceed 20000 Egyptian pounds or one of both punishments. 
 
The varying civil society entities working on gender based violence and sexual 
harassment issues welcomed this addition to the law, yet the criticism leveled at the 
government has focused on the narrow way in which it defined sexual harassment. Here, 
the law constrained sexual harassment to its sexual or pornographic nature, as well as to 
the context of stalking and following (El-Rifae 2014). Without an underlying gender 
analysis, the law encapsulates sexual harassment within the framework of shame and an 
offense against modesty. It is now part of a small constellation of articles that link honor 
to women’s sexuality, and the loss of honor to the loss of their bodily integrity.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the phenomenon of sexual harassment in Egypt by 
exploring the context in which it came to be understood as a problem and the history of 
social and political activism around it. Prior to 2005, sexual harassment, as taḥarrush 
ginsy, was not a concept that Egyptian civil society or the wider public understood, 
though Chapter 4 will delve further into the history of terminological usages of taḥarrush 
ginsy and key conceptual shifts since the turn of the millennium. Important here is the 
way in which the term taḥarrush ginsy was appropriated by NGOs, like ECWR, to frame 
the problem of sexual harassment as one of gender violence. Additional frames, however, 
in the early years of activism presented sexual harassment as a largely social problem. 
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Concomitantly, activism on the problem was focused on social change at the community 
and street levels and did not directly target the state for both sponsoring the use of sexual 
violence in protest and detention settings, or for enabling an environment where sexual 
harassment was tolerated by failing to enforce laws to protect women in public. This left 
ECWR open to criticism by both activists and scholars for depoliticizing sexual 
harassment by failing to include a political analysis of the role of the state in perpetuating 
sexual violence in its strategic approach, thereby avoiding the state as harasser in its 
discourse. Moreover, its focus on everyday sexual harassment left ECWR vulnerable to 
critiques that it was demonizing Arab boys and young men.  
 These critiques of anti-sexual harassment efforts focused on abuses of state power 
or the corporatization of civil society work, however, similarly failed to take a more 
expansive view of the way in which patriarchal power ordered both social and political 
practice. Amar (2011) argued that the state was involved in gendering respectability 
politics, attacking young women’s honor and driving them out of the public space. As 
part of this argument, sexual harassment was postulated as the perversion of state 
practice. Yet this perversion occurred within a wider system of gender that privileged a 
heteronormative duality, where the male-female dynamic was naturalized, and where 
female sexuality was not tolerated outside of the marital context. In public, women’s 
sexuality was controlled, in part, through normative concepts informed by Islamic 
practice that stressed the danger inherent in their bodies. Here, women’s bodies were 
ʿawra and the potential source of fitna, or social chaos. Controlling female sexuality 
through codes of modesty that protected their respectability, and therefore honor, also 
protected women’s marriageability and ensured the integrity of the patrilineal family. In 
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addition to this, however, violence was also a method through which male sexual 
aggressiveness found expression, as a means of shaming women into modest behavior.  
 The independent initiatives that arose from late 2010, such as HarassMap, have 
maintained an intense focus on community-based, street level activism, while the civil 
society sector has continued on with gender violence advocacy and promoting improved 
legislation and enforcement to better serve women’s needs. HarassMap, for its part, has 
included multiple levels of analysis in its work and drawn on feminist and psychological 
literature to contest gender binaries and gender stereotypes, but also doing so by targeting 
bystanders to change their perceptions and behaviors. In the following chapters, different 
facets of HarassMap’s work will be further explored to make visible the way in which 
their street activism is also a form of political activism.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
CHAPTER 3: THE STREET, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND MEDIATING 
TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS TO COMBAT GENDER VIOLENCE 
 
 
“So, I think those international human rights ideas are well integrated within our mission and our 
core understanding of HarassMap, and our core curricula and everything, but we’re taking baby 
steps into communicating them and we’re very cautious about how we talk…So, just to alleviate 
the tension, so we talk about like, for example, in Alexandria we were outreaching that guy who 
sells, that Salafi guy who sells books and CDs…right outside the gate of the Faculty of Law at 
Alexandria Uni…[W]e had just received a report a couple of days before of sexual harassment. A 
girl, she was going outside of uni and was harassed by a microbus driver. Eventually, she fell on 
the sidewalk and she got injured and when we went to that street we were talking to the people 
about the accident that happened two days ago, and obviously everybody said that this did not 
happen, that this girl is a phony. One of the people, when I told him that we, over the years, we 
collected more than 10,000 stories, he was, like, literally what he said was ‘they’re all bitches.’ So, 
we were talking to this Salafi guy and he was like ‘Yeah, this is awful but you know what’s also 
awful? I always see those couples making out here.’ And I’m like, making out here in the main 
street in front of Alexandria Uni? What do you mean by making out? He was like ‘They’re kissing 
and touching and walking hand in hand.’ And I’m like hey, okay, this is not what we’re talking 
about okay…And he’s, like, he starts to ask us about our religion…So, this for example…it’s a 
resistance reaction…they wanted to see us as that Westernized group who does not want men to 
harass women and who want to give more freedom to women, and God knows what happens when 
women get more freedom…” (Director Community Outreach, HarassMap) 
 
This chapter explores the context within which grassroots anti-sexual harassment 
activism unfolds in Egypt. Visible in the above quote are important aspects of this 
context and the role that entities such as HarassMap play in bringing about social change. 
In part, the work of initiatives like HarassMap is made possible by and is well ensconced 
within transnational activism on women’s rights (as human rights), in which certain 
ethics or standards about women’s lives actively informs the discourses, or intersects 
with other aspects of the discourses, employed by these initiatives to facilitate change. 
Accordingly, such initiatives play a key role in mediating the middle ground, in moving 
between and bringing together differing norms, values, and practices circulating among 
various entities at multiple sociopolitical levels. In addition, this work directly engages 
with people, and seeks to change perceptions and behaviors of individuals rather than 
institutions. Here, the street serves as an active site for the negotiation of new social 
perceptions and behaviors. In the context of repressive state politics in Egypt, 
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community-based forms of engagement offer potentially long reaching effects. Examples 
from HarassMap’s Community Outreach trainings provide useful insight on these issues. 
Since early 2013, HarassMap has held its weeklong HarassMap Academy (HMA) 
every fall and spring to train volunteers to become community captains. The role of 
community captains is to build their own neighborhood teams that conduct regular street 
outreach days, where they speak with shop owners and passers-by – those they call 
“bystanders” - to dispel myths and stereotypes around gender and women’s rights in 
public, as well as to convince them to speak up against sexual harassment when it is 
witnessed. HMA workshops are designed to teach captains how to conduct outreach, 
explore the nature of patriarchal society and gendered norms that orders the lives of both 
men and women and blames women for being sexually harassed, as well as the kinds of 
bystander responses that are prevalent when a woman is sexually harassed in public, 
among other issues.	  These HMA’s represent a critical space, or a contact zone, where 
global and local ethics intersect to produce new, and even hybrid, ways of envisioning 
gendered relations, sexual norms, and social responsibility (Pratt 1992). They also 
demonstrate the important role that HarassMap staff and volunteers play as 
intermediaries between global and local spheres.	  
A workshop session at the Fall 2013 HMA, called “Sexual Harassment: 
Information and Statistics,” offers a good example of how HarassMap reframes sexual 
harassment in ways that simultaneously draw on normative practices and beliefs in 
Egypt, as well as transnational rights regimes that center of violence against women. The 
session opened with physical performances of the below two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: Two women are walking together in the street. A thief walks by, grabs a purse from 
one of the women, and then tries to run. The woman’s companion and a passer-by both grab the 
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thief before he can get away and a fight ensues. The victim, her friend, and the passer-by drag the 
thief to the police station, where he is treated roughly by police officers. Everyone screams as they 
try to present their side of the story, while the thief is simultaneously shouting his innocence. 
 
Scenario 2: A young woman is walking down the street when a young man purposefully bumps 
into her. He begins joking with her and tries to strike up a conversation. She responds fearfully 
when a female witness takes her arm and insists she move on. Yet, the young man won’t leave her 
be, and a friend of his who appears out of nowhere urges him to go after her. The girl angrily 
demands that the young man leave her alone and that he be taken to the police station for harassing 
her. However, the female witness who initially urged her to move on also encourages her to let the 
situation go because the police will not help. The girl insists and she and the female witness force 
the harasser to the police station. While there, the police invite the young man to sit and tell his 
side of the story, and then demand to know from the woman what she wants them to do.  
 
The goal of these performances was to enjoin trainees to 1) compare the social responses 
of bystanders and police in cases of thievery versus sexual harassment, even if the 
harassment was seemingly ambiguous, and 2) to consider how criminality is understood 
vis-à-vis personal property and the body. These scenarios emerged within a context 
where thievery has long stimulated a stringent social response, often inciting action from 
numerous individuals within neighborhoods to capture thieves, beat them, and turn them 
into the police. HarassMap members saw this in stark contrast to the social response of 
community members when a woman’s body or personal space is violated. As opposed to 
the rapid mobilization that street theft garners, the HMA workshop highlighted how 
sexual harassment was frequently met with bystander silence or apathy, attempts to 
convince the victim of sexual harassment to let it go (at best), or angry responses from 
police who did not feel sexual harassment to be worth their time. Quite often, as was 
visible in the quote that opened this chapter, women claiming to have been sexually 
harassed are dismissed as unrespectable or are viewed as the cause of the sexual 
harassment. In the workshop discussion that followed these performances, HarassMap 
attempted to reframe trainee thinking to see sexual harassment not just as a problem, but 
to associate it with the criminality abhorred in theft, thus making sexual harassment a 
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criminal act that resulted from the inappropriate actions of harassers, regardless of 
perceived stimuli. Promoting the criminalization of sexual harassment aligns with efforts 
of women’s advocacy NGOs at the national level to redefine laws and penalties around 
gender violence. It also serves as a grassroots instantiation of what many scholars refer to 
as the domestic socialization of human rights norms. Here, domestic socialization refers 
to a process where norm mediators (NGOs) facilitate state adherence to international 
conventions through the creation of new (and ever improving) laws prohibiting violence 
against women (Merry 2006a; Starchursky 2013). Starchursky (2013) argues for the need 
to expand this understanding of socialization to include the work of changing perceptions 
around the law at the grassroots level, which will be further discussed later in this 
chapter.  
In addition to weaving together local and global ethics, HMA workshops further 
underscore how HarassMap members challenge the factual bases of local beliefs and 
norms, often drawing on scientifically derived data made available by other NGOs or 
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs). Similarly, HMA utilizes feminist rhetoric in 
more direct attempts to unseat entrenched patriarchal norms. In the same workshop 
above, the discussion of the two performances was followed by a talk on the statistical 
evidence around various aspects of sexual harassment in Egypt. Here, the 2013 UN 
Women study served as an important reference point, which reported that 99.3 percent of 
female respondents had experienced sexual harassment (El-Deeb 2013). As part of this, 
HarassMap staff that facilitated the workshop additionally countered what they believed 
to be prevalent stereotypes around sexual harassment, many of which were also raised by 
the trainee captains in the session. This included emphasizing that the way women 
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dressed in public was not a factor in why they might be sexually harassed, as the UN 
Women study indicated 69 percent of respondents did not believe clothing had any 
impact on who was sexually harassed. Minimally, they argued, the near universal 
numbers of women indicating they had been harassed in the survey pointed toward the 
problem itself being universally suffered by women regardless of their form of dress. 
Additionally, they countered popular notions that the economic situation and delayed 
marriage were factors underlying the existence of sexual harassment by noting that 39 
percent of harassers identified in the UN Women study were young boys not at 
marriageable ages (and therefore, somehow, also not sexually motivated or repressed). 
In another session, titled “The Gender Box: Violence Against Women,” offered 
both in Fall 2013 and Spring 2014, HMA staff encouraged trainees to confront the 
gendered roles assigned to both men and women, as well as the violence each faced for 
failing to adhere to these roles. Within this workshop, men and women were asked to list 
all of the behaviors that either made a woman “respectable” (mu’adaba) or that made a 
man masculine or manly (ragil – here the imperative, istargil, was used, asking the men 
to identify incidences that led to them being told to “man-up”). In 2013, this session 
exposed a vital tension between global and local ethics when it became heated around 
around the issue of religion, with trainees disagreeing vehemently about the way in which 
Islam either provided the grounds upon which women were oppressed or proved 
liberating to women, conferring upon them rights that were largely abused by 
contemporary society. In 2014, the session offered another order of theory regarding the 
heteronormative (al-mi’yariyya al-ghayariyya) partriarchal system that privileged the 
heterosexual binary pair (nizam al-sinna’iy), and where the control of women’s sexuality 
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was critical in maintaining the social order. Both sessions ended, as intended, with 
trainees arriving at an agreement that the violence faced by women was often more 
physical and shaming than that faced by men. 
 In order to engage with, counter, and reframe local sentiments around sexual 
harassment, HarassMap further drew on the widely examined phenomenon of the 
bystander effect, first noted by social psychologists following the infamous Kitty 
Genovese case in the United States in the 1960s, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 
(Latane & Darley 1968; Manning et al. 2007). In a session offered at the Fall 2013 HMA, 
entitled “Negotiation Skills and Management,” HMA members covered some of the most 
prevalent bystander responses that outreach teams would be expected to manage in the 
street, including 1) denial (al-inkar), where bystanders would refuse to believe in the 
existence of sexual harassment; 2) minimization (al-tadniyya), where bystanders would 
downplay the seriousness of sexual harassment, often stating that men and boys were just 
playing (byhazar); 3) blaming the victim (lawm al-dahiyya), where bystanders would 
argue a girl was asking to be sexually harassed, was not respectable, and that it was her 
clothing that incited the sexual harassment; 4) comparing the suffering of boys (muqarna 
al mʿanat), where bystanders would argue that boys were suffering due to the late age of 
marriage and they do not have a proper outlet or release for their tension; 5) reinforcing 
the status quo (tʿaziz al-wadʿa al-rahaan); where bystanders would argue sexual 
harassment did not exist in their neighborhood but might indicate where else it might be 
found, and that they often sidelined conversations by moving into other issues around 
gender and religion; 6) silence (al-sawmt), where bystanders simply would not engage in 
the conversation, and 7) justification (al-tabreer), where bystanders would argue that 
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certain sexually harassing behaviors were okay and that men should not be punished for 
committing them. The Community Outreach training manual offered examples of 
counter-responses to help trainees and volunteers combat these bystander techniques of 
avoiding direct engagement with the issue, as well as to contest the inherent gendered 
stereotypes visible in bystander statements. 
 These HMA workshops demonstrate how HarassMap staff and volunteers serve 
as important mediators and translators of norms and values circulating into and within 
Egyptian society. HarassMap members are agents in a liminal, or interstructural, process 
of change that simultaneously engages with local values, transnational women’s rights, 
feminist rhetorics, and scholarly theory on bystander behavior in order to directly 
challenge local perceptions and behaviors, or to fuse together local and global values to 
construct new conceptions of sexual harassment (Turner 1987). In a conversation with 
HarassMap’s former Marketing and Communications Director, she argued that even if 
changing people’s ideas and perceptions was hard and slow work, because it required 
changes in so many other areas of life. But if HarassMap could, minimally, change 
people’s everyday behaviors and get them to intervene against sexual harassment 
(because, somehow, it was the “cool” thing to do), then this could in turn lead to a shift in 
perceptions. Accordingly, a shift in the behaviors and perceptions of enough people at the 
societal level would, in theory, generate a critical mass of individuals speaking up against 
sexual harassment. A tipping point of bystanders, in turn, would force more equitable 
political and legal change. Political and legal change, however, was not the ultimate goal 
for HarassMap activists, for whom the politico-legal dimension was only one aspect of 
the wider societal change that they sought.  
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 Nonetheless, this chapter contends that the work of entities such as HarassMap, 
which employ wide numbers of volunteers and engage in street-level, community-based 
outreach to change perceptions, behaviors and, ultimately, social practice overall, is 
inherently a political act. Dovetailing with critiques of the depoliticizing nature of anti-
sexual harassment activism focused on community-based efforts that do not directly 
challenge the state as harasser and that do not focus on structural gender inequality 
discussed previously, this chapter underscores that the philosophical approach of 
HarassMap, in the final analysis, seeks to generate mass support that will foment change 
in social, economic and political realms. Yet, it is also argued that this change results 
from a bottom-up process of reframing the nature of social responsibility that HarassMap 
activists believe will ensure widespread and sustainable social acceptance of new norms 
around ideas that sexual harassment is an expression of gendered power that hinders 
women’s freedom and is a crime. Moreover, this chapter argues that this bottom-up, 
grassroots effort at social and political change is occurring within a field of overlapping 
and interacting global and local forces, what Pratt (1992) called a contact zone. This 
contact zone is comprised of the spaces of engagement, as well as the varying entities that 
engage in defining new and contested meanings around sexual harassment. These include 
civil society and grassroots organizations, the wider public that comes into contact with 
these entities, public and private institutions (such as universities, corporations, and small 
businesses that develop anti-sexual harassment policies), state agencies, international 
development donors, transnational anti-sexual harassment/gender violence organizations, 
and even international and Arabic media that reports on sexual harassment in Egypt. 
Within this contact zone, HarassMap, and other similar initiatives, actively mediate 
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between many of these forces to reconceptualize sexual harassment in ways that 
encourage an end to its social acceptability and greater social responsibility among 
community members, and the production of greater freedoms for women in public space. 
The next sections of this chapter situate anti-sexual harassment activism within 
the larger transnational field of women’s rights advocacy that focuses on violence against 
women. I first highlight how transnational gender violence activism has been largely 
attuned to promoting legal changes, which is also evident in Egypt. Then I discuss the 
theoretical underpinnings of mediating international norms, the role of Egyptian civil 
society within transnational space, and how Egyptian civil society entities serve as 
important translators and mediators of new and shifting norms. Finally, I compare the 
role of street politics and community mobilization with more formal advocacy channels 
that have dominated in Egyptian civil society approaches, which sets the framework for 
further analysis of the role of anti-sexual harassment grassroots movements in promoting 
social change at the community level.  
 
Transnationalism, Women’s Rights and Violence Against Women 
Women’s rights have been a feature of international governance spheres since the 
end of the Second World War. Shortly after its founding in 1946, the United Nations 
formed the Commission on Human Rights (HRC), as well as a sub-commission of the 
HRC that eventually became its own entity, the Commission on the Status of Women 
(CSW). The goals of the CSW were to advocate for the creation of new international 
legal standards designed to ensure women’s greater equality in the world and to provide a 
central forum for women around the world to work together and coordinate efforts 
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(Quataert 2011). However, the CSW and women’s issues were initially peripheral to 
larger international human rights agendas and were not well integrated with UN goals 
overall. Human rights advocates during the Cold War period debated the universality, or 
naturalness, of rights, as outlined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and worked to define varying categories of rights, such as civil/political rights, 
social/economic/cultural rights, and collective rights (Cmiel 2004; Merry 2009). Through 
the creation of various conventions and declarations in these years, Merry highlights the 
significance of the way in which human rights regimes created a “system of quasi-law” 
that, while not necessarily enforceable, could be integrated into national systems (2009: 
82-83). Women’s rights were subsumed within this process and did not materialize as a 
major field of political and legal advocacy and research until much later in the 1970s. 
Gender violence, as a distinct transnational platform around which women’s rights 
advocates rallied, arose later, fueled in part by growing feminist attentions on rape and 
domestic abuse through the later part of the 1970s and 1980s.  
By 1979, the CSW drafted what would become one of the most significant 
international conventions for global and local women’s advocacy groups, the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
Comprised of 30 articles, the convention laid out a framework for defining discrimination 
against women, enjoining states to promote more equitable social, economic and political 
conditions for women, and developing a structure for states to administer the convention 
and report on progress (Brandt & Kaplan 1995-1996). As of 2011, 188 states parties had 
ratified the convention, though many with reservations or objections, which underscored 
inherent tensions around the creation of a standard of universal rights that did not 
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accommodate differences in cultural beliefs. Brandt and Kaplan (1995-1996) noted that 
many reservations by more than 100 states members were based on tensions with 
religious doctrine, highlighting a larger impasse between (secular) universal rights and 
culture (Donnelly 2007; Merry 2009). Despite state reservations, or more importantly 
because of them, and because of the lack of state enforcement of international protocols, 
the establishment of CEDAW generated increased political and legal advocacy among 
women’s organizations worldwide and provided a common framework for promoting 
women’s equality and human rights.  
The beginnings of transnational women’s rights advocacy, underpinned by the 
force of CEDAW, coincided with the emergence of second wave feminism in the West 
and the growing grassroots women’s movements in the developing world that were all 
documenting and generating new knowledge on the scale of gender inequities and 
discrimination, particularly around acts of sexual violence, such as rape and domestic 
abuse (Quataert 2011). A number of international events occurred that helped to facilitate 
the expanding transnational focus on women’s rights and sexual violence, including the 
designation of 1975 as International Women’s Year by the UN at the behest of the CSW 
in response to the growing call for gender reform, and the designation of March 8 as 
International Women’s Day to commemorate the long (Soviet-inspired) history of 
working women’s struggles (Kaplan 1985). Between 1975-1985, the UN held several 
world conferences on women in Mexico City, Copenhagen and Nairobi that placed 
additional attention on women’s rights issues (Tungohan 2010). This was designated the 
Decade for Women, and resulted in increased emphasis on the need for a unified, global 
perspective and an integrated transnational feminist network focused on women’s rights 
 127 
unhindered by cultural difference, as well as the creation of a number of platforms 
designed to further expand the scope of women’s advocacy (Tinker and Jacquette 1987). 
The Copenhagen Program for Action and the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies 
identified specific areas for continued reform, including the reduction of gender violence, 
and infused a gender focus in all areas of sociality, economy and politics (Merry 2009; 
Tripp 2006).  
 Heightened attention to combatting gender violence emerged through a series of 
events in the early 1990’s. In 1990 the CSW submitted a resolution that was adopted by 
the UN Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC), describing gender violence as a 
form of gender-based inequality (Merry 2009). A UN CEDAW monitoring committee 
subsequently generated a recommendation that defined gender violence as a form of 
discrimination, something not originally specified in CEDAW itself. “The 1992 statement 
placed violence against women squarely within the rubric of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and made clear that states are obliged to eliminate violence 
perpetrated by public authorities and private persons” (Merry 2009: 78-79). At the 1993 
UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, women’s rights as a fundamental feature of 
human rights was expressly stipulated in the Vienna Declaration. This recognition was 
the result of a great deal of local and global advocacy by women’s groups from across the 
world, who argued that human rights doctrines only represented half of humanity 
(Friedman 1994: 22). The Vienna conference signaled a turning point in gendering the 
global human rights agenda, but it was the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on 
Women held in Beijing, from which the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was 
produced, that brought gender violence and sexual rights firmly into international 
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governance spheres and became a frame around which women’s rights activists 
worldwide rallied (Bunch & Friend 1996; Friedman 2003; Stamatopoulou 1994).	  
 These world conferences helped to turn gender-based violence into a powerful 
trope around which the work of countless women’s organizations worldwide has 
revolved. Yet, such work has not come without problems and criticisms. Chief among 
these are concerns that secular women’s rights doctrines do not represent important 
values and precepts derived from religion. This concern is part of a larger cultural 
critique of human rights, where human rights are seen to represent the inequitable 
development situation and Western hegemony over the rest of the world, and where 
culture and religion are seen as under threat from Western inspired secular ethics (Mayer 
1994; Raday 2003). Relativist arguments arose to counter the naturalization of secular-
based rights espoused in international conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. According to Brandt and Kaplan, though, relativism and the problem of 
culture are not acceptable grounds upon which to deny women equal rights with men, and 
that CEDAW “…encourages State Parties to modify cultural norms and to eliminate 
practices that hinder women’s right to equality” (1995-6: 109). Advocates of human 
rights ague that universal human rights supersede cultural practice. However, Donnelly 
(2007) argued that there is no real impasse between universality and cultural practice, 
where human rights can be grounded in moral/religious doctrine, and that relativist 
arguments assume that cultural systems are coherently understood by cultural members 
and are bounded when they are, in fact, constantly fluctuating systems of meaning.   
Related to this problem of culture is the academic critique of international 
women’s rights as a hegemonic trope, which promotes a particular feminist perspective 
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on what constitutes equality for women. According to this critique, women’s rights tied 
to international human rights agendas normalizes a particular feminist discourse 
underpinned by elite, secular, and Western(ized), livelihoods. Critics argue that 
differences between women’s issues and experiences across class and culture have been 
downplayed or dismissed, and oppositional female voices are not counted in international 
discourses. In particular, Hasso (2009) questioned the governmentalization of women’s 
rights and the creation of a transnational sphere within which national and international 
NGOs or non-profits imagines alliances between women from disparate locations. 
Grewal also argued that narratives of women’s rights have become a “regime of truth” 
that are no longer simply concerned with the civil or political rights of women but are 
restructuring the moral fabric of modern society in particular ways (2003: 121). Here, a 
transnational feminist exceptionalism is visible. This is comparable to Puar’s (2007) 
argument of Western exceptionalism, where white, heterosexual America constructed a 
new homonormative assemblage (or arrangement), positioned against a new terrorist 
assemblage, with the image of the fundamentalist, homophobic, and sexually repressed 
Muslim terrorist at its core. Puar argued that the US-led War on Terror was made 
possible, in part, via the intersection of these two assemblages. In a similar vein, 
transnational feminist exceptionalism constructs a particular assemblage of womanhood 
that is inhered with neoliberal, secular, Western, elite values.  
Other concerns around women’s advocacy center on institutionalized patriarchy. 
Zinsser (2003) argued that, throughout the Decade for Women, the contradictions 
between development practices, national priorities disadvantaging women, and 
international doctrines promoting their equality, as well as the slow and uneven pace of 
 130 
actual change on the ground in many places, resulted in women’s rights activists 
questioning “…whether women could ever become defining participant of ideologies and 
the equals of men in structures predicated on their exclusion and disadvantage” (Zinsser 
2003: 167). Yet, she noted with hopefulness that the activities of women’s organizations 
worldwide were driving women’s issues into the mainstream, bringing women together 
as a political force. Transnational networks offer activist women support structures at 
both the local and global levels as women come into contact with others advancing 
similar or complimentary agendas (Sharify-Funk 2008). Women’s rights as human rights 
also provide activists with a common platform to combat discrimination and gendered 
violence and to more coherently raise awareness of the problems that women, as a class, 
face. Notwithstanding relativist arguments, such an approach counters the problem of 
dismissing certain forms of violence as uniquely cultural deficiencies. For instance, 
Narayan (1997) argued that dowry murders should not be viewed as singularly an Indian 
problem that required reconfigurations of Indian culture, but as an expression of domestic 
abuse in a locale that had no discourse on the abuse and battering of women. The 
boundary crossing aspect of transnational women’s rights networks provide a shared 
framework and forum within which activist women are able to speak about issues and to 
tap into resources that might not otherwise be available to them, allowing them to work 
toward consensus-building and advocacy at multiple levels.  
 
Transnational Women’s Activism in Egypt 
 Within the framework of transnational activism, Egyptian women have long been 
engaged in promoting women’s equal rights, in both public and private. Even prior to 
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geopolitical shifts following the Second World War, Egyptian women were organizing 
and seeking to redefine their roles in both politics and society. Many scholars have 
explored the early decades of women’s advocacy at the turn of the twentieth century, 
noting how the image of woman and women’s public role was initially tied to the 
nationalist project and constructing Egypt’s identity as an independent and modern 
nation-state. In this period, the voices of male scholars and nationalists helped to delimit 
the scope of new discourses around women’s rights. A paradigmatic shift ensued among 
some religious scholars who saw the need for continued interpretations (ijtihad) of the 
religious texts to maintain Islam’s relevancy in the modern world, and the woman 
question served as an important facet (Badran 1996; Baron 1994; Pollard 2005). These 
individuals, referred to as Islamic modernists, along with their secular counterparts, were 
actively involved in reshaping notions of womanhood in Egypt. Among the changes that 
prominent figures, such as Murqus Fahmy, Muhammed Abduh, and Qasim Amin, 
advocated for in various ways was reform in laws governing marriage, polygamy and 
divorce, and changes in cultural practice around women’s seclusion and veiling practices, 
which Amin felt had no basis in Islam. Interestingly, Murqus, in his 1894 play al-Mar’ah 
fi al-Sharq (The Women in the East), connected seclusion and the control of women’s 
bodies to an underlying need to control paternity, since women were believed to be prone 
to sexual infidelity (Badran 1996:17).  
Women were also a critical part of challenging women’s domesticity and 
redefining their role in the public, and they included such seminal female figures as Hoda 
el-Shaarawi, Nabawiya Musa, Zaynab al-Ghazali, and Doria Shafiq, to name but a few. 
Events during the years of the First World War, including the rape of Egyptian women by 
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British soldiers and the growth of prostitution, helped to link notions of women’s honor 
with that of the nation, where threats to women were viewed as a collective threat to the 
nation. Women activists sought to address such issues, but they were silent on the 
underlying patriarchal basis of connecting women’s bodies to national honor. “Women 
nationalists used family metaphors, attacked prostitution, and discussed national honor, 
but they shied away from notions of national honor grounded in female sexuality and 
connected to their bodies” (Baron 2005: 54). However, following Egypt’s formal 
independence from British rule in the early 1920’s, it became clear to women activists 
that claims to full citizenship in Egyptian society were still being challenged through the 
denial of the right to vote (Badran 1996).  
The internationalization of women’s activism at this time initially centered around 
suffrage, where Egyptian women sought alliances with transnational women’s 
organizations, such as the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal 
Citizenship (IAW), which was comprised of women’s groups from the West and East, for 
support in promoting expanded notions of women’s citizenship. Yet, such alliances were 
frustrated by the lack of sensitivity by Western women’s organizations, which dominated 
the IAW, in understanding how the history of imperialism impacted women’s options and 
the course of change in the (former) colonies. However, Badran (1996) notes that Arab 
women activists did not articulate any distinct challenges against colonialism, despite 
being linked to nationalist movements at home, which did not help to assuage tensions 
between Western and non-Western women’s groups. By the start of the Second World 
War, international activism on women’s suffrage was fracturing, in particular due to 
tensions between Jewish and Arab women’s organizations around the looming Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict. Intra-Arab differences between women also manifested themselves 
given country-specific histories of colonialism and religious particularities, most 
especially around public (un)veiling. In Egypt, the most iconic event in the history of the 
women’s movement was Hoda Shaarawi’s public removal of her niqab (face veil) at a 
Cairo train station upon returning from an IAW congress in Europe. This signaled a shift 
in Egyptian women’s engagement with the public space, as well as the system of gender 
within which veiling was embedded. Despite their differences, though, Arab women 
across the region, led by Egyptian activists such as Hoda el-Shaarawi, were actively 
engaged in defining what Badran (1996) calls a pan-Arab feminism, focused on Arab 
women’s political and economic rights, education, and the question of Palestine. This 
would be challenged across the region in the post-WWII period. 
Following the full removal of British forces from Egypt in 1956 and the advent of 
the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser, women’s independent activism and any possibility 
for international collaborations were abruptly curtailed. Under Law 32 of 1964, all 
associations came under rigid government controls as the state moved into a period of 
nationalization and corporatization. Women’s rights entered a new state-sponsored phase, 
however, as “[t]he new Nasserite welfare state offered women an explicit commitment to 
public equality of the sexes…During these years of ‘state feminism’ many Egyptian 
women were mobilized, both in terms of their political participation and their economic 
productivity” (Blaydes and El-Tarouty 2009: 367; Al-Ali 2000; Hatem 1992). Hatem 
argued that the “state feminism” of the Nasserite and the succeeding Sadatist periods 
promoted a patriarchal paternalism that imagined women as children in need of 
protection and assistance (1994: 664). The absence of women’s independent organizing 
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left them subject to the whims of the state as it devised and implemented national gender 
policies. According to Abu Lughod, the infitah, or the open door liberal economic policy 
which went into effect in the later years of Sadat’s regime and which paved the way for 
greater Western interventions in the country through the 1980s and 1990s, led to reform 
structures that later truncated the state’s roll in advocating women’s rights (2010: 3). The 
Mubarak regime that took over in the 1980s was left with a legacy of state-sponsored 
gender reforms, many of which were highly unpopular among Islamic organizations. The 
state readily back-pedaled on women’s issues when they conflicted with other strategic 
interests, especially where it concerned negotiating with Islamic opposition groups. As 
the state retreated from supporting women’s issues, Islamic opposition parties and 
organizations at the same time began to operate more publically, taking on women’s 
issues alongside their secular counterparts.  
During the Mubarak era, and the concomitant turn toward liberalization, a 
“growth industry” of civil society organizations engaged in development and human 
rights work (Abu Lughod 2010). This growth industry of NGOs in Egypt mirrored the 
growth of NGOs world wide, tied to the changing development strategies of international 
donors and, with respect to promoting human and women’s rights, the numerous world 
conferences that were held throughout these decades. In 1994, the UN International 
Conference on Population Development (ICPD) was held in Cairo, where NGOs, 
including Egyptian organizations, served in the preparatory process (Al-Ali 2000; 
Starchursky 2013). An NGO forum was concomitantly held alongside the conference, 
which resulted in “…the possibility for many NGOs with different backgrounds to get to 
know each other, exchange ideas, discuss forms of cooperation, and make their demands 
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known to the wider public” (Starchursky 2013: 88). Moreover, NGO involvement in the 
preliminary stages gave women’s groups the ability to discuss issues around women’s 
political participation, gender violence and sexual rights (Al-Ali 2002). While the Cairo 
conference was not focused on women’s issues, participating women’s groups organized 
a campaign that firmly situated gender violence as a human rights violation  (Bunch et al. 
1996). Gender violence research and activism in Egypt concomitantly arose within the 
context of these conferences and global efforts to make the ending of women’s suffering 
part of the international human rights agenda. 
Female genital mutilation/circumcision (FGM/C), while a longstanding practice 
in Egypt, which many argue began early in the Pharaonic period and which the British 
colonial government attempted (unsuccessfully) to criminalize, became a widely 
recognized problem by international organizations in the late 1970’s when the UN Health 
Organization held the first international conference on the problem in Sudan (Ortiz 2010; 
Toubia & Sharief 2003). Research and advocacy, focused primarily on documenting the 
scale of the problem and its’ adverse health effects, persisted throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. However, it was the release of a CNN documentary showing a young Egyptian 
girl being circumcised just before the 1994 ICPD conference that placed FGM squarely 
within the framework of violence against women and spurred Egyptian women’s 
organizations to form the Taskforce Against Female Genital Mutilation (Nelson 1996). 
Similarly, domestic abuse became a problem that Egyptian women’s organizations 
researched and lobbied against in the lead up to the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing (Ammar 2000). At the Beijing Conference gender violence was not 
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only highlighted as a serious problem in Egypt but also became an active trope that 
women’s rights activism began to revolve around. 
Such events, along with the proliferation of NGOs worldwide, were part and 
parcel of what Abu Lughod (2010; 2013) and Hasso (2009) have argued to be the 
governmentalization of rights. Women’s rights, absorbed into international governance 
structures, were accompanied by the creation and professionalization of a new elite class 
of activists mediating international norms in local settings, and speaking on behalf of all 
women. With the growing participation of Egyptian NGOs in governance, the Egyptian 
state saw a need to develop its own official entity to handle women’s issues and to 
regulate the scope of NGO activities. The National Council for Women (NCW) was 
created following the Beijing conference. Moreover, the state amended the Nasserite law 
of associations (Law 32), which went through two iterations between 1997-2002 but 
continued to allow for state discretionary power over NGOs (Starchursky 2013).  
From this period on, civil society organizations in Egypt have been dynamically 
engaged with international organizations and transnational networks to draw support, in 
the form of funding, technical expertise, capacity building, and developing new norms 
and frames in which to facilitate change around women’s rights. Yet the socio-political 
field within which this work has been carried out limits the scope of influence of these 
organizations. 
 
Mediating International Human and Women’s Rights 
One important area of scholarly inquiry around human and women’s rights is 
understanding the processes by which international conventions and protocols are 
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articulated with local systems of meaning, often referred to by scholars of international 
relations as the domestic socialization of human rights norms (Risse 1999; Risse & 
Sikkink 1999). Here, the concept of norms mirrors that of culture. They are a 
conceptually fuzzy reference to ways of understanding and standards of behavior that 
draw on, and/or convey, a sense of shared tradition that feeds (and are fed by) varying 
identities. They are also contentious, unevenly experienced and performed by cultural 
actors, lack homogeneity, and are constantly shifting (Finnemore 1996; Merry 2006a). 
There are two facets of concern with respect to the socialization of human and women’s 
rights norms, 1) how states are enjoined to adhere to these conventions and to codify 
them into legislation and legal codes, and 2) how the population within a state engages 
with the ethics and spirit contained in these conventions to, somehow, incorporate them 
within a locally historic set of cultural beliefs and practices. The first has received a great 
deal of attention by those seeking to map the diffusion of international human rights 
norms and to understand the way in which state institutional structures are refashioned 
and brought into compliance with international standards, what Starchursky references as 
the “high politics” of vertical change (2013: 5, citing Smith et al. 1997: 70). Cultural 
change at the ground level on human rights, on the other hand, is less straightforward. 
Such change involves reshaping the consciousness, attitudes and behaviors of the wider 
public, or the “deep politics” of horizontal change (Starchursky 2013: 5, citing Uvin 
2000: 23). Both are viewed as critical for the success of the socialization process and the 
sustainable adoption, internalization and embodiment of universal standards of rights. 
Yet, it is the first - 
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promote more a more equitable environment for all - that often receives a greater share of 
activist and scholarly attention. 
In theoretical conceptualizations, processes of norm socialization are mediated 
primarily by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In large part, this is connected to 
the turn in development practice over the last several decades that privileged NGOs in 
terms of funding and implementing development-based project work given their 
perceived connection to the grassroots (Fisher 1997; Murdock 2003). Defined as “private 
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, 
protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development,” NGOs emerged as important players in governance and development 
spheres because, originating from within local communities, they are believed to be more 
concerned with the interests of the community and to be independent of state institutions 
(World Bank 2002: 1). Additionally, NGOs are commonly viewed as essential features of 
a healthy civil society and in facilitating democratization, particularly in locales with 
corrupt regimes (Edwards and Hulme 1997). NGOs assume the label of broker, 
translator, mediator, and norm entrepreneur, occupying intermediate space between the 
global and the local, between inter-governmental organizations (IGOs)/international 
development agencies and state/local communities (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Merry 
2006b). NGO workers negotiate with international entities in ways that are not possible 
for all members of a community and they seek to influence their fellow community 
members to see the world in new ways, inspired by external discourses that might 
seemingly be incompatible with local ways of life. Yet, this does not occur without 
tension, and as Merry (2006b) notes, those who translate or mediate exist within an 
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unequal structure of power. “Translators are both powerful and vulnerable. They work in 
a field of conflict and contradiction, able to manipulate others who have less knowledge 
than they do but still subject to exploitation by those who installed them” (Merry 2006b: 
40).  
An extensive literature exists on norms, whether international or domestic, and 
the process of norm socialization, which variously involves brokerage and mediation, 
entrepreneurial skills, and translating. It should first be noted that while norms, like 
culture, have been vaguely or generally seen as a standard of behavior, they differ from 
culture in one important way. While there is no clear consensus on what constitutes 
culture, theorizing posits culture to be an overall “system” that has varying aspects to it, 
i.e., adaptive, cognitive, structural, symbolic (Keesing 1974). This system crosscuts the 
spaces people live in, the way they mediate their environment, communicate with each 
other, and sense, experience, or imagine the world around them. Interactions in tthese 
systems are a complex series of signs, symbols and performances of actors situated in 
particular times and places. Accordingly, there can be no truth about the world, only the 
differential perspectives of actors who mediate it. Norms may be seen as a feature within 
these cultural systems, as specific codes that guide certain behaviors in certain contexts. 
In this vein, scholars of norm dynamics posit two different types of norms: regulative, or 
constitutive, norms that direct behavior in particular ways, and evaluative, or prescriptive, 
norms, which have received less attention but have been defined as “appropriate” or 
“proper” norms or rules (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Finnemore and Sikkink 
note, “norm-breaking behavior…generates disapproval or stigma…” while “…norm 
confirming behavior…produces praise, or…is so taken for granted that it provides no 
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reaction whatsoever” (1998: 892). Norms are shared within communities at varying 
scales, whether local, regional or international, and they shift based on the actions of 
actors that interact and move across these communities of scale.  
Scholars of human rights and international relations are frequently concerned with 
top-down flows, or the trickling down, of international norms to local places, which is 
referred to as norm diffusion (Zwingel 2012). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) proposed a 
three-stage process of norm diffusion. This begins with norm emergence, or norm 
building, where norm entrepreneurs, or “meaning architects,’ identify particular 
problematics and promote a new vision of appropriate behavior to, somehow, mitigate or 
alleviate the problem (Finnermore and Sikkink 1998: 897, citing Lessig 1995). Promoting 
new norms takes place within differing cultural systems of already established rules, 
codes, and meanings around appropriate behavior. In order for new norms to take hold, 
the authors argue that there must be some platform on which to promote the new norm 
and these norms must be accepted as legitimate by states and incorporated into the 
institutional fabric of differing societies. Once norm entrepreneurs are able to build a 
critical mass of states behind the new norm, this propels them into the second stage of the 
diffusion process, called norm cascades. Here, once a tipping point has been reached of 
states accepting the new norm, then other states follow. Socialization in this stage 
involves states adhering to new codes and rules largely in order to maintain their 
legitimacy and reputations within the larger international structure (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 902, citing Waltz 1979: 75-76). The final stage of the diffusion process, 
called internalization, occurs when the new norm becomes so ingrained in the way states 
operate that they are no longer contentious and become a matter-of-fact part of practice. 
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Notwithstanding the state-centric focus of this model, it provides a springboard 
for considering how non-state populations adopt new notions of rights. Indeed, 
Starchursky (2013) argues for the need to understand how domestic socialization takes 
place outside of institutional frameworks. Drawing on certain features of social 
movement theory, many scholars further elaborate on the way in which norm 
entrepreneurs, translators, and mediators engender support for new norms and new ways 
of behaving and perceiving the world at the ground level. The notion of “framing” gained 
widespread attention for helping to explain how social movement actors portray problems 
and issues to achieve a certain outcome in their activism. Framing has been defined as 
“’schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and 
label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al. 1986). 
Frames are not so much a norm, but how a new norm is discursively constructed and 
promoted to achieve certain ends. In their analysis of how social movements facilitate 
cultural change, Snow et al. (2013) outline two critical facets of the framing process, 
articulation and elaboration. Frame articulation involves the construction of the frame 
itself. This includes bringing together all of the discursive elements of the frame in 
question, which “involves the connection, or splicing together, and coordination of 
issues, events, experiences, and cultural items…so that they hang together in a relatively 
integrated and meaningful fashion” (Snow et al. 2013: 229). Frame elaboration involves 
differentially emphasizing different aspects of the frame as it evolves. The purpose of 
these processes is to build resonance or salience around the framing of new norms, which 
facilitates their acceptance among the population. 
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 Resonance is a central concept in the acceptance of new norms at the local level. 
It assumes that norm entreprenuers are translating or framing new norms in ways that tap 
into local values or practices in order to lessen the shock of change. The idea of 
localization emerged to explain how external norms might be adjusted to link with local 
practices, just as local norms may also be adjusted to accommodate the external norm 
(Acharya 2004).  However, resonance has been contested by scholars who note that 
resonant frames may not address the inherent biases inherent in local norms and that 
social movements often employ frames and espouse norms that are oppositional in 
nature, i.e that more directly challenge power imbalances (Feree 2003). Radical ideas or 
frames may actually facilitate much deeper structural changes than resonant frames. Yet, 
resonance and radicalism are not inimical processes. Both are selectively employed by 
norm mediators in shifting fashion to build support around new norms. Levitt and Merry 
(2009) posited a process they call vernacularization, which involves more active 
mediation between overlapping groups of individuals talking to each other. Norm 
mediators here are not simply or throwing together discursively disparate ideas to 
construct a new norm. Instead, these actors are involved in speaking vertically and 
horizontally, and they convey sentiments in a circuitous flow between multiple levels. 
The implication is that local communities are dynamically involved in the way that norm 
mediators construct frames and norms. This process consists of conflict and tension as 
these norm mediators strive to convey new notions of human and women’s rights in ways 
that do not reproduce the inequality they are seeking to eliminate. 
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Egyptian Civil Society and the Politics of Mediating Rights 
 Mediating international human and women’s rights is challenging for NGOs and 
other independent initiatives in Egypt’s militarized and corporatized climate. 
Intermittently since independence and continuously since 1981, Egypt has been under a 
state of emergency, purportedly in the interest of the country’s national security, but 
which has allowed the military to solidify its power as the ruling faction (Brownlee 2002; 
Reza 2007). Within this militarized context, opposition, particularly that from Islamic 
organizations but also from within secular liberal spheres, is severely restricted, though 
not extinguished. Scholars note several important features of the nature of state-civil 
society relations in Egypt. The first is that the state vacillates between differing strategies 
that are both inclusionary and exclusionary with respect to oppositional forces. 
Uncompromising repression is one such measure, which is witnessed in the shutting 
down of organizations, censoring of opposition publications, elections tampering, and 
imprisonment, torture, and murder to silence opposition figures and activists. Here, it is 
posited that repressive measures, in fact, generate more violent and militant opposition 
counter-responses (Anderson 1997). The Egyptian state further engages in a tactic of 
integrated dissent, where a certain degree of opposition and even a limited pluralism in 
the form of political parties is tolerated, in order to forestall more significant incursions 
into the political process by opposition members (Albrecht 2005). Co-optation is part of 
this integrated dissent, where entities become embroiled, in one way or another, in 
serving the interest of the state, even while they seemingly engage in challenging state 
policies and practices. Bianchi (1989) labeled this form of integrated dissent corporatism, 
whereby the Egyptian state engages with, takes over, or heavily monitors any 
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organization or entity that could stimulate widespread popular resistance to state practices 
and undermine state legitimacy, which extends over professional syndicates, political 
parties, and civil society organizations. 
 Within this corporatist framework, the legal environment demonstrates the extent 
of government co-optation over civil society. Under Law 32 of 1964, all forms of 
associations, including NGOs, came under the strict regulation of the state. Comprised of 
140 articles, the law stipulates the conditions within which associations may form, their 
structure and governance, their relations with other associations, and their funding 
process. For instance, the law prohibited NGOs from engaging in work viewed as 
unnecessary by the community and duplicating work already under the purview of 
another organization (Abdelrahman 2004). Yet, Abdelrahman argued the notion of what 
comprises necessary or unnecessary work is sufficiently vague that the state has 
significant authority to reject applications for licensing. Moreover, the law gives the state 
the right to reject licensing for those entities that prove a threat to the security of the 
country, with no guidelines as to what constituted a threat to national security. Other 
provisions of the law include the right of the state to dissolve any association, approve or 
appoint members to its board (including state officials), and to approve funding from 
external (international) sources (Abdelrahman 2004: 130-135). As NGO activism came 
into full swing within the context of liberalization, expanding transnational movements 
and the world conferences on human and women’s rights, as well as the development 
drive to fund project work through NGOs, Egyptian activists increasingly called for 
amendments to Law 32 (Fouad et al. 2005; Starchursy 2013). In 1999, consequent state 
concerns about the growing influence of NGOs in the international arena, and the 
 145 
potential ramifications of that within the local setting, resulted in an even more stringent 
version of the law generated without consultation of civil society entities: Law 153. It 
was quickly overturned by the Constitutional Court for not proceeding through proper 
channels of approval within the Parliament, yet was re-established in 2002 under Law 84. 
The new version of the law maintains the provisions of Law 32, but also specifically 
establishes that NGOs are to be excluded from political activity, thus putting most, if not 
all, advocacy NGOs at high risk of being targeted by the state. Abdelrahman argued that 
this law went as far as to nationalize civil society in Egypt and that so long as NGOs 
avoid political work – more specifically, direct challenges to state legitimacy - the state 
would give them a pass (2004: 132-136; Pratt 2005).  
 Top-down restrictions are only one factor complicating the ability of NGOs in 
Egyptian civil society to mediate the socialization of human and women’s rights norms 
and to create a more broad based movement to combat gender violence. Despite the 
growth industry of NGOs in the last several decades, the existence of a true civil society 
in Egypt is contested and argued to be weak, not only due to overarching controls from 
the state, but also because of the perceived lack of an ethic of tolerance, acceptance, and 
collaboration between differing civil society groups (Al-Sayyid 1993; Ibrahim 1996). A 
perceived absence of civility and a high degree of intolerance marks relations between 
these groups, particularly between Islamic and secular organizations. Moreover, 
increasing professionalization in the NGO field and the competition for funds creates a 
general atmosphere of mistrust and infighting among organizations (Al-Ali 2000 and 
2002; Abdelrahman 2002 and 2004). The lack of political space afforded to NGOs results 
in internal conflicts and a lack of mutual acceptance. Individual activists are often unable 
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to dissent within this rigid NGO system, in part, due to fears around being marginalized 
and labeled a traitor (Starchursky 2013: 102; Abdelrahman 2002). In many ways, civil 
society reflects the practices of political society, where corporatist arrangements lead to 
divisiveness and competition where certain groups seek to repress others while 
attempting to generate popular support for their own agendas (Abdelrahman 2002). 
Along with the presence of internal incivility, the elite nature and lack of internal 
democratic structure within Egyptian NGOs further impedes their ability to effectively 
mediate human and women’s rights discourses and to facilitate change (Abdelrahman 
2004; Langohr 1994). In her analysis of 60 NGOs in both Cairo and Upper Egypt, 
Abdelrahman (2004) noted the class bias among the leadership of almost all of these 
organizations. Board members consisted of members of influential families, former 
ministry officials, as well as individuals with high levels of education and 
professionalization in various fields, such as medicine and law. Her informants argued 
that having the qualifications and expertise necessary to undertake NGO project work 
were requisites both for project success and for building confidence among community 
members and beneficiaries (Abdelrahman 2004: 155). However, Abdelrahman raised 
concern that NGO elitism disconnected them from the issues and sensibilities of the 
popular classes, which they are often lauded for within development circles. Scholars 
widely note that the increased institutionalization and professionalization of NGOs and 
their staff often lead to a disjuncture between NGOs and the communities they serve, as 
elite language and seemingly Western-inspired discourses contribute to the potential 
alienation of community members from the NGOs providing services (Murdock 2010). 
Additionally, NGOs have been viewed as a vehicle for NGO leaders to become quasi-
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authoritarian rulers, to (attempt to) ingratiate themselves within the political sphere, and 
to acquire and (mis)use funds for personal gain (Petras 1999; Spiro 1996-1997). Al-
Sayyid Sa’id argued that NGOs serve as vehicles for political officials to mobilize the 
public toward the interest of the state (2005: 66). However, NGOs may similarly serve as 
vehicles for corrupt individuals not already involved in the political process to mobilize 
NGO resources in their own attempt to advance themselves into the political arena.  
 Political engagements on women’s rights in Egypt, within the framework of state 
corporatism and the lack of NGO cooperation, manifest themselves in particular ways. A 
number of strategic approaches have developed that reflect activist considerations of 
where their work might have the most impact, given the limited space afforded to them 
by the state to challenge the status quo and their beliefs about the nature of social and 
political change. Common approaches included conducting research, writing reports, 
running awareness-raising events, such as seminars, conferences and workshops, as well 
as offering training sessions and legal clinics. “Nadwat (seminars/ workshops) and 
mu’atamarat (conferences) are among the most commonplace and visible activities of the 
Egyptian women’s movement, a phenomenon which is sometimes used to discredit the 
women’s movement as ‘women who spend their time sitting and talking’” (Al-Ali 2000: 
171). Topical concerns include raising the legal consciousness of women around Personal 
Status laws, poverty reduction through assistance with access to services and running 
micro-credit type programs, and sexual violence programming focused on FGM/C and 
domestic abuse (Al-Ali 2000). As noted in previous chapters, there is also concern with 
increasing women’s political participation in government and lobbying government 
officials to support changing discriminatory laws. Much of the work of these NGOs seeks 
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structural change in top-down fashion, though this is not to imply that NGOs do not work 
directly within communities to offer services and support, which has always been a 
component of the strategic approach for many NGOs. Underlying NGO strategies is an 
apparent conviction that to change the structure of discrimination against women 
involves changing legal and institutional processes, and pressuring the state to comply 
with and enforce international human and women rights standards. The need to encode 
human and women’s rights within the overarching structure is of paramount importance. 
Consequently, political and legal changes, like stricter punishments for offenses against 
women, are seen as the kind of force needed to then shift widespread social practices.  
Yet women’s NGO advocacy work in Egypt occurs within a patriarchal 
institutional structure that already disadvantages and discriminates against women. A 
number of factors are unclear in this process, including whether the state is able to shift 
cultural beliefs or is simply a mirror of those beliefs, and the extent to which changes in 
the political and legal environment are able to reshape social perceptions among the 
populace. An account of a sexual harassment incident witnessed by the HarassMap 
Community Outreach Director, Hussein El-Shafei, serves as an important example of 
concerns that have arisen from independent initiatives since 2010 that have chosen to 
bypass lobbying for legal change as a means of facilitating societal change. According to 
El-Shafei, while traveling by microbus from Alexandria to Cairo, a woman vehemently 
accused a man sitting behind her of sexually harassing her. The microbus stopped while 
passengers attempted to calm the woman and urge her to let it go, asserting their desire to 
get home. The woman demanded the man be forced off but he loudly declared that he 
would not leave. When the bus took off with the man still as a passenger, the woman 
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made a phone call that passengers could hear where she insisted the police be waiting at 
their arrival point to arrest the man. At this point, the man shouted to be let off the bus, 
yelling that the woman “would send him to hell.” The passengers all agreed it would be 
better for him to run off into the desert than be arrested. To El-Shafei, aside from 
showing no concern for the woman, passengers did not see sexual harassment as a crime 
and definitely not something worth being arrested and prosecuted for. Despite already 
existing laws on “indecent assault,” and even recent attentions in the media on the 
growing problem of sexual harassment in Egypt, particularly given the assaults in Tahrir, 
HarassMap activists have argued that people do not see sexual harassment as problematic 
or as a punishment-worthy offense. More importantly, according to El-Shafei, “people 
don’t want to stop harassing, they just don’t want to get caught.” This story illustrates the 
wide gap between social and politico-legal ethics. The law itself may not be enough of a 
deterrent to circumvent discriminatory practices, and people would still find the creative 
means to engage in discriminatory behavior that would allow them to avoid getting 
caught.  
 
The Street as the Site for Societal Change 
In the strategic repertoire of NGO approaches and activities, social change is 
facilitated through more direct forms of engagement with the political and legal 
machinery in Egypt. Embedded as they are in a larger global process that seeks state 
compliance with international standards of universal rights, Egyptian NGOs strive to 
create more a equitable rights based structure enshrined in political and legal practice. 
Part of the problem with the relationship between rights and the political sphere is 
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inherent connection of rights-based claims to notions of liberalism, which underpin 
Western-inspired international conventions and standards. According to Schneider 
(1986), liberalism emerging from capitalistic frameworks is assembled around the 
opposition of self and other, individual and community. Rights that are part of this liberal 
scheme are, therefore, individualistic, owned by people, and “overemphasize the 
separation of the individual from the group, and thereby inhibits an individual’s 
awareness of her connection to and mutual dependence upon others” (Schneider 1986: 
595). Moreover, Schneider highlights the critique that rights are reified, or festishized, 
creating a social order around which people imagine a new sense of belonging and 
community.  Yet, she goes on to say that this reification of rights tends to diminish the 
diversity inherent in social worlds, divides and disunites people from each other, and 
creates a dependency on state structures that confer upon people their rights. American 
feminist scholars prominent in anti-rape and anti-sexual harassment activism in the 
1970’s and 1980’s also argued that legal frameworks are themselves patriarchal and that 
rights encoded in the law represent masculinized understandings of the world (Baker 
2007; MacKinnon 1983). Some groups within the American women’s movement chose 
not to engage with the state and the law in shaping social change around sexual 
harassment. This is not to say the law is not helpful in projects that seek societal change. 
The question is the extent to which the law, which is embedded within already 
discriminatory and patriarchal institutions, can be refashioned or deployed to reshape 
wider social perceptions around new notions of women’s rights and gender violence.  
For the independent initiatives that arose in Egypt in late 2010 and then in the 
post-Revolutionary period, direct political and legal engagement to facilitating change 
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was not a strategic method of choice. The question of whether political and legal change 
could effect wider social change was arguable to some activists and perhaps not a 
consideration reflected upon by others. However, the corporatist nature of advocacy and 
activist work in Egypt’s corrupt political environment was widely evident, which left 
some activists looking for means to promote change without becoming embroiled in state 
machinations. Until 2014, many of these new initiatives, including HarassMap6, Ded el-
Taharrush, Harakat Bassma, and others that arose and waned early, chose to work 
informally in the street, without registration, and by using a volunteer pool of community 
members that engaged in activism, often on a part time basis. This street-level work 
involves speaking directly to strangers, opening a dialogue, and engaging in debate, with 
the intent of seeking agreements from individuals that they will behave in new ways vis-
à-vis sexual harassment; i.e., either they will stop sexually harassing or they will speak up 
if they witness sexual harassment. Such strategies do not eschew the uses of the law and 
law enforcement mechanisms in promoting change. For example, as already discussed in 
the previous chapter, Harakat Bassma openly coordinated with police forces when 
implementing street patrols. According to Bassma co-founder, Nihal Saad Zaghloul, the 
goal of this was to build a cooperative and not a combative relationship with the police, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  While not formally registered, as previously mentioned HarassMap incubated with Nahdat al Mahrousa in 
2012. In late 2013, they submitted their application for formal registration as both an NGO and a 
corporation. In this year, HarassMap split into two entities: HarassMap and Tadween. Tadween was 
comprised of HarassMap’s research unit, which became a separate entity in its own right, with the goal of 
engaging in research on gender violence and monitoring and evaluating project work. In 2014, the 
government of El-Sisi began a project to update Law 84 of 2002 and gave all formal NGOs and informal 
initiatives in Egypt until November 2014 to submit their NGO registration applications. In prior years, 
NGOs creatively skirted the provisions of Law 84 by registering as corporations and were now being 
forced into new forms of compliance by the re-installed military regime. Similarly, the unregistered street 
initiatives were required to register in order to continue with volunteer-based operations. As of the research 
period for this project, Bassma tentatively indicated their interest in registering and Ded el-Taharrush was 
waiting for the application period to open to incubate with Nahdat el-Mahrousa. 
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such that their work would not be thwarted and the police might actually prove helpful in 
apprehending harassers or supporting victims. Similarly, Shoft Taharush is also closely 
connected with the police and the Ministry of Interior in monitoring new sexual 
harassment units. HarassMap openly encourages victims of sexual harassment to submit 
police reports in order to normalize the process of reporting so that, eventually, the police 
will not see such reports as nuisances and victims as unrespectable. Notwithstanding 
these examples, a number of reasons exist with respect to the choice these initiatives 
made to work in communities and not lobby for political and legal reforms. 
In part, the post-Revolutionary period offered a unique opportunity to engage in 
volunteer-based community work directly in the streets that was not possible before. The 
fall of the Mubarak regime opened up a more dynamic environment within which 
activism and rights-based work could take place (ElSayed and Rizzo, unpublished 
manuscript). Certainly, the political vacuum also meant that the rigid controls on 
associations were temporarily interrupted, and thus gave new groups a window within 
which to engage in new forms of activism that had not previously been seen in Egypt, 
including work in the streets and via online platforms (Khamis 2011). Also, many 
activists express concerns that formalized engagement with the state will lead to co-
optation and eventual ineffectiveness. Many of these organizations feel that volunteerism 
and community involvement in social change is, somehow, more effective because it 
derives from a spirit of wanting change. According to Nihal Saad Zaghloul, the family-
like nature of informal work is appealing. This was echoed in the perspective of Ayman 
Nagy, the founder of Ded El-Taharrush, who stressed that Ded El-Taharrush activists 
interact with each other outside of their activist work and that developing a family-like 
 153 
trust among members is critical to the success of community outreach. There was a sense 
of the inherently democratic nature of such work, where decisions were made collectively 
and hierarchies were minimized, with people occupying a few leadership positions 
simply to facilitate the completion of work. This stands in contrast to the more 
hierarchical structure of pre-Revolutionary NGOs, with entrenched leadership and a lack 
of internal democratic ethos. However, it must be stated that some entities arose with 
relatively narrow objectives, and without very well developed philosophies or approaches 
to street-level work. For instance, both Bassma and Ded el-Taharrush targeted all 
individuals, harassers, bystanders and victims, in their outreach, with the intent to open a 
dialogue. However, there was no underlying philosophy of cultural change guiding their 
approach to promoting change. 
Organizations like HarassMap, on the other hand, developed a relatively 
philosophical program for mediating social change and encouraging respect for women’s 
rights. HarassMap members felt that engendering sincere belief for women’s rights at the 
ground level could not be done effectively from within the political or legal sphere. 
According to HarassMap co-founder and Executive Director Rebecca Chiao, the state 
itself had no motivation to change or to enforce change regarding the situation for 
women. This mirrored feminist arguments around the state’s lack of commitment to and 
trivialization of women’s rights (Bunch 1990 and 1995). HarassMap fundamentally 
differed from other NGOs in Egypt that were active in women’s rights advocacy with 
respect to where they identified the locus of change. Instead of a top-down flow where 
new political and legal formulations would somehow infiltrate the structure of beliefs (or 
fears) among the populace, HarassMap activists envisioned a bottom-up flow of shifting 
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ideologies that would impact how people wanted to be governed. In recent years, scholars 
have explored such forms of bottom-up change, including Bayat (1997 and 2010), who 
posited the notion of “quiet encroachment,” which afforded more mobilizational power to 
the people. Social change started with the values and practices of the people themselves, 
of whom state officials were a part.  
In this formulation, the people were the force necessary to instigate political and 
legal change. With enough people espousing new perspectives and behaving in new 
ways, political change would then follow to accommodate new widespread social 
realities. Having said this, it is important to note that this philosophical platform espoused 
by HarassMap developed within a context where a certain amount of political advocacy 
was already occurring and community-level work was not seen as sufficiently deep. 
HarassMap members did not argue that political advocacy in Egypt was a lost cause 
because of state oppression and that political and legal changes prior to social change on 
the ground were not possible. In fact, HarassMap actively cooperated with other civil 
society organizations and, somewhat hesitantly (and without uniform support internally 
from staff members), with state entities. However, they argued that society-wide changes 
started with the people themselves and not necessarily with political institutions.  	  
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the global and local context within which anti-sexual 
harassment activism has been situated, along with how activists serve as intermediaries 
between these two contexts to mediate new norms of women’s rights and gender 
violence.  While the notion of women’s rights was more generally part of international 
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human rights advocacy in the post-WWII period, it did not become a critical or active 
force until the Second Wave Women’s Movement arose in the 1970s. In this period, 
women’s organizations from around the world, though predominantly from Western 
countries, lobbied at the international level to mainstream gender concerns and to demand 
that gender and women’s rights receive greater attention in international governance 
spheres. Through the 1970s – 1990s, various legal instruments, world conferences, and 
international platforms were devised and organized that were geared toward enforcing 
national compliance with international standards around women’s human rights and 
ending gender violence. This work focused on facilitating state compliance and mediating 
the socialization of international law into national institutional frameworks. As part of 
this, civil society as important mediators in the socialization process was discussed, along 
with the constraints that hindered this mediation in Egypt. 
In the mediation process, NGOs have been argued by scholars to be norm 
entrepreneurs, or entities that develop and frame new values and practices, and who work 
at the state level to facilitate more equitable politico-legal structures that align with these 
new values. Political and legal change, in turn, is postulated to lead to society-wide 
changes where all individuals eventually come to have greater respect for women’s 
rights. Such change occurs in a top-down flow from international governance spheres to 
the ground level. In the Egyptian context, the long history of state corporatism, as well as 
emergency rule, created a challenging context where NGOs had very little political space 
in which to enjoin the state to make political or legal changes. This lack of political space 
resulted in internal bickering and mistrust among civil society members that generated 
concerns about their overall effectiveness as norm mediators. Partially due to this 
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situation with Egyptian civil society, just prior to and more rapidly since the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution new independent initiatives arose around the problem of sexual 
harassment. As opposed to direct state engagement, these initiatives chose to employ a 
largely volunteer corps of community members and to focus efforts at the street level.  
With respect to HarassMap efforts, this community-based approach was underpinned by 
the philosophical belief that the locus of societal change was not rooted in the institutions 
of politics or law, but with the people themselves who formed the core of society. By 
changing the hearts and minds of enough people, i.e., by getting people to speak up and 
accept new norms of women’s public roles, HarassMap believed that equity around 
women’s participation in the public space could be more sustainably achieved.  	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CHAPTER 4:  ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT DISCOURSES:  
FRAMING NORMS OF GENDER VIOLENCE AND CRIMINALITY IN EGYPT 
 
In May 2014, HarassMap’s new Marketing and Communications unit head, Noora 
Flinkman was participating in an interview, held early in the morning in a Western-style 
coffee shop in the upscale neighborhood of Maadi, not far from HarassMap’s new office. 
Sitting in the covered courtyard, Flinkman and her interviewer, a British researcher who 
happened to be conducting participant observation with HarassMap at the same time I 
was present within the organization, were the only individuals in the café that morning. 
They sat at a table in which Flinkman was facing the doors that lead to a backroom area 
where the shīshas (hookahs) were prepared, while the researcher had his back to the 
doors. In the course of carrying out the interview, Flinkman became aware of a young 
man, the person in charge of providing the shīsha, coming out of the door. She noticed 
that his pants were unzipped and that he was visibly masturbating in her sightline. “I just 
like noticed it and he was standing in the door of this shisha room, like completely in the 
open, not behind anything, not like hiding inside the door halfway or anything like 
outside of the door…like his whole zipper was open and his whole penis was out and he 
was masturbating and his penis was like, I mean I could, like, ugh, I could see 
everything…it was completely erect…” The young man stared at Flinkman as she 
watched in disbelief while he masturbated in front of her.  
Flinkman’s experience, while disturbing, is an example of what is now recognized 
by anti-sexual harassment activists as a common occurrence reported by women in 
Egypt. In their 2014 research report, HarassMap indicated that “indecent exposure” 
constituted 12 percent of the more than 1200 narratives received via their crowdmapping 
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platform, a category they defined as “Showing intimate parts of the body or masturbating 
in front of someone or in their presence” (Fahmy et al. 2014, pp. 41 & 59). Prior to 
HarassMap’s study, UN Women similarly found that 12.8 percent of their study sample 
of almost 2000 women, out of 3500 total respondents, identified experiencing “Exposure 
by the man of private parts or hinting to it” (El Deeb 2013). Interestingly, in their 2008 
study, ECWR noted that 4.3 percent of their male study population admitted to revealing 
themselves in public, though the study did not report the frequency of public 
masturbation (Hassan et al. 2008). Masturbation exists as part of a constellation of new 
behaviors comprising taḥarrush ginsy, which has become a regular feature of public life 
for women, yet Flinkman’s experience following her exposure to public masturbation is 
not so common in that she chose to report her sexual harassment to the police and to 
follow it through the court process. Her experience with police reporting helps to 
illuminate what activists see as problems with sexual harassment and legal avenues for 
redress in the country, which community-based anti-sexual harassment initiatives like 
HarassMap actively combat, though not directly with police and legal institutions but 
indirectly with community members and the public.   
With Flinkman’s case serving as a stating point, the goal of this chapter is 
threefold: 1) to understand the efforts and tensions with criminalizing sexual harassment; 
2) to explore anti-sexual harassment discourses, focusing specifically on prominent 
themes in the content of such discourses; 3) to examine the framing strategies employed 
by initiatives to change social perceptions and build a society of bystander publics that 
will speak up against sexual harassment; and 4) to interrogate efforts by anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives to persuade people of the criminal nature of sexual harassment 
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while bypassing legal structures. Evident themes in anti-sexual harassment discourses 
include defining sexual harassment as violence, challenging victim blaming rhetoric, 
identifying the role of men in perpetuating the problem, confronting the perceived basis 
of sexual harassment, managing public safety, and promoting criminality and state 
responsibility to end sexual harassment. Moreover, resonant and radical techniques are 
employed in overlapping fashion to frame sexual harassment in particular ways, such as 
associating desired behaviors with historic values and practices that Egyptians have held 
dear, mythologizing certain stereotypes around the existence of sexual harassment, and 
directly challenging patriarchal ideas of appropriate behaviors for women in the public 
space.  
 
Patriarchy, Victim Blaming and the Problem of Reporting Sexual Harassment 
 When Flinkman realized she was witnessing a man publicly masturbate, she 
immediately alerted her companion, the British researcher, who did not turn to witness 
the masturbation. He later indicated that he did not know what kept him from doing so. 
That the researcher did not actually view the masturbation event later raised some 
question among investigators as to the veracity of Flinkman’s claims, but did not prohibit 
the process from moving forward. Flinkman’s status as a foreigner might have helped her 
case with the police, but her position as a HarassMap member also led to suspicion that 
she was fabricating the story. In general, anti-sexual harassment and women’s rights 
activists have noted the “double victimization” women face when reporting any form of 
gender violence to the police because they are often not believed, where “prosecutors 
tend to be skeptical of the testimony of survivors,” and they are often required to bring in 
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two witnesses to confirm sexual harassment happened, in addition to other problems in 
police stations (FIDH 2014: 35 & 43; Jones 2014; Shawky 2011). In their 2008 study, 
ECWR noted that police tended to mock women reporting their experiences, making 
women reluctant to come forward to seek legal assistance (Hassan et al. 2008). 
After telling the British researcher what she witnessed, Flinkman called several 
work colleagues, one of who showed up to the café, along with her fiancé. Together, the 
four decided that Flinkman should report the incident to the café owner, which she did by 
phone since he was not physically present that day. Seeming apologetic, the owner 
promised the offender would be reprimanded and/or fired. However, he did not agree to 
show up at the café to manage the situation until Flinkman intimated that she intended to 
file a police report. The owner showed up shortly thereafter and told her he had already 
taken the liberty of calling the raʾīs el-mobaḥthīn (Chief Investigator) at the police station 
and that he would take care of everything once the investigator showed up, hoping that 
this would satisfy Flinkman and her companions enough to leave. Instead of leaving 
immediately, however, the four waited in their car in the street in the hopes of speaking to 
the investigator when he showed. After a couple of hours, the owner then came out to let 
them know the investigator had come and gone and that the report was filed.  
Skeptical, the four left the coffee shop but realized they did not request a physical 
copy of the report or the report number to follow-up on the case. They decided to go to 
the police station and check whether a report was actually filed. At the station, the four 
were directed to several offices where Flinkman had to recount her story anew each time 
to different investigators. Each recounting of the story generated a contradictory set of 
responses, where officers appeared smiling and visibly impressed with the masturbating 
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young man, yet they verbally cursed him and called him an animal. Flinkman stated, 
“Well, I remember that they, every time when I got to the part about his zipper…all of 
them smiled and they were kind of like shocked…people were smiling, like, that’s kind 
of funny…” The British researcher, who accompanied Flinkman to the station, noted of 
one particular investigator, “…he was like, they’re animals, and then they repeatedly 
sounded explanations…they said, oh but the thing is its because they can’t get married, 
and if they can’t get married what are they going to do? I just remember he sat there 
going ‘lezim’ (necessary)…as if it was something sad, but inevitable…”  
Whether each of these encounters were required as part of the internal vetting 
process before Flinkman was allowed to see the Chief Investigator is unclear. However, 
the officers’ reactions highlight prevalent, underlying perceptions of sexual harassment 
and men who harass that exist more broadly in Egyptian society and among police, who 
HarassMap members have argued reflect the values of their society. Since the January 25, 
Revolution, Egyptians have increasingly viewed sexual harassment as a problem and 
many have frequently decried men who harass as “ḥyawān” (animals). At the same time, 
many (if not most) Egyptians also view sexual harassment as a fairly minor problem – 
certainly one that does not require the involvement of police - and one that is easily 
excused as the inevitable result of the deteriorating economic situation (Peoples 2008). A 
refrain commonly heard, and also markedly visible in survey data collected for this 
project, is that men harass because they have pent up tension, or “shaḥwa” (lust), that 
cannot be released through the typical channel of marriage, which is denied them by their 
lack of having a job or money. For this reason, despite implicit understandings that sexual 
harassment is somehow crossing a line in public gendered interactions, many readily 
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argue that sexual harassment is something that men cannot help and, usually, that women 
encourage in one way or another.  
 Such rationales became visible in Flinkman’s case when she was met with the 
Chief Investigator and was confronted with her harasser. After a few hours at the station, 
Flinkman and her group were taken to an anteroom to the Chief Investigator’s Office. 
Unbeknownst to them, officers were sent to the coffee shop to bring the harasser in for 
questioning. Generally speaking, it is not typical for the police to bring in a harasser for 
questioning. Victims of sexual harassment in Egypt are frequently the ones required to 
produce their own harasser (Jones 2014). Noha Rushdy’s infamous 2008 sexual 
harassment case, the first of its kind in the country, which garnered wide media attention, 
was prosecuted partially because Rushdy forcibly dragged her harasser to the police 
station after the police insisted she needed “to bring the perpetrator in” (Ilahi 2008).   
Flinkman’s harasser was brought into the Chief Investigator’s officer prior to 
Flinkman and her companions. Sometime afterward, the four were permitted in to see the 
Chief Investigator, where Flinkman had to recount her story yet again in front of her 
harasser, who denied Flinkman’s accusations. The young man argued that Flinkman tried 
to seduce him by sitting in her chair sideways with one leg hanging over the arm, leaving 
her spread-eagle in invitation. While the harasser’s characterization of Flinkman’s actions 
were explicitly sexual, many Egyptians often dismiss sexual harassment with less 
explicit, but no less sexual, explanations that women entice men to sexually harass by 
dressing suggestively in tight clothes, or by wearing Western clothing that is often 
described as akin to nakedness. For anti-sexual harassment initiatives like HarassMap, 
ascribing sexual harassment to women’s behavior or dress is a form of blaming the 
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victim, which places responsibility on women to stem male desire through restrictions on 
their own movement and practices. Initiatives challenge the way sexual harassment is 
linked to male desire, where it is viewed less as a criminal act and more of a moral 
dilemma that women must manage. Failure to manage sexual harassment in satisfactory 
ways, i.e. by not engaging with the harasser or by staying out of public, ultimately results 
in compromises to a woman’s respectability. For the initiatives, male harassers are rarely 
held responsible for failing to control their own behaviors, which is part and parcel of 
victim blaming attitudes. 
Neither Flinkman nor her companions knew if the Chief Investigator believed the 
harasser’s counterclaim. However, he permitted Flinkman to move forward with 
completing a report. In order to do so, she had to leave the investigative side of the police 
station and move over to where the uniformed officers were located, where she was once 
again forced to recount her story for the report. However, the British researcher noted, 
despite some amount of tittering, the investigators were very skeptical of the event and 
there was some sense they did not buy Flinkman’s story. The uniformed officers, on the 
other hand, found the incident entirely believable, hilarious and unproblematic. Flinkman 
was asked several questions that were not for the purposes of the report where officers 
seemingly wanted to know more of the details of the event for their own amusement. 
 In the following days, Flinkman and the British researcher met with the nī’eba 
(Prosecutor) to be officially interviewed for legal proceedings, with the help of a lawyer 
provided for free by Nazra for Feminist Studies.  At the Prosecutor’s office, Flinkman 
was subjected to detailed and graphic questioning on the café layout, the way they had 
been sitting, the directions they were facing, as well as the masturbation event itself. 
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Referring to the Prosecutor, the British researcher stated, “Yeah…he laughed, as well, 
when you told him what happened…the way he spoke, the terminology he used was 
really kind of like porn terminology.” Flinkman and her companion noted that the 
prosecutor found her tale of the event humorous and asked them, in English, “did he 
cum,” followed by a laugh. Moreover, the prosecutor asked which hand the young man 
used and how he moved his hand. Following that, the Prosecutor wanted to know how the 
event left Flinkman feeling. In English, she responded that she had been disgusted, which 
the Prosecutor translated in his official report as feeling shamed (‘ār). At the same time 
that this was taking place, the young harasser and the café owner were also required to go 
through questioning. They were brought into the Prosecutor’s office while Flinkman and 
the British researcher were present, where the café owner denounced Flinkman as hating 
Egypt, hating the army and wanting to destroy the country’s reputation. Moreover, he 
raised questions as to whether or not Flinkman was a member of the Ikhwān (Muslim 
Brotherhood) and how her position as a staff member at HarassMap lead her to fabricate 
accusations to create a story, both of which the Prosecutor appeared to seriously consider.  
Ultimately, Flinkman’s case went to court and the young harasser was sentenced 
to a year in jail. However, her experience in the process highlights critical issues 
surrounding public perceptions of sexual harassment that civil society entities have 
identified as problematic and work to combat. 
Between 2005 and the start of the Revolution, the public viewed (and largely still 
views) sexual harassment as a relatively insignificant problem, if a problem at all. When 
sexual harassment cases arise, many often view them more as moral or interpersonal 
conflicts between men and women, based in a number of precipitating factors. As 
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described above, one of those factors is economic, where sexual harassment is seen as the 
inevitable expression of masculine insecurity given changing conditions that restrict their 
access to resources and culturally prescribed lifeways. Conflict occurs because men and 
women are either in competition for limited jobs or men are faced with an inability to 
meet their social obligations, thus resulting in them lashing out against women.  
Other factors include a variety of social conditions, such as a lack of being 
properly brought up and having insufficient religious belief, which people apply to both 
women and men in sexual harassment incidents. In addition, people frequently ascribe the 
problem of sexual harassment to one of women dressing according to Western and not 
Eastern/Islamic standards or, even if dressed in hijāb (head scarf) and niqāb (face veil), 
wearing clothing too tight and walking in suggestive ways, among other factors (Fahmy 
et al. 2014). Both men and women are often accused of failing to adhere to socially or 
religiously prescribed codes of behavior. Yet, more specifically, women are still largely 
assumed to be the ones transgressing sexual boundaries, thus forcing men to likewise 
transgress. The moral or interpersonal dilemmas raised by public sexual harassment can 
be resolved with changes in women’s presence or comportment in public space – not 
changes in men’s behavior and especially not through criminal proceedings.  
Moreover, anti-sexual harassment groups note the connection people make 
between sexual harassment and sex or sexual desire. Hussein El-Shafei, Director of 
HarassMap’s Community Outreach Unit, highlighted one case of an outreach event that 
occurred outside of the Alexandria University campus following an incident in which a 
young girl was injured while being sexual harassed. Speaking with one vendor in the 
street around the campus, El-Shafei indicated that the man stated, “yeah, this is awful, but 
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you know what’s also awful? I always see those couples making out here…they’re 
kissing and touching and walking hand in hand…” To El-Shafei, while talking about 
taḥarrush ginsy, the vendor was unable to distinguish the difference between consensual 
and non-consensual sexual interludes. The vendor conflated both the sexual harassment 
that resulted in injury to the girl with the “making out” of other students in public, which 
El-Shafei disparaged, saying “I’m like, making out here in a main street in front of 
Alexandria Uni?” It should be noted that “making out” in Egypt is not necessarily 
equivalent to making out in the West, where kisses in public, if they occur between men 
and women, would include double-cheeked greetings. Generally speaking, these are not 
considered appropriate for men and women in public and might hint at sexual access.  
Organizations like HarassMap, in addition to other community-based groups, 
challenge these patriarchal norms in their discourses and messaging, which privilege and 
excuse male behavior while placing the blame on women for allowing themselves to be 
victimized. Anti-sexual harassment groups eschew these gendered constructions, noting 
that sexual harassment is a form of male control over women to force them into 
appropriate behavior. Eba’a El-Tamimi, the former Marketing and Communications 
Director at HarassMap stated, “Not all but a lot of men see women as whores… 
harassment is about control and the harassment that happens is often disgusting.” Other 
activists have argued sexual harassment is a way of punishing women, as noted by Dalia 
Abdel Hamid, the gender officer at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, who said: 
“I think the way sexual violence is used in Egypt on a daily basis and on that severity, and the 
forms, like mob assaults and the gang harassment and so on, these are actually tools to punish 
women for their presence in public space and I think maybe because that presence has 
exponentially increased after the revolution, also the rate of the sexual violence has changed, it has 
increased as equally. I think it’s a way to express...that inferior look to women, you know? 
Sometimes I think that men in the society are being brought up in a way that they are 
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superior…and they find that women are managers and that they are in far better places 
sometimes…and they have to be punished.” 
 
In addition, anti-sexual harassment groups note that the social acceptability of 
sexual harassment in Egypt also stems from larger public ignorance of that which 
constitutes taḥarrush ginsy. Referring to Flinkman’s experience, an example of both 
patriarchal public beliefs and the lack of awareness is visible in how the police officers 
and prosecutor treated public masturbation as humorous and the necessary behavior of a 
frustrated man unlikely able to marry and who could not help himself. Such behavior was 
not treated as a violating act with detrimental effects on women. While the law gave 
Flinkman a narrow avenue by which to seek redress for a public act that she felt to be 
sexually harassing, her ability to do so did not come easily and may have been made 
more possible by both her status as foreigner and as an anti-sexual harassment activist 
who did not feel shamed, but angered, by being victimized and who could insist that her 
case be prosecuted. Anti-sexual harassment discourses confront this lack of public 
understanding by including a wide range of behaviors into new frames of sexual 
harassment, where sexual harassment is promoted as a form of violence against women.   
An important point to stipulate here is that women in Egypt overwhelmingly 
refuse to report their experiences of sexual harassment to the police for reasons evident in 
Flinkman’s case. HarassMap’s 2014 study noted that less than 1% of women in their 
survey sample indicated they have reported their harasser to police and that 78% of 
women feared the scandal associated with reporting (Fahmy et al. 2014). Through the 
very terminologies it employs, the law is encoded with the shame of being dishonored 
through sexual harassment and other forms of gender violence. Shame was apparent in 
how the prosecutor had to describe Flinkman’s feelings about being harassed in order to 
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move the case forward, which most women in Egypt are loath to accept (FIDH 2014). 
Not until after the Revolution, and more specifically until 2014 when the government 
instituted Law 306 a and b illegalizing taḥarrush ginsy, most Egyptians found the 
criminal nature of sexual harassment dubious. Promoting the criminality of sexual 
harassment, therefore, is a vital facet of discursive approaches, and even promoting some 
limited form of reporting is undertaken to encourage people, and law enforcement, to see 
sexual harassment as a violation of women’s bodies and personal space and worth 
prosecuting. However, as will be discussed, criminality also has a dimension outside of 
the law on which entities like HarassMap center their discourses. 
 
Criminalizing Sexual Harassment  
 Anti-sexual harassment groups have promoted sexual harassment as a crime 
since ECWR began its work in 2005. ECWR’s work fluctuated over the three years that 
its anti-sexual harassment program was most active. It began with a community-driven 
focus on changing social perspectives and behaviors and then shifted to advocacy-based 
approaches that centered on reconfiguring the penal code to include sexual harassment. 
The shift in focus was precipitated by several factors, including the departure by the end 
of 2008 of key figures managing their anti-sexual harassment program. Rebecca Chiao 
and Engy Ghozlan were central in driving the community-based focused that waned 
toward the end of their tenure at ECWR. Additionally, as the anti-sexual harassment 
program gained in notoriety, spurred by multiple television and radio appearances, print 
articles, and UNFPA funding awarded in 2007, the program, which started informally, 
was drawn into ECWR’s more formal structure of political and legal advocacy work.  
 169 
In 2008, the same year that ECWR released “Clouds in Egypt’s Sky,” they sent a 
draft amendment of penal code article 278 to the Egyptian parliament. The amendment 
sought to include the term “sexual harassment” to the text of the law that illegalized 
violations of honor and the corruption of morals (FIDH 2013). Their amendment did not 
remove the connotations of shame contained within the wording of the article. However, 
the draft stipulated a punishment of 2000 Egyptian pounds and up to one year in jail for 
“deeds such as touching, pursuit, stalking, or other actions, or by explicit or implicit 
sexual or obscene words, or via telephone, the internet or messages containing sexual 
images, texts, or inscriptions (FIDH 2013: 74-75). ECWR never received a response to 
their draft, which they resubmitted to the President’s Office in 2012, also with no 
response. In 2009, ECWR published findings from a conference held on the cultural 
forms and legal gaps regarding sexual harassment in the Arab region. In their report, they 
argued that the spread of sexual harassment as a problem was the result of the lack of a 
“legal and security deterrence and the absence of specific legislation for this crime” 
(ghiyāb al-radaʿ al-amnī wa al-qānunī al-nātag ʿan ʿadam wagud tashriʿa khās bi-
hathihī al-garīma) (ECWR 2009: 118). The conference report concluded by 
recommending amending the law to criminalize sexual harassment, though ECWR 
emphasized workplace sexual harassment, which conflicts with their 2008 study that 
noted workplace sexual harassment was not as prevalent in Egypt as in the public space.  
ECWR’s draft amendment was one of several amendments sent to either the 
parliament or the president between the years 2005 and 2014 by women’s advocacy 
NGOs, many of which were part of the Taskforce to Combat Sexual Violence. The other 
drafts focused on differing facets of violence against women, including rape and 
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domestic violence, which also received no responses from the government. By 2009, this 
early anti-sexual harassment work was well ensconced within a field of transnational 
advocacy focused on ending gender-based violence through legal channels. Amar noted 
that ECWR was among those NGOs “that drew most directly on UN gender doctrines 
and CEDAW institutions, funds, discourses and legal-juridical mobilizing strategies” 
(2011: 318). Moreover, he argued that the work of these NGO’s  
“reveal the particular gendered and moralized politics of the ‘human security’ era. In this period, 
NGOized civil society actions move in constant cycles to demand more police protection of 
gendered and culturalized subjects of re-esentialized gender and moralized sexuality that can only 
appear for more police rescue and paramilitarized governance” (Amar 2011: 318).  
 
Amar was particularly concerned with how the state itself had appropriated anti-sexual 
harassment discourses in its securitization rhetoric, even as it deployed tactics of sexual 
violence targeted at female respectability to undermine Revolutionary protest. His 
analysis, however, highlights the intersection of what Hasso (2009) and Abu Lughod 
(2010) have referred to as transnational governmentality with legal and police practices in 
anti-sexual harassment NGO work. 
When HarassMap formed in late 2010, its’ co-founders were equally embedded 
within the same transnational networks as ECWR. Three of the four co-founders were 
active development workers, one of whom had worked on FGM projects at the United 
National Population Fund and was involved in funding ECWR’s anti-sexual harassment 
program, Amel Fahmy. However, in the beginning, HarassMap formed almost as a side 
project of these co-founders, with no formal structure and no funding. The co-founders 
proceeded with an incomplete platform employing the Ushahidi technology, which was 
growing in its international applications for elections monitoring and combatting political 
corruption, with the belief that they could manage the work in addition to their full-time 
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jobs in NGOs elsewhere. HarassMap’s transnational connections may have been initially 
“looser” than those of ECWR because it was not intended to grow as it did, but as it grew 
so did its transnational network of donors, including a number of agencies of the United 
Nations, the International Development Research Center (IDRC), German Agency for 
International Cooperation (GIZ), the Mediterranean Women’s Fund, and the Global Fund 
for Women, among others. Even with an expanding transnational network, Engy Ghozlan 
noted that in the beginning they “tried to basically protect it [HarassMap]…we tried to be 
really conservative in choosing who to work with and how…we wouldn’t take any 
serious partnerships or serious corporation things” (Interview 2014). Unlike ECWR and 
other advocacy NGOs at the time, HarassMap’s co-founders had a different vision of the 
Egyptian political and legal context, which drove their approach toward promoting the 
criminality of sexual harassment. 
 The HarassMap co-founders were concerned with what they saw as two 
prevailing problems with respect to civil society work and with the government response 
to sexual violence. On the one hand, they were wary of “NGOized” work. This wariness 
stemmed partially from a fear of government co-optation and the government limiting the 
kinds of activities they sought to undertake. According to Rebecca Chiao, “The way the 
government controls things, or the way the system is set up, is that it all revolves around 
money. Kind of...so, like you register as an NGO so that you have access to money and 
the byproduct is you get government control” (Interview 2012). Additionally, Chiao and 
Ghozlan both voiced their disinterest in what they saw as the “same patterns” of NGO 
work, that were “risk averse,” involving trainings, seminars, press conferences and 
reports to “raise awareness.” Here, “awareness” was Chiao’s way of indicating that NGO 
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work tended to center on a set of regularized practices, like research, holding workshops 
or trainings, and report writing. In one interview about how HarassMap measured its 
impact, Chiao excitedly stated, “Screw awareness, let’s do something!,” which 
highlighted Chiao’s belief in the ineffectiveness of NGOized work that was, to some 
extent, disassociated from the community (Interview 2012). Ghozlan also indicated that 
they “needed to take the discussion to the street and live it…” underscoring a widespread 
sentiment among HarassMap staff and volunteers of the need for more active and 
decentralized forms of engagement with community members taking the lead, and fewer 
bureaucratic entanglements prevalent within NGO work (Interview 2014).  
 On the other hand, the HarassMap co-founders believed the government had no 
incentive to change its stance on issues of violence against women. Chiao, in particular, 
expressed some uncertainty in the effectiveness of NGO advocacy work and that the 
NGOs alone were not going to induce political or legal change, certainly not without 
much broader popular support to force the state to change (Interview 2015). Therefore, 
HarassMap from the beginning was unconcerned with political and legal work. As Chiao 
stated, “We don’t really care about the law, we don’t care at all about the law actually. 
Um, we don’t care about the media or funding or the things that NGOs typically care 
about. What we judge our success by, internally, is how many people are coming up to us 
and wanting to get involved and taking action...” (Interview 2012). Additionally, most 
HarassMap staff believed the police, as instruments of the government, were also part of 
the problem of reproducing sexual harassment in the country.  
 For the most part, HarassMap’s work has avoided either targeting or cooperating 
with the state and police, with some exceptions following the passage of the 2014 law on 
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sexual harassment. In the spring of 2015, HarassMap launched a new campaign called 
“mutaḥarrish mugrim” (The Harasser is a Criminal). The campaign included the first 
public service announcements that HarassMap created, which were widely circulated on 
television. The goal of the campaign was to let people know more widely that there was a 
new law criminalizing sexual harassment. Toward that end, two commercials circulated, 
one showing a pair of handcuffed mail hands with police sirens sounding in the 
background and the second showing a woman on a crowded bus at night standing up to a 
harasser while bystanders watch. Textual messaging with the commercials highlighted 
the text of the new law and also told bystanders they could be silent no more because 
sexual harassment is a crime. According to Noora Flinkman, the PSAs and the campaign 
messages that followed were designed as a call to action, giving people tips on how to 
intervene in sexual harassment cases. Based on Flinkman’s experience reporting her case 
of sexual harassment to the police, some of the messages also gave people tips for 
managing the reporting process inside of the police stations. She stated, “we don’t want 
to sound as if there is no problem with the police, because there is” (Interview 2015). 
Moreover, while lauding the passage of the new sexual harassment law, numerous 
HarassMap staff members have noted the law alone is not enough to end the problem. 
 HarassMap’s approach to promoting the criminality of sexual harassment draws 
on transnational discourses of women’s rights and the criminality of violence against 
women. It also depends on developing a moral sensibility among the public in the 
wrongness of sexual harassment, even if people know they will not be punished. 
HarassMap seeks to infuse a new understanding of sexual harassment and social 
responsibility within the public by framing new notions of violence, challenging victim 
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blaming, and encouraging bystanders take responsibility and speak up. This approach 
both differs from and aligns with that of other independent anti-sexual harassment 
initiatives. For instance, Harakat Bassma works closely with the police when running 
outreach or patrols in the street, obtaining permissions to carry out community work and 
also letting the police know they are not supplanting but assisting them to catch harassers. 
Shoft Taharrush also works closely with the police and the Ministry of Interior to monitor 
sexual harassment units and ensure their proper operation. Both, however, also challenge 
victim blaming and, in part, approach bystanders, though they also speak directly to 
victim/survivors and harassers. The sections below highlight some of the more prevalent 
themes in anti-sexual harassment discourse in more detail.  
 
New Norms of Sexual Harassment in Egypt 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, civil society entities are key mediators and 
translators of women’s rights norms. While much theorizing on processes of mediation 
look at vertical flows and center on the socialization of new norms within state 
institutional structures, mediation also operates at the horizontal, or community, level. 
Such horizontal mediation, however, has received less analytic attention and is, in part, 
the focus of this chapter. This section explores how civil society entities in Egypt 
discursively mediate change around sexual harassment at the ground level, with messages 
directed at community members, and not state actors, that are intended to create new 
understandings of gender and women’s rights, as well as build a corps of bystander 
publics that will speak up against sexual harassment. Seven prominent themes are visible 
in anti-sexual harassment discourses. Each theme is representative of new values, beliefs, 
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or norms, which anti-sexual organizations seek to promote across Egyptian society, and 
include a range of discursive elements that frame the norm in particular ways.  
 
Defining Sexual Harassment: From Muʾāksa to Taḥarrush 
 Naming sexual harassment as an existing phenomenon has been a contentious 
process, not only in Egypt but also in other contexts where activism involves both 
community-level and legal change. Scholars note that naming and labeling sexual 
harassment, which only occurred as late as 1976 in the women’s movement in the United 
State, increases its salience and makes visible acts that both objectify and humiliate 
women (Wood 2009: 352). However, this naming process is laden with tensions that cut 
across gender, class and age, where women’s complaints and sentiments are frequently 
distrusted and dismissed by both men and women of all ages and backgrounds, which 
often leads to silence from women on the issue.  
In their study of American women, Magley et al. (1999) identify a discrepancy 
between women’s experiences at work and school and their labeling of those experiences 
as sexual harassment. The authors postulated that women’s lack of labeling was related to 
either 1) a large gap between their conceptual understanding of sexual harassment and its 
psychological outcomes; 2) the perceived ambiguity of the situation, i.e. uncertainty 
whether non-coercive yet unwanted behaviors can be considered sexual harassment; 
and/or 3) the consequences of labeling, either from an organizational or social standpoint, 
where women hesitate to be labeled a victim or to be mistreated for labeling their 
experiences in ways that do not cohere with wider social norms. The authors’ argument 
highlight that the women in their study were also confused as to what constituted sexual 
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harassment. In other words, the conceptual frames that arose around sexual harassment in 
the United States generated public perceptions that prevented women from unequivocally 
identifying certain behaviors as acts of sexual harassment. In part, legal definitions 
centered on coercion and hostility in economic contexts play a role, thus also illustrating 
fissures between legal definitions and social perceptions (Fitzgerald et al. 2010).  
 In the Egyptian context, defining and raising awareness around sexual harassment 
has been no less problematic for women’s movements seeking to name and bring to light 
sexually-based discriminatory behaviors targeting women. Certainly, political and legal 
inattention to the problem until recently has contributed to a lack of salience around the 
issue. Even with the 2014 amendment to Article 306, which specifically added taḥarrush 
ginsy to the penal code, women’s groups argue that its narrow wording limits the 
definition of what constitutes sexual harassment and promotes a structure that conflates 
experiences of sexual violence with the loss of honor (El-Rifae 2014; Nazra 2014a). It is 
unclear how the wording of this amendment, along with consequent prosecutions under 
this law, will impact local perceptions of sexual harassment in the future. Beyond (and 
perhaps more important than) legal structures, the way taḥarrush ginsy now signifies 
many forms of gender violence within the anti-sexual harassment movement and the 
media, particularly since the Revolution, creates additional confusion and contributes to 
continued public denial that certain behaviors are sexual harassment. Aside from this lack 
of clarity, anti-sexual harassment groups have created a new, or what activists view as 
“correct,” and bounded definition of sexual harassment. 
 When ECWR first targeted sexual harassment as a social problem, they sought to 
name and define sexual harassment in particular ways. At the time that ECWR began its 
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work on sexual harassment, there was no popular conception that sexually-based 
discriminatory behaviors that violated women’s rights in the public space was a real 
phenomenon. According to ECWR’s director, Nehad Aboul Qomsan, people widely 
understood certain forms of gendered street interactions as muʾāksa, often conceptualized 
as flirting or teasing. Interestingly, very little is understood about the concept of muʾāksa, 
despite the wealth of description and theory that exists on women, gendered interactions, 
marriage and sexuality in Egypt and the region (see Ahmed 1992; Ali 2006; Early 1993; 
El Kholy 2002; Hasso 2011). In this literature, muʾāksa is limitedly discussed as a 
consensual ritual courting practice that may include more aggressive behaviors that 
women are seemingly able to manage. With respect to women’s public presence and 
social injunctions that require them to refrain from interactions with men in the street, 
Singerman notes, “In reality, these excursions are used by some women as opportunities 
to flirt with young men, or to meet others. However, in shʾabī [popular] communities 
both parties know the limits of this flirtatious interaction, and women will seldom tolerate 
insulting or abusive behavior” (1995: 82). Moreover, Ryzova (2005) mentions that 
muʾāksa, in a way, is a game and that erotic street encounters loom large in the popular 
imagination. Such flirtations occur within a restricted field of sexualized practice and 
women, in their aggressive sexuality, are cognizant of how to display their mafātan 
(charms) while maintaining strict codes of modesty (Ryzova 2005: 108). She argues this 
is evident as far back as the 1930’s with the popularization of the figure of the bint al-
balad, a concept that parallels ibn al-balad, both of which signify women and men of the 
lower/popular classes. While this understanding of muʾāksa in one sense begins to 
underscore how women themselves are sexual beings, albeit within a system that 
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fetishizes and objectifies their bodies, what is left abundantly unclear is the boundary 
between consensual street flirting and non-consensual sexual abuse. Moreover, there is 
no analysis of the impact of supposed street flirting on women’s sensibilities.  
Early surveys that ECWR’s volunteer team collected from 2005-2006 helped 
them to construct a new ethic around sexual harassment as a distinct set of practices that 
were not part of this ritualized courtship, but instead represented as unwanted (un-
coerced) non-physical and physical behaviors that were sexual in orientation and that 
were psychologically detrimental (Hassan et al. 2008). For instance, a number of these 
early surveys highlighted how women felt threatened, afraid, disgusted and angry with 
being followed, leveled with insults and constant commenting, whistled and hissed at, 
invited for dates and sex, witnessing many cases of public masturbation and nakedness, 
being pushed to the ground by men on passing motorcycles or bikes, as well as well as 
having their buttocks, legs and breasts grabbed and fondled, often painfully so. In some 
cases, women’s stories also noted their (or their friends’) experiences with attempted 
rape. These stories and more served as the basis for additional surveys that ECWR 
conducted as part of a larger UNFPA funded scientific study, the results of which were 
published in their 2008 report, and which established seven forms of sexual harassment 
that were commonly experienced by women in public contexts, primarily transportation: 
“touching, noises (including whistling, hissing noises, kissing sounds, and the like.), 
ogling of women’s bodies, verbal harassment of a sexually explicit nature, stalking or 
following, phone harassment, and indecent exposure” (Hassan et al. 2008: 15).  
ECWR’s goal when its program began was to frame these behaviors in a new 
light, to disconnect them from consensual flirtation that was unproblematic and could be 
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easily handled by savvy women. Instead, ECWR sought to expose the imbalances in 
gendered power that existed in public space and how such actions had very negative 
ramifications for many women, as demonstrated in the more than 10,000 surveys that 
were submitted over the years that their program was active. Framing sexual harassment 
as a form of violence was critical and aligned with global trends in women’s rights 
advocacy that sought an end to violence against women. According to Aboul Qomsan, 
because of the level of tolerance in Egypt for muʾāksa, for behaviors that many saw as 
flattering, ECWR undertook a comparative analysis to review how other countries 
legislatively defined sexual harassment. She noted that none of the countries in the Arab 
region that they examined, including Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan, had codified 
definitions of sexual harassment. In this situation, employing the term taḥarrush ginsy to 
refer to these behaviors further underscored the inequality and violence in sexually 
harassing behaviors. This naming of sexual harassment as taḥarrush ginsy changed the 
nature of the discussion, and undermined the stereotypical image of the sexually 
aggressive (and perhaps promiscuous) bint al-balad. Moreover, it made sexual 
harassment a potentially criminal offense, which ECWR did not believe possible in its 
configuration as muʾāksa.  
This discussion is not intended to dismiss the existence of women’s flirtations in 
public space. Despite the dearth of literature examining male and female pre/non-marital, 
sexualized interactions or courtship practices, anecdotal evidence obtained in interviews 
from activists indicate that young women, particularly in high schools, actively engage in 
sexually harassing young men. How harassing female behaviors can be interpreted, 
whether unwanted by their male victims or a form of ritual, sexualized interplay, is 
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unfortunately unclear. However, prevailing local discourses have long assembled all 
forms of sexualized street interactions under the concept of muʾāksa, something women 
are presumed to enjoy. With anti-sexual harassment activism that arose in 2005, this view 
was challenged for the first time. Part of ECWR’s framing technique was to position 
sexual harassment as a threat to public safety, thereby obligating the state to create and 
enforce better laws protecting women (Rizzo et al. 2008 & 2012).  
Since the Revolution, more active campaigns have also sought to delineate and 
frame sexual harassment in new ways and to distinguish it from other forms of gender 
violence. Such campaigns are decidedly more vigorous than ECWR’s campaign in the 
sheer amount of messages that are generated, their use of imperative linguistic forms, and 
their visual scope in illustrating problematic behaviors that denigrate women. For 
instance, the joint ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak (Fix It In Your Mind/Get It Right) campaign, 
organized by HarassMap, Nazra for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights (EIPR), and Tahrir Bodyguards, aimed to “correct” social misperceptions around 
taḥarrush ginsy and other forms of gender violence. Accordingly, activists attempted to 
more firmly define different acts of sexual violence and to emphasize how certain 
behaviors that might have previously been associated with muʾāksa were actually a form 
of taḥarrush. Images 1- 4 represent four campaign posters from ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak that 
were released in December 2013. In each, various behaviors, including staring, catcalls, 
and following/stalking are all argued to be nuwʾa min el-anwāʾ el-taḥarrush, or forms of 
sexual harassment. Staring is referenced as appropriate for watching football matches, not 
women’s bodies; catcalling is a method for getting cats and not women to pay heed; and 
following/stalking is acceptable only if going after a thief. Moreover, touching, facial  
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Illustration 1:              Illustration 2:        Illustration 3      Illustration 4 
“Staring”             “Catcalling”                  “Following”                    “This is All Sexual Harassment” 
  
expressions, invitations, and phone calls are also identified as sexual harassment. Nazra 
later produced a concept paper that separated sexual harassment from rape and assault, 
using HarassMap’s categories to identify it as, “ogling, facial expressions, catcalls, 
comments, sexual invites, unwanted attention, sexual photographs, online harassment, 
telephone calls’ harassment, touching and nudity/indecent exposure/flashing of sexual 
organs” (Nazra 2014b).  
 
Rejecting Victim Blaming 
A prominent aspect of anti-sexual harassment discourses is to disrupt widespread 
beliefs that women are to blame for the sexual harassment they experience. Victim 
blaming rhetoric in Egypt is comprised of a number of features, usually centered on some 
aspect of women’s bodies, their movements, or their vocalizations in public. As noted in 
Fahmy et al. (2014), the most widely cited accusation leveled against women who 
experience sexual harassment is that they dress inappropriately, thus attracting the 
interest and attention of men in the street. The 2008 ECWR, 2013 UN Women, and 2014 
HarassMap studies all noted widespread perceptions among men and women that 
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wearing revealing clothes contributes to sexual harassment (Hassan et al. 2008; El-Deeb 
2013; Fahmy et al. 2014). Survey analysis for this project similarly found expansive 
public perceptions that wearing tight clothes, in particular skinny jeans or even tight 
robes (ʾabāyāt), that made it easy for men to see bodily forms, especially in the breast 
and pelvic region, also contribute to women’s sexual harassment. Walking with shaking 
hips or buttocks, laughing or speaking loudly, wearing too much make-up, and gazing too 
long are additional components of this victim blaming rhetoric. As evident in the example 
that opened this chapter, the accusation that Flinkman incited the young man to 
masturbate in front of her because she allegedly sat with legs open, similarly highlights 
both the prevailing norm that women’s bodies should be constrained in public and the 
fact that truth is not necessarily critical in situations of sexual harassment. Deeply 
ingrained mistrust of female sexuality, stemming from beliefs that women’s bodies are 
ʾawra (private) and lead to fitna (chaos), find expression and acceptance in the pervasive 
rhetoric that makes them responsible for attracting inappropriate male attention. 
However, whether women actually are or are not adhering to modesty codes is irrelevant, 
as women customarily assume blame, and their garments and actions will be accordingly 
criticized regardless of any possible truth.  
 Within this framework of public perceptions, anti-sexual harassment discourses 
are geared toward undercutting this victim blaming mentality, both by challenging public 
perceptions and by encouraging women to reject the blame that is assigned to them. Anti-
sexual harassment activists promote new norms and values that support women’s claims 
of sexual harassment as truthful and that lay blame instead on harassers themselves for 
transgressing other critical social values, such as gedʾana (dependability or being 
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upstanding), shahāma (magnanimity), karama (dignity), or iḥtaram (respect)7. Moreover, 
NGOs and initiatives advance new norms to women that they are strong and right in their 
claims, emboldening them to take control over their bodies and to speak up and refuse to 
accept social censure for actions that discriminate against them. Messaging campaigns 
released since 2012, largely through online social media but also through offline 
community events, are geared toward this effort. 
 One of HarassMap’s first campaigns, “byitḥarrash lih?” (Why Does He Harass?), 
aimed to counter what they saw as unsupported myths that deflected blame for sexual 
harassment. HarassMap argued that the blame for sexual harassment rested with society 
as a whole, not just with men, for allowing the practice to continue. The campaign itself 
brought to light multiple issues, but victim blaming was a critical facet. Comprised of ten 
statements that challenged a number of myths, presented in visually simple, textual, point 
and counterpoint fashion, three of these slogans focused specifically on women’s bodies. 
The statements contrasted gendered stereotypes against the contradictory realities made 
visible through the stories of thousands of women elicited in the ECWR research, as well 
as by HarassMap’s online crowdsourcing site, where women could report their 
experiences anonymously. Such statements included, with the accompanying 
transliterated Arabic: 1) If the reason for sexual harassment is women leaving their 
homes, then what is the reason for phone harassment? Law el-taḥarrush sababu nazul al-
sitt min al-bayt, ṭayyeb, al-taḥarrushāt al-telefuniyya sababha eih?; 2) If the reason for 
sexual harassment is women’s bodies and charms, then why do they [reference to a plural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Gedʾana, shahāma, karama, and iḥtaram were all terms identified by many participants in HarassMap 
organized focus groups that were conducted in Spring 2014 to better understand people’s values and what 
would make them stand up to sexual harassment.  
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you] harass children? Law al-taḥarrush sababu gism al-marāa wa mafātanha, 
byitḥarrashu bil-aṭfāl lih?; 3) If the reason for sexual harassment is women’s dress, why 
do they [reference to a plural you] harass women in niqab? Law al- taḥarrush sababu libs 
al-marāa, byitḥarrashu bil-munaqabba lih?.  
 In late 2013, the joint ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak campaign similarly contained 
messaging that reframed how blame was assigned for sexual harassment. As with 
defining sexual harassment, challenges to victim blaming rhetoric were also conducted 
using imperative linguistic forms, where participating initiatives demanded that society 
see the problem differently. For example, as visible in image 5, campaign posters stated 
1) Don’t say it’s because of how she’s dressed, say what happened to her is a crime, 2) 
Don’t say it’s because of how she walks, say I won’t be silent when she is harassed, 3) 
Don’t say it’s because she was out late, say it’s her right to walk safely anytime, 4) Don’t 
say why was she there, say why did he touch her. Moreover, as part of the framing 
process, these same posters illuminated the widespread effect of sexual harassment on all 
women. They emphasized there were no differences in women’s experiences of sexual 
harassment based on how they dressed, walked, their presence in public at any time of 
day and at any location. Messaging and imagery highlighted that women in veils were 
just as exposed to sexual harassment as women who wore more revealing clothes, and 
that even children could be victims of sexual harassment. Walking with caution was the 
same as walking like a soldier, while being out 24 hours of the day, whether at school, 
work, or at the market, made all women consistently vulnerable to sexual harassment.  
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 The mesh sākta (I Will Not Be Silent) campaign in early 2014 was one of the first 
released by HarassMap that did not target bystanders. There were two underlying reasons 
for deploying mesh sākta. One was to speak directly to women, who studies showed were 
primarily the targets of sexual harassment. The second was to encourage reporting via 
HarassMap’s online crowdsourcing platform. Like the byitḥarrash lih? campaign, mesh 
sākta included a messaging component disseminated on flyers, posters, postcards, and 
stickers that provided women with a conceptual framework to reject being blamed and 
accepting the sexual harassment they experienced. The campaign was comprised of 
twelve statements and a set of tips for how women could defend themselves, take control 
of their bodies and not be a victim, and make positive steps toward ending the larger 
problem of sexual harassment. Women were to know that they were not silent, accepting, 
weak, afraid, wrong, alone, hiding, comfortable, broken, shy, and that they would not 
forgive or ignore. With each of these messages, a corresponding tip encouraged women 
to not back down from their rights, fight against sexual harassment, report their stories, 
give their testimony, participate in self-
defense and exercise to strengthen their 
bodies and mental health, volunteer their 
energies with a social initiative fighting 
sexual harassment and to, essentially, 
“take back the night.” 
 
 
 
Illustration 5: “Don’t say it’s because of how 
she’s dressed” 
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Men as Animals  
 In the HarassMap Academy offered in Fall 2013, held at Dina’s Hostel on Abdel 
Khalek Tharwat Street in downtown Cairo, one of the final workshop sessions to be 
organized after a long week of training included a talk from the well-known political 
blogger, Sandmonkey.  Following this session, trainees would be going into the streets to 
practice speaking with bystanders. Before they did, HarassMap’s Community Outreach 
Director wanted the trainees to receive more advice and perspective on the problem of 
sexual harassment. Sandmonkey covered a range of topics, the most salient of which was 
his characterization of male sexuality and the male agenda in Egyptian society. Among 
the claims he made were that men, in general, were obsessed with sex and relationships, 
and they wanted to control women, often not directly but through the use of 
manipulation. He noted that there was a great deal of peer pressure among men to behave 
in particular ways, that, in part, included exhibiting the ability to get girls.  He further 
stated that the male ego was fragile and that there was fear among men that they would 
be judged harshly for not adhering to normative standards of manhood. He tied these 
claims to assertions around the prevalence of men watching online pornography where an 
informal survey that he conducted demonstrated that Egyptian men largely preferred 
sexually violent pornography that included rape. According to HarassMap’s Community 
Outreach Director, Sandmonkey’s underlying claim was that there could be no separation 
between sex and violence in the Egyptian male imagination. Within this context, 
Sandmonkey argued that sexual harassment – taḥarrush – was a disease and that the way 
people were socialized and educated needed to be changed.  
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Illustration 6:   Illustration 7:   Illustration 8: 
“Open 24/7”    “Can’t control myself”     “I was just joking with her.”  
 
 Such claims, at once, appear somewhat dubious yet also offer insights into how 
some activists perceive fundamental facets of the male psyche and social practices that 
inform (and are informed by) patriarchal norms, which anti-sexual harassment initiatives 
have sought to combat in various ways. Notwithstanding criticisms that Sandmonkey’s 
claims assume sexual violence is, somehow, biologically programmed, in which case 
activism geared toward sociocultural or political change might be potentially irrelevant, 
his argument establishes a connection between sexual harassment with control, power,  
and male desire, even though the three major studies on sexual harassment in Egypt 
demonstrated that men report being the victims of sexual harassment, albeit in more 
limited numbers. While the sexual harassment of men has not received a great deal of 
attention, such practices, as argued in Chapter 2, help to reaffirm the heterosexual order, 
where men are reminded of what qualities are valued as masculine, and not necessarily 
because men, as a class, suffer the same level of discrimination as women (Bergdahl and 
Magley 1996; Stockdale et al. 1999).  
Some elements of anti-sexual harassment discourses present the image of male 
sexuality as bestial and men as animals. Activists are not alone in sometimes presenting 
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men as animals, but a number of the young women that participated in the focus group 
sessions organized by the Harassmap contracted market research firm in spring 2014 
similarly made reference to harassers as “ḥyawān/ ḥyawānāt” (animals). This is a 
common refrain in everyday contexts. Images 6-7 from the ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak 
campaign depicted harassing men as both wolves that prey on and dogs that chase after 
women in public. Men are shown as either sexually available 24 hours of the day (image 
6), unable to “imsak nefsy”, or control themselves (image 7), or as joking with women 
(image 8). Here, aggressive, and even hostile, sexuality is reversed and not the domain of 
untrustworthy, sexually promiscuous women that are the source of chaos, but perpetrated 
by men that feel entitled to women’s bodies. Such imagery and messaging that turns men 
into animals both naturalizes and debases sex obsession in men, as noted by Sandmonkey 
However, the idea of men as animals does not resonate equally among activists. 
Within HarassMap, some of the members raised concerns over the negative portrayal of 
men in the ṣallaḥha campaign and the idea that anti-sexual harassment work could be 
viewed as an attack on masculinity. Scholars examining prior aspects of anti-sexual 
harassment work raised such criticisms, arguing that the focus on street sexual 
harassment and anonymous men created a class of unruly male subjects in need of 
policing (Abu Lughod 2010; Amar 2011). Activists argue for the need to remain gender 
inclusive, particularly given that so many anti-sexual harassment volunteers are men, and 
to refrain from alienating men, while simultaneously trying to curb what is viewed as a 
gendered imbalance of power that contributes to sexualized discrimination against 
women.  
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Rejecting Socially Accepted Stereotypes of Sexual Harassment 
 The fundamental goal of HarassMap’s work, articulated in their mission 
statement, is societal rejection of, and therefore an end to, sexual harassment. In addition 
to challenging victim blaming, meeting this goal requires undercutting many of the most 
commonly held normative assumptions about the reasons why sexual harassment exists. 
Many of these assumptions are built around the deteriorating economic situation in 
Egypt, which contributes to what some have argued to be a crisis of masculinity (Peoples 
2008). Accordingly, the lack of employment leads to both idle young men hanging out in 
the street, as well as the inability of men to save towards marriage. Here, men sexually 
harass as an outlet to release pent up sexual frustration. Peoples argued that men also 
harass because an inability to marry subverts traditional male roles and erodes 
masculinity as understood in Egyptian society. In this vein, men sexually harass in order 
to maintain and perform their masculinity in new ways. A portion of this reasoning was 
challenged in the byitḥarrash lih? campaign, where HarassMap activists asked two 
pointed questions: 1) If the reason for sexual harassment is delayed marriage, then why 
do father’s harass? Law el-taḥarrush sababu tākhir sin el-gawāz, abu el-ʿayāl 
byitḥarrash lih?, and 2) If the reason for sexual harassment is sexual repression, why do 
children harass? Law el- taḥarrush sababu el-kabt el-ginsy, illy ʿandu sabʿa sinīn 
byitḥarrash lih?. The frames generated by HarassMap denied the widely held belief that 
sexual harassment was inevitable as men sought sexual release, as illustrated in the 
example at the beginning of this chapter where the police investigator indicated that 
sexual harassment was inevitable when men were unable to marry. 
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The above examples further disrupt other stereotypes around sexual harassment, 
including that it is an age-related problem. Sexual harassment is widely seen as a youth-
based activity engaged in by pubescent, sexually awakening teenagers or young adults as 
they navigate gendered space. Consequently, there is a sense that young children and 
older men do not engage in such behaviors because either they are not sexually aware or 
they are already sexually satisfied through marital relations. In their 2014 study, 
HarassMap, and even ECWR and UN Women before them, addressed this issue of age-
based distinctions around sexual harassment. They noted that men of all ages harass, a 
fact that has become a feature of their outreach messaging to bystanders in the street. 
Although their official statistics illustrate that the majority of harassers are between the 
ages of 18 and 24, as reported by sexually harassed women. These statistics highlight the 
18-45 age brackets, but what is not visible in their report is that HarassMap collected 
information on harassers from age 14, and possibly younger. Much of the data that came 
in via their Ushahidi map provided data on nominal ages, for example sin el-madrasa 
(school aged) or ṭifl (young boy). This data was sorted and some 39 percent or so of the 
sample of harassers from the online data appeared to be young boys. It was not presented 
in their study because of the unreliability of the data, but it became a part of the 
discursive message that very young children harass and are taught to do so by harassing 
older family members. In challenging this age distinction, HarassMap argued that sexual 
harassment is not a transitional event in the male life cycle, but a facet of gendered 
inequality that the young are socialized to accept in Egypt. 
 Moreover, poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, and drugs feature in the discourse, if not 
in all of the campaign messaging. Such reasons were pervasive in the data collected by 
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HarassMap for their 2014 report. Frequent individual responses in the surveys conducted 
for this project included: baṭālla (unemployment), tʿalīm (education), ṭarbiyya 
(socialization), gāḥil (ignorance), mukhadarāt (drugs), and the lack of akhlāq (principles) 
and aman (security) in society. In byitḥarrash lih?, HarassMap noted that sexual 
harassment is perpetrated not just by the poor but by the wealthy, and that teachers might 
equally be harassers along with those who cannot read. They, along with all of the 
independent initiatives and NGOs active in anti-sexual harassment work, have 
consistently framed sexual harassment as a phenomenon that is not bounded by social 
status and economic condition. Instead, anti-sexual harassment discourses frame sexual 
harassment as a widespread activity that many engage in, i.e., anyone can be a harasser, 
regardless of age, background, educational attainment, socioeconomic level, and 
profession. Moreover, it is argued that sexual harassment continues to persist because 
people refuse to see it for what it is, as a form of control over women’s bodies. For this 
reason, society itself is responsible for allowing the problem to continue. 
 
Creating Safe Spaces and Public Safety  
 In September 2013, HarassMap unit directors held a series of meetings to discuss 
their new Safe Areas project. A parallel program, called Safe Schools and Universities, 
recently received UN Habitat funding and a pilot project was underway. Both would 
eventually be subsumed under a new unit called Safe Areas, but at the time there was no 
consensus on whether Safe Areas should be considered a project or an organization in 
and of itself. There was internally contentious sentiment about the scope of Safe Areas 
and the future of HarassMap, with Marketing and Communications particularly keen to 
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see the entire focus of HarassMap shift toward creating Safe Areas across Egypt. In the 
configuration proposed by the Marketing unit, large corporate entities, such as Vodafone 
or MobiNil, would be a critical driving force behind the idea of creating safe spaces or 
zones for women. Vodafone was especially attractive because it maintained small offices 
and kiosks all over the country and it was believed that corporate practices would filter 
down to all of the individual offices. However, all public entities, not just businesses but 
also government and private agencies, would be enjoined to participate.  
There were two central facets of Safe Areas, including the creation of role 
models, or organizations that would take the lead on creating safe zones that other 
organizations would seek to emulate, and the creation of escalation policies that would 
generate some form of due process around sexual harassment complaints. As these facets 
were developed and laid out, the project plan became intricate and involved creating and 
hiring all new positions devoted to recruiting, monitoring, training and managing 
corporate Safe Areas. A dissenting view, largely coming from the Community Outreach 
unit, reflected a reticence to work within a corporate structure and desired to work at a 
more manageable level, although the overall ideas about role models and policies were 
not contested. In its early stages, the Community Outreach unit was already managing the 
Safe Areas project and had begun recruiting small business entities, such as kiosks and 
taxi drivers, with some talk about trying to work with the Ministry of Transportation to 
create safe spaces on public buses.  
A twofold strategy evolved from this project. First, Community Outreach 
deployed its training technique to volunteers inside of schools and universities to build a 
corps of captains among teachers and administrators in the secondary schools and 
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students in the universities that would raise awareness among all students and their 
families. Second, they sought to recruit all of the business entities, including kiosks, 
restaurants, cafes, organizations, and doctors offices on a street-by-street basis to agree to 
speak up and ensure their locations were sexual harassment-free zones. Generating 
policies and due process around sexual harassment events when they occurred was 
critical. The Marketing and Communications unit, in conjunction with the Research unit, 
similarly began considering how HarassMap’s Ushahidi map could be reconfigured to 
add additional layers that would show safe areas against the “hotspots” of sexual 
harassment. In theory, the idea behind this was that individuals would know where the 
safe spots were in an area rife with sexual harassment, where they could go in the event 
they experienced sexual harassment in that area, and that these individuals would 
patronize only the safe zones highlighted on the map.  
As part of this effort, new campaign messaging was devised to frame and promote 
public safety and developing anti-sexual harassment policies. Image 9 below is one of 
four messages focused on public transportation, which was the most problematic public 
location for sexual harassment noted by the ECWR, UN Women and HarassMap studies. 
The background image depicts a set of stairways descending into Cairo’s underground 
metro line, with the text reading, “3 million people ride the metro in Cairo everyday, 
81.8% of sexual harassment occurs on public transportation like the metro and 82.3% of 
bystanders do not intervene to help a women being sexually harassed. Imagine how much 
better riding the metro would be if people fought back against sexual harassment?” The 
other messages encourage people riding public transportation to report sexual harassment 
and asked them to imagine how much sexual harassment occurred and whether they  
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Illustration 9: Safe Metro          Illustration 10: We Want a Policy    Illustration 11: Campus Sexual  
        Harassment 
 
considered themselves to be among the small percentage of people that did intervene. 
Images 10 and 11 are part of HarassMap’s “guwa el-gāmʿa” (Inside the University) 
campaign, promoted by the Safe Areas/Safe Schools and Universities unit. Image 10 
specifically highlights the drive to develop policies across all of Egypt’s universities, 
already accomplished by Cairo University in 2014 following the sexual harassment 
incident highlighted in Chapter 2 at their College of Law. The four posters in Image 10 
demand “ʿāyzīn siyāsa ḍed el-taḥarrush” (We Want a Policy Against Sexual 
Harassment), with the caricatures showing how teachers and students sexually harass 
while administrators deny that sexual harassment exists on campus. Image 11 is part of a 
small suite of messages that also underscore the breadth of the problem of sexual 
harassment inside of schools, stating, “Egypt has more than 2 million students. Our 
research says that 77% of men confess to sexually harassing. How many of those do you 
think are college students and graduates?” Additionally, the messages ask people to think 
and calculate how many students on college campuses and how many actual women are 
sexually harassed if the reported percentage of harassers and victims is so high. 
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While HarassMap is particularly vigorous in framing the importance of public 
safety, they are not alone is arguing that women have the right to walk unmolested 
in the street. Stories from activists and non-activists alike highlight how women are 
consistently made aware of their bodies in public and constantly feel uncomfortable by 
watching eyes. Discursive framing here seeks to make people see the fundamental 
humanity of women and to be concerned with transgressions against them. 
Sexual Harassment as a Crime 
 Raised at several points throughout this dissertation, an integral component of 
anti-sexual harassment discourses from the very beginning was encouraging the public to 
see sexual harassment as a “garīma,” or crime. Toward this end, the use of the term 
taharrush ginsy made it possible for activists and organizations to emphasize the violence 
inherent in acts deemed to be sexually harassing. The conceptual leap that violent acts 
should be criminalized was seemingly more logical and thought to be more palatable than 
the idea that flirtations could be crimes. Yet, there are differing views within Egyptian 
civil society with respect to how to advance the criminality of sexual harassment. 
Advocacy NGOs/groups typically lobby and work with the government to facilitate 
changing legal frameworks. This work is predicated on beliefs that legal change will 
trickle down to inform new ethical practices within society. To date, this strategy has 
been unsuccessful and the penal code structures remain largely unchanged, with one 
exception. A new amendment to Article 306 added taḥarrush ginsy to the legal 
framework, yet not in ways which satisfy women’s rights groups in Egypt since the 
amendment encapsulates sexual harassment within the problematic, historic system of 
honor and shame. Other groups, including the independent initiatives like HarassMap, 
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argue that changing the law does not necessarily lead to changing social perceptions.  For 
this reason, HarassMap deploys messaging that specifically promotes that certain acts are 
taḥarrush and that taḥarrush is a crime. The ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak campaign, which had 
an online Twitter reach of 15 million individuals, attempted to make this connection, 
framing sexual harassment and all forms of sexual violence, as well as theft and violence, 
as criminal acts8. Other messaging also argued, “el-taḥarrush garīma, malhāsh hāga,” or 
sexual harassment is a crime and has no excuse. Moreover, community outreach teams 
similarly strive to advance this point when speaking to people in the street, discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
 One problem with a focus on changing social perceptions that does not include 
driving concomitant changes in the law is that the lack of prosecution might create a 
larger sense of impunity around the problem. There is a disjuncture in HarassMap’s 
rhetoric between encouraging people to see sexual harassment as a crime and believing 
that the law won’t change people’s perspectives. Without codifying the illegality or 
criminal nature of sexual harassment, which would result in punishment, groups like 
HarassMap face a problem in making people believe sexual harassment is a crime. It is 
not clear if anti-sexual harassment groups may be able to encourage people to see sexual 
harassment as a crime if the legal structure is such that people are not punished for it.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Through the advice of a technology expert at Nazra for Feminist Studies, HarassMap ran analytics for the 
hashtag #ṣallaḥhaXdimāghak using the online software, Topsy. Focused primarily on Twitter since 
software for Facebook analytics was not as readily accessible, the analysis report showed the circulation of 
tweets and retweets containing this hashtag, with an exposure of almost 15 million. Much of the Twitter 
activity was located in Saudi Arabia, followed by Egypt and then the United States. What was not clear to 
HarassMap staff, however, was what “exposure” necessarily meant since there was no ability to assess how 
Twitter followers were internalizing campaign messaging.	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Don’t be an Antenna: Intervene! 
 HarassMap maintains that 
intervention and speaking up is the 
key to social change. Building a new 
ethic around what constitutes sexual 
harassment and in the nature of 
people’s social responsibility to 
members of their community, 
underpins their philosophical 
approach to ending sexual harassment 
as a problem in Egypt. Their rhetoric, 
messaging and outreach campaigns are geared toward two issues: 1) asking people to 
take a stand against sexual harassment and to provide assistance when witnessing a 
woman being sexually harassed; and 2) asking women themselves to not remain silent 
but to speak up about their experiences and to make it known that sexual harassment is 
unwanted and has real consequences. Image 12 offers insight into how HarassMap views 
the bystander effect. Though the image itself was not created by HarassMap, they 
actively circulated the poster, with the caption reading, “mātbaqāsh erīyāl,” or don’t be 
an antenna, showing a woman walking past a bystander has her bottom grabbed by a man 
depicted as a pig. The bystander stares lazily into space while the sexual harassment 
incident is happening behind him. The antenna on his head reflects the bystander’s 
distraction, his state of being “spaced out” and not paying attention to what is occurring 
almost under his own nose, much in the way that television can serve as a distraction 
Illustration 12: “Don’t be an Antenna” 
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from the realities of everyday life. A frequent refrain individuals offer is that they were 
unaware of sexual harassment happening around them. The visual cue to people here is to 
pay attention to what others are doing and to be proactive in saying something to stop 
sexual harassment when it occurs. According to HarassMap staff, one of their primary 
goals is making the act of speaking up the new norm, so that harassers will know that it is 
not an acceptable practice. 
 
Techniques of Framing New Norms of Sexual Harassment 
 Framing practices and the construction of new discourses or norms are prominent 
aspects of analyses on how social movements facilitate social change, as well as diffusion 
processes from international to local fields. Movements, NGOs, initiatives and activists 
all play a role in mediating new norms, moving circuitously between various entities at 
multiple levels as they do so. These individuals and organizations at once build on and 
challenge historic values and beliefs as they devise new, or even hybrid or composite, 
ways of conceptualizing social problems, and as they formulate new ethical practices 
designed to drive particular agendas. A fundamental precept underpinning framing 
practices is that new frames or the norms they advance must be resonant in order to find 
salience within the population (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In other words, new 
discourses and norms must be grounded in local values, to some undefined extent, in 
order for those practices to have any persuasive impact in changing social perceptions, 
beliefs and practices. Resonant discourses alone do not necessarily result in successful 
social change. More radical and less resonant frames that disrupt local values have been 
argued by some to be more effective in eliminating problematic ideological structures, 
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whereas resonant frames may simply reproduce the problem (Feree 2003). Scholars note 
that resonance and radicalism are not mutually exclusive and that mediators frequently 
move between these practices as they seek to bring about change. This chapter offers 
insights into the way in which anti-sexual harassment organizations actively move 
between both resonant and radical approaches. However, it argues that there are very 
specific techniques by which this is done. The next section defines more clearly some of 
these techniques, which include processes of association, mythologizing, and 
rationalization that seek to make people believe in both the reality of sexual harassment 
and the necessity of ending the phenomenon.  
 
Associative Framing: Aligning Old and New Norms 
 One method of constructing discourses or problems is through a technique 
referred to as associative framing, where connections and relationships are built between 
conceptually disparate ideas. According to Von Atteveldt et al. (2006), in associative 
framing the salience around one concept, or network of concepts, is transferred to another 
concept in order to sway public opinions and perceptions in particular ways to meet 
specific agendas. Research on associative framing has primarily occurred within media 
and communications, notably around mass media but also print media, where scholars 
explore how media has allowed various entities to position themselves or world events in 
ways that effectively channel or deflect blame for a set of catastrophic or alarming global 
occurrences. For instance, associative frames deployed via media contribute to a 
widespread conflation of terrorism with Islam, where a high proportion of the public, 
most especially in the Western world, now sees Muslims as terrorists (Von Atteveldt et 
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al. 2006). Through associative frames, global terror events are shown to have local 
effects, with discourses in places like London and Madrid framed within the context of 
the 9/11 attacks and the US-led War on Terror (Ruigrok and Von Atteveldt 2007). 
Moreover, Schultz et al. (2012) argued that concepts incorporated into associative frames 
are strategically selected and, often, are asymmetrical in salience. The actual public 
adoption of associations, therefore, is conditional. The authors exemplified this 
conditionality with a study of the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, 
where BP framed the crisis in ways that set blame on factors external to the corporation, 
thereby disassociating themselves from the problem. The authors argued that US and UK 
news differentially aligned their frames with that of BP’s based on different reporting 
agendas.  
 In addition to concepts and events, this chapter argues that associative framing in 
the case of the anti-sexual harassment movement also extends to social values. 
Establishing the criminality of sexual harassment in 
Egypt is, in part, approached through techniques of 
associating bodily violation with that of property 
theft. An example of this was discussed in Chapter 
3, where the staff at the HarassMap Academy 
employed performance to highlight how police and 
bystanders viewed theft as a more serious offense 
than sexual harassment. In the workshop, the 
example of theft was designed to encourage the 
Illustration 13: “Stealing Wallets/Bodies” 
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volunteers to see sexual harassment as an equally criminal act, though activists believed 
sexual violence to be far more detrimental than theft. Communities regularly intervened 
to capture, beat and force thieves to police stations. HarassMap sought to transfer such 
interventionist actions to the crime of sexual harassment and to press people to treat 
harassers like thieves. In the ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak campaign, this association with theft 
was similarly deployed, as visible in Image 13. The top of the image notes “He who 
pickpockets/steals your wallet is a criminal” and in the bottom, “He who 
pickpockets/steals your body and rapes your smile is a criminal.” Additionally, the text 
notes that it is possible to forgive the crime of stealing a wallet, but there is never a 
possibility of forgiving sexual harassment, assault and rape and that these acts of sexual 
violence are crimes against humanity. 
 Two sets of negative practices are associated in this example in order to establish 
an equivalency between them and to influence people to see sexual harassment as a 
crime. HarassMap staff also intended to create positive frame associations with speaking 
up and overcoming the bystander effect in an, as of yet, unreleased campaign called 
“Through the Line” that was in the planning stages during the course of participant 
observation for this project. As explained by the former Marketing and Communications 
Director at HarassMap, one of the goals behind Through the Line was to employ different 
levels of media, both above (mass media) and below (niche media) the line, in order to 
reach people more broadly at varying levels of society. The focus group sessions that 
were organized through the marketing research firm centered on eliciting popular 
conceptions of important values that all Egyptians held in common, reasons that 
prevented people from intervening, and factors that would eventually induce them to 
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intervene. Through the insights generated from these focus groups, the intent was to link 
speaking up with important social values, such as shahāma (magnanimity) and gedʾana 
(being upright), and to create a sense of it being “cool” to intervene. This positive 
approach also represented moves that HarassMap wanted to make in facilitating 
constructive social change that, in essence, did not alienate people and made them feel 
good for contributing to ending sexual harassment.  
 Despite these attempts, the problem with such associative framing techniques is 
the conditionality around the salience of sexual harassment as a concept. Such framing 
practices are dependent on a more cohesively understood notion of sexual harassment in 
Egypt. Instead, definitions are contested and aspects of the phenomenon are still largely 
denied. Public conceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment do not yet (more 
expansively) align with those of civil society entities seeking to create change.   
 
Mythologizing Local Knowledge 
 The notion of mythmaking and its role in framing identities (including national 
and ethnic identities) and discourses is abundantly covered in anthropological analyses. It 
is not the goal here to canvass these theories in great detail but to highlight a few key 
ideas. Myths offer schemata through which people are able to understand, or imagine, the 
world around them and to order social practice. “Myths contain lessons –whether made 
explicitly as morality tales, or implicitly by portraying the universe of the exceptional and 
the commonsensical. The connections they draw and the precedents they supply serve as 
templates for action, structures for interpretation, and modes of negotiation” (Brown 
2004). In his examination of the relation of myth to political discourse, Brown (2004) 
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noted how American discourses regarding intervention during the First Gulf War were 
rhetorically similar to justifications of intervention in Europe during the Second World 
War. This rhetoric drew on prevailing national myths around the nature of American 
strength, values and manifest destiny (Brown 2004: 29). The state was able to draw on 
mythic national values to advance specific political agendas. Yet, Chock (1991) argued 
that myths may reinforce inequality, even while they seemingly promote the opposite, by 
framing social status as an individual problem that ignores structural discrimination. She 
argues this is evident in the body of myths surrounding illegal immigrants in the US. 
Moreover, myths serve as legends or stories that help people to mitigate risk in dangerous 
situations (Roche et al. 2005). 
 Engaging with this theoretical framework, anti-sexual harassment organizations, 
particularly HarassMap, actively mythologize normative sentiments around sexual 
harassment in order to advance opposing claims. Mythologizing involves promoting long 
held ideas as myths that do not accurately reflect the situation they are intended to 
explain. The byitḥarrash lih? campaign, which HarassMap interchangeable calls “Myths” 
or “Debunking Myths” in English, provides insight into this process of mythologizing. 
Accordingly, HarassMap argues that the widespread denial and silence around sexual 
harassment is predicated on a set of, what they call, stereotypes. These stereotypes 
revolve around deteriorating economic conditions and include myths around 
unemployment, poverty, delayed marriage, and illiteracy. Additionally, they are built on 
patriarchal structures that order gender in particular ways and that seek to protect women 
from potentially dangerous gendered interactions in public, which is visible in victim 
blaming rhetoric designed to shame women into compliance with the status quo. A 
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popularly repeated sentiment regarding the existence of sexual harassment is that men 
cannot find work, have no money, and cannot get married. The connection between work, 
marriage and sex is rooted in deeply held norms that privilege marriage as the only 
acceptable outlet for sexual relations, where marital practices require men to attain a 
certain level of economic livelihood to support a wife and family. It is also more 
generally rooted in mythic beliefs about the nature of sexuality, where male sexuality 
must find release and female sexuality must be contained. In the reverse, the containment 
of male sexuality and release of female sexuality only leads to social chaos, where 
“maleness” and paternity would both come into question. Within this mythic structure, 
sexual harassment is not a social problem, but the necessary and unproblematic 
maintenance of the social order. 
However, from the HarassMap perspective, these stereotypes elide more direct 
judgments of the underlying problem of sexual harassment, and therefore reinforce 
patriarchal inequalities by offering peripheral logics that support male power and control 
over female bodies. Their argument claims that the problem of sexual harassment is not 
rooted in economic deterioration and that there is no natural connection between sexual 
harassment and sex, per se. Drawing on feminist critiques present in the global Violence 
Against Women movement, HarassMap argues that sexual harassment is about control 
and that it exists because no one challenges the basis of this control by speaking up.  The 
numerous campaigns and messages that HarassMap creates attempts to challenge these 
myths, arguing that delayed marriage, and therefore the lack of sexual relations, cannot 
be the reason for sexual harassment because fathers harass, and that poverty and the lack 
of money cannot be the reason because company directors harass. HarassMap posters 
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further illustrate the belief that people “play stupid” by ignoring why sexual harassment 
really happens, and that ignoring it will not make the problem go away. 
 
Rational Framing: Data and Creating New Empirical Realities 
 The data revolution and the globalized focus on utilizing large amounts of data, or 
“Big Data,” to provide insights into human behavior has been growing since, at least, 
2006 with the advent of interactive web technologies that make possible the collection of 
vast amounts of information by technologically-oriented activists and organizations 
seeking development change (Curran 2013; Howe 2006). Data, both in its narrative and 
statistical form, provide some apparent measure of an empirical reality that activists 
believe will better allow them to advance a variety of claims. Local narratives serve as 
important features of building coherent frames that orient problems in particular ways 
(Labov 1972; Johnstone 2004). With respect to sexual harassment, eliciting such 
narratives are all the more important given that they have historically not existed or have 
been suppressed, therefore new narratives obtained through technological means offer 
counter-perspectives to dominant norms (Clair 2009).  
Concomitant with narrative approaches, Chang and Lee (2010) argue that 
statistical frames, at least in the case of promoting charitable causes, are especially salient 
in driving an agenda, more so when the denominators in an expressed set of ratios are 
large. The reason for this, they claim, is that the “base rate neglect” phenomenon tends to 
make people dismiss smaller denominators. Problems seem magnified when 
denominators are large. Using death rates as an example, the authors notes that death 
rates expressed as 24/100 (24 percent), while actually more serious, looks less so against 
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a larger sample of 1286/10,000 (13 percent) (Chang and Lee 2010: 201). Data in both 
forms serves as a powerful tool in the negotiation of perceived truth around a problem. 
Ursa (1993) discusses how testimonies and numbers create “reality-effects,” serving as 
“authoritative facts” that allow people to “make themselves visible, make claims upon the 
state, and to describe who they are to themselves and to society” (Ursa 1993: 836.) 
 Such forms of rational framing have been visible in anti-sexual harassment work 
from the very beginning. At the outset of ECWR’s campaign, when volunteers were 
collecting surveys and then later when ECWR was able to hire a research team, the 
crucial question they faced was how to portray sexual harassment in ways that effectively 
changed how the public understood the concept. According to Nehad Aboul Qomsan, “I 
am not a scientific social researcher, but I told them from a policy review do not talk to 
me about research with less than three numbers as a sample, three zeros. Less than 1000 
and I will not accept talking about this, because I understand how the media will receive 
it…you can kill the whole campaign in the beginning with a bad approach.” She went on 
to note that in order to convince people that sexual harassment was a real problem it was 
critical to demonstrate that there were large numbers of victims reporting it as such. Their 
2008 study, which included a sample of 3000 surveys, generated the first set of statistics 
that highlighted how many women suffered from sexual harassment, what forms of 
sexual harassment were most prevalent, the most common locations where sexual 
harassment occurred, and the characteristics of those that experienced sexual harassment.  
In 2013 UN Women and in 2014 HarassMap repeated this study. All three 
contributed to a new narrative that high numbers of women reported being harassed, that 
touching and unwelcome comments were overwhelmingly what women identified as 
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problems, and that public transportation was where women faced the most harassment, 
which led ECWR to conclude that workplace sexual harassment in Egypt was not as 
prevalent as transportation sexual harassment. The need for strong statistical evidence to 
establish the veracity of the claim that sexual harassment was a problem found relevance 
in a 2014 press conference held at Nazra for Feminist Studies. There, a reporter for 
Gumhuriyya (Republic) Newspaper questioned that sexual harassment was as widespread 
as anti-sexual harassment organizations were claiming. During the second Revolution of 
June 30, 2013, when Mohamed Morsi was deposed, anti-sexual harassment initiatives, 
like Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntish) and HarassMap, reported that 186 
women were assaulted and raped in Tahrir Square. The reporter noted that in a country of 
80 million people, 186 individuals seemed fairly small to be an epidemic. A founding 
member of OpAntish responded to this by stating that there were 186 documented attacks 
in a single week only, with many more likely undocumented and many more that 
occurred prior to and after the deposal of Morsi.  
In addition to the statistical studies, narrative accounts and testimonies are also 
viewed as fundamental in establishing the seriousness of sexual harassment as a problem 
facing women in the public space. When HarassMap launched in late 2010, they did so 
first around their online Ushahidi crowdmapping platform that allowed members of the 
public to anonymously report their stories online. The online platform was believed to 
offer women a forum in which to detail their accounts of sexual harassment, and in some 
cases assault and even rape, without fear of reprisal from kin and community. In so 
doing, the map was intended not only to highlight “hotspots” but to build an evidence 
base for the public to witness (referred to as crowdfeeding, where crowdsourced data is 
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circulated back into the crowd). The growing problems with Ushahidi maintenance, as 
well as internal ideological differences concerning the uses of crowdsourcing, eventually 
changed how much HarassMap promoted their map, and therefore, public use of the 
platform. Nonetheless, by late 2013, when the HarassMap crowdsourcing research began 
there were 1200 stories. Nazra for Feminist Studies and El-Nadim Center for the 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture also collect testimonies of survivors of 
violence, often publishing them in print. In addition, Facebook and Twitter offer online 
space with broader reach than crowdsourcing for individuals to submit their stories. Yet, 
some of the messaging campaigns designed between 2012 and 2014 were done so in 
order to spread the word about the Ushahidi map. In particular, mesh sākta and the 
transportation campaign highlighted the need for both victims of sexual harassment and 
bystanders to speak up and let their voices be heard, with the HarassMap SMS shortcode 
and websites as avenues for doing so (and not the police). The transportation and “guwa 
el-gāmʿa” campaigns bolstered this need to speak up by highligting additional statistical 
realities, including the vast numbers of people both using transportation and going to 
school that suffered sexual harassment everyday.    
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presented data on salient frames and framing techniques in anti-
sexual harassment activism. Activists discursively produced the problem of sexual 
harassment and generated a body of rhetoric designed to elicit new social perceptions that 
it was a real phenomenon and a criminal act. Within a transnationally-inspired field of 
activism, various frames positioned sexual harassment as a form of violence that was 
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unwanted and violated women’s bodily rights. Moreover, prevailing excuses commonly 
proffered to dismiss the practice were challenged, with activists and organizations 
arguing that the existence of sexual harassment was ultimately grounded in societal 
attitudes that made it permissible. Here, victim blaming and other stereotypes simply 
gave harassers a pass to continue to objectify and control women’s bodies and sexuality 
in the public space. Within this framework, male sexuality, rather than that of women, 
was inversely, though contentiously, portrayed as uncontrollable and animalistic. In 
addition to the actual frames, techniques of framing have similarly encouraged new 
attitudes and beliefs by associating sexual harassment with the criminality extant in theft, 
turning old norms into a system of myths with little basis in reality, and by employing 
data and narratives to generate a new reality underpinned by women’s lived experiences. 
Through these discursive practices, anti-sexual harassment activism has devised new 
normative structures that have sought an end to the social acceptability of sexual 
harassment and the creation of more equitable spaces for women in public. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMMUNITY OUTREACH AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS  
OF MOBILIZING BYSTANDERS 
 
“Although we have deep faith that sexual harassment is a crime, we also believe that there is no 
magical solution for sexual harassment. One way to change prevailing perceptions that have made 
sexual harassment acceptable and to reject it is to work together as a community, where each of 
us: 1) is vigilant and aware of the existence of sexual harassment in our community, and 2) do not 
remain silent that sexual harassment is a crime and to reject it as part of our community…” 
(Translated by this Author from HarassMap Community Outreach Training Manual) 
 
  
June 8, 2014 marked inauguration day for Egypt’s newly elected president, Abdel 
Fattah El-Sisi. The day included public celebrations, with thousands, if not millions 
according to a Ministry of Interior spokesperson, flooding into Tahrir Square to express 
their support for the former field marshal (New York Times 2014). In a scene reminiscent 
of the days of revolutionary protest in Tahrir, a mobile-phone video was released via 
YouTube the following day showing the collective sexual assault of a woman whose 
naked body was visibly beaten and bruised. On this same day, a joint statement was 
coordinated and released by the feminist group Nazra for Feminist Studies (Nazra 2014). 
The statement denounced recent amendments on sexual violence in the penal code as 
ineffective, including the passage of a new sexual harassment law. It noted that more than 
250 cases of collective sexual harassment, assaults and rapes had taken place between 
November 2012 and January 2014 and that 9 were recorded on Sisi’s inauguration day. 
Moreover, the joint statement called for comprehensive legal reform and the creation of a 
national strategy inclusive of all institutions of government to eradicate sexual violence 
and guarantee women’s safety in public. HarassMap was among the twenty-two human 
and women’s rights groups listed as signatory to the statement.  
 The decision by HarassMap staff members to sign the joint statement was the 
source of continued discussions in the weeks to follow. When the press statement 
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circulated among activist groups on January 9, they were given a 2-hour window to 
respond. In general, HarassMap staff were supportive of elements of the statement that 
addressed the insufficiencies in the new amendment to the penal code, Article 306a and 
Article 306 (bis)b, for the way it narrowly defined sexual harassment. Yet, there were 
also concerns raised about the overly critical nature of the statement toward state entities, 
joining a call for a national strategy, where blame should be placed for the phenomenon 
of sexual harassment and what this meant for the nature of their activism, which was 
largely centered within the community and on combating what they saw as the social 
acceptability of sexual harassment. As the co-founders and staff discussed the 
appropriateness of HarassMap signing the statement, they decidedly wanted to avoid 
language that placed blame on the state for inciting the sexual violence that had unfolded 
at any point during protests and celebrations in Tahrir, even if they approved language 
that placed blame on the police and security forces for their failure to stop such violence9. 
 On Sunday, January 15, a week following the release of the statement, HarassMap 
staff participated in a joint press conference held at Nazra’s office in Garden City, 
alongside members of Nazra, El-Nadeem Center, Tahrir Bodyguard and OpAntish on the 
issue of sexual violence in public space and the role of the law and state institutions in 
combating the violence. HarassMap’s part in this press conference was to speak more 
about the everyday forms of sexual harassment women experienced in the street and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The joint statement does not blame state entities for instigating the sexual violence that took place in 
Tahrir, but it was suggested by one HarassMap staff member that perhaps it should. This prompted a 
discussion about avoiding blaming the state directly for sexual harassment. In a personal conversation with 
Engy Ghozlan, she noted that while some activists had a sense that state actors were implicated in 
commissioning violence, there was no proof to suggest this and she was wary of supporting unverified 
claims. As a founding member of OpAntish, she mentioned the many stories of OpAntish members of 
average men “who had nothing to do with it” stopping what they were doing and joining into mobs that 
would form around a single woman. 
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public space. A week after this on Sunday, January 22, HarassMap held a dissemination 
conference for the release of a study on the effectiveness of crowdsourced data on 
understanding sexual harassment, in which a number of government officials were 
invited as guests and participants. This included representatives from the Ministry of 
Justice, who ultimately did not appear that day, along with individuals from the Ministry 
of Education, the Ministry of Health and the National Council for Women.  
 Around this series of events that unfolded over a two week period, various staff 
members at HarassMap debated how political their work should be, whether this meant 
simply signing onto joint statements with civil society colleagues or developing a more 
active political position with respect to state responsibility on the issue of sexual 
harassment. On the one hand, there were concerns that failing to take a more political 
stance would result in “bland” messaging and, to some extent, a lack of enthusiasm 
among staff and within volunteer pools for the work. There were also concerns that by 
failing to be more political civil society colleagues would begin to see them as colluding 
with state entities. This was exemplified at the dissemination conference where a 
discussion occurred between the then-deputy executive director (now executive director) 
of HarassMap, Reem Wael, and HarassMap’s Digital Marketing manager and founder of 
Ded el-Taharrush, Ayman Nagy, about involvement with state agencies and whether it 
presented an opportunity to effect change from “within the system.” From Nagy’s 
perspective, working from “within” was not the solution because the state had a history 
of coopting movements. He was adamant that Ded el-Taharrush would never become 
involved with the National Council for Women or any of the Ministries in any capacity.   
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HarassMap’s director of community outreach, Hussein el-Shafei, echoed some of 
Nagy’s sentiments. He desired a more politically active stance on sexual harassment and 
gender violence. Yet, like Nagy he was wary of collaborating with state institutions or 
being seen as too close to them. At the same time, he was concerned about being “caught 
in the middle” of colleagues who wanted or did not want them to be more political. For 
him, this included a general wariness of being swayed into the political arena by NGO 
partners upset by HarassMap’s seeming lack of political engagement, which he felt 
should not influence the decisions HarassMap made with respect to its work.  
This example highlights a tension that exists among activists, visible also in 
academic analyses of civil society activism, in what constitutes the nature of “political” 
engagement and how sociopolitical change might be effected. Here, the political largely 
references some form of engagement with state institutions, often expressed in lobbying 
and advocacy activities prevalent among NGOs. Unstated but visible in the above 
example is the notion that social change requires a change in state level practices or 
policies, which can only be effected through direct confrontation with corrupt state 
practices. The state, therefore, serves as the pivot point around which new norms and 
values must first occur which then, presumably, filters down to society in a top-down 
flow of change. Mobilization, therefore, becomes a tactic through which civil society 
organizations seek to build consensus and challenge problematic state practices.  
Analyses of mobilization in pre-and-post Revolution Egypt more often than not 
centers on challenges to exclusionary state practices and oppressive political conditions 
that constrain democratic life ways and undermine some conception of human and 
women’s rights. Missing in much of this analyses is a broader understanding of what 
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constitutes the “political,” where community-based activism that that does not target the 
state and, instead, seeks to mobilize people against problematic social norms has been 
viewed as depoliticizing. Such analyses fail to address how community mobilization 
against discriminatory social norms or practices may effect change in state institutions. 
Rather, given the repressive political context, scholars have been interested in how people 
negotiate free space, political influence and new opportunities for themselves within 
structures designed to limit avenues for greater participation in governance, or even 
public, spheres. Scholars of Egypt have long theorized how corporatist state practices 
hinder (but do not eliminate) the possibilities for widespread public mobilization and 
public engagement (Al-Sayyid 1993; Bianchi 1989; Owen 1994). The state immobilizes 
dissent by building elite allies in various sectors who direct sector-member sentiments, or 
at least voting behavior, in return for state protection of their interests.  
Particularly since the advent of liberalization, corporatism is recognized as a 
process through which state institutions attempt to control labor and forestall the kinds of 
worker protests that undermine state legitimacy. Yet, worker protests and strikes were 
common through the 1980’s - 2000’s, numbering in the thousands. While many worker 
protests centered on industry reforms following declines in employment opportunities 
that accompanied structural adjustment, they were also politically oriented, especially in 
the years immediately preceding the Revolution (Beinen & El-Hamalawy 2007; Clement 
2006).  Visible in the April 6th, 2008 protest, worker demands shifted to include “…the 
elimination of government corruption, and end to police torture and arbitrary detainment, 
and the creation of a fair judiciary system (Ottaway & Hamzawy 2011). The April 6th 
movement, which incited the labor protest, also became a driving force behind the 
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Revolution, helping to mobilize the mass protest that brought down the Mubarak regime 
(El-Tantaway & Wiest 2011; Lim 2012).  
In addition to labor, analyses of mobilization tend to focus on state opposition 
from Islamist movements. Scholars have explored how such movements, specifically 
their non-militant forms, offer “low-risk” opportunities for engagement and how they 
actively build their constituent base by providing the kinds of services the state was 
forced to cut back on under liberalization (Wickham 2002). As a contender for political 
power, state responses to the mobilizational power of Islamist entities, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, involves vacillating instances of limited inclusion in the political 
process and repressive measures that include illegalization, detention and even torture of 
key movement activists (Albrecth & Wegner 2006). The mobilization of women is also 
often explored in relation to efforts at increasing their political participation and inclusion 
in formal political spheres with running campaigns, changing discriminatory laws, and 
voting, in addition to exploring the differences in religious and secular activism on 
mobilizing support for women’s movements (Al-Ali 2002; Blaydes and El-Tarouty 2009; 
El-Mahdi 2010). The role of digital activism and online platforms in facilitating the 
mobilization of protest has also generated a growing corpus of research, with many 
arguing that new social media networking sites serve as both spaces and tools through 
which individuals are able to connect with each other, plan and organize dissent 
(Aouragh and Alexander 2011). April 6th and Kefaya were noted for their use of social 
media and YouTube in calling the public to protest, though they were long involved in 
fostering public dissent to corrupt state practices (Khoury 2014; Lim 2012). This 
contrasts with other forms of state-controlled media, in particular mass media such as 
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television, which Abu Lughod (2005) argues is intimately connected to the project of 
creating, and not contesting, national identity.  
This discussion provides a very brief glimpse into a complex and nuanced set of 
analyses in which dissent from corrupt state practices is scrutinized via party politics, 
social/economic/political protest, labor/religious/youth/women’s movements, and 
information and communication technologies. It attempts to minimally highlight how 
studies on mobilization and social movements in Egypt largely look at the political with 
the objective of understanding challenges to the state, centering on top-down forms of 
democratic change (Rizzo 2012). Within this body of knowledge, political institutions, 
the economy, and religion serve as important potential loci for change. Few, if any, 
studies in Egypt explore the community, or the street, as a critical site for sociopolitical 
change. Analyses have not addressed how and why movements choose to avoid directly 
target the political establishment. Underpinning the choice to eschew the state as a target 
for change, many community-based anti-sexual harassment initiatives in Egypt are 
concerned that amended state or legal practices do not trickle down to the populace and 
generate widespread shifts in perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, 
community-based activists are wary that, even if the law can change behavior by 
penalizing people for non-compliance, the likelihood exists that the public might develop 
forms of resistance to the law to continually reproduce inequitable practices, particularly 
if people don’t believe in the laws that exist. Few studies interrogate the efficacy of 
Egyptian activism that looks toward community members themselves as the solution to 
the problems afflicting society, without the need for concomitant political and legal 
adjustments. As evident in anti-sexual harassment activism, community mobilization 
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tackles the issue of political change only peripherally, as the eventual outcome of 
expansive changes in normative social perceptions and behaviors. The more immediate 
goal of this activism is broad-based societal change, which would only later trickle up.  
This chapter explores community mobilization and bottom-up grassroots change. 
It argues that independent initiatives active in anti-sexual harassment work, such as 
HarassMap, are engaged in mobilizing for change inside of communities, at the level of 
the street, and that their work of changing social perceptions and behavior represents a 
political process with long term political effects, even if they do not have direct political 
targets. The next sections of this chapter explore the notion of the political and why the 
point that community mobilization serves as a political act is critical, in light of criticisms 
that social interventions in anti-sexual harassment activism are somehow depoliticizing. 
It then illustrates how anti-sexual harassment activists have attempted to mobilize for 
change, specifically examining theory and praxis concerning bystander approaches, with 
HarassMap as its primary case study. It then further considers what motivates people to 
both change and to facilitate change, drawing on surveys of initiative volunteers and 
discussing challenges to the bystander approach in building a critical mass.  
 
Decentering the Political: The Cultural Politics of Social Transformations 
Studies of social movements, community organizing, and grassroots mobilization 
began to proliferate in the 1970’s, at a time when such movements were a growing form 
of engagement for many of the world’s disenfranchised, in both developed and 
underdeveloped contexts. Within the development framework, social movements, NGOs, 
and grassroots solutions to problems were argued to be possible alternatives to top-down 
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technocratic forms of change that frustratingly seemed to reproduce inequality and 
poverty (Escobar 1995). Across disciplines, a wide body of research has developed that 
looks at varying conditions giving rise to social movements and making social activism 
possible, including political opportunities/process and resource mobilization, power and 
resistance, identity and representation, and culture and politics (Alvarez et al. 1998; 
Edelman 2001; Fisher & Kling 1993). Varying theoretical frameworks that engage with 
Foucauldian, Weberian and Gramscian-inspired notions of power, inequality and 
hegemony are frequently deployed to examine the nature of state and community, and 
intra-community, interactions. Power, in its postmodern configuration, is viewed as more 
dispersed, as exercised or performed, and not as something held by particular groups or 
individuals, while movements are seen as embedded in multiple, overlapping relations of 
power (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Swidler 1995). Culture, as “socially organized 
practices,” is also increasingly vital in understanding how grassroots movements are able 
to transform society, where “The agendas of many social movements revolve around… 
cultural recodings. Indeed, since most movements lack political power…they can shape 
the world more effectively through redefining its terms rather than rearranging its 
sanctions” (Swidler 1995: 31 & 34).  
In many analyses of community-based, grassroots movements, culture has been 
deployed as an almost reified assemblage of practices and symbols that guide behavior 
and is positioned in parallel, or opposition, to the political sphere. With the postmodern 
turn, culture, long viewed as peripheral to politics, took on a more primary role in 
disrupting the notion of power as consolidated solely in the political realm and also that 
“…cultural practices, categories, and rules are enactments of power...,” (Swidler 1995: 
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30). Thus, it is a powerful analytic tool in many analyses for understanding more 
complex negotiations with respect to sociopolitical change. As a set of codes that 
influences perceptions and behaviors, culture might be recoded in new ways. Yet, 
political institutions still tend to serve as anchors around which cultural practices are 
recoded or negotiated, as they provide both constraints and opportunities for movement 
operations (Swidler 1995). While new conceptions of power have afforded more agency 
to individuals and have recognized cultural negotiation as critical to social 
transformations, a fissure between culture and politics still exists in these analyses. 
Political spheres are still not viewed as a domain of cultural negotiation but in reverse, 
that political institutions guide or constrain cultural negotiations and are, somehow, 
outside of the cultural negotiation process. Concomitantly, cultural negotiations are also 
typically not viewed as political acts or processes.  
Moreover, these analyses often privilege the material, or the tangible and 
seemingly real, conditions of change, limiting what constitutes the political and political 
engagement (Alvarez et al. 1998).  The narrow focus on the politics of movements directs 
analyses toward and positions the locus of change at institutionalized levels, where 
change may be witnessed and comparatively measured.  Expanding the focus to the  
“cultural politics” of movements, however, offers the potential for drawing more 
expansive conclusions about the nature of social change that decenters how politics and 
the political are understood. A cultural politics approach makes possible an interrogation 
of the relationship between culture and politics, where cultural politics represents the 
struggle over power, meaning, identity and practices, and where culture is seen as 
inherently political “…because meanings are always constitutive of processes that 
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implicitly or explicitly, seek to redefine social power” (Alvarez et al. 1998: 7). While, 
this theoretical framework recognizes a formally defined political sphere consisting of 
directive and managing institutions, politics itself is understood as the overall negotiation 
of meaning that influences the shape of both the societal and political spheres.  
Turning to scholarly analyses of Egyptian movements and NGOs, a highly “state-
centered or center-centered notion of politics” is visible, which does not fully explore the 
integrated nature of cultural and political power in the country. Power is implicitly treated 
as “…as something that is amassed and brokered at the center among explicitly political 
actors” (Rubin 1996: 88).  Analyses focus on brokerage, or mediation and translation, as 
it occurs around political institutions, which admittedly are involved in defining and 
constraining the scope of people’s activism. The new meanings that many movements 
and NGOs seek to promote with respect to human and women’s rights are also, in part, 
influenced by institutional practices and movements that are geared toward direct state 
engagement in order to change the political, or more precisely institutional, culture. Yet, 
the work of reshaping culture, in which community-based anti-sexual harassment entities 
are engaged, is not viewed as part of this effort at reshaping political culture, nor is it 
postulated as a political act. Instead, institutional change is divorced from larger cultural 
changes, which Rubin views as problematic because “….the state apparatus is the 
‘institutional crystallization’…of something that happens elsewhere, in multiple local 
sites of contestation, such as workplaces, families, associational groups, and 
institutions…” (1996: 89, citing Foucault 1990: 93-96). Rubin indicates that “cultural” 
contestations are, in fact, political negotiations and that formalized political or 
institutional practices are themselves the outcomes of this process of cultural negotiation, 
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not vice versa. Exploring bottom-up rather than top-down change and recognizing people 
as key to social transformations, which later become institutionalized and codified in 
political and legal culture is, therefore, critical.  
With this in mind, it is important to (re)consider the nature of political 
engagement of anti-sexual harassment work focused on social change at the community 
or street levels. Chapter 2 discussed concerns around such work, particularly that of 
ECWR, highlighting criticism of its’ depoliticizing nature or effects. Community-based 
efforts were argued to be failing in the need to address structural gender inequality, in 
which the state is a key transgressor against women’s respectability and bodily integrity 
(Amar 2011). Moreover, social interventions were believed to contribute to the 
demonization of men as a class and to result in problematic public responses that only 
served to reproduce gender inequality, such as sentiments that the best approach to 
mitigating sexual harassment is to enforce stricter regulations on women that limit their 
participation in the public sphere (Abu Lughod 2010; Tadros 2013). Such arguments rest 
on distinctions that the political and cultural are two distinct realms, where political 
negotiations are more intimately tied to shifting institutional culture and practice. 
Recently, however, street-based activism has been argued to be central in fomenting 
social and political change.  
The street itself is increasingly viewed as a political arena and a site for the active 
vertical and horizontal negotiation of acceptable values and practices (Bayat 2010). 
Bayat’s notion of the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” centered on poor people’s 
movements, underscores the way in which people themselves are “actors in the making,” 
or bystander who can be mobilized toward the solution of a variety of sociopolitical 
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problems (1997:158).  Centered on “non-movements” and those who are “non-
ideologically driven,” Bayat’s theorizing positions social movements as those groups 
who seek to “mobilize the constituencies to put pressure on authorities to meet their 
demands” (2010: 19). Yet, he also defines quiet encroachment as the action oriented 
politics of practice of those living what it is they espouse. This notion aligns with the 
work of non-NGOized social initiatives, who are similarly action-oriented and whose 
work is a politics of practice, focused on refashioning the nature of social responsibility 
rather than state practice. As also argued by Ahmad (2014), the “politics of staying out of 
politics” does not imply that people are divorced from political sentiment or engagement, 
and that new socialities of indignation and outrage are equally as influential in 
sociopolitical processes. It is possible to evince new sentiments among broad swaths of 
bystander, who, in turn, can be incited into particular forms of action, not all of which 
will necessarily target the state or fall within the realm of political culture, but that still 
create change across the social and political spheres. 
 
Bystanders, Critical Mass, and Tipping Point: Theoretical Considerations  
 The primary target of HarassMap’s outreach and activism is bystanders, and 
ending the “bystanding effect” has been central to their community outreach work, in the 
streets and within schools and universities. In April 2014, an internal staff development 
workshop was held to explore the bystander effect and corollary notions of critical mass 
and tipping point, lead by then Operations Manager for Safe Areas and Safe Schools and 
Universities, Miriam Freudenberg. On a Sunday afternoon, staff members gathered in the 
reception hall of HarassMap’s new office in the neighborhood of Maadi for the 4-hour 
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session titled “The Tipping Point and Other Theories of Social Change.” At the outset of 
the session, Freudenberg opened by asking every team member if they were bystanders 
and to recall the last time they saw something happen where they did not intervene or 
respond. A spattering of examples were provided that did not revolve around intervening 
in cases of sexual harassment, but other common, every day events in Cairo streets 
involving the homeless and street children. Freudenberg followed this by then asking 
everyone to provide explanations of why they did not intervene to help and why they 
were, in fact, bystanders themselves. Responses to this ranged from feelings of anxiety 
that their interventions would not ultimately help to the recognition that certain problems 
were so commonly observed that it was second nature to ignore them. This served as her 
point of departure to explore what the bystander effect was and its underlying causes.  
From here, Freudenberg juxtaposed two critical scenarios that highlighted the 
deep ramifications of non-intervention. The first involved the infamous Kitty Genovese 
case of the early 1960’s, which became widely iconic in social psychological research on 
the bystander effect. Genovese, who lived and worked as a waitress in New York, was 
returning home late one evening when she was attacked, raped and stabbed to death in an 
alleyway. As she was being attacked and raped, 38 individuals that lived in the buildings 
along the alley – bystanders – supposedly reported hearing Genovese’s screams. The 
newspapers at the time claimed the witnesses watched while the killer attacked and killed 
Genovese (Manning et al. 2007). It was reported that none of these bystanders intervened 
to save Genovese or called the police for help. Manning et al. (2007) questioned what 
they argue is now a parable around these witnesses, and that the facts have become 
somewhat distorted with respect to what the bystanders actually saw or understood to be 
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happening. Despite this, the original case when it arose spawned a great deal of research 
around this phenomenon, which has since been documented in numerous experiments. 
The second scenario was graphic imagery of the lynching of African Americans in the 
American south prior to the Civil Rights Movement. African Americans were shown 
hung from trees surrounded by cloaked members of the KKK, which was a widespread 
phenomenon across the south that many did nothing about. Here, the two scenarios 
together highlighted how both gender and race served as dehumanizing factors that made 
non-intervention possible among the public.  
  With these examples in mind, Freudenberg asserted a number of claims. First, 
she explored a number of reasons why people did not intervene, including uncertainty in 
interpreting whether a person is actually in need, fear of embarrassment, fear of being 
harmed, diffusing responsibility to others in the crowd, the high cost of intervention, lack 
of feeling competent in a potential intervention, and social control from the crowd itself 
(Darley & Latane 1968; Chekroun & Bauer 2002). In particular, she problematized group 
or crowd dynamics, which she referred to as “The Popular Mind” and herd mentality, 
where “individuals become dominated by the collective mindset of the crowd” and where 
those in the minority “…fall silent while those perceived to be in the majority thrive” 
(HarassMap Training Notes, 2014). Indeed, early research produced primarily by Latane 
and Darley demonstrated that individuals on their own were more likely to intervene than 
those in a group setting. Research on group dynamics shows that individuals become 
more passive based on their interpretation of group reactions, and that they look for cues 
among the crowd to provide an indication of how they should react and respond (Darley 
et al. 1973).  In Freudenberg’s estimation, the way to combat this was to provide 
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bystanders with more information about a victim, not personal information but general 
facts that humanized these victims, and to somehow establish a connection between 
bystanders and victims, such that bystanders would have a vested interest in intervening 
and would be able to overcome the effects of the crowd. 
 This assertion emerged from Freudenberg’s reading, and coverage, of theory that 
noted bystanding would be more pronounced in high ambiguity situations. People were 
more likely to intervene if a situation was well understood (low ambiguity), if they had an 
interest in the outcome of the situation, and if they perceived minimal consequences for 
intervening. Concomitantly, Freudenberg noted that the more connected (or homogenous) 
the group, and the less anonymity that existed between community members, the more 
likely it was that a victim would receive support from within their community. Likewise, 
research shows that bystanders may actually speak up and intervene when witnessing the 
breaking of a norm if they feel personally vested in the norm (Chekroun and Bauer 2002). 
Sexual violence research in the United States highlights how community norms are 
shaped by bystander interventions and, therefore, educating the populace through 
prevention programs is vital (Banyard et al. 2004). Research on the relationship between 
the political context, the populace and the activists in the middle also shows that 
bystander responses to political events don’t just effect the community but influence the 
way activists view the same event (Braun & Koopmans 2012). Accordingly, the reactions 
of observant and watchful bystanders may direct social interventions. Important here is 
the concept of “bystander public,” or what Freudenberg called “Early Adopters.” These 
are non-adherents to a movement or observers to an event/issue, i.e. “distal spectators” 
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that may bear witness and respond to political or social movement issues, and may later 
become movement adherents (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Snow et al. 1981).  
Bystander publics are those segments of the public that social movements, like 
HarassMap, seek to mobilize to their cause, depending on how movement leaders decide 
resources are best allocated (McCarthy & Zald 1977). These are individuals with some 
level of social and political consciousness, and though they are generally non-engaged 
they may emerge as observers and commentators to the breakdown – and restoration - of 
public order. Their reactions can quickly politicize an issue/event, or even influence the 
behavior of law enforcement entities (Snow et al. 1981). Bystander publics are necessary 
in refashioning dominant social norms. Freudenberg drew on theory around Early 
Adopters, to note how it took only a few individuals “quick on the uptake” to change the 
dynamic of a crowd and build support within a group. For new norms to take hold a 
critical mass of support would be required and once a tipping point of bystander publics 
is reached, larger social change ensues and institutionalization through legal codification 
becomes possible (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Marwell & Oliver 1993).  
Critical mass is defined as “a loose metaphorical way to refer to the idea that 
some threshold of participants or actions has to be crossed before a social movement 
‘explodes’ into being” and tipping point, according to Freudenberg, was that moment 
when a group radically changed to adopt a “previously rare practice” (Oliver & Marwell 
1985: 523). Theorizing on critical mass and tipping point often do not examine the 
grassroots origins of new norms, nor do they make clear what constitutes a critical mass 
and where tipping points may lie, though some mathematical formulations have been 
postulated for how a critical mass may be calculated (Marwell & Oliver 1993). While a 
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fundamental part of social movement theory, problems identified with critical mass 
include the need to motivate and incentivize people to action, as well as the challenge of 
“free riders,” who are individuals that do not support a movement but somehow benefit 
from movement achievements. Regardless, bystander publics serve as meaningful 
elements in the facilitation of new sociopolitical or cultural norms, as well as integral 
features of a potentially ensuing critical mass of support. Bystander reactions are 
dialectically shaped by and shape social activism and politico-legal practices.  
It is important to note while HarassMap operates within this framework to 
mobilize bystanders to speak up against sexual harassment, they do not maintain any 
clear notions of what constitute a critical mass. In her workshop session, Freudenberg 
discussed the theoretical underpinnings of what proportion of individuals needed to adopt 
a new norm before others in society would do so. Yet, the session did not end with 
recommendations of specific programmatic approaches to achieving a critical mass. In 
this vein, there are no established targets with respect to the numbers required to facilitate 
societal-wide change, and this part of their philosophical platform has been left 
deliberately vague. Here, tipping point is a mythical point that is reached when 
recognized, i.e. they would know it when they see it. However, elements presented in this 
workshop have since been incorporated into newer versions of community trainings, 
including HMA and Safe Schools and Universities, where captains and volunteers are 
given information to understand why people may choose not to intervene. Freudenberg 
optimistically ended the workshop session by noting that social change was only a person 
away. Drawing on the theory of six degrees of separation, she stated that everyone was 
ultimately connected to each other and that it would be possible to get people to shift 
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their thinking in a cascade-like effect. The end goal would be the admittedly grand notion 
of “ending the social acceptability” of sexual harassment 
 
Mobilizing for Social Change: HarassMap and Community Activism 
Even without clear, theoretically informed strategies for generating socially 
conscious bystander publics, HarassMap actively seeks to engage as many bystanders in 
the street as possible. Their community-based activism located in the streets and on 
school campuses directly targets members of the public/bystanders, rather than state 
institutional structures and politico-legal frameworks. Their approach to ending the 
bystanding effect encompasses both changing perceptions and changing behaviors one 
person (or one entity) at a time in the hopes that doing so will facilitate wider changes at 
the base of society. As discussed in Chapter 4, a number of initiatives worked in tandem 
to frame new norms around sexual harassment and gender-based violence in Egypt. 
Through the production of new norms, anti-sexual harassment activists seek to re-order 
public beliefs and values that sexual harassment is an unproblematic form of flirtation 
and that it is, instead, an unwanted violation of women’s bodies and a criminal act that 
people must speak up about and not accept. In the following section, how these new 
discourses are deployed and circulated through society will be explored. The spread of 
these new ideas (across class and age groups) and promoting new values underpins the 
mobilization of bystanders to intervene and reject the reality of sexual harassment in 
Egypt. In order to get people to speak up, HarassMap directly confronts the entrenched 
historic norms that prevent them from doing so. HarassMap employs three critical 
methods to mobilize bystanders, including street campaigns, creating safe areas, and 
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technological deployments. Each are discussed below, along with the inherent challenges 
they pose to HarassMap efforts. 
 
Street Campaigns: Mobilizing Communities to Action  
In fall 2013, following the conclusion of the HarassMap Academy (HMA), the 
HarassMap Community Outreach team began a series of mobile training academies, one 
of the first of which took place in the agricultural oasis town of Fayoum City in the 
Fayoum governorate an hour south of Cairo. The mobile training academy consisted of 
two segments: the first was a lengthy 2-3 hour workshop that, in brief, replicated some of 
the information that was provided to captains at the HMA; the second was a practice 
street outreach event, in which HarassMap staff followed, listened and offered guidance 
to new volunteers about speaking to bystanders in the street.  Roughly, ten new 
volunteers showed up to the workshop, of whom two were young women and the rest 
were young men. The Community Outreach Director began the session by asking the 
volunteers how many of them had experienced sexual harassment, which, in a room 
primarily full of young men, generated initial surprise and a few uncomfortable moments 
of silence. Only one young man spoke up to say that as a child of 12 living in Saudi 
Arabia, he was sexually harassed, but provided no details of the situation. Here, the 
Director, while sympathetic, used this as a springboard to move into a discussion of who 
HarassMap was and the goal of their work, noting that child molestation, unfortunately, 
was not within the scope of their mission, but that children themselves learned to become 
sexual harassers from those around them, including those within their own families, that 
accepted it as a normal practice. He stated that HarassMap’s work was focused on ending 
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this social acceptability of sexual harassment and that, in order to do so, they targeted 
bystanders, encouraging them to reject sexual harassment and to build slow change 
around having people not tolerate it as an unproblematic practice. In part, he noted that 
the goal was to also create safety in the street and to get people to speak out against 
sexual harassment the way they did to theft.  
A small rift was visible in the contentious dialogue that arose between the 
volunteers and the Director over HarassMap’s bystander approach to ending sexual 
harassment. One of the volunteers pointedly asked why HarassMap did not take the 
stories they received from their map and work with the police to find a solution to the 
problem. Another volunteer asked why the Ministry of Interior, the state entity in charge 
of the police forces, did not also address the problem at the national level. The 
Community Outreach Director argued that the police were not a solution, that they were 
often harassers themselves or they dismissed sexual harassment as a problem. He further 
maintained that the instability of the last several years of revolution also made it difficult 
to work on this problem side-by-side with the state. Aspects of this conversation circled 
around how criminality had changed in Egypt post-Revolution, where volunteers insisted 
that people increasingly refused to speak up against thieves, indicating that failures to 
speak up against sexual harassment, perhaps, were not centered on people’s perceptions 
that it was acceptable, but on larger fears of engaging with unknown elements in the 
streets.  Yet, at the same time, volunteers claimed that Fayoum, as a small and closed 
community, was not like Cairo in that sexual harassment was not as perceptible a 
problem. They made the point that, like in many small towns, everyone in Fayoum knew 
each other, sexual harassment did not really happen, and that if a case of sexual 
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harassment somehow occurred the harasser would be shunned. This then lead to the 
question of why HarassMap did not directly go after harassers themselves, instead of 
bystanders. Concerns were raised that it would be all too easy for bystanders to say “wa 
ana mālly?,” or “what business is it of mine?”.   
Following the completion of the workshop, where HarassMap also discussed what 
volunteers could expect to hear from bystanders in the street, a practice outreach was 
conducted along one of the busiest streets in the center of Fayoum City. The volunteers, 
who by this time were an all male-group as the female volunteers from the workshop 
disappeared, broke into two smaller groups. One of these teams began by visiting a 
clothing store and a pharmacy that sat along a canal snaking through downtown before 
they approached a small group of young men sitting together on the canal wall. In the 
businesses, the team spoke with two young women that, like the volunteers in the 
workshop, argued that sexual harassment was a huge problem, but that Fayoum was not 
like Cairo. The young woman managing the clothing store stated that there was more 
safety in the streets and that this problem did not exist in Fayoum in the same way it did 
in Cairo. In the pharmacy, however, the young woman argued that theft and sexual 
harassment could not be compared, but they were both wrong and that people tended to 
ignore sexual harassment. Both young women agreed when asked by the volunteers if 
they would say something if they saw sexual harassment happen, yet they were never 
asked what behaviors constituted sexual harassment. The exchange with the young men, 
however, was of a completely different nature.  
Unlike the young women in the stores, the young men, who looked to be in their 
late teens, were less serious and spoke joking and laughingly about sexual harassment. In 
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this conversation, those behaviors that could be classified as harassing came into dispute. 
The idea that simple comments and, more particularly, stares could constitute sexual 
harassment appeared most problematic for these boys, one of whom stated that he looked 
at all people all the time and what was he supposed to do. Moreover, the boys noted that 
girls dressed in particular ways to be stared at and that not all young women were 
respectable. The contested nature of sexual harassment was also visible when the boys 
were asked what they thought sexual harassment was, to which they replied that it was 
the type of mob harassment and assault that occurred during the Eid holidays. When 
asked about speaking up against sexual harassment, the boys then noted that quite often 
women and their “harassers” knew each other, which appeared to indicate that these boys 
saw gendered street interactions as a form of flirtation. They worried that it was not their 
business to intervene and that it could potentially anger either the woman or the harasser 
with whom the woman was engaged in some type of courtship behavior. When one of the 
volunteers countered this by arguing harassers were like thieves, one of the boys 
reiterated what the volunteers stated in training, that while both were wrong people were 
not as active in standing up to theft anymore. The conversation continued on for more 
than half an hour without the same type of resolution that occurred in the two businesses.  
This example of HarassMap’s mobile training academy provides insight into how 
HarassMap seeks to foment social change by working directly inside of communities and 
asking people to see problems and then work to change them in particular ways. It also 
highlights the challenges HarassMap, and other similar initiatives, face when working to 
combat deeply entrenched norms and values that the public does not already view as 
problematic and inequitable. Evident in the example, HarassMap’s work in the streets to 
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change social perceptions and behaviors rests on a dual-layered decentralized approach 
that involves 1) building a corps of community leaders, or captains as HarassMap refers 
to them, and then 2) having those captains build their own community teams that 
independently conduct outreach under the auspices of HarassMap’s name and oversight.   
The selection and trainings of community captains is more rigorous than that of 
the captain’s team members.  Community captains serve as representatives and liaisons 
into the communities for HarassMap and they report directly to the Community Outreach 
Director, though there is an intermediary individual, the Community Mobilization 
Coordinator, who assists in managing, communicating with and organizing teams across 
Egypt. Twice a year, HarassMap receives a few hundred applications from interested 
individuals from various backgrounds and age groups for, roughly, 20 spots at each 
HarassMap Academy (HMA). Selection criteria for these captains involve several factors, 
such as the volunteer’s professional or volunteer experiences, their goals in working with 
HarassMap, and their governorate of origin. Additionally, as developed over the course 
of this research, there was a drive within Community Outreach to be more selective in 
their choice of captains, to ensure that those who took on leadership roles not only 
wanted to combat sexual harassment but also maintained some sense of the gender 
inequality underpinning the problem. The unit Director noted at one point that while 
many of the volunteers might not like sexual harassment not all of them believed in 
gender equality, which he found problematic. 
Community captains, in turn, recruited team members largely through Facebook 
in order to broaden their community reach, but also did so through their own personal 
networks. In general, anyone with interest and commitment were free to join a 
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community team. HarassMap’s requirement for captains was that they organize a 
minimum of 1-2 street outreach days a month and that following the outreach they submit 
a report of what unfolded with bystanders in the streets, so that HarassMap could monitor 
public sentiments and what their teams were dealing with. Captains maintained 
responsibility for organizing these outreach days, though HarassMap was critical in 
supplying resources to teams, including handouts, posters, flyers, and stickers that teams 
would pass out or plaster in public places. Twice a year, HarassMap would also organize 
their mobile academies, which required weeks of travel to outside governorates for team 
members. Part of HarassMap’s training to captains included that they should download 
and print relevant reports from HarassMap’s Ushahidi map to take with them on 
campaigns to show bystanders proof of the problem of sexual harassment in the area. 
Each team maintained its own unique HarassMap community Facebook page, and what 
became a common and popular practice was uploading photos from outreach events as 
they were unfolding. The founder of Ded el-Taharrush, Ayman Nagy, noted that they also 
engaged in the same for their outreach events and that providing the public with real-time 
information was important to show people how active the initiative was in combatting 
sexual harassment and generating continued interest for future recruitment. 
Both captains and their team members work on volunteer bases and HarassMap 
provides no financial compensation or remuneration to volunteers for their outreach 
work. The spirit of volunteerism was identified by HarassMap staff to be a critical facet 
of community work, which was similarly noted by members of other initiatives, such as 
Harakat Bassma and Ded el-Taharrush. Such volunteerism was viewed as more authentic 
and was thought to ensure that those engaging in community activism had a true passion 
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for working toward social change. Compensation and salaries were conversely viewed as 
a potential source of conflict, where salaries could either lead to people feeling their 
volunteerism was more of a job and, therefore, an obligation that they could not easily get 
out of if they so chose. There was also concern that this, in addition to increasingly 
bureaucratic structures required to manage financial flows, would then lead to decreasing 
passion for and effectiveness in the work. Moreover, differing levels of compensation for 
volunteers/staff was noted as a possible cause for enmity, which would be detrimental to 
the longevity of the initiative (Saad Zaghloul Interview, February 2014). However, 
according to HarassMap’s Executive Director, Rebecca Chiao, some compensation and 
financial structure for running events was crucial. She noted that while the spirit of 
volunteerism was important, also ensuring that goals could be met was even more so and 
that there was nothing more demoralizing than to work hard and strive for something and 
not be able to achieve it because of a lack of resources. Such sentiments were debated 
among many of the members of HarassMap, Ded el-Taharrush and Harakat Bassma as 
they grappled with efforts to reach as many people as possible in their outreach, while 
still seeking to retain their connection to their grassroots base as they all contemplated the 
need for formal registration, institutionalization, and accepting foreign funding.  
Street campaigns and grassroots outreach were often stressful and fractious, 
signaling that the street itself is a highly contested field of meaning, or a contact zone.  
The opening example demonstrated how changing people’s perceptions is fraught with 
tension over that which constitutes sexual harassment and what the best course of action 
is to end this problem. Part of HarassMap’s training indicated the need for volunteers to 
disengage from arguments and to politely keep conversations focused and on track, using 
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statistics and testimonies to demonstrate the reality of sexual harassment as a problem. 
Yet, as in the Fayoum outreach, heated debates between HarassMap volunteers and 
bystanders were not uncommon. Public responses to HarassMap arguments frequently 
included victim-blaming sentiments and the defense of male behavior by justifying, 
minimizing, and excusing sexually harassing actions. Moreover, there was often outright 
disagreement that certain actions were, in fact, real problems, such as staring at women, 
as described above.  Outreach reports submitted to HarassMap from various teams across 
Egypt further demonstrate that many bystanders insist that dress stimulates sexual 
harassment, that girls usually do not get harassed in their home neighborhoods, that 
sexual harassment is the fault of both the woman and the man, among other things. 
Combatting such sentiments is a challenge, and not always successful. Yet, minimally, 
the goal has been to secure an agreement from bystanders that they would say something 
to stop sexual harassment if they saw it. 
Additionally, volunteer teams are differentially active, with some teams running 
more frequent and regular outreach events than others. Teams in Cairo and the Delta 
region, such as Alexandria, Port Said and Manshiyet Nasr, are generally considered more 
independent, and even more effective. A goal of HarassMap’s Community Outreach unit 
is for teams to become almost franchised, operating on their own to employ HarassMap’s 
model but not heavily depend on HarassMap’s Cairo-based staff to take the reigns in 
organizing and running street campaigns. The inactivity of many of the teams is linked to 
a number of potential factors. In part, maintaining volunteer commitment is an incredible 
task for HarassMap, made all the more challenging by difficulties in keeping up constant 
communication with teams. With more than 1400 volunteers in 23 governorates, and a 
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Community Outreach staff of two (until recently) to manage all volunteers, the task is 
daunting if not seemingly impossible. Moreover, as demonstrated above, not all 
individuals agree with bystander approaches to ending sexual harassment. This is 
particularly the case in areas where, according to the Community Outreach director, 
people are more “interventionist” in orientation, seeking to target harassers directly. In 
the case of Ded el-Taharrush, targeting harassers involves shaming them into better 
behavior, and numerous entities, including the online movement Efdah Mutaharrish 
(Shame the Harasser), took the approach of posting pictures of harassers on Facebook 
and embarrassing them for their misbehavior. Additionally, not all volunteers believe in 
disrupting gender binaries and stereotypes, which require a complete re-ordering of the 
entire system of gender in Egypt.  
The process of volunteering for HarassMap, as it is developing, requires 
volunteers to confront their own assumptions around gender and the naturalization of 
certain roles for women and men in society. HarassMap training workshops, such as the 
Gender Box, were designed around the purpose of getting community leaders to see 
gendered binaries as a social construct and not as natural categories. Yet, for many, such 
discussions are confusing and new. While captains are often able to contribute to 
discussions focused on gendered discrimination, and while they also see connections 
between gender discrimination and deeply held patriarchal (dhakariyya or abawiyya) 
norms that underpin sexual harassment, their ability (and desire) to wield these notions 
into coherent and believable arguments against sexual harassment and gender violence, in 
general, is unclear. A salient example of this from the spring 2014 HMA was the general 
confusion around notions of gendered power, gender binaries, and heteronormativity, 
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where future captains noted that women were objectified and men would argue that they 
weren’t able to control themselves. Yet, there did not appear to be any notion that in 
order to end sexual harassment the system of gender as whole needed to be upended. 
Whether captains are able and want to convey these sentiments in a down-the-line 
fashion to their own volunteer teams, who do not receive the full HarassMap training 
unless they seek to become captains, is additionally unclear.   
 
Creating Safe Areas in Communities and Schools 
“The mission is to, as the first step, make businesses safe because we think that through this 
method we can influence street culture, the culture of sexual harassment, because we’re 
establishing safe zones and these safe zones will help us to influence, let’s say, the atmosphere in a 
given area. And so far, judging by some examples, we have reason to believe that it will work. It’s 
also based on some theories, like the tipping point effect…we are not targeting the harasser and 
we are not supporting the victim, this will both be a side effect of actually changing the street 
culture, which is changing the attitude of the people who are living, passing by, who are existing 
in a certain area, either as a business owner or supplier or just like passing through…we think we 
can reach a critical mass where the atmosphere is changing radically...that harassers will get the 
signal that harassment is not accepted anymore in that area. We don’t need to convince everyone, 
we need to convince the people who have the most influence on a certain area…” (HarassMap 
Safe Areas Operations Manager, Interview March 2014).  
 
 As an initial sub-unit of Community Outreach, and then a unit in its own right, 
Safe Areas (SA) and Safe Schools and Universities (SSU – combined SA/SSU), is one of 
HarassMap’s fastest growing programs. However, working inside of schools is not a new 
idea to anti-sexual harassment activists. From the early years of the ECWR Safe Streets 
campaign, the idea existed that working in schools and socializing children to see sexual 
harassment as a violation of bodily integrity was an important mode by which to change 
the culture from the ground up. Toward that end, ECWR established a formal project, as 
part of its Safe Streets efforts, to work with teachers and school administrators to raise 
awareness among students and parents. This project was in effect until 2013, though the 
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degree to which they were active is unknown. In part, working inside of schools, 
particularly secondary schools, is challenging for activists, both because it usually 
requires high-level approvals that are not easy to obtain and that there is denial and push 
back from families who do not agree with or want their children exposed to the topic. 
For that reason, in 2013, when HarassMap was making its own plans for entry 
into schools, they began collaborative talks with a new, up-and-coming Egyptian NGO 
that was a partner in UN Women’s Safe Cities initiative. Safe Kids was formed a year 
before to combat the problem of child sexual abuse and assault. More importantly, they 
received approval from the city mayor of Heliopolis, an upscale Cairene neighborhood, to 
provide trainings to teachers and administrators in almost 60 schools on how to recognize 
the signs of sexual abuse. In addition, they offered psychological services to children and 
families, though they had little ability to substantially assist abused children by removing 
them from unsafe homes, especially given the lack of state infrastructure to support 
families in crisis. HarassMap sought to team up with Safe Kids to begin building the 
equivalent of community captains from among the staff inside of schools that would 
build their own internal teams to work with students and families about sexual 
harassment. For primary and secondary schools, this work required developing curricula 
around bodily integrity designed for students at varying age levels that went beyond 
HarassMap’s expertise. The partnership with Safe Kids, in this respect, was critical 
because they already utilized age appropriate materials that could be enhanced with 
additional information. Funded by UN Habitat, HarassMap ran a pilot study focused on 5 
schools, from the secondary to university level, to build and test the design of their 
program. However, as it unfolded, work in the primary and secondary schools was 
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erratic, whereas at the university level, students and administrators were far more ready 
to take on the problem of sexual harassment. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, SA began in parallel with SSU and centered instead on 
public entities, mostly including small and large businesses. In its planning stages, 
HarassMap wanted to build role models that would encourage other businesses and 
public organizations to follow their lead. Toward this end, there were two trains of 
thought on how to accomplish this: by recruiting large corporate entities, such as 
Vodafone, or to focus on smaller community level businesses, like sidewalk kiosks, taxis, 
and privately owned family businesses. With the first, corporate enterprises with branch 
stores were though to offer faster and more expansive entry into multiple neighborhoods 
at once. However, some internal discomfort with this, along with the eventual realization 
that large companies were not jumping on board with becoming safe areas, turned 
HarassMap’s attentions toward community-level businesses. Moreover, Community 
Outreach staff had already begun to recruit small businesses to become safe areas. The 
first of these was a Zamalek kiosk located near a popular Hardees fast food restaurant, in 
which the proprietor installed a camera and began catching and chastising men for 
harassing women in the area. The kiosk owner argued that sexual harassment was 
keeping people away from patronizing his kiosk, and he feared the rampant sexual 
harassment in Zamalek itself would keep people from the area, in general.  
The kiosk owner’s sentiments reflected one of HarassMap’s goals with SA – for 
businesses to see the potentially positive effects of standing up to sexual harassment by 
becoming a safe place for clients to patronize.  In theory, in neighborhoods rife with 
sexual harassment, such safe areas would be havens for individuals to remain in public 
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but be free from unwanted interactions, thus making them more attractive than other 
businesses. Businesses that did not become safe areas would then suffer the financial 
ramifications of allowing sexual harassment to continue, either inside or in the streets 
around their premises. From the beginning, both SSU and SA were predicated on similar 
foundations. For SA, the mission is recruiting businesses and other public entities to 
become role models to encourage other businesses to follow suit. This is undertaken on a 
street-by-street basis, recruiting one business at a time on a single street until the whole 
street itself is a safe area. For SSU it is building school teams that offer campus outreach 
and trainings. Both seek to build slow rejection for sexual harassment in their respective 
community locations. More importantly, both SA/SSU also promote the need to develop 
tangible escalation policies for dealing with incidences of sexual harassment. For that 
purpose, HarassMap built multiple policy templates for different types of public and 
private entities. One such template was sent to the Cairo University faculty committee 
that worked to establish a campus policy following the high profile sexual harassment 
incident at the Faculty of Law.  
Of the two programs, SSU has grown significantly, with their primary presence 
located on university campuses, with currently more that 380 student volunteers in 7 
universities throughout Egypt. Like Community Outreach, SSU trains university captains 
using Community Outreach workshop materials and even organizing weeklong training 
academies mirroring HMA. An early SSU training workshop held at HarassMap’s offices 
in Maadi in April 2014 for students at Cairo University, Ain Shams University and the 
American University in Cairo, underscored what HarassMap sees as the critical need for 
gender-based approaches inside of universities. The first two hours of the session focused 
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extensively on the excuses people gave for sexual harassment, with students offering 
numerous stories about interactions with professors and other students.  The SA/SSU 
Director, who was then the Field Operations Manager, noted that excuses offered among 
university populations were more advanced than what you might hear in the street, that 
students and professionals were cleverer in their argumentation skills and decided in their 
opinions. For instance, he stated that on campus there is no way to claim that an unveiled 
woman who is sexually harassed might be Christian. The implication is that people’s 
sentiments around victim blaming cannot be countered based on their lack of knowledge 
of a person’s religion. On campus people would somehow be able to tell which 
individuals were and were not Muslims and unveiled Muslim girls would always be in 
the wrong if they failed to cover. Gender issues, he noted, were more stark on campus 
and moving forward trainings needed to have an underlying theory of gender in order to 
better combat the patriarchal bias underpinning sexual harassment. Trainings since have 
employed the Gender Box workshop and also explicitly promote building a critical mass, 
drawing on materials from the internal HarassMap professional development session on 
the bystander effect offered only weeks before. 
As with Community Outreach, confronting bystander biases is a contentious 
process in the SA/SSU program. In the SA program, the connection between corporate 
practices and cultural norms is an important question. To what extent does the 
development of internal policies and due process within businesses pervade wider social 
perceptions, such that the culture around sexual harassment shifts? Is there a link between 
neoliberal market forces within which businesses are embedded and societal practices? 
This question was particularly salient when HarassMap was in conversations with multi-
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national entities, such as Vodafone, but is no less so with their work around small 
businesses. Moreover, does the policy approach with businesses and universities differ 
from NGO political and legal advocacy that similarly seeks codified definitions and 
enforced punishments for sexual harassment? In part, the approach of SA does not simply 
view business owners and employees in their capacity as capitalist entrepreneurs. Instead, 
it sees them as individual members of their communities with a stake in the safety of their 
neighbors, and potential client base. Enterprise, therefore, serves as a springboard for 
advancing claims around individual social responsibility, but it is not the enterprise itself 
that is seen as a force for change. This approach grounds corporate and business owners 
and employees more firmly into communities and does not absolve them of the 
responsibility of ensuring the safety and integrity of the communities they are a part of 
and serve. At the same time, policy approaches are geared toward similar outcomes as 
legal advocacy, i.e. the creation of institutionalized frameworks that criminalize and 
penalize certain behaviors. Policy approaches, however, are not singularly restricted to 
the level of state practice and encompass a broad range of both public and private entities, 
whether large or small. In their work with small businesses and schools, such an approach 
by anti-sexual harassment initiatives only confirms how cultural negotiations are 
themselves political acts that have material political effects.  
 
Technology for Social Change: Online Spaces and Tools to Mobilize Dissent 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) play an important role, 
alongside on-the-ground efforts inside of communities, in the work of shifting 
perceptions and mobilizing the public to action. The use of ICTs in anti-sexual 
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harassment work evolved alongside its use within other entities in Egypt seeking to 
combat political corruption, which numerous scholars emphasize played a significant, if 
not generative, role in the Revolutions that swept across the region in 2011 (El Tantawy 
& Weist 2011; Khamis and Vaughn 2013; Lim 2012; Shahin 2012). Activists and 
scholars alike view technology as both a tool and a space that allows for the negotiation 
of new subjectivities and where inequality and violence can be challenged in pursuit of 
free and democratic futures (Aouragh & Alexander 2011; Rifaat 2008). New forms of 
activism in Egypt employing ICTs are made possible with the increasing growth and ease 
in the availability of varying technologies, primarily Internet and mobile phone access. 
As of December 2013, the rate of Internet penetration reached almost half the country at 
45%, and mobile phone penetration rates were as high as 118%, indicating that while 
almost half of Egyptians had access to the Internet, almost all Egyptians owned at least 
one if not two mobile phone (MCIT 2014). Social media outpaces other available online 
sites and platforms, with Facebook surpassing Google as the most visited Internet site in 
Egypt by mid-2013 (Ahram 2014; Digibuzz 2013).  The potential of social media was 
summed up by HarassMap’s (former) Director of Marketing and Communications who 
stated, “I was shocked when I realized that people can access social media but may never 
have an email address...I realized when someone would send us a message and they 
wanted to get in touch with us somehow, people would be like ‘how do I do that?’ 
because they don’t actually have email. They have Facebook but they don’t have email, 
which is crazy for us because we all had email first and then social media came about. 
Especially the younger generation, their first interaction was through social media…” 
(Interview, April 2014). 
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HarassMap stands out from other anti-sexual harassment initiatives in Egypt for 
its broader and more integrated use of varying technologies. They employ three specific 
technological platforms, including 1) an Internet-based GIS mapping system developed 
by Ushahidi that allows people to report and spatially plot the location of their sexual 
harassment incidences on a map, otherwise known as crowd-mapping, 2) a mobile phone-
based SMS system linked to their Ushahidi map, and 3) Internet-based social media sites, 
particularly Facebook, but also Twitter and, to a lesser extent, Tumblr. In particular, 
crowd-mapping is argued to be a unique, creative, and more importantly, democratic 
method for expanding the way information is generated, disseminated and utilized since 
it depends on reports from the public (Howe 2006; Lane 2010). Through crowd-mapping, 
HarassMap gave the public both a space and tool to speak up about sexual violence 
anonymously, something not guaranteed through other technological platforms. For 
HarassMap staff, this was vital given the historic silence and stigma surrounding sexual 
harassment. Moreover, the data it generates allows HarassMap teams to mobilize 
communities by demonstrating the reality and impact of the phenomenon on victims. As 
already discussed, stories from the map are printed out for each street outreach event in 
order to convince members of the public that sexual harassment is real. 
 Ushahidi works by bringing together a database linked to Google maps and 
telecom services. The database is housed on HarassMap’s website and is interfaced 
through a web report form that acts as a type of online survey. Members of the public 
with Internet connectivity can access the form, fill out a number of questions, describe 
their experience of sexual harassment, and then turn to a map and click on the location 
where their experience took place. This information is sent to a dashboard where the 
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report can be reviewed and approved. Reports go through an internal verification process, 
and once approved they become visible on the public side of HarassMap’s map for 
anyone visiting the site to see and serving as testimony to people’s suffering. SMS 
technology allows individuals to send their story to the map via text message. A mobile 
phone short code was established to provide a more accessible tool for those without 
Internet access or who were less active on social media to report incidents of sexual 
harassment. Since 2010, SMS has played a fairly minor role in expanding the breadth of 
voices speaking up against sexual harassment. In the most recent statistic generated by 
HarassMap, SMS reports accounted for less than 10% of the more than 1200 reports 
received through the map to date. However, it is often of critical concern for staff 
members looking to improve reporting options, given the differences in penetration rates 
of mobile phone and Internet technologies.  
Problematic with crowdsourcing as a new data collection method and for 
mobilizing the public sentiment against sexual harassment is the lack of knowledge on 
whose stories have come to shape understandings of the phenomenon in Egypt. 
Anonymity combined with biases in Internet access have made it difficult to know which 
segments of society are utilizing the map, how experiences and perceptions may differ 
among social classes and age groups, and why certain individuals choose to speak up 
when others may remain silent. Moreover, while HarassMap staff argue that it is often 
easy to tell which submitted stories are fake and which are real, this is a particular 
confound with the system, where anything that meets the basic criteria for reports may be 
approved. There are no additional modes by which to follow up with victims and verify 
the veracity of the stories. With respect to outreach, stories are easy to dismiss as not 
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genuine or made up, especially in situations where the public is not clear on how such 
data is generated and more tangible knowledge of victim identities. From a maintenance 
standpoint, HarassMap staff rely on IT professionals to update and fix Ushahidi when a 
problem occurs and, until recently, this was only possible with external help from 
international partners as Egypt had no Ushahidi experts. SMS floundered given the lack 
of specialized knowledge to deal with problems and how best to deploy the technology. 
At the end of 2013, the SMS system was down for several months, in which time text 
message reports were not received and some were thought to be lost overall.  
For these reasons, social media is a very popular space and tool for activism and 
reporting, and a number of HarassMap staff members believe it to be more user-friendly 
and easier to manipulate than Ushahidi.  Social media affords activists the ability to 
encourage reporting, deploy messaging campaigns with concomitant visual components, 
and to organize teams across the country. Reports submitted via social media that meet 
review criteria are manually uploaded to the Ushahidi map, though the contours of social 
media reports differ from that of reports received directly by the map and may include 
information tailored toward a particular online campaign. They are usually not 
anonymous and sometimes also include photos and information about the harasser in 
question. Because of a full lack of details, reporting through social media reduces 
HarassMap’s ability to treat reports as a data set from which they are able to draw certain 
conclusions about the changing state of sexual harassment in Egypt. Reports cannot be 
downloaded, filtered or controlled as easily via social media as with crowdsourcing 
platforms and, therefore, hinder HarassMap’s ability to more objectively track changes in 
social perceptions over time. Also, as with online platforms in general, social media 
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outlets are not widely accessible to all segments of the population, and have been noted 
by HarassMap’s Marketing and Communications Director as a below the line media that, 
while full of potential, does not yet have the reach of mass media like tv. 
Yet, each of HarassMap’s major campaigns, such as byitḥarrash lih?, ṣallaḥha fi 
dimāghak, mesh sākta, and ʿayizīn siyāsa guwa el-gāmʿa, were deployed and their broad 
reach monitored via Facebook and Twitter. For the mesh sākta campaign, there were 
multiple phases that asked people to upload photos and videos of themselves providing 
tips to standing up to sexual harassment. Also, all of HarassMap’s community outreach 
and SSU teams maintain their own individual group page through which they send out 
HMA applications, report activities (and upload photos from outreach events) in real time 
to recruit new members, keep each other updated on news stories of sexual harassment 
and gender violence in the country, and generally maintain a sense of community with 
each other as a team. As such, it is an invaluable tool in helping to disseminate 
information and generate new members. HMA is primarily advertised through Facebook 
and, while college-aged students represent the vast number of active volunteers, they are 
not the only ones. HMA’s also include professionals working in other community-based 
organizations, and even a stay-at-home mom that came with her infant in fall 2013. 
 While technology represents a vital component with respect to mobilization, by 
itself there is question as to whether it can change societal perceptions and behaviors. As 
noted for the Revolution, technologies to foment dissent were not viewed as generating 
the discontent that made the Revolution possible. Technology, especially online 
technologies, such as Facebook and YouTube, provided opposition movements the ability 
to incite an already dissatisfied populace into action, allowing opposition leaders to send 
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out calls for action and to organize on the ground protest (Khoury 2014).  Also noted by 
HarassMap’s Executive Director, Rebecca Chiao, online activism is more of a bonus to 
the offline work of mobilizing communities. Despite the excitement and the potential 
around employing Ushahidi, which was a new technology when HarassMap formed, the 
co-founders always saw it as guiding but not supplanting grassroots activism. In this way, 
ICTs play a more supportive, yet no less critical, role in mobilizing the public. 
 
Bystander Publics: Changing The Nature of Social Responsibility 
 There are a number of criticisms around the notion that a corps of bystander 
publics will intervene against sexual harassment when they witness it. In part, bystanders 
are not an undifferentiated mass of potentially interested individuals that will speak up 
when necessary. Movements are comprised of 1) adherents, or those that become active 
in a cause, 2) bystander publics, or those on the sidelines that may become movement 
adherents but are at present uncommitted, 3) another category of public referred to as 
weak supporters, or those individuals that may share in a movement’s values and who 
actually provide some level of support but do not commit resources, in terms of time and 
funds, to assist the movement (this category also includes free loaders, or those who do 
not provide assistance but benefit from a movement’s achievements) and 4) opposition, 
those that do not support movement goals (Ennis & Schreuer 1987; McCarthy & Zald 
1987). It is not clear what the relationship is between these categories of the public, nor is 
it understood what stimulates bystanders to either become weak supporters or adherents. 
Additionally, that which constitutes a bystander is shifting, particularly in the age of 
above and below the line media forms, where technology is increasingly mediating how 
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people perceive the world (Koopmans 2004). What it means to understand an issue, to 
recognize a problem, and actually be a witness to that problem in person are all under 
contestation. Here, witnessing itself may no longer singularly occur in the street, as 
people are ever increasingly watching events from behind their televisions and computers 
and lending their voices, if not other resources, to an issue (Ahmad 2013). An example of 
this is the sexual harassment incident of the female student at the College of Law at Cairo 
University, in which Cairo University’s President blamed the women for being sexually 
harassed because she removed her black, outer robes, but not her actual clothing or her 
hijab, head scarf. The incident aired across Egypt’s major broadcast and print news 
outlets, which stimulated surprisingly stringent public responses that necessitated the 
university President to retract his statement about the victim, prompted a corps of faculty 
to form a committee to create a new sexual harassment policy at the university, and was 
also the final push for the government to create the new amendment to Article 306 of the 
penal code. Though, admittedly, this incident built on years of publicized sexual 
harassment cases, particularly from Tahrir, which generated new public awareness. 
 Additionally, recent criticisms surrounding bystander intervention from those 
looking at how to end rape culture in the United States note that such approaches do not 
solve the underlying problem of sexual violence. In their New Inquiry article, Elk and 
Devereuax (2014) argued that there is inherent danger to the bystander in asking them to 
intervene in cases of sexual violence, like rape, and that bystanders, like victims, do not 
receive adequate support. They state that this does not eliminate victim-blaming rhetoric 
and only shifts where that rhetoric is directed, i.e. at bystanders that fail to provide 
assistance when needed. Moreover, in their estimation, bystander interventions appear to 
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be nothing more than another seeming form of vigilantism, which they note is an artifact 
of the violence that exists in state legal structures singularly designed to punish, rather 
than rehabilitate, offenders. “Even where bystander intervention is successful, disrupting 
one assault is not the same as ending violence. It’s not even violence prevention” (Elk & 
Devereuax 2014). Ultimately, they believe that bystander intervention does not solve the 
problem of rape culture because it does not force people to look at themselves and 
address the violence they are capable of committing.  
However, such arguments elide some of the complexities around both bystander 
behavior and social movement messaging. In part, this argument does not explore the 
nature of bystander interventions and does not define what constitutes intervention. There 
is a sense here that a physical intervention is required, yet other forms of intervention that 
are equally as helpful or lifesaving, yet do not require bystanders to put their bodies in 
harms way, are not discussed. In the case of Kitty Genovese, the New York woman that 
was brutally raped and murdered in an alley where 38 witnesses supposedly did nothing, 
a phone call to the police, everyone turning on their apartment lights and/or collectively 
yelling from their windows might have minimally scared Genovese’s murderer off before 
he murdered her, even if it did not stop the rape. This is purely speculative and it can’t be 
known for sure what the possibilities in the Genovese case would have been with 
bystander help. However, in Egypt, what is also evident is that bystanders are not averse 
to physically intervening and putting themselves in danger if they feel it is warranted by 
the situation. In the case of theft, where it is popularly known, and also regularly 
witnessed by many, whole neighborhoods will rally to catch and beat a harasser, with 
young men often forming small ad hoc posses and wielding sticks, iron bars, and chains, 
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to do so. In one well-reported case, villagers in a Delta town lynched a man for stealing a 
car, though this was linked to the devolving security situation in the post-Revolutionary 
context and is rather extreme for interventions in most theft cases (Michael 2013).  
HarassMap’s rhetoric of bystander intervention implicitly accepts that within a 
group of bystanders there will likely be many harassers. In attempting to avoid accusatory 
rhetoric that blames particular groups of people for sexual harassment, and to also avoid 
engaging in what scholars criticize as the neocolonial- inspired practice of 
misrepresenting Arab men, their discourse instead centers on the need to recognize that 
each individual has a responsibility to all other members in their community. Rather than 
shifting blame, this message is subtly refashioning the nature of social responsibility by 
asking people to reconsider their own inherent biases - biases that keep people silent or 
that prevent them from seeing the basic humanity of the victims of sexual violence. For 
this reason, bystander approaches are expanded beyond harassers – or victims – to the 
broad swath of the population, making all people equally accountable in building a better 
and more equitable society. The problem of viewing bystander approaches as a practice 
that shifts victim blaming and that does not address an individual’s inner potential for 
violence, is that it draws on a particularly Western-inspired binary of the individual 
versus the community. Notions of individual responsibility only promote the need for 
people to control themselves and divorces them from any responsibility to the community 
in which they belong.  For this reason, promoting community responsibility is instead 
viewed as ineffective and as another form of hegemony. 
For social movements, bystanders are a critical component of the work they 
conduct, as they seek to ever expand their reach. In many ways, building bystander 
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publics is geared toward creating new forms of non-violent social pressure, where people 
feel compelled to conform to new norms that respect an individual’s human rights. 
Notwithstanding the problematic vigilante violence in the Egyptian case mentioned 
above, entities like HarassMap seek, instead, non-violent methods in which people are 
not putting themselves in danger. Interventions and speaking up take many forms, from 
creating a dialogue within families and neighbors, to offering testimony of the sexual 
harassment they have witnessed, to being the first voice that says stop when a sexual 
harassment incident is occurring. The hope is that one voice becomes multiple voices and 
that group solidarity will prevent situations from devolving in to further violence. 
 What is it, then, that stimulates people to move from bystanders into either weak 
supporters or movement adherents? Empathy as a suggested motivation for interventions 
is a possibility, with Batson et al. (1981) establishing that empathy may have either 
egoistic or altruistic underlying bases. In either situation, it is the outcome of the 
intervention that determines its nature, meaning that people either see an end-stage 
benefit to themselves (egoistic) or to others (altruistic) for the intervention. Other studies 
examine multiple motivations, based on a range of emotions that bystanders experience 
when deciding to intervene in a situation, particularly in medical emergencies (Skora & 
Riegel 2001). Such motivations include empathy, feeling a sense of duty, guilt and social 
pressure. These types of motivations are visible in volunteer reasons for participating in 
anti-sexual harassment programs and activities. Volunteers from both HarassMap and 
Ded el-Taharrush were surveyed on a range of issues, including what precipitated their 
involvement in activism. The same survey was distributed to several hundred volunteers 
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across the two initiatives, of which an almost equal number of responses were received: a 
total of 22 surveys from Ded El-Taharrush and 19 surveys from HarassMap volunteers.  
 Demographically, differences were noticeable between the two sets of volunteers, 
with HarassMap respondents representing a slightly older population than Ded el-
Taharrush. The median age of HarassMap members was 24 years and 20 years for Ded 
el-Taharrush, though at least three HarassMap respondents listed their age as 30+, and a 
number of others were 24 and above. Ded El-Taharrush respondents were primarily 
between the ages of 18-23 with two individuals that were 27 years old. There were equal 
numbers of male and female respondents for both initiatives, at 10 men and 9 women for 
HarassMap and 10 men, 11 women and 1 unspecified for Ded el-Taharrush. Generally 
speaking, there was a wide age distribution for men in HarassMap, with men represented 
at almost all ages between 21-30, but there appeared to be two primary age groups for 
women, from 18-20 and then 29-30+.  That was not evident with Ded El-Taharrush 
members that were mostly under the age of 23. This possibly suggests that HarassMap 
work appeals to a broader range of individuals at differing life stages, whereas either the 
approach or the atmosphere within Ded el-Taharrush is attracting a younger set of 
volunteers. Moreover, the increasingly institutionalized nature of HarassMap’s work also 
presents the possibility that they have a better ability to reach a broader swath of the 
population than Ded el-Taharrush, and are, therefore, able to recruit older volunteers.  
 Despite age variations in these organizations, responses demonstrate many 
similarities around the question of what made these individuals decide to volunteer for 
their respective initiatives. In particular, two themes are evident that confirm the 
motivations explored by Batson et al. (1981) and Skora & Reigel (2001). For the first 
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theme, reasons for joining were linked to having some personal experience with sexual 
harassment. Generally speaking, people wanted to offer assistance in order to mitigate the 
emotional and physical costs that sexual harassment caused to themselves and family 
members. Primarily visible among females, many of these respondents noted that they or 
other female family members and friends had been the victims of sexual harassment. 
Participation in anti-sexual harassment efforts, therefore, gave these women a chance to 
resist and reduce this phenomenon that caused them personal suffering. One respondent 
from Ded el-Taharrush noted that she volunteered (translated from Arabic), “Because I 
hate that I feel my body is violated all the time, and every time that I walk I hate my life 
more from the comments I hear and the attempts at physical harassment that happen. I 
hate being in a state of nervousness all the time and that I always keep a cutter in my 
hand, ready to repel an attack…” A HarassMap respondent also stated that, “…I 
personally want to know more about how to deal with situations like this in the street.” In 
part, self-preservation and finding proactive ways to deal with public sexual harassment 
was part of the underlying motivation for female volunteers in these initiatives.  
 In addition, another major theme in survey responses was volunteer desire to be 
involved as part of the solution to sexual harassment. This theme included two sub-
components. Volunteers either noted that they wanted to promote greater respect for 
human and women’s rights or they indicated that they wanted to change social 
perceptions in order to improve the current sorry state and reputation of their society. 
These responses, derived from both men and women, highlight a mix of altruistic and 
egoistical motivations to volunteerism. Altruism in these responses is visible in abstract 
notions of creating a better society for all individuals, which, in the words of one Ded el-
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Taharrush volunteer, “is the duty of all human beings.” Also mentioned by many 
volunteers were desires to help create safe spaces for women and girls, to see that women 
as a class were respected, and promoting women as human beings. Yet, what is also 
noticeable, particularly among Ded el-Taharrush volunteers, are egotistical motivations 
around the volunteers’ need to reaffirm their own principles and to be proud of their 
country by improving the state of social practice. One volunteer noted that, “My desire at 
attempting change will help me to hold on to my own humanity.”  
 These survey responses provide only a small glimpse into the myriad motivations 
that undoubtedly exist among the thousands that lend their time, energy, and even 
emotions, to combatting sexual harassment. They also hint at an interesting conundrum 
for anti-sexual harassment initiatives, in that it is clear that volunteer motivations are 
partially driven not only by concerns around protecting their own female family 
members, but women as a class. While this is seemingly unproblematic, it dovetails with 
concerns raised by activists that 1) it is not possible to advocate for change by appealing 
to people’s sense of responsibility toward their female family members, and 2) that there 
is a fine line that must be carefully watched between the “need to save women” and 
advocating for women to have the space and ability to fend for themselves. With the first, 
there is a push within the Community Outreach unit to avoid claims that individuals 
should consider all women to be like their sisters, mother’s, wives, or daughters, and 
therefore women should be protected from sexual harassment. The Community Outreach 
Director notes that such a claim only expands patriarchal control from a harasser’s 
immediate female kin to all of society’s women. Community Outreach, therefore, seeks 
to convey a sense of women’s overall right to access the public sphere regardless of 
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social location. With the second, the bystander approach itself is designed to target all 
members of society, both men and women, to create safety in the streets that prevents 
sexual harassment from occurring. In this way, women are also asked to speak up, and 
are actively encouraged to report their own stories and take back control of their bodies. 
 What these survey responses additionally demonstrate is the potential significance 
of creating a bystander public that seeks not only and end to the problem of sexual 
harassment but the creation of a more equitable society for all.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that anti-sexual harassment efforts to change social 
perceptions and behaviors is a cultural negotiation and, therefore, represents a political 
process. Criticism that such work is, in fact, depoliticizing is grounded in narrow 
assumptions about the nature of the political, where the political is synonymous with the 
political sphere. In such a view, cultural negotiations are viewed as separate and non-
political in orientation. However, this chapter contends that the negotiation process is a 
political act and, as such, cultural negotiations are very much political. Seen this way, 
anti-sexual harassment efforts that are focused at the community and street levels, 
therefore, are not necessarily anxiety-worthy endeavors that reproduce the problem of 
sexual harassment. In fact, the opposite is the case, where initiatives seek to undercut 
patriarchal norms to redefine the way in which people view women’s roles in public and 
their own responsibility vis-à-vis sexual violence that limits women’s participation in 
public. Moreover, such avenues of change are, perhaps, far more profound than advocacy 
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for political and legal change because they seek to reconceptualize the fundamental bases 
of social belief.  
Within this framework, the mobilizational strategies of entities like HarassMap, 
which is focused on the community or street, are geared toward two primary purposes: 1) 
challenging biased gendered norms that primarily disadvantage women, and 2) changing 
the nature of social responsibility by building a corps of bystanders publics that will 
speak up and intervene to end the social acceptability of sexual harassment. Toward this 
end, HarassMap’s work at mobilizing bystanders occurs through street campaigns, 
creating safe areas, schools and universities, and through technological means to expand 
the reach of their social messaging. Work in the street directly engages with average 
individuals, school professionals and business owners and employees. Such work asks 
all, whether they agree with challenges to gendered norms or not, to minimally lend their 
voices of support to those being sexually harassed in public. Notwithstanding the 
challenges of such work, social movement scholars note that building popular support for 
movement values and goals is critical for movement success. Numerous motivations exist 
that propel people into supporting movement endeavors and potentially speaking up, 
motivations that are both altruistic and egoistical in orientation. Entities like HarassMap 
need to more adequately tap into such motivations to incite greater numbers toward their 
cause.  
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CHAPTER 6: LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF TAḤARRUSH GINSY: 
INCOMPLETE FRAME ALIGNMENT IN THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
In September 2013, members of the Egyptian anti-sexual harassment initiative, 
HarassMap, participated in the MasterPeace street festival in the upscale Cairene 
neighborhood of Dokki. MasterPeace is a global grassroots initiative aimed at mobilizing 
local communities to support peacebuilding through intercultural dialogue. HarassMap 
utilized this opportunity to continue to grow their public presence, to spread their 
message about ending the bystanding effect around sexual harassment, and to recruit new 
volunteers for community outreach teams. At one point, a heated exchange arose between 
an older man passing through the festival and HarassMap members on the existence of 
the phenomenon of taḥarrush ginsy, or sexual harassment, in Egypt. The crux of the 
man’s argument was that taḥarrush was not a problem in Egypt. Instead, he noted that 
muʿāksa, or flirtation, was prevalent, though he qualified this by stating that muʿāksa also 
existed in other countries (even America) and was not unique to Egypt, but that taḥarrush 
was a “big word” that should not be used lightly. HarassMap members, for their part, 
approached the man’s argument first by asking him if he had daughters and how he felt 
about the possibility of them being harassed in the street. Then, in more agitated fashion, 
female volunteers detailed what harassment was really like for them and other women in 
the streets. Underpinning HarassMap’s counter-arguments seemed to be a belief that 
public denials of the existence of sexual harassment were based on a lack of knowledge 
and sensitivity to the real suffering of women. However, the gentleman’s understanding 
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of, and distinction between, the terms taḥarrush and muʿāksa were not challenged and 
did not receive critical examination by HarassMap members.  
 Almost a decade earlier, when the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) 
began the first campaign against street sexual harassment in 2005, public reactions were 
similar to the gentleman’s comments at the MasterPeace event. From the start, ECWR 
referred to the phenomenon of sexual harassment as taḥarrush ginsy, which met with 
confusion, embarrassment, anger, and most often denial. Salient elements of public 
feedback at the time were that taḥarrush did not exist in Egypt, that it was an American 
concept and an exact translation of the English term “sexual harassment” that could not 
be directly applied in the Egyptian context – which, incidentally, also arose in later 
contexts where HarassMap conducted outreach events – and that the word taḥarrush was, 
quite simply, too “big” to signify the phenomenon of catcalls, comments, stares, and even 
touching that were prevalent in the streets.  
These examples demonstrate the tension that has existed, and continues to exist, 
around the naming of sexual harassment as taḥarrush ginsy and the framing of certain 
behaviors as forms of violence that violate of women’s rights. This chapter interrogates 
this tension and explores, 1) the shifting perceptions around the use of taḥarrush ginsy 
among the public through data derived from online Arabic discussion board forums over 
a 12-year time period that pre and post-dates ECWR’s anti-sexual campaign, and 2) 
current conceptualizations of taḥarrush vis-a-vis muʿāksa existent in perceptions of 
Cairene residents derived from surveys deployed in three neighborhoods at differing 
socioeconomic levels. I argue here that the tension around taḥarrush ginsy in Egypt stems 
not from public misunderstandings and unsympathetic denials that women suffer from 
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unwanted attentions in the street that constrain their ability to freely move about and 
participate in public space. Instead, this chapter contends that public denials of sexual 
harassment are linked to the incomplete frame alignment of public perceptions and wider 
social norms with the new norms promoted in anti-sexual harassment discourses.  
Data presented in this chapter will demonstrate a number of key trends in sexual 
harassment discourses. These include that historic discussions of sexual harassment, as 
taḥarrush, largely focus on molestation and rape, whether or children or women, in the 
private sphere of home or semi-private sphere of school, work and other locations. 
Certain high profile events in Egypt shifted the meaning of sexual harassment from a 
phenomenon that primarily occurred in private to the public sexual harassment targeting 
women in the streets as it is understood today. Additionally, the data from neighborhood 
surveys show that widespread public perceptions link taḥarrush mostly to physical 
behaviors, or verbal behaviors that acquire the weight of physical transgressions in their 
seriousness. Verbal behaviors, primarily, are associated with the more commonly used 
term muʿāksa. For reasons that will be discussed later, at the beginning of anti-sexual 
harassment activism, strategic decisions were made to not promote sexual harassment as 
muʿāksa. Despite this, the concept of muʿāksa appears to have more variable uses that the 
term taḥarrush, where violence is equally as visible in how the term is deployed as with 
the term taḥarrush. The connotations of rape and very serious sexual transgressions 
inherent in taḥarrush make it difficult for the public to accept that it can signify the 
everyday sexually harassing behaviors in the street that anti-sexual harassment initiatives 
promote. In this way, the efforts of anti-sexual harassment initiatives might be enhanced 
if conceptual reformulations of muʿāksa are similarly undertaken.  
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In the following sections, I first present the data from online Arabic discussion 
forums. Then I turn to some central themes elicited from street survey data, followed by a 
discussion of the trajectory of change of public perceptions and what this trajectory 
means for anti-sexual harassment activism. 
 
Online Arabic Discussion Forums: The Multiple Meanings of Taḥarrush Ginsy 
Internet access in Egypt became commercially available in 1996, with increased 
efforts made by the state to improve the country’s satellite and fiber-optic infrastructure 
(Abdulla 2007). At this time, there were large pushes across the Middle East to improve 
connectivity and provide widespread Internet access to the public, though these early 
years of connectivity were, more generally, slow and expensive for most households to 
maintain, requiring not only the service but the hardware to connect to the Internet. 
Moreover, the interaction of Arabic-language users with the Internet was complicated by 
a number of factors. Chief among these state control and censorship of content and class 
and gendered barriers to access, with particular obstacles to rural connectivity (Bakkar 
2006; Wheeler 2008). Abdulla (2007) noted that the late availability of Internet access in 
the region is thought by some to be an expression of government control over 
information. In the years following the commercial availability of the Internet, she 
highlighted a number of arrests of prominent online political activists, including Alaa 
Seif al-Islam Abdel Fattah, who suffered several instances of imprisonment since 2006 
(including in 2015 under the new protest law that made any form of public assembly 
without formal permission a crime). Aouragh and Alexander (2011) further noted that 
during the Revolution, the government was able to shut down satellite and Internet 
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communications in their effort to interrupt the ability of opposition movements to use 
various media platforms to continue to foment protest in the streets, though this did not 
put an end to rising dissent. Since the Revolution, surveillance of opposition activists and 
attempts to censor various forms of online and offline media have continued under the 
government of El-Sisi (Hughes and Mubarak 2014). Yet, comparatively speaking, Egypt 
is far less repressive in its control of Internet access and use than other regimes in the 
Middle East, and many note that information and communication technologies have the 
power to destabilize corrupt regimes (Kalathil and Boas 2003). In addition, the Internet 
serves as a powerful medium through which social norms and values may be discussed, 
debated and refashioned in new ways (Loch et al. 2003; Lynch 2011). 
 Increasing Internet access in Egypt and the region as a whole made possible the 
growth of a “new media scene” comprised of wide range of voices and forms of 
interaction (Bakkar 2006). Within this, discussion forums and blog sites are a critical 
space in which public members are able to discussion a range of political as well as 
deeply personal issues. Research elsewhere notes how the anonymity possible via online 
platforms creates a “disinhibition effect,” where people are able to disconnect from who 
they are and from any perceived repercussions of revealing too much personal 
information (Suler 2004).  Online space is increasingly critical for those working on a 
range of sensitive or taboo issues, especially those of a sexual nature. For sexuality-
related problems, especially those revolving around violence, such as domestic abuse and 
rape that are connected to deep sentiments of shame, online space affords a pathway 
toward exposing the contours of such problems, providing victims a voice to make their 
experiences known and to receive support from others in similar situations, and even 
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giving law enforcement a better means to gauge criminal activity and devise improved 
strategies for combatting gender-based violence (Byrne et al. 2013). Arabic online 
forums provide such a space for public individuals concerned with the issue of el- 
taḥarrush el-ginsy. From almost the beginning of commercial access to the Internet, 
discussion board forums demonstrate the wide range of conversations on taḥarrush that 
unfolded between people across the Middle East, as well as key shifts in this discourse 
over time and location. 
 
Demographics and Distribution of Online Discussions of Taḥarrush 
Data derived from online Arabic discussion forums and blogsites between the 
years 2000-2012 provided longitudinal data of public sentiments on taḥarrush ginsy. 
Online data were utilized as a proxy for living communities, given that it was not possible 
to obtain such historic information via interviews. Discussion forums represented a 
unique archive, of sorts, in which to elicit insights about the way in which individuals and 
communities perceived the issue of taḥarrush ginsy. Using Google as the primary (free) 
search engine for data collection, 233 posts were located from 107 discussion forums and 
blog sites spanning 18 countries or areas in the Middle East and North Africa. Single 
posts ranged in length from short paragraphs to pages of text, with men and women 
almost equally represented among the sample, with 114 women and 107 men and 12 
unknown. Discussion boards focused on health, religious and personal issues, often with 
people talking to each other on sensitive topics and/or receiving advice from 
professionals. Data from multiple Arabic speaking countries was included in this analysis 
largely given the paucity of online data from Egypt prior to 2005. The use of data from 
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across the region offered the ability to look at change comparatively and to make 
observations about conceptual changes happening inside of Egypt. Data generated from 
these posts offer critical preliminary, if not generalizable, insights into shifting discursive 
practices around sexual harassment in Egypt and the Arab World.  
Critical changes have taken place in public conceptualizations of sexual 
harassment across the Middle East, but most particularly in Egypt. The distribution of 
posts across country of origin is shown in Figure 1. Points of origin for most posts were 
identified based on the stated country of the forum member or the national orientation of 
the discussion forum or blogsite itself. Where specific countries could not be found or 
national orientation of the site could not be determined, more general areas were listed, 
such as “Gulf,” which was often determined based on regional indicators or peculiarities 
of dialect inherent in the text of the posts. While listing countries in general terms is not 
ideal, it still points toward useful regional variations in conceptualizations around sexual 
harassment.  Only 6 posts could not be easily identified based on these criteria and 2 
posts came from Arab members based in Canada. As is evident in the figure, the majority 
of posts derived from Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and the Gulf area, 
representing 77% of the sample. 
Here, Gulf represents a 
conglomeration of potential countries 
lining the Persian Gulf, but it may be 
possible to presume that many of 
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these posts derive from Saudi nationals given their high rate of participation in online 
discussions. It is clear, though, that individuals from across the region participated in 
discussions of taḥarrush ginsy, although their prevalence is comparatively low when 
viewed against Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. For those most part, this suggests that 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia represent central loci for the development of national and cross-
national discursive configurations of sexual harassment.  
Figures 2 and 3 include the distribution of posts over time, Figure 2 for all of the 
posts from across the region and Figure 3 just for those posts originating from Egypt. 
Overall numbers of posts from year to year are relatively low, however, an increase in the 
discussions of taḥarrush ginsy in the region is apparent from 2004 and peak between 
2005-2006, as noted in Figure 2. The number of posts then slowly decreases from 2007 
but does not get as low as pre-2005 numbers. It is not clear why there are fewer posts 
prior to 2004, but possible explanations include that conversations about taḥarrush ginsy 
were rare or not happening in online communities, or that this data was not recoverable 
through Google. Moreover, more focused searches on individual discussion forum and 
blog sites did not take place across the more than 100 sites represented in this dataset, but 
individual forum searches were conducted with a limited number of Egyptian sites in 
order to capture as much data possible for this context. In Egypt, the discussion on 
taḥarrush ginsy mirrors the regional trend, to some extent. It is noticeable from 2003, but 
remains minimal until 2006. As shown in Figure 3, there are 7 posts in total between 
2003-2005, which jumps to 21 in 2006 and represents a 200% increase in the discussion 
on sexual harassment between these years. A dip in the conversation occurs in 2009 but 
by 2011-2012 starts to pick up again. 
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FIGURE 2: Distribution of All P osts by Year    FIGURE 3: Distribution of Egyptian Posts By Year 
 
Thematic Content of Discussions on Taḥarrush 
All posts were analyzed for thematic content and a codebook developed in order 
to code and quantify the prevalence of certain themes in the text of people’s sentiments 
and conversations. Twelve codes, which correspond to major themes, emerged from these 
posts, with another 10 sub-codes. A single post received multiple codes, depending on the 
nature of the discussion, which often cut across a range of issues. This resulted in 670 
coded instances across 233 posts. Table 1 details the codes and Table 2 the sub-codes that 
emerged from discussion forum and blog site posts. Sub-codes were linked to individual 
codes, such that when the code was evident then the sub-code could also be identified. 
Sub-codes were not utilized independent of their parent code. For instance, there were 4 
sub-codes for the code “Sexual Harassment of Women.” When this code was identified, 
then a sub-code identifying whether the harassment took place at work, in public (the 
streets, transportation, etc.), in the home, or at another location. The most prevalent 
“other” location was the doctor’s office. The same was true for the code “Child 
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Table 1 
 
Codes/Themes from Posts Across the Middle East and North Africa Region 
 
 
Total Coded 
Raw Number 
Total Coded 
Frequency 
Code/Theme N=233   
Child Molestation & Rape 132 57% 
Sexual Harassment of Women 98 42% 
Rape 19 8% 
Muaksa 18 8% 
Zina (Illicit/Consensual Sex) 22 9% 
Teen/Youth Sexual Exploration 10 4% 
Parental Responsibility 82 35% 
Homosexuality/Sexual Deviation 70 30% 
Sexual Harassment of Men 7 3% 
State Violence 4 2% 
Power/Authority/Control 10 4% 
Mob Assault 6 3% 
Total Codes 478   	  	  
Table 2 
 
Sub-Codes/Themes For Women and Children Only 
 
 
Total Coded 
Raw Number 
Total Coded 
Frequency 
CHILDREN, N=132   
Incest 51 13% 
Servants/Domestic Help 17 26% 
Schools/Other Public Venues 34 5% 
Neighbors 7 2% 
Religious Leaders 2 74% 
Total 111   
 
WOMEN, N=98 
  Workplace 19 19% 
Public 41 42% 
Domestic/Family 15 15% 
Other Location 6 6% 
Total 81   	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Molestation and Rape,” in which there were 5 sub-codes: 1) incest, where the sexual 
harassment occurred with a family member, such as father, brother, uncle, or grandfather, 
2) servants and domestic help, which often included drivers and maids, 3) in schools or 
other public venues, 4) with neighbors, and 5) with religious leaders, usually in mosques. 
Women and children represent two highly prevalent thematic areas in the 
discussion of taḥarrush ginsy. As highlighted in Table 1, 57% of all posts were coded as 
child molestation/rape and 42% as the sexual harassment of women. Egypt shows an 
inverse trend in with a higher focus on the sexual harassment of women at 66% and child 
molestation/rape at 32%. As will be discussed, this trend is potentially linked to anti-
sexual harassment efforts that began in 2005. Salient elements of the discussion around 
the most salient themes on children and women include: 
 
Child Molestation/Rape – This code represented more than half of the conversations that 
were located on taḥarrush ginsy across the region. In these conversations, there was 
overwhelming concern with child sexual assault within families, followed by schools 
and, with particular reference to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the assault on children by 
domestic employees, such as drivers and maids. Taḥarrush ginsy in this context was 
viewed as both a violation of children’s bodies, but also an act with devastating 
consequences for children. This is especially the case for the molestation and rape of 
young boys, where fears were evident that such an act would lead to perceived sexual 
deviance, such as homosexuality, sodomy, and masturbation. Child molestation/rape and 
homosexuality co-occur more than any other two codes that were analyzed, with the 
exception of child-molestation/rape and parental awareness/ responsibility. Within this 
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context, posts often exhorted parents to not leave children alone unguarded, to teach their 
children unacceptable forms of touching, and offered advice and support to those whose 
children had been the victims of sexual molestation and rape.  
 
Sexual Harassment of Women – This was also a prevalent theme in discussions of 
taḥarrush ginsy, representing almost half of posts region-wide, and two-thirds of the 
posts from Egypt. It is important here to note that this theme overlapped significantly 
with the molestation and rape of children, where many discussions focused on the abuse 
of young girls, in particular by fathers, stepfathers, uncles, cousins, and in some cases 
grandfathers and brothers. As part of this, there were divergent trends in the discussion on 
women, focused both their sexual abuse at home and work and sexual harassment in 
public settings, most especially in the street or on transportation. In Egypt, the majority of 
posts focused on women’s public sexual harassment, while moving about in the streets 
and on transportation. Most often, this was described as physical in nature, including 
touching, rubbing, and groping. However, verbal harassment that was vulgar and sexual 
in orientation also arose in online conversations. Individuals debated the role of dress in 
promoting sexual harassment, with many placing the blame on women for going out 
without the minimal protection of hijāb, or the headscarf. In the workplace, discussions 
centered on women’s lack of power, being propositioned by bosses, and leaving 
employment to avoid further unwanted advances. 
Beyond these two dominant themes around taḥarrush ginsy, others were also 
critical. Rape arose in conversations and was viewed as a problem in families, schools 
and the workplace. It was sometimes linked to homosexuality, particularly where rape 
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and sexual harassment targeted young boys or men. This theme was also connected to the 
public sexual harassment of women, where individuals debated the role clothing 
underlying the problem and argued it to be a psychological disease. Moreover, zinā, or 
adultery and illicit sexual relationships, emerged as significant, notably in Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf. Such relations were usually presented as a consensual, if a negative and 
demoralizing, practice.  
Muʿāksa, or flirtation, similarly came up in discussions. Though a largely 
Egyptian term, it appears in its noun form “el-muʿāksa” or in a verbal form, “tʿākis” in 
three posts from Saudi Arabia, three from the Gulf, and one from Qatar. For instance, a 
self-identified Saudi male participant on the discussion forum al-Ḥayā al-Zawjiyya 
(Married Life), explored who he felt to be responsible for sexual harassment, arguing that 
the blame did not rest on girls for the “taṣarafāt al-shāb al-shādha wa mumarāstu lil-
mu’āksa wa al-taḥarrush”  (flirting and harassing behaviors of abnormal men). Muʿāksa 
overwhelmingly co-occurred with the code for the sexual harassment of women. As 
visible from the Saudi post, it was often used synonymously with taḥarrush but was also 
presented in multiple and conflicting ways. It was a reference for physical forms of 
sexual harassment, rape and sexual relations, and was also used to denote verbal 
harassment and compliments to women.  
  Power, control and authority were likewise important talking points, especially in 
Egypt, and included critiques of the authoritarian system, patriarchal society, women’s 
vulnerability and inferiority to men, women’s fear of being fired, and social blame placed 
on women for their sexual harassment. Lastly, the sexual harassment of men, that was not 
connected to the abuse of young boys, could limitedly be found in some conversations  
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that recognized that women could be harassers, but more often still linked harassed men 
to homosexuality.  
 
Temporal Shifts in Discussions of Taḥarrush 
 Exploring the distribution of these codes over time, a number of trends are visible 
that provide valuable insights on changing conceptualizations of taḥarrush ginsy. Figure 
4 demonstrates the prevalence of child molestation and rape throughout the majority of 
the 12-year timespan under analysis, with peaks in online discussions between 2005 and 
then again in 2009. In general, conversations on taḥarrush appeared to proliferate around 
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2005 and this theme was (and remained) a consistent feature of evolving discourses 
through this time period. Figure 5 shows that this distribution also holds true for Egypt, 
where, from 2003-2012, child molestation/rape remains a present, if only a very small, 
part of the dialogue on taḥarrush ginsy. Egypt does not experience the same peaks that 
occur across the region, for which there may be several explanations. It is possible that 
child molestation was not as significant a problem in the imagination of Egyptians as 
elsewhere, therefore limiting this aspect of the discourse on taḥarrush. Given the 
widespread concerns around the molestation of children by domestic help in Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf, it’s possible that this became a trope in discourses of sexual violence in that 
part of the region. Alternatively, it is possible that the taboo nature of child sexual abuse 
in Egypt was also something that people did not feel comfortable enough to discuss more 
widely, even in online forums. 
 In Figure 6, the sexual harassment of women in posts from across the region also 
spans the majority of the time range, but prior to 2002 it was not part of the discourse on 
taḥarrush ginsy. When it became visible in 2002, public concern was initially on incest 
and the assault on girls and young women by male relatives, women’s vulnerability in the 
0	  5	  
10	  15	  
20	  
Q1200
2	  
Q3200
2	  
Q4200
2	  
Q1200
3	  
Q2200
3	  
Q3200
3	  
Q4200
3	  
Q1200
4	  
Q2200
4	  
Q3200
4	  
Q4200
4	   Q1200
5	  
Q2200
5	  
Q3200
5	  
Q4200
5	  
Q1200
6	  
Q2200
6	  
Q3200
6	  
Q4200
6	  
Q1200
7	  
Q2200
7	  
Q3200
7	  
Q4200
7	  
Q1200
8	  
Q2200
8	  
Q3200
8	  
Q4200
8	  
Q1200
9	  
Q2200
9	  
Q3200
9	  
Q4200
9	  
Q1201
0	  
Q2201
0	  
Q3201
0	  
Q4201
0	  
Q1201
1	  
Q2201
1	  
Q3201
1	  
Q4201
1	  
Q1201
2	  
Distribution of Code Sexual Harassment of Women Across Time - All Posts 
FIGURE 6: Distribution of All Posts Coded as “Sexual Harassment of Women” by Year (Year Distributed in Quarters) 
 274 
 
workplace and in hospitals, and even the harassment and rape of females at Abu Ghraib 
prison. In October 2006, a dramatic peak in conversations about sexual harassment of 
women occurs, with the majority of such posts deriving from Egypt. Figure 7 illustrates 
that 15 of the 17 posts referencing the sexual harassment of women in this month derive 
from Egypt. At this point, taḥarrush ginsy came to signify the street sexual harassment 
and mob violence that occurred around the Eid al-Fitr holiday. As noted in previous 
chapters, the Eid mob harassment that took place in downtown Cairo and that has since 
became a yearly ritual, generated a wide degree of attention in the Egyptian blogosphere, 
which was similarly matched by public deliberations via discussion forums on the event 
(Rifaat 2008; Rizzo et al. 2012). It is from this historic moment that sexual harassment 
targeting women in the streets became a vital part of how taḥarrush ginsy was 
conceptualized. From 2006 on, the conversations on taḥarrush in Egypt primarily center 
on women in public space, and most often on transportation. This was interlaced with the 
continued yet miniscule use of taḥarrush to refer to child sexual assault, as well as 
fluctuating use with respect to rape and muʿāksa. Outside of Egypt, child sexual assault 
still dominated conversations on taḥarrush. Though, even in the rest of the Arab region, 
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Egyptian uses of taḥarrush to reference the public sexual harassment of women have 
begun to infuse the discourse, such that there appear to be two parallel uses for the term 
outside of Egypt. 
 
Discussion: Reconceptualizing Taḥarrush in Egypt 
Returning now to the example at the outset of this paper, how does online 
discussion forum and blog site data help to explain the shifting uses of taḥarrush ginsy? 
Historically, taḥarrush ginsy in the popular imagination across the region has been 
intrinsically associated with and understood as child sexual assault and rape, largely 
occurring in the privacy of home and often committed by trusted individuals. Here, 
taḥarrush was overwhelmingly viewed as the physical violation of the body and was 
frequently a reference for rape. Moreover, child sexual abuse, particularly that of boys 
but in some cases of girls, generated high levels of anxiety that taḥarrush would result 
later in psychological problems and sexually deviant practices, such as homosexuality, 
that would negatively impact children’s lives. When applied to women in all settings, 
private and public, this term conveyed similar notions of violence, violation, exploitation, 
illicitness and demoralization, with long lasting consequences.  
In 2005, when ECWR began addressing street sexual harassment targeting 
women in Egypt, taḥarrush, muʿāksa, zīna, and rape, as well as child molestation, were 
part of a nebulous constellation of sexually deviant practices with loose and obscured 
terminological borders. According to Nehad Aboul Komsan, the Director of ECWR, 
taḥarrush was a harsh term that people often conflated with rape (Interview February 
2014). muʿāksa, which was (and still is) more commonly deployed and understood to 
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describe attentions directed toward women in the street (whether seemingly wanted or 
not), was not a term that had mobilizational power. As noted by Ryzova, muʿāksa was 
popularly understood as “a communication code, a more or less ritualized performance of 
courtship,” which always occurred in public in Egypt’s loosely gender-segregated 
society, and was always seemingly consensual with the bint al-balad knowing how to 
flaunt her charms to attract men (2005: 108) Aboul Komsan stated that there was a level 
of tolerance for muʿāksa given its widespread association with teasing, flirting and 
courtship and that nobody could or would ever see muʿāksa as a crime. The 
criminalization of harassing behaviors prevalent in the street, such as catcalls, comments, 
following/stalking, and touching, was the end goal of ECWR efforts, along with 
widespread social perceptions that these behaviors were, somehow, non-threatening, non-
problematic, a public form of courtship, and the normal actions of libidinous men in an 
economically depressed and sexually repressed society. Taḥarrush ginsy provided the 
conceptual power ECWR and other civil society entities since have needed to reshape 
public perceptions around ostensibly benign yet sexualized street behaviors, turning them 
instead into violent, violating, and criminal bodily practices.  
 
Public Perceptions of Taḥarrush Ginsy as Visible in Three Cairene Neighborhoods 
  Despite almost a decade of activism, the connection between the discourses of 
anti-sexual harassment entities and the shifting public perceptions around sexual 
harassment is not very clear. As discussed, prior to this activism, taḥarrush was 
associated with sexually violent practices that usually involved rape and molestation, 
whether of children or women at home, school, work or in other places by individuals 
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known or close to them. Anti-sexual harassment activism sought to deploy this term to 
describe the everyday forms of sexual harassment prevalent in the streets and perpetrated 
by strangers, including catcalls, comments, stares, and touching/groping. Essentially, 
these behaviors ranged from the non-physical verbal (unwanted) interactions all the way 
up to rape, but not including rape, for the most part. Notwithstanding a number of prior 
public campaigns designed to solidify definitions, anti-sexual harassment discourses have 
not always been clear that rape and harassment are differing, even if connected, forms of 
sexual violence. The mass assaults and rapes that occurred in Tahrir Square, in addition 
to other high profile cases, further complicate what is understood under the appellation of 
taḥarrush ginsy, where the boundaries between sexual harassment and rape continue to 
be blurred. Moreover, the circuits through which various discourses on sexual harassment 
have traveled, whether via the Internet, television, personal networks, etc., provides 
another confounding element to how the public understands taḥarrush and the degree to 
which such understandings can be attributed to the work of the anti-sexual harassment 
initiatives.  
 In this section, public perceptions of sexual harassment are explored, though this 
project makes no specific claims as to the modes through which the public arrived at its 
current perceptions. This information is offered here for two primary reasons, 1) as a 
more generalized measure against which to view the potential success of anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives in driving discursive agendas, though, again, no distinct causal 
relationship between activism and public perceptions is assumed, and 2) to understand 
how the strategic use of taḥarrush as a signifier for the public sexual harassment of 
women muddies the ability of anti-sexual harassment entities to combat everyday forms 
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of sexual harassment prevalent in the streets, particularly given its historic uses as 
described above.  In order to assess public sentiments, 156 surveys were conducted in the 
streets of three Cairene neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were chosen along socio-
economic lines to examine possible class variation in perspectives. These neighborhoods 
were the lower socioeconomic area of Masaken Zilzal, the middle class area of Shubra 
Masr, and the upscale area of Heliopolis. Additionally, surveys were deployed to men 
and women equally in each neighborhood, as well as distributed across two age groups of 
younger individuals between 18-25 and older individuals between 26-40. Thematic 
content of the surveys were elicited as a means of arriving at the two goals stated above.  
 A team of 6 Egyptian students and professional researchers were hired by this 
project to deploy surveys. Given the sensitive nature of sexual harassment, as well as the 
long held suspicion that sexual harassment is a foreign conceptual import, it was 
important to ensure that data collection was not compromised by the presence of a 
foreign national. Surveys consisted of open-ended questions and were conducted in 
interview-style with passers-by in the streets, which were voice recorded. In general, 
survey responses were brief, on average 5-6 minutes, but because people were given 
leeway to simply speak their responses, in some cases fast talkers provided a great deal of 
information. Those a little more shy or reticent with the topic offered only succinct and 
not very detailed answers to questions. For the most part, people were in between 
activities and were anxious to move on, so question responses likely reflect immediate 
thoughts that came to mind. Respondents were probed on what they thought taḥarrush 
ginsy was, as well as what they thought the difference was between taḥarrush and 
muʿāksa, if any. Immediately apparent for the responses on taḥarrush across class, 
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gender and age are the same set of eleven themes that continuously reoccur, though there 
are variations in the prevalence of certain themes for each of the three sample sets. Two 
of the eleven themes are most ubiquitous, and include physical touching/grabbing and 
verbal comments. The physical/verbal distinction represents an important conceptual 
divide in public understandings of taḥarrush. As described below: 
 
Physical Touching/Grabbing – This theme includes some form of physical act upon the 
body of, usually, a woman in public. It included items that were generically detailed as 
touching, which most frequently included terms such as “mid/yimid īdo” (he 
extended/extends his hand), “yihoṭ īdo” (he puts his hand on), and “el-lems/lemis-ha” 
(touching/he touches her).  In these responses, individuals provided very little 
information about the nature of such touching, but it was overwhelmingly clear that any 
form of contact was considered a form taḥarrush. Additionally, however, other forms of 
touching that arose included “yikhabuṭ-ha” (he bumps into her), “”yilzāq fiha/el-taznīq” 
(he gropes her/groping), “yimasik-ha” or “yished-ha” (he grabs/pulls at her), “yiḥas-ha” 
(he feels her), and also “yitḥarrash gasady” (he physically harasses). At times, 
respondents were also more descriptive in noting that the touching centered on “ṣidraha” 
(her chest) or “riglaha” (her leg), this usually on transportation when women sit next to 
men that touch them, or some “manāṭiq khuṣusiyya/ḥasassiyya” (private/sensitive areas).  
  
Verbal Comments –Here, respondents noted that taḥarrush included a range of 
verbalizations that were usually unwanted or problematic, in some way. Descriptions of 
such kinds of verbalizations included “al-fādh khārga” (outside/unacceptable words), 
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“kalam mish kwayyis” (bad words), “kalam mish muḥtaram” (disrespectful words), 
“byḍayiq’ha bil-kalam” (he bothers her with talking), “taḥarrush lafdhy” (verbal 
harassment), and “al-fādh sāiʾa” (bad/faulty words), among many others. Additionally, it 
was common for individuals to treat comments as violating and/or equally as serious as a 
physical altercation. For instance, people often referred to verbalizations as “yʿatidy bil- 
fādh” or “ʿatadāʾ lafdhy” (verbal assault), “al-kalam al-khadsch lil-hyāʾ’” (indecent/ 
dishonoring words), or “yuwadhiha bi aya kalam” (he’ll hurt her with any words). 
Hurting the feelings of women was considered a form of assault that many argued was 
taḥarrush. However, in general, most of the descriptions of verbal comments were very 
vague and most often detailed simply as “al-fādh” or “kalam” (words/comments), 
sometimes described as “bil-lisān” (of the tongue) or “bil-boq” (of the mouth). One 
interesting way of describing verbalizations by a small number of respondents was as a 
form of “muʿāksa laṭifa” (light muʿāksa), “muʿāksa lafdhy” (verbal muʿāksa), or 
“muʿāksa bil-boq” (muʿāksa of the mouth), where it appears that muʿāksa was considered 
synonymous with some conceptualization of taḥarrush.  
The other themes that arose, that are no less important than physical or verbal 
aspects of taḥarrush, include a range of both behaviors and perceptions of the practice 
overall. Very briefly, these themes are:  
 
Violent Behaviors - “Ightaṣāb” (rape), “ʿatadāʾ” (assault) and “ḍarb” (beating/hitting) 
arose across the three areas among many individuals, with the exception of older men in 
the lower class area of Masaken Zilsal and middle class neighborhood Shubra Masr, older 
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and younger women in Shubra Masr, and younger women in the upscale area of 
Heliopolis, where there are no respondents that list this as an aspect of taḥarrush.  
 
Annoy/Bully – In one-way or another, “yiḍayiq-ha’” or “muḍayiqa” (he annoys her or 
annoyance) was commonly utilized by all groupings of respondents to express how 
taḥarrush was unwanted, or the physical and verbal interactions were displeasing and 
upsetting to the woman in question. This was also interspersed with terms that have been 
synonymous with flirting or teasing, such as “yʿakis-ha”, “muʿāksa”, or “yirāzalha,” yet 
in this context of describing taḥarrush did not appear benign. Moreover, in a few 
instances, individuals directly indicated that men would “yibaltag-ha” (bully her).  
 
Gaze – The gaze was another significant theme that arose. Frequently cited actions in this 
category included such items as “al-naẓra” (the gaze), “al-ʿaīn” (the eye), “ʿatadāʾ 
baṣry” (visual assault), and “baṣa mish kwayyisa” (bad looks). It was also clear that 
problems with the gaze centered on the way in which they involved certain parts of the 
female body and were sexual in nature, such as “baṣas ʿala ḥeta mish kwayyisa” (staring 
at a bad area) or “nizām baṣat ginsiyyan” (system of sexual gazing). One young man 
from Masaken Zilzal noted that “illy byboṣ dilwaqty al-shabab ʿaīniha tikhorm al-
ḥedum” (the young men’s eyes that are looking now burn holes in the clothes).  Even 
“ibtisam” (smiling) limitedly emerged as a feature of this theme.  
 
Nearness/Getting Closer – Even without physical touching someone, sometimes just the 
act of getting close enough to make this possible was deemed inappropriate and, 
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therefore, a form of taḥarrush. A number of references were made to men who “yiwaqif-
ha fi al-sharʿa” (stop her in the street), “yigy ganbaha” (come next to her), 
“yiqarab minha” or “yiqarab al-bint” (get close to her/the girl), or “ʿad ganbaha” (sitting 
next to her).  
 
Generic Actions/Movements – Where people attempted to make a distinction between the 
verbal and the physical, they sometimes described taḥarrush as some form of action or 
movement of the body. Here, such actions or movements were more generally stated as 
“fʿal” (action, or doing something), “ḥaraka mish kwayyisa” (bad move), or “ṭariqa mish 
kwayyisa” (bad way). There was no other descriptive quality to such movements and 
appeared only to set taḥarrush apart from the verbalizations.  
 
Following – To a lesser extent, people described taḥarrush as following or stalking, 
which contradicts the quantitative survey data produced by ECWR, UN Women and 
HarassMap, demonstrating that women identified stalking and following as a prevalent 
aspect of taḥarrush – 87% of women in the UN Women study identified this as sexual 
harassment, whereas HarassMap reported that almost 50% of their survey respondents 
indicated having been stalked/followed (El-Deeb 2013; Hassan et al. 2008; Fahmy et al. 
2014). The qualitative survey data for this project does not contradict such frequencies, 
but appears to indicate that it is not the first thing that people think of when quickly 
defining what sexual harassment means to them. In this case, people sparingly indicated 
that taḥarrush included men that “yigry waraha” (run after her) or “yilif ḥawaleyki” 
(circle around you).  
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Immoral/Abnormal – A highly prevalent aspect of respondent definitions of taḥarrush 
focused on the immorality or strangeness of the act. In some cases, this morality drew on 
historic gendered norms that placed shame on sexual transgressions. For instance, people 
noted that taḥarrush was when men “yikhadsch ʿaleyha” (“rake” her, or is indecent upon 
her), “yihatik wahida” (degrades her), or was “fʿal faḍah” (an outrage, to her honor), 
“ḥaram” (forbidden) and “mish ḥilal” (not sanctioned). Additionally, people frequently 
referred to taḥarrush as “wisakha” (filthy/dirty), “ḥāga ghariba” (something strange), 
“gheer ʿʿādiyya” (not normal), or “shadh ginsiyyan” (sexually aberrant), among many 
other similar comments that highlighted its position as something unclean and wrong.  
 
Sex/Lust – One interesting and highly prevalent theme, particularly among almost all 
younger men and women, is the association of taḥarrush with sex. Here, there was a 
great deal of discussion that men were full of pent up desires that needed some form of 
release, which then lead to inappropriate attentions directed at strange women in public. 
For example, the notion of “shaḥwa” (lust) arose in a number of responses, along with 
that of “ghariza” (instinct). Sexual desire, here, is given primal status in men, who are 
looking for sexual liaisons. Statements like, “ʿāyyīz yimaris-ha” (he wants to “do” her), 
“yiwaṣal-ha l’marḥālla mʿāshara kamila” (he wants to have complete relations – sex - 
with her), “al-gins huwwa shaghal” (sex is at work), and “el-sokhaniyya bayn al-rigalla 
wa al-bint” (the heat between men and the girl) were common. While transgressive, 
people generally argued that the inability for men to marry and have sanctioned 
intercourse made taḥarrush a problem for all women in public.  
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Violation of Rights – This theme also arose to a lesser extent and included comments, 
such as “yintaḥak ḥāga” (he violates something), “tʿady ala ḥaq’ al-shakhs” (an assault 
on personal rights), and “tʿady ala khususiyyāt” (an assault on privacy). This was more 
frequently referenced by upper class men and women and less so in places like Shubra 
Masr or Masaken Zilzal. Only one young man from Masaken Zilzal made any reference 
to taḥarrush as the invasion of privacy.  
 
Gender-Based Differences in Survey Responses 
 What is immediately noticeable is a binary fissure between the physical and the 
verbal when looking at gendered responses to taḥarrush. Overwhelmingly, men of all 
classes and age groups viewed taḥarrush as a physical act, where touching in some form 
had to occur. However, upper class men tended to give equal weight to the physical and 
verbal aspects of taḥarrush, whereas in Masaken Zilzal and Shubra Masr men of all ages 
were much less likely to view any verbal interaction as a possible feature of taḥarrush. 
Men, in general, defined taḥarrush as connected to the body in some way, either through 
direct contact, as the object of male sexual desire, or, in small measure, through more 
violent forms of interaction, such as assault and rape. Women from all areas and age 
groups, on the other hand, gave almost equal weight to the physical and verbal aspects of 
sexual harassment. They were also more prone to discussing verbal harassment in terms 
akin to that of physical harassment, where words and comments could hurt their feelings, 
assault, violate and degrade. Moreover, the annoying and bullying aspect of taḥarrush 
was similarly as salient for most groups of women, whereas the violent assaults were not 
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discussed much. Some women, particularly older women in Heliopolis, did note that 
taḥarrush was a preparatory stage for more violent acts. However, it appears more the 
urgent concern for women was the day-to-day sexual harassment they faced.  
 
Class-Based Differences in Survey Responses 
 Generally speaking, there seemed to be very little horizontal difference among 
respondents. People in all three neighborhoods appeared to hold similar perspectives on 
what constituted taḥarrush. Perhaps the only immediately visible difference in the 
responses along class lines is the degree to which men and women in the upper class 
neighborhood of Heliopolis promoted the notion of taḥarrush as a violation of a person’s 
rights. Such deliberations were not present in the responses of any individuals from 
Masaken Zilzal or Shubra Masr. Whether this means that there was less consciousness in 
middle and lower income areas of taḥarrush as a violation of women’s rights, however, is 
unclear. People were not probed more deeply on their conception of rights, so it is 
possible that in the context of the street where these surveys were conducted, this was not 
something people immediately considered. Even among those in Heliopolis, taḥarrush as 
a violation of rights was not a dominant feature of responses, at least among men. It was 
a more discernible line of discussion among upper class women, which does suggest that 
among this class of individuals the violation of women’s rights was a larger concern. In 
their analysis of interview and focus group data, Fahmy et al. (2014) noted that, while 
rights-based considerations were visible among all classes of women, upper class female 
participants in their study were particularly prone to speaking about their rights. The 
survey data in this study seems to offer corroborating evidence of Fahmy et al’s findings.  
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Age-Based Differences in Survey Responses 
Younger men and women across all three neighborhoods were inclined to connect 
taḥarrush with male sexual desire. In particular, there seemed to be an existing tension 
among young men across all classes between seeing taḥarrush as an unfortunate yet, 
perhaps, unproblematic expression of pent up male desire and those who recognized it to 
be very wrong, despite the sexual repression of men in Egypt. Even among young women 
in Masaken Zilzal and Shubra Masr, there was some limited recognition that men were 
sexual beings and that sexual harassment was the natural, even if improper, release of 
male sexual frustration. This was not present at all among upper class young women or 
any of the older women across neighborhoods. When such responses arose among 
women they did not outweigh the heavier focus on other aspects of taḥarrush that had a 
denigrating and limiting impact on them as a class. Moreover, there was a lack of any 
discussion of sexuality and lust from older men in all three neighborhoods. In fact, the 
responses from these men were geared more toward moralizing and discussing taḥarrush 
as an aberrant social practice. The implications of this are somewhat ambiguous. In part, 
prior survey data from ECWR, UN Women, and HarassMap indicate that men of all ages 
sexually harassed women. HarassMap messaging campaigns also underscore how sexual 
repression, as a reason for sexual harassment, is a myth largely because older, married 
men sexually harassed. Yet, the absence of any focus on sex and lust among this age 
grouping of respondents may indicate one of a couple of things. 
It must be conceded that given the small sample size, there may be an issue with 
sampling bias that is obstructing a better understanding of the perspectives of older men. 
This is a distinct possibility, given that older men represent only 78 total respondents. 
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However, in their analysis of the number of interviews necessary to reach theme 
saturation in non-probabilistic sampling, Guest et al. (2006) noted that anything more 
than 13-18 interviews did not significantly increase the number of identifiable themes in 
interview data. Given this, it might be possible to assume that sampling bias is not an 
issue here. It is further possible that, as a subset of the male population, older men may be 
less sexually repressed, less focused on sexual release, and, therefore, less inclined to 
sexually harass. Here, marriage may have offered men the pathway toward sexual 
satisfaction valued and supported by Islamically inspired systems of gender. Of the 
sample of older married men, only 4 had never been married while the rest were either 
married with children or divorced. However, this explanation rests on an implicit 
acceptance that the reproduction of sexual harassment is driven by sexual desire, which 
runs counter to extensive theoretical arguments that ground sexual harassment in uneven 
imbalances of power and expressions of male control. It is also possible, and maybe more 
probable, that given their station in life, older men may outwardly position themselves in 
particular ways, as somehow more moral, principled, and concerned with the ethical 
problems around sexual harassment, thus obscuring any association they might have 
otherwise made between taḥarrush and sex.  
  
Revisiting Muʿāksa and Taḥarrush: Disrupting the Flirtatious Nature of Muʿāksa 
 Survey responses on the concept of taḥarrush present a fairly varied picture, 
where there has been noticeable change from historic terminological deployments 
centered on the molestation and rape of children, homosexuality and workplace sexual 
harassment of women. Overwhelmingly, Egyptians now view taḥarrush as some set of 
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behaviors directed at women in the public space. The above discussion highlights how 
taḥarrush has come to signify both physical and verbal altercations, in addition to a suite 
of other behaviors. Yet, there are a few issues that are important to note with this. In one 
respect, new perceptions of taḥarrush appear to cohere with anti-sexual harassment 
discourses, in which commonplace behaviors in the street are increasingly absorbed into 
new understandings of taḥarrush, such as comments, catcalls, stares and 
stalking/following, in addition to a range of physical behaviors that extend to, but usually 
do not exceed, rape. Taken alone, this data on how people define taḥarrush offer a new 
ideoscape of increasingly expanding understandings in which sexual harassment 
encompasses a range of behaviors from the arguably trivial, but unwanted, to the more 
detrimental and even dangerous. However, a more thorough probing of people’s 
perceptions of the differences between muʿāksa and taḥarrush illustrate a more 
perplexing picture of evolving conceptualizations.  
 When asked what, if any, difference existed between muʿāksa and taḥarrush, a 
very low percentage of people indicated that there was no difference between the two 
concepts. Only 10 of 78 men (13%) and 20 of 78 women (26%) noted that muʿāksa was a 
form of taḥarrush (nu3a min anw3a el- taḥarrush), and that both were part of the same 
system of inappropriate behaviors directed at women. Despite this, many of these 
individuals claimed that muʿāksa was usually a verbal action (al-kalam) while taḥarrush 
was primarily physical in nature (al-lems). For the majority of the respondents, men and 
women overwhelmingly, in all areas and age groups, distinguished muʿāksa and 
taḥarrush into this binary verbal - physical scheme. Many argued that both complements 
and verbal harassment that was bad or filthy could be classified as muʿāksa. However, 
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among women, there appeared to be some confusion as filthy comments cut across 
muʿāksa and taḥarrush. Women would note that comments, whether good or bad should 
be considered a form of muʿāksa, but that bad comments were also a type of taḥarrush. 
Yet, even in such cases, women largely claimed that taḥarrush was mostly physical 
touching and did not extend to the verbal. Concomitant with this, respondents deemed 
taḥarrush as something more than muʿāksa, where the differences between the two were 
“shāsʿa” (vast) and “kabīr” (big).  Taḥarrush was viewed as fundamentally more violent, 
and therefore it was challenging for many to claim that behaviors associated with 
mua’ksa could also be labeled taḥarrush.  
This verbal - physical opposition paralleled other binary assemblages visible in 
people’s responses. These included far - close, respectful - impolite, normal – abnormal, 
simple - egregious, and desexualized - sexual oppositional pairings. Accordingly, 
muʿāksa was often defined as something that happened “min bʿeīd” (from afar) that did 
not act directly upon the body like taḥarrush. Largely seen as complementary, people 
noted that there was an element of niceness to muʿāksa, even though many also claimed 
that mean and unwanted comments were a form of muʿāksa. However, there was a 
perceived severity to taḥarrush that even the meanest form of muʿāksa could not reach. 
Muʿāksa was “haaga ʿādiyya” (normal) and taḥarrush was something strange, even a 
disease of some sort. More importantly, because it was not directly linked to the body in 
the way of taḥarrush, muʿāksa was set apart as not being sexual in orientation. Instead it 
was often an act of admiration without the attached connotation of illicitness.   
 Yet, regardless of this polarity in meaning, most respondents made use of 
muʿāksa when asked to define taḥarrush. Without conscious consideration of any 
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difference between the two concepts, respondents drew on muʿāksa in order to highlight 
street behaviors they felt to be problematic. In this case, muʿāksa was synonymous with 
taḥarrush, which is also a common occurrence in everyday parlance. On the surface of it, 
therefore, the relationship and distinction between the two are then more vague and 
ostensibly problematic. How can this conflation of muʿāksa and taḥarrush be understood 
in light of the above discussion that highlights critical distinctions between these 
concepts? There may several reasons to explain why it is that muʿāksa is referenced in 
place of taḥarrush in quotidian discourse, notwithstanding untested assumptions that 
muʿāksa is more palatable a concept than taḥarrush or that they have always meant the 
same thing. muʿāksa increasingly exists in a larger sphere of almost interchangeably used 
terms. For instance, “muʿāksa lafdhy,” (verbal flirting) “taḥarrush lafdhy” (verbal 
harassment) and “’atada’ lafdhy” (verbal assault) all arose to similarly define taḥarrush. 
Each of these terms engages with varying aspects of sexualized violence to illustrate how 
verbal comments deeply impact female victims. They also demonstrate the degree to 
which the underlying meanings around muʿāksa are shifting. While remaining a 
transgressive verbal act, its historically benign, teasing, and unproblematically flirtatious 
nature is coming into contestation. In addition, it may be possible to assert that muʿāksa 
and taḥarrush are beginning to assume similar levels of gravity, even if they aren’t 
actually aligned in meaning. People are far more willing to accept verbal behaviors as a 
form of taḥarrush provided that those behaviors are portrayed as demoralizing or 
dishonoring. The violence intrinsic in taḥarrush can only be applied to non-physical 
behaviors if they assume the moral weight of physical violence, where bodily or mental 
integrity are compromised. This further suggests that transformations in the meanings 
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around taḥarrush also impacting how muʿāksa is conceptualized. Contrary to efforts of 
anti-sexual harassment initiatives in promoting street sexual harassment as taḥarrush and 
then criminalizing consequent behaviors, a more focused effort on redefining muʿāksa 
may have significant potential impact in shifting local perceptions. 
 
Victim-Blaming: Challenging Femininity in Constructing Local Identity 
 Concomitant with questions on taḥarrush and muʿāksa, survey participants were 
additionally asked who were the girls that were sexually harassed. In essence, the 
question asked participants to define the characteristic traits of such individuals, without 
specifying what sorts of traits to consider. Responses demonstrated a clear gender and 
class-based distinction in how people conceived of those women that suffered from 
sexual harassment in public. Men were especially apt to identify victims of sexual 
harassment based on their outward appearance. The large focus was on the nature of 
female attire and how tight women’s clothes were. Younger and older men from both the 
lower-income neighborhood of Masaken Zilzal and the middle-income area of Shubra 
Mast showed very little difference in their answers to this question. Moreover, responses 
to this question from men in these areas were peppered with rationales for why women’s 
clothing was particularly problematic. Men’s pent-up sexual energies were often cited as 
reasons why women who wore form fitting shirts and jeans, and who incidentally were 
not respectable, were usually the targets of harassing men. Men from Heliopolis showed 
some variation in that, roughly, half of the respondents, both younger and older, 
identified all women as potential victims. The other half, however, showed more 
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variation in their descriptions, noting that dress, walk and outward behavior were all 
equally problematic and could result in women’s sexual harassment in the streets.  
 Women, on the other hand, were far less inclined to assign blame to women’s 
clothing. The majority of women across class and age groups asserted that any woman 
could suffer from sexual harassment. Interestingly, older women were slightly more apt 
to argue that dress could be a contributing factor to sexual harassment, as well as the age 
of potential victims. Some older women from Heliopolis pinpointed female dress as an 
indirect invitation to men, who had “ṭaqāt ʿunf” (violent energy) that needed release. In 
their estimation, stretch clothes pushed the boundaries of acceptable dress for girls in 
public. Also, school aged girls were especially viewed as vulnerable, with some women 
listing age ranges from 15-18 years old. In a few cases, men’s access to pornography via 
the Internet and sexual impropriety on television, as well as improper socialization, or 
“ṭarbiyya,” of girls, were also listed as factors that lead to sexual harassment. For the 
most part, however, women more generally identified harassers as a problem, not women. 
Many respondents highlighted how a harasser would harass no matter what, regardless if 
a woman wore a face-veil, headscarf, or tight clothes, and that it made no difference to 
men for whom women were simply just an object to be used to relieve their own 
repressed sexual tension. 
 For those exploring gender-based violence and sexual harassment, regardless of 
location, such responses are not surprising. Fahmy et al. (2014) reported that 97% of 
male and 61% of overall survey respondents in their study indicated that tight clothes 
lead to women’s sexual harassment. Perceptions in Egypt run high that the way women 
dress in public is somehow linked to the persistence of sexual harassment. Such reasons 
 293 
that assign blame to women run counter to the growing body of statistical data where vast 
numbers of women have reported being the victims of sexual harassment. The data 
highlighted in this section are not intended simply to corroborate already existing 
findings. Instead, the street survey data here point toward another interesting dynamic at 
work that may potentially disrupt the efforts of anti-sexual harassment initiatives. In 
essence, women’s clothing has become a trope that not only points toward the underlying 
imbalance of gendered power at work in Egypt but, perhaps just as importantly, larger 
anxieties around local identity in the neoliberal age.10 The near universal focus in these 
street surveys on tight clothing also evident in the focus group example from Chapter 2, 
appear as the festishization of dress, signaling fears around the commodification of 
women’s bodies and the rejection of a local identity that is positioned in opposition to 
Western inspired values. In this way, sexual harassment not only reaffirms the 
heternomative gender order, but also reaffirms a distinct sense of what it means to be 
Egyptian and Muslim in the face of global, Western-backed market forces.11  
 A number of responses to the question of victimhood noted that Egyptian women 
should not dress like European women and should not wear clothes that were “khārga” 
(from outside of the culture or country), including “body” fitting clothing and tight jeans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In 1981, El-Guindi discussed tensions around women’s public participation vis-à-vis Islamic movements 
in the period of infiṭah (economic opening), which was marked by the flow of migrants, commodities and 
ideas. She notes that the infiṭah lead to corollary fears of inhilal (disintegration) among Islamic movement 
activists and that Islamic dress was a negotiation tactic for women’s public participation to forestall 
demeaning sexual harassment – here, appropriately dressed Muslim women were portrayed as strong.  
 
11 According to Shukrallah, both women and Coptic Christians suffer from the politics of representation by 
the Islamic movement. The tension between modernity and national identity has lead to Coptic Christians 
being treated as an “other within,” a discriminated class that is viewed as in cohesion with Western values. 
Women are an important locus of identity and Islamic tradition. She states, “The importance of this role in 
the reconstruction of the ‘true community’ has generated a fierce attack against women, in order to pull 
them back into line with this role” (Shukrallah, 2001: 190).   
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with loose blouses. This form of dress was posited in opposition to Islamic mores that 
required women to wear looser clothing that did not outline the form, and signified a 
critical tension in Egypt with circulating global fashion trends in an increasingly 
consumer-oriented and cosmopolitan society (Abaza 2013).12 Western inspired dress and 
their attendant external values flooding Egypt through liberal market channels have 
generated apprehension around the loss of local norms and values, such that women are 
frequently viewed as pushing the confines of the acceptable. Here, tight clothes represent 
the rejection of the Islamization of the female body (Dialmy & Uhlman 2005). However, 
Abaza (2013) notes that “transcultural interactions” have a very long history in Egypt, 
where global consumer influences are visible since at least the reign of Khedive Ismail in 
the 19th century. Islamic trends are not divorced from this process of transculturation. 
Abaza argues that even Islamic items of clothing, such as the “ʿabāya,” or the flowing 
black robes that women wear, is a recent “invention of tradition, which was previously 
non-existent” (2013: 85).  Yet, people frequently ignore, overlook, or do not even 
consider the evolution of modern Islamic dress because it adheres to some popular notion 
of what it means to be a Muslim woman in the current moment, while the tightness of 
modern, Western-style clothing is viewed as antithetical to Islamic values.  
  Associated with this local angst over modern female dress is the way in which 
sexuality, and perhaps even sexual violence, is viewed as a Western phenomenon (even 
commodity with respect to the availability of pornography). Abu Khalil (1997) notes that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It should be noted that Christians were no less concerned about women’s clothing than Muslims in the 
surveys, though there were no references to a distinct Coptic identity at threat by the way women chose to 
dress. In one survey response, a male respondent noted how his priest would stop Sunday services to point 
out young women that needed to be covered (who were then supplied with shawls) and who would be 
refused communion for inappropriate dress.  
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concerns over sexuality, including homosexuality, have a deep history in Islam. Islamic 
jurists and scholars of the past, in his estimation, demonstrated an obsession with 
sexuality, which he perceived to be more open. This was eclipsed in modern era with the 
rise of Islamic puritanism, which he likened to European Protestantism and resulted from 
a very lengthy and contentious interaction between the West and Islam (see Alatas 2007 
and Sukidi 2006 on Protestantism and Islam and Vann 2011 on Puritan Islam). The 
nature of sexuality within this puritanized Islam shifted, “…after centuries of Christian 
criticisms of Islamic moral permissiveness, just as Christian criticisms of the absences of 
miracles in Muhammad’s life produced myths and miracles that were attributed to him 
after his death by Muslims put on the defensive by the severity of enemy attacks” (Abu 
Khalil 1997: 92). Abu Khalil was concerned more with how homosexuality and its place 
in Islam were obscured within this growing and defensive puritanism, but also discusses 
how desire was repressed as shameful, while sexism and (heterosexual) male control 
were perpetuated. As part of this, he asserted that puritan Islam privileged heterosexual 
relations, and naturalized bisexual and (male) homosexual relations as a kind of prelude 
to heterosexual sex within marriage (Abu Khalil 1997: 101).  
Abu Khalil indicates that heterosexual marriage was, in a way, just a cover 
making transgressive practices invisible, since homosexual relations did not end with 
heterosexual marriage. Marriage simply served to conceal such illicit practices, neither 
making it acceptable or unacceptable. This is inverted in the way people view sexual 
harassment. This is not to say that the act of sexual harassment is in any way similar to 
homosexuality, since the two may not be viewed as commensurate practices. However, 
public sentiments that sexual harassment serves as a means for the release of pent up 
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sexual energy for men who cannot marry underscores critical features of how sexuality is 
constructed in Egypt. Women, unlike homosexual men, are positioned as desexualized 
beings within this puritanized order (and, incidentally, lesbians do not receive much 
attention from Abu Khalil in his analysis). Ostensibly, they do not engage in any sort of 
sexual prelude to marriage, and have none of the same pathways for sexual exploration as 
straight men. Therefore, the lack of marriage as an excuse for sexual violence serves as a 
seeming cover that masks the male heterosexual control of women.  
Within this system of male, heterosexual control, women and their bodies are 
festishized through the act of concealment via Islamic codes of dress in order to preserve 
their honor and respectability, but also to make them viable in marriage for repressed and 
suffering heterosexual men that do not engage in homosexual liaisons. Berger argues that 
this festishization of women’s bodies through Islamic dress, such as the veil, “…is shown 
to be that which turns women into generic objects of consumption” (1998: 101). There is 
a dual practice in operation where women in public become an undifferentiated mass, 
who on their own assume no human status but may be commodities to be used and, as she 
notes, traded, but which also “…seems to stage or posit the spectral presence of the 
phallus” (Berger 1998: 101). In other words, women’s bodies pre-suppose their use by 
male consumers. Yet, at the same time, Muslim women’s use of jewelry and make-up 
serves as a means for them to display themselves “…immodestly out of modesty” and to 
demonstrate their value in the current sexual economy (Berger 1998: 98). The outright 
rejection of Islamic practices of dress may, therefore, be seen as a rejection not only of 
modesty codes, sexual norms and the sexual economy underwritten by Islam, but also the 
notion of hegemonic masculinity that desexualizes women in public. As similarly argued 
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in Chapter 2, sexual harassment, and perhaps any form of gendered violence, in this 
scenario may then be seen as an attempt to reaffirm the system of gender where male 
heterosexual control is absolute. Tight, Western-style clothing and women who are 
“over” or who prop themselves up “ziyāda ʿan el-lezūm” (more than necessary), as noted 
by survey respondents, point to the way in which sex, sexuality and even sexual violence 
are intertwined with global market forces and practices of commodification.  
Survey respondents frequently mentioned that the victims of sexual harassment 
were those women who were some how too much, i.e. their clothing, make-up and style 
of walking or talking was somehow deemed overly done and their femininity extreme. 
Not unlike the trope of dress, that of the uncontrollable female who tempts men, 
unleashing pent-up male sexual frustration also seems less connected to the real lives and 
practices of women in public and is more an expression of the anxiety people feel around 
their perceptions of changing norms vis-à-vis globalized practices. Within this new global 
order, femininity and the idea of women as both consumers and as independent beings 
outside of the system of male control challenge recently established Islamic identities that 
rest on a binary division of male and female. Within this binary, women are the ones 
consumed and do not consume. Sexual harassment that targets women, then, is in part a 
reflection of fears that local identities and life ways will give way to external, globally 
inspired values and represents the desire to keep both men and women in their gendered 
place and their place as good, authentic Muslims and Egyptians. As such, the challenge 
for anti-sexual harassment initiatives is not only confronting this system of gender, but 
also understanding the way in which that system has already been shaped by global, 
neoliberal market forces. In so doing, there is perhaps a need in anti-sexual harassment 
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activism to demonstrate that disrupting notions of masculinity and femininity does not 
mean the loss of any locally distinct identity.  
The problem of Islamic identity in Egyptian society represents the fundamental 
conundrum for secular-based, civil society work. According to Mahmood, secular 
projects seeking to reorder public space “…has sought not so much to banish religion 
from the public domain but to reshape the form it takes, the subjectivities it endorses, and 
the epistemological claims it can make. The effectiveness of such a totalizing project 
necessarily depends upon transforming the religious domain through a variety of reforms 
and state injunctions” (2006: 326). Here, Mahmood argues that secular projects, 
essentially, seek to make “religious subjectivities…compliant with liberal political rule” 
(Mahmood 2006: 328). A returned focused to Islam, not just within Islamic movements 
but more broadly across society, therefore, represents a rejection of liberalization, and the 
liberal spheres that anti-sexual harassment initiatives operate within. Initiatives, for their 
part, have not worked closely with religious organizations or entities, nor have they 
employed religiously inspired framing practices that might appeal more broadly with the 
public. In fact, it is the religious community in Egypt that is often viewed as reproducing 
the gender discrimination that contributes to sexual harassment. This was particularly 
evident during the Revolution when the Freedom and Justice (the political wing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) and the Salafi Nour Parties came forward to state that women 
should not be protesting in Tahrir and that those who did so and got raped knew what 
they were getting into (Taha 2013). At about the same time, the Salafi televangelist, Abu 
Islam, also decried protesting women as bad Muslims who specifically went to Tahrir to 
be raped, i.e. they wanted it (al-Arabiyya News 2013). There has also been a long history 
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of tense engagement between women’s secular advocacy and Islamic organizations, 
where “secular” activists promoting women’s rights believe that religion “…does not 
constitute the only source of values and axis of orientation in people’s lives,” and are 
often labeled as bad Muslims or against religion (Al-Ali 2000: 142 ). Yet, the 
implications of the data presented in this chapter suggest that some form of compromise 
solution might be critical, where religious framing devices may offer the resonance that 
anti-sexual harassment initiatives seek for their messaging.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the contentious and shifting nature of how sexual 
harassment, as a configuration of taḥarrush ginsy, has been understood in Egypt over the 
last fifteen years. Online Arabic discussion forum data demonstrated that taḥarrush was 
long understood in a multitude of ways. Prior to the beginnings of anti-sexual harassment 
activism in 2005, public discussions of taḥarrush centered largely on the molestation and 
rape of children, in addition to the sexual assault and rape of women at work and in their 
homes. However, there were additional meanings linked to sexual transgression ascribed 
to taḥarrush, including consensual, but illicit, sexual activity between unmarried partners. 
Discussions of taḥarrush also dovetailed with fears that the rape of young boys, in 
particular, would lead to sexual deviance and homosexuality. In 2006, a noticeable shift 
in discourses around taḥarrush occurred in Egypt, resulting from the mass sexual 
harassment of young women in downtown Cairo during Eid. Following this highly 
publicized event, discussion forum posts from Egypt largely employ taḥarrush to denote 
the public, street sexual harassment of women. This term was appropriated by the 
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Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) in 2005 when they began their Safe 
Streets campaign. The goal of this campaign was to problematize and criminalize 
seemingly benign yet pervasive street behaviors, such as catcalls, comments, stares, 
following/stalking, phone harassment, and even touching. However, the advent of the 
Revolution in 2011, along with the mass sexual harassment, assault and rape of women in 
Tahrir Square, complicated the way in which activists themselves discussed sexual 
harassment. 
Until now, public perceptions of taḥarrush have not been critically analyzed and 
no detailed studies address the more widely understood and accepted concept of muʿāksa. 
Instead, a scattering of studies present muʿāksa as a courtship-type behavior that women 
in public, somehow, are able to manage, though it is never been made clear how this is 
so. This chapter presented qualitative data on public understandings of the taḥarrush - 
muʿāksa complex in order to understand in more nuanced fashion how the meanings of 
these two terms have been shifting. What was evident in this data was that muʿāksa and 
taḥarrush correspond respectively to verbal and physical behaviors. Verbal behaviors 
ranged from complementary to filthy, while physical behaviors included touching, 
groping, and grabbing. However, despite a slate of binary pairings around muʿāksa and 
taḥarrush, people are increasingly using muʿāksa and taḥarrush synonymously. Here, it 
is postulated that attendant meanings around muʿāksa are shifting in relation to the now 
widespread use of taḥarrush. Despite efforts of anti-sexual harassment activists to 
encourage people to view taḥarrush as encompassing problematic street behaviors, 
people have been reticient to view staring and comments as equivalent to rape and other 
physical altercations in severity. Having said that, people are willing to view staring and 
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comments as threatening and even dangerous, but only within the framework of new 
notions of muʿāksa. Here, the benign and flirtatious nature of muʿāksa is eroding away in 
the face of growing discourses of violence against women. Taḥarrush and muʿāksa are 
evolving into distinct but interrelated notions of the sexual harassment and assault of 
women.  
Survey data further highlight how victim-blaming rhetoric that specifically 
focused on the way women dressed in public was a trope that served to reproduce the 
heteronormative system of gender. Prevalent in survey participant responses was a heavy 
focus on tight and Western-inspired forms of dress that women supposedly wear, as well 
as the demonization of an archetypical overly-done female that incites the lust and pent-
up sexual energy of young men unable to marry in Egypt’s economically depressed 
society. Such women were posited in opposition to Islamic visions of womanhood, which 
require women to dress modestly by covering their form around strange men. However, 
Islamic norms with respect to dress were themselves recent constructs evolving out of a 
long history of East-West tensions, where Islamic mores were villainized by Christian 
commentators. They also arose within a historic context of the global flows of 
commodities and values between the Western and Muslim Worlds. The focus on 
women’s dress represented widespread local anxieties over shifting local identity vis-à-
vis global, neoliberal market forces. Therefore, sexual harassment is, in part, an 
expression of these local tensions around globalization.  
A number of issues are critical for further exploration around changing 
conceptions of both taḥarrush and muʿāksa. There is a need to better understand historic 
practices relating to muʿāksa and pre-marital courtship behaviors. Scholars have looked 
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more extensively at pre-marital sexual practices, such as temporary (‘urfi) marriage, but 
no detailed studies have directly engaged courtship rituals in the public space. For this 
reason, it is unclear how women have actually perceived their street interactions with 
men, as well as what sorts of practices constitute muʿāksa. This is also important to better 
understand shifting notions of both muʿāksa and taḥarrush. Additionally, a need exists to 
understand how shifting norms around taḥarrush, i.e., their new meanings focused 
largely on women in the public space, impact how sexual violence directed at children is 
now understood. Whereas taḥarrush offered the conceptual framework in the past for 
discussing crimes against children, what has been left in the wake of shifting norms and 
discursive practices with respect to children is unclear. This is vital in Egypt, where there 
is little infrastructure and legal support for families dealing with these sorts of crises. 
Lastly, public resistance to new norms and frames of sexual harassment are linked to 
tensions between modernity, represented by Western, neoliberal market practices, and a 
locally authentic, Islamic identity. Perhaps in order to be more successful, anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives must consider the frames they promote may directly challenge 
norms linked to Islamic notions of womanhood and to find other, more creative methods 
to continue their work in ways that do not threaten local identities that incorporate 
Islamic mores. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON SOCIAL CHANGE 
AROUND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
 In Spring 2013, HarassMap was invited to co-coordinate and participate in the 
first of what would become a regular effort organized by Zumba Fitness and Wen-Do self 
defense, two fitness programs offered through locally based gyms/ dance studios. Named 
IGMADI ḍed el-taḥarrush, or Be Strong Against Sexual Harassment, this was a paid 
public event open only to women, and it was widely advertised via numerous online and 
offline channels and networks, including that of participating gyms, NGOs, and social 
initiatives. Since its’ beginning, IGMADI has also gained widespread media attention. It 
promotes the physical and emotional health and wellbeing, alongside offering women 
positive advice and training to teach them how to defend themselves against sexual 
harassment, both physical and verbal, in the street. The two-hour event, held in various 
locations, such as the Semiramis Intercontinental Hotel in downtown Cairo, included 
high-energy dance/zumba and self-defense sessions, but the event also organized 
performances and games by anti-sexual harassment entities such as HarassMap. In 2013, 
there were three such IGMADI events, with more than 1000 female participants 
(HarassMap 2015). In spring 2014, the female rapper and participant on the regionally 
broadcast hit television show, Arabs Got Talent, Maryam Mahmoud, joined IGMADI to 
perform a song she wrote on sexual harassment. Throughout 2014 and 2015, IGMADI 
became a regular outreach event traveling across Egypt, taking place even in schools, to 
reach broad swaths of women to promote empowerment through building health and self-
confidence. 
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   IGMADI is just one of what is a proliferating number of public events that 
engages everyday individuals on the issues of sexual harassment, gender violence and 
women’s right to public space. In 2012, UN Women participated with local activists in 
the Nefsy (I Wish) campaign, in which women formed human chains along busy streets, 
holding signs with varying messages that highlighted the impact of sexual harassment on 
women in public space. In late 2013, as part of the ṣallaḥha fi dimāghak campaign, 
participating initiatives teamed up with Mashrouʿa Mareekh, an open microphone 
initiative, to give all individuals a free and open forum to speak of their experiences or 
thoughts about sexual harassment. Open mic events have become a popular form of 
public engagement for anti-sexual harassment initiatives in various venues, including on 
university campuses. Also, in early 2014, a number of NGOs and initiatives, including 
Nazra for Feminist Studies and HarassMap, took part in a major public event in the Borsa 
area of downtown Cairo, well known for its rampant sexual harassment. The event, put 
on by the Women on Walls (WoW) artist initiative, focused on women’s empowerment. 
It included a week of painting graffiti on walls, workshops, dance and public talks geared 
toward raising public awareness on gender-based violence, including sexual harassment. 
In addition to this, long-standing and regular performances by theater groups, like the 
BuSSy (Look) Project, and even art exhibits through galleries, such as Darb 1718, 
conducted in conjunction with a variety of outreach efforts of anti-sexual harassment 
groups, like the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) and HarassMap, further 
underscore the negative ramifications of sexual harassment on women’s bodies and 
experiences in public. 
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 These examples provide brief glimpses of the diversity of events and forms of 
public engagement through which anti-sexual harassment initiatives, and even concerned 
members of the public, are attempting to raise public awareness of sexual harassment.  
Art, music, performance, and public speaking that include everyday individuals have 
become regularized tactics in appealing to public understanding and sensibilities. 
Moreover, such tactics were employed and foreshadowed by ECWR that actively 
organized awareness days at El-Sawy Culture Wheel (a Zamalek-based cultural center), 
which attracted 1000 participants, The Gezira Youth Center, and the Goethe Institute 
(Rizzo 2008).  
This year marks ten years of anti-sexual harassment activism, begun in 2005 by 
ECWR but now including an increasing range of formal and informal groups, like 
HarassMap, seeking ways to change social perceptions, social behaviors, and inequitable 
laws. While this dissertation has made no causal claims that anti-sexual harassment 
activism is, in fact, shaping public perceptions, in large part because not all of the critical 
channels through which information travels were examined (namely mass media, whether 
television or print), ten years later it is clear that the messaging and the rhetoric of these 
anti-sexual harassment initiatives is an important feature of the growing discourse on 
sexual harassment in Egypt. The larger goals of this dissertation were to show 1) what 
community-based efforts were doing about sexual harassment and the discursive and 
mobilizational approaches they employed, with particular emphasis on HarassMap’s 
bystander approach; 2) how such initiatives operated in a middle space and were 
mediating a range of local and extra-local forces in the construction of new discourses of 
sexual harassment, which built on yet also challenged long-held social norms on gender; 
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3) how the cultural negotiations of community-based anti-sexual harassment initiatives 
represented a political process with long-term political impacts, and is viewed by 
community-based initiatives as a critical facet of facilitating sustainable social change; 
and 4) how local perceptions do not yet fully align with the new norms (and the 
discursive frames around these norms) promoted by the community-based anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives.  
Perhaps an even bigger question to ask at this point is why it is important to 
understand what community-based initiatives are doing to reshape social perspectives and 
behavior. Correspondingly, why have community-based efforts proliferated in post-
Revolution Egypt and why does it matter if this is or is not a political process? One of the 
most salient reasons for both of these questions is the recognition that people themselves 
have the power to shape the societies in which they live.  Of course, this focus on the 
power of people is mirrored in international development and transnational 
human/women’s advocacy, focused increasingly on citizen action and the funding of 
grassroots efforts at change (Cornwall & Brock 2006). In many ways, the everyday 
actions of individuals are even more significant in shaping the course of sociopolitical 
change than political advocacy and even revolution. Bayat raised this idea when 
proposing his theory on the quiet encroachment of the ordinary with respect to poor 
people’s movements in Iran, stating “…my aim is to show how these ordinary and quiet 
practices by very ordinary and often silent people engender significant social changes – 
the kinds of changes that are comparable to those that revolutions are said to achieve for 
them” (1997: 5). The beliefs and behaviors of all members of society serve as the 
fundamental foundation of social and political practice. Accordingly, efforts to change 
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those beliefs and behaviors – Starchursky’s (2013) “deep politics” of change - represent 
an almost revolutionary attempt to rearrange the foundation of social and political life 
itself. In this way, understanding the community-based strategies of initiatives (and 
NGOs and movements) bears at least equal weight - and significance - with the study of 
political mobilization and revolution. 
Toward that end, this dissertation underscores the various strategic approaches 
undertaken by one social initiative that figures large in community-based efforts in 
Egypt, HarassMap. Founded in 2010, just months prior to the Revolution, HarassMap 
was in many ways the continuation of efforts by its predecessor, ECWR. ECWR was the 
first to tackle the problem of sexual harassment within the community in order to 
convince people that sexual harassment was a real problem with real effects on women. 
While some scholars have found aspects of ECWR’s work and messaging problematic, 
ECWR set a precedent for the need to change how the public understood sexual 
harassment, particularly in the repressive Egyptian political climate that makes political 
work challenging. Such an approach was a risk management tactic, but it also emerged in 
response to what some ECWR members, especially those working on the anti-sexual 
harassment campaign, saw as a gap in social and political activism in Egypt. HarassMap, 
when it arose, also sought to work in communities and on the streets, without directly 
engaging the state through political advocacy. For HarassMap’s co-founders, it was in the 
streets where Egypt would (and will) see real effective change on the problem of sexual 
harassment, not through limited and nominal legal reformulations weakly implemented 
by a government that is uncommitted to reform and gender equality. 
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HarassMap’s community-based strategies include constructing new discourses 
and forms of public outreach. On the discursive side of their work, HarassMap is loosely 
informed by feminist-inspired perspectives that posit sexual harassment to be the control 
of female bodies by privileged men in a patriarchal society and that this control, in fact, 
represents the reproduction of a binary system of gender where heterosexuality is the 
norm.  By “loose,” I imply here that HarassMap staff do not directly pull from feminist 
theory when devising messages and trainings but are part of a transnational network of 
gender activism that is already informed by the long history of work by feminist activists. 
Chapter 4 highlighted the contours of this discourse, identifying seven primary themes 
prevalent in their messaging campaigns, as well as three framing strategies for effecting 
change.  In addition to discourse, HarassMap’s work is also underpinned by social-
psychological theory about the bystander effect and theories of critical mass.  For them, 
bystanding represents the fundamental reason why sexual harassment exists, regardless of 
prevailing discriminatory gender norms – people generally do not speak up to help when 
they see someone is trouble. For that reason, as discussed in Chapter 5, outreach 
campaigns in the streets, inside of schools and with local public entities/businesses are 
undertaken to convince people to start speaking up. At the same time, these campaigns 
work to change people’s perspectives on gendered norms, and promote the development 
of internal escalation policies that provide due process for those suffering sexual 
harassment within participating entities. 
However, the analysis of public perceptions discussed in Chapter 6, demonstrated 
interesting trends and thoughts for future activism.  Social media data analysis explored 
the history of the use of the term sexual harassment, as taḥarrush ginsy, over a 12-year 
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period. This analysis noted early associations of taḥarrush with molestation and rape, 
particularly of children but also of women in the private sphere. In Egypt, a shift occurred 
in this discourse with the Eid mob sexual harassment event in 2006 in downtown Cairo, 
after which taḥarrush became associated with the public sexual harassment of women in 
the streets. This discursive shift coincided with efforts of anti-sexual harassment 
initiatives to frame sexual harassment as a crime, which taḥarrush as a violent action 
made possible. Street surveys with young and older male and female residents in three 
Cairene neighborhoods at varying socioeconomic levels further highlighted that people 
have a widespread conception of sexual harassment. However, people’s perceptions draw 
distinct boundaries between physical and verbal forms of harassment and do not fully 
align with the discourses of anti-sexual harassment activism. Verbal harassment is still 
primarily associated with older notions of flirtation, or muʿāksa. This analysis, however, 
further underscored the wide variability in the use of muʿāksa, versus taḥarrush, where 
muʿāksa is becoming more and more associated with violence, even if still largely verbal. 
Here, verbal actions take on the seriousness of physical altercations. In addition, the 
survey data also made visible the public pre-occupation with the way women dress in 
public, where sexual harassment is perceived to largely be the result of women wearing 
tight clothes. Such public concerns signal deep anxiety around local identity in the global, 
consumer-driven marketplace. Sexual harassment here is linked to this anxiety, allowing 
for the re-affirmation of gendered roles and local (Muslim) identity centered on these 
gendered roles.  
Given the findings in this dissertation, some gaps in anti-sexual harassment work 
that may hinder efforts toward social change include:   
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Conceptual Issues:  The data highlights that muʿāksa is still a prevalent and longstanding 
concept that is not being addressed by anti-sexual harassment initiatives.  In general, the 
approach has been to deny that everyday sexually harassing acts can be called muʿāksa, 
when they should more correctly understood as taḥarrush. Examples of this can be found 
in various messaging campaigns that note certain behaviors, like comments, catcalls and 
stares, are not muʿāksa and are, in fact, taḥarrush. This approach has not resonated well 
with the public that continues to see a distinction between verbal and physical 
transgressions. This is not to say that people do not view these kinds of behaviors 
problematically, but they are less inclined the treat the verbal exchanges as seriously 
because of the historic meanings associated with taḥarrush. In other words, verbal 
harassment does not yet hold the same gravity as assault or even rape, and therefore 
people refuse to conflate the two under the name taḥarrush. In order to facilitate the 
change they want, an important component of discursive change for anti-sexual 
harassment initiatives is to reframe muʿāksa in ways that better align it with taḥarrush, 
such that the two truly become synonymous in meaning.  For instance, campaigns that 
underscores the violent nature of muʿāksa and which highlight it as a form of taḥarrush 
might be an option to consider.  
  
Identity Issues: In 2013 and early 2014, HarassMap’s Marketing and Communications 
unit took on a market research project in the hopes of developing a new campaign 
designed to associate speaking up against sexual harassment with “coolness.” This 
campaign sought to tap into locally held values and to associate standing up with those 
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values. Unfortunately, the Director of Marketing and Communication in charge of the 
project left HarassMap in spring 2014 and the campaign did not materialize. HarassMap 
still maintains interest in the campaign, as does the former Director, who retained her 
affiliation with HarassMap as a campaign consultant (of sorts). Harassmap and other 
initiatives, however, have not yet designed messages that associate standing up to sexual 
harassment, or creating public spaces free of sexual harassment, with notions tied to 
Egyptian or Islamic culture, practice or history. In other words, there is no example of 
practice linked to some sense of self that is also distinct from some sense of the other. In 
particular, victim-blaming rationales that focus on women’s clothes must be differentially 
addressed so that people begin to see that women regardless of how they dress are worthy 
Egyptians (or Muslims). It is important for anti-sexual harassment groups to work within 
a framework that acknowledges Islamic norms guiding social beliefs and practice. 
Alongside campaigns that demand people recognize that sexual harassment happens to all 
women, in various forms of dress, noting that each of these women is also a human being 
in some other Egyptian or Islamic value system is critical.   
 
Circulation Issues:  The same campaign noted above as in the planning stages in early 
2014 was intended to be a  “Through the Line” campaign. In marketing terms, the goal 
was to make use of both above and below the line media outlets for circulating campaign 
messages.  The goal was to not only continue to use Internet-based platforms and tools, 
but to work to expand into mass media promotion and to design public service-type 
announcements. Media has long been an area that HarassMap believes to be crucial. 
From television portrayals of sexual harassment and gender violence to news coverage in 
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print and broadcast, they have been interested in understanding more about how media 
operates in order to combat persistent discriminatory stereotypes that have wide public 
reach through these channels.  
Toward that end, HarassMap’s Marketing and Communications unit has long 
engaged with journalists in promoting their work (though stories are developed by the 
journalists and news agencies, who have their own reporting agendas). In 2013, the unit 
developed a project designed to explore international and national news coverage of 
sexual harassment in Egypt. However, the project remains unfunded and of peripheral 
import to the unit. Moreover, it does not more adequately explore media overall and there 
has not been any current push to move into the kinds of televisionary approaches that 
Howe (2008) noted existed in Nicaraguan gender activism. Howe explored how 
Nicaragua gender activists produced their own soap operas and utilized the reach of 
television to spread new norms of gender. A soap opera is not the only option to explore 
for HarassMap, but finding new partnerships that allow them to expand into television, 
with its almost 100% reach in the country, would help to spread their messages more 
expansively. 
 
In the coming years, it is unclear how community-based anti-sexual harassment 
activism will unfold. What makes the future even more uncertain are the post-
Revolutionary shifts that are (re)solidifying authoritarian military rule. Beginning in 
2013, almost as soon as Morsi was deposed, the newly reinstalled military regime, with 
(the newly retired military general) El-Sisi elected as President in 2014, undertook 
stringent measures to suppress civil (and religious) activism. News stories of the arrest 
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and imprisonment of numerous activists, rumors among activists of targeted NGO raids, 
and even plans to monitor, and perhaps censor, Internet activity have set a new tone for 
human and women’s rights work overall in the country (CSMonitor 2014; Al-Monitor 
2014). Toward the end of participant observation for this project, stories circulated within 
HarassMap that even the personal social media activity of a single individual member 
could jeopardize the entire organization and that Egypt was seeing the worst repression of 
civil society that it had seen for a long time - worse than under Mubarak. This 
increasingly scary reality led HarassMap leadership to ask its members to approach their 
personal online activity with caution. Moreover, news that the government was revising 
and updating NGO Law 84 of 2002 created an uproar within civil society, as many of the 
entities that previously skirted the repressive law by registering as corporations were 
forced to change their registration or risk being shut down (Reuters 2014). As the 
government consolidates its power base, there is great risk to all initiatives that seek to 
undermine the political status quo, including those engaged in street activism. Yet, 
perhaps the perceived fissure between culture and politics, and the belief that cultural 
negotiations pose no real threat to the legitimacy of ruling elites, will allow such 
initiatives to slide by with minimal attention.  
Regardless, as of the completion of this dissertation, community work continues 
for anti-sexual harassment groups like HarassMap. Most recently, with the government 
seeking greater control over public space through crackdowns on civil society 
organizations, HarassMap’s community-based activities are increasingly moving out of 
the streets and into institutions. In part, this is due to a newly enforced requirement that 
all groups conducting community work must seek the appropriate permits from local 
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police stations. Such permits are haphazardly given by the police, and usually contribute 
to difficulties with organizing community groups. This situation has resulted in 
HarassMap placing a greater emphasis on the Safe Areas, Safe Schools and Universities 
and Safe Corporates programs, though they are re-evaluating their community-based and 
technological strategies.  
In terms of community outreach, HarassMap staff are keen to approach work in 
the streets in ways that make it possible to measure effect, that don’t stretch the unit too 
thin and that also adequately account for the concerns of different groups of individuals. 
For instance, in a personal conversation with HarassMap Executive Director Reem Wael 
(2016), she indicated there is some indication a bystander approach is not effective for all 
populations, such as refugees who are themselves already disempowered. For this reason, 
there are now discussions about amending their messaging to tailor it toward specific 
groups. With repect to technology, there is also growing concern among HarassMap staff 
that crowd-mapping technology is not very effective because there is usually no benefit 
to those who report. The information submitted to the map lives online with no follow-
up, meaning HarassMap does not have the capability to investigate each claim or to 
provide legal or psychological services. Research unit staff members are now working on 
better understanding community needs with sexual harassment reporting and to, in turn, 
devise new strategies to support those needs. 
My own engagement with HarassMap continues, as well. Most recently, I have 
been asked to serve as a research consultant on a new global replication project. Since its 
inception, HarassMap has served as a coach to numerous groups in other countries who 
have been interested in replicating HarassMap’s technological model of mapping sexual 
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harassment. According to Rebecca Chiao (personal conversation 2016), she has coached 
almost 50 different groups on how HarassMap implemented its model. Such coaching 
included providing detailed information via emails, meeting via skype sessions, and 
holding physical workshops and in-person meetings to walk these groups through the 
process of implementation. Such groups were located across the Middle East, Africa, 
India, Asia, Europe, North and Latin America – not all of whom followed through with 
implementation. With funding from the Canadian-based International Development 
Research Center (IDRC), HarassMap will now follow up with many of these groups to 
learn more about their coaching experience, their current needs, specific contextual issues 
they face with respect to sexual harassment in their locales, and how to get everyone to 
work together through the use of a global dashboard modeled on Ushahidi. This is a 
project I will assist with, including surveying and interviewing members of these groups 
and assisting in developing a cooperative process, implementation and follow-up.  
I have sought a more engaged approach to ethnographic work. Low and Merry 
(2010) note five forms of engagement for anthropologists. These are “sharing and 
support,” which they highlight as a shared commitment to social justice with 
interlocuters, “teaching and public education,” focusing more on teaching and training 
using an anthropological perspective, “social critique,” focusing on structural power 
imblances, “collaboration,” in which participant anthropologists move into more active 
collaborative work with interlocuters without necessarily assuming leadership roles, and 
“advocacy,” in which anthropologists provide various levels of assistance to groups when 
those groups require it, with an emphasis on assisting in organizing or political advocacy. 
My own work crosses a number of these forms of engagement, where I have shared my 
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writing with HarassMap staff members and have brought those interested into the 
theorizing and writing process. Moreover, I have been called on to represent HarassMap 
at various events when staff members are not available, continue to collaborate on 
various projects when research is needed, and also serve as a Board member who is 
readily available to troubleshoot problems for HarassMap as they arise. For instance, in 
November 2015, HarassMap suspended operations while their NGO application was 
pending. This suspension was decided on by HarassMap leadership in collaboration with 
Board members and was a response to the increasingly precarious situation for NGOs and 
civil society organizations in Egypt. As a member of the Board, my own support for this 
decision was predicated on concern for the safety of HarassMap’s community activists 
who ran the risk of arrest with continued operations without formal registration in place. 
The future is both hopeful and bleak, as community-based work offers the chance 
for deep and lasting change, while the political situation may prove hindering to all forms 
of activism. 
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Documentation	  of	  Informed	  Consent	  for	  Participation	  in	  Research	  Study	  	  Documentation	  of	  Informed	  Consent	  for	  Participation	  in	  Research	  Study/Survey	  Cover	  Letter	  	  
Project	  Title:	   The	  Role	  of	  NGOs	  in	  Mediating	  Global	  Discourses	  of	  Sexual	  Violence	  in	  Cairo,	  Egypt	  
Principle	  Investigator:	  	   Angie	  Abdelmonem,	  PhD	  Candidate,	  Arizona	  State	  University;	  Research	  Fellow,	  Institute	  for	  Gender	  and	  Women’s	  Studies,	  the	  American	  University	  in	  Cairo	  James	  Eder,	  PhD,	  Arizona	  State	  University	  
Email:	   angie.abdelmonem@asu.edu	  	   	   james.eder@asu.edu	  	   	   	  	  
Tel:	   _______________________	  	   	   	   	  You	  are	  being	  asked	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  research	  study.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  investigate	  how	  NGOs	  are	  spreading	  awareness	  and	  have	  changed	  public	  opinion	  about	  sexual	  harassment	  in	  Egypt.	  The	  findings	  from	  this	  study	  may	  be	  published	  in	  academic	  journals	  or	  newsletters	  and	  presented	  at	  conferences.	  Results	  will	  also	  be	  provided	  to	  the	  NGOs	  that	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  study.	  The	  expected	  duration	  of	  your	  participation	  in	  this	  study	  is	  anywhere	  from	  15-­‐20	  minutes	  to	  1-­‐2	  hours.	  	  	  Research	  procedures	  include	  participant	  observation	  within	  NGOs	  and	  interviews	  with	  NGO	  staff	  members,	  volunteers,	  program	  participants,	  as	  well	  as	  community	  members	  not	  affiliated	  with	  an	  NGO.	  Through	  participant	  observation,	  I	  will	  be	  present	  at	  all	  relevant	  trainings,	  information	  sessions,	  meetings,	  and	  conferences	  where	  I	  will	  observe	  the	  interactions	  between	  NGO	  staff	  members	  with	  other	  staff	  members,	  other	  civil	  society	  members,	  members	  of	  the	  community,	  and	  participants	  in	  NGO	  programs.	  Through	  the	  interview	  process,	  I	  will	  ask	  detailed	  questions	  about	  sexual	  harassment	  programming,	  personal	  perceptions	  about	  sexual	  harassment	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  Egypt,	  personal	  perceptions	  about	  women	  in	  public,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  on	  women,	  among	  other	  questions.	  	  	  There	  may	  be	  certain	  risks	  of	  discomfort	  associated	  with	  this	  research.	  The	  topic	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  is	  sensitive	  and	  there	  may	  be	  questions	  that	  cause	  anger	  or	  embarrassment.	  There	  are	  no	  foreseeable	  risks	  to	  personal	  safety	  by	  participating	  in	  this	  research.	  	  	  There	  will	  likely	  be	  no	  direct	  benefit	  to	  you	  by	  participating	  in	  this	  study.	  However,	  your	  participation	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  NGO	  programming	  and	  may	  help	  to	  guide	  improvements	  in	  approaches	  to	  spreading	  awareness.	  	  	  The	  information	  you	  provide	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  is	  anonymous	  and	  confidential.	  No	  individual	  will	  be	  identified	  in	  any	  report	  or	  publication	  resulting	  from	  this	  study.	  All	  NGO	  staff	  members,	  volunteers	  and	  participants	  will	  receive	  pseudonyms.	  All	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survey	  interviews	  with	  community	  members	  will	  be	  anonymous.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  tape	  record	  interviews,	  but	  this	  will	  occur	  only	  with	  your	  permission.	  If	  an	  interview	  is	  tape-­‐recorded,	  you	  are	  free	  to	  withdraw	  permission	  for	  the	  recording	  any	  time	  throughout	  the	  interview.	  All	  recordings	  will	  be	  stored	  in	  a	  password	  protected	  digital	  folder	  on	  the	  researcher’s	  computer.	  	  Participation	  in	  this	  study	  is	  voluntary.	  Refusal	  to	  participate	  will	  involve	  no	  penalty	  or	  loss	  of	  benefits	  to	  you	  which	  you	  are	  otherwise	  entitled.	  You	  may	  discontinue	  participation	  at	  any	  time	  without	  penalty	  or	  the	  loss	  of	  benefits	  to	  which	  you	  are	  otherwise	  entitled.	  Signature	  	   	   ________________________________________	  	  Printed	  Name	   	   ________________________________________	  	  Date	   	   	   ________________________________________	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    ددررااسة بحثیية للمشارركة في مسبقة ااستماررةة مواافقة
	    االجنسي. االعنف  من  االعالمة  لخطاباتت  االتوسط  في  االحكومیية  غیير  االمنظماتت  ددوورر  : عنواانن االبحث
  بالقھهرةة؛ االامریيكیية  في االجامعة  أأبحاثث  ززمیيل  وو  االارریيزوونا  معة االجا في  االدكتوررااهه  ططالبة  االمنعم،٬  عبد  اانجي  : االرئسي االباحث 
  االارریيزوونا. االجامعة  في  االانسانن  علم  ددكتورر  اایيدرر،٬  جایيمس 
 
  :االالكترووني االبریيد 
 ude.usa@menomledba.eigna
  ude.usa@rede.semaj
 
  : ___________________االھهاتف
 
 اانت مدعو للمشارركھه في ددررااسھه بحثیيھه عن:
ھھھهدفف االدررااسھه ھھھهو: ااكتشافف كیيف تعمل االمنظماتت االغیير حكومیيھه علي نشر االوعي .وو كیيف تغیير ررأأيي االناسس في قضیيھه االتحرشش االجنسي في 
 مصر.
   وو سوفف تناقش في االمؤتمرااتت.نتائج ھھھهذاا االبحث سوفف تنشر في االجھهاتت االإعلامیيھه 
  ساعاتت.  ١۱- ٢۲  ددقیيقھه ااوو  ٥١۱- ٠۰٢۲ھھھهي   االبحث  ھھھهذاا  في  للمشارركھه  االمتوقعھه  االمدهه
 
االملاحظھه بالمشارركھه من خلالل االمنظماتت االغیيرحكومیيھه .وو عمل االمقابلاتت مع االافراادد االعاملیين بھها وو  مع االافراادد االتي إإجرآآتت االبحث تشمل: 
  علاقھه مع االمنظماتت.االمتطوعیين،٬ وواایيضا لا تربطھهم 
 وو سوفف أأحضر كل االتدرریيباتت وو االندووااتت االعلمیيھه وو االاجتماعاتت وو اايي مؤتمرااتت تخص قضیيھه االتحرشش االجنسي.
 وومن خلالل االمقابلاتت سوفف أأسالل فیيما یيخص براامج االتحرشش االجنسي وو عن االآررااء االشخصیيھه في ھھھهذاا االموضوعع في مصر.
  أثیيرهه علیيھها.وو اایيضا ًعن ووجودد االمرأأهه في االمجتمع االخاررجي وو ت
وو لكن لیيس أأيي خطر من بعض االاسئلة محتمل اانن تكونن مزعجھه للبعض،٬ إإنن موضوعع االتحرشش االجنسي حساسس وو سوفف یيسبب االغضب أأوو 
  االكسوفف للبعض االعمل علي ھھھهذاا االبحث.
نشر االوعي بطریيقھه لیيس ھھھهناكك أأيي إإستفاددهه من إإشترااكك في ھھھهذاا االبحث وولكن بالتعاوونن سوفف نحصل علي إإستیيعابب ددوورر االمنظمھه وو سوفف یيتم 
 اافضل.
 أأيي معلوماتت تدلي بھها ستكونن سریيھه للغایيھه وولن یيعلن عن ااسم أأيي شخصیيھه سوفف تشارركك في ھھھهذاا االبحث.
  كل أأعضاء االمنظمھه وو االمتطوعیين سوفف یيحصلونن علي أأسماء حركیيھه. وو سوفف تسجل كل االمقابلاتت وولكن بعد مواافقھه االمتطوعیين.
  .من حقك أأنن تنسحب من االمقابلھه في أأيي ووقت
  كل االتسجیيلاتت سوفف تحفظ علي االكمبیيوتر مع ووضع كلمھه سریيھه علي االملف.
 االمشارركھه في ھھھهذاا االبحث تطوعع وولیيست مفرووضھه علي أأحد.
 ررفضك للمشارركھه لن یيعرضك لأيي مسآلھه أأوو خساررهه أأوو غراامھه . وومن حقك أأنن تنسحب في أأيي ووقت خلالل االمقابلھه.
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   ........................: ..................................االامضاء
	   	   : ................................................... ااسم االمشارركك
	   : ........./................/.............. االتارریيخ
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Survey	  Recruitment	  Script	  	  My	  name	  is	  Angie	  Abdelmonem	  and	  I	  am	  a	  doctoral	  student	  and	  researcher	  with	  the	  Institute	  for	  Gender	  and	  Women’s	  Studies	  at	  the	  American	  University	  in	  Cairo.	  I	  am	  conducting	  a	  research	  study	  on	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  how	  they	  spread	  awareness	  about	  sexual	  harassment	  in	  Egypt.	  As	  part	  of	  this	  study,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  people’s	  opinions	  about	  the	  problem	  of	  sexual	  harassment.	  	  	  I	  am	  recruiting	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  survey	  with	  twenty	  questions	  that	  should	  take	  no	  longer	  than	  30	  minutes.	  	  	  Your	  participation	  in	  this	  study	  is	  voluntary.	  If	  you	  participate,	  your	  name	  will	  not	  be	  recorded	  and	  will	  be	  completely	  anonymous.	  You	  are	  free	  to	  answer	  only	  the	  questions	  you	  wish	  to.	  Your	  responses	  to	  these	  questions	  will	  also	  be	  used	  by	  HarassMap	  to	  better	  assist	  you	  with	  trainings	  and	  outreach	  activities	  in	  your	  governorate.	  	  	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  concerning	  the	  research	  study,	  you	  can	  reach	  me	  at	  angie.abdelmonem@asu.edu.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
انآآ  ةیيكیيرملااا ةعماجلاا يف ةةاارملاا ننووأسل تتاساارردلاا دھهعم يف ةثحاب وو نناسنلااا ملع يف ةةاارروتكدلاا رضحب
 .ةةرھھھهاقلاب  
.رصم يف يسنجلاا ششرحتلاا نع يعولاا رشنتب يھھھه ييززاا وو ةیيمكوحلاا ریيغ تتامظنملاا نع ثحب لمعب اناا  
.يسنجلاا ششرحتلاا ةلكشم نع سسانلاا يياارر دخاا ةةزیياع ،٬يثحب يف  
 
نلاا للأسب اناا نع ننوكم ریيصق ثیيدح يف ككرراشت سسا٢۲٠۰ .للااؤس  
 نم رتكاا تقوو دخایيح شم١۱٠۰ -٢۲٠۰ .قیياقدد  
 
.ييررابجاا شم ،٬ععوطت يثحب يف كتكرراشم  
.كمساا لجسھھھه شم ،٬ھهیيف ككرراشت ول  
.اھهیيلع ددرت ززایيع يللاا ةلیيأساا یلع ددرت كناا قحلاا كلل  
 
لصتت نكمم ،٬يثحب نع للؤس يياا ككدنع ول\يلع تقوو يياا يف ایيب يلصتت edu.asu@abdelmonem.angie  
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 االنظرةة االاجتماعیية للتحرشش االجنسي في مصر
 
 
	  1.	   لل االلي بتعتبرھھھها تحرشش جنسي؟اما ھھھهو االتحرشش االجنسي؟ ما ھھھهي االافع
	  
 2	  . ة معاكسة؟ھھھهتستخدمم كلمة تحرشش ااوو كلم سسمعاكسة،٬ وو اامتى االناما ھھھهو االفرقق بیين االتحرشش االجنسي وواال
 
 3	  . االناشش ھھھهتعمل اایية وو ھھھهتقولل اایية عنھها, وو لیيھه؟  لو حصل لفتاةة تحرشش جنسي في االشاررعع،٬ 
 
 4	  . یيك،٬ اامتى ھھھهتقولل االناسس اانن االبنت ناززلھه تتعاكس ااوو مبسوططھه بالتحرشش،٬ وو لیيھه؟أأفي رر
 
 5	  . ھھھهم في االتحرشش االجنسي؟التي تسیيك،٬ ما ھھھهي االعواامل االمعیينة في مصر ااأأفي رر
 
 6	  . لتحرشش؟للتحرشش االجنسي،٬ وو لیيھه ھھھهي بتتعرضض لتتعرضض بیيك،٬ ما ھھھهي صفاتت االناسس االلي أأفي رر
 
 7	  . ؟لمتحرشیين وو لیيھه ھھھهم بیيتحرشواااایيك،٬ ما ھھھهي صفاتت أأفي رر
 
 8	  . یيك،٬ ما ھھھهو اانسب رردد فعل من االناسس االلي ااتعرضواا للتحرشش االجنسي؟أأفي رر
 
 9	  . ؟االجنسي یيوخخ في االمساجد ااوو على االتلفزیيونن )ااوو من االاززھھھهر( عن االتحرششسمعتي من االش\ماذذاا سمعت
 
 01	  . اایية عنھه؟ سمعتي\بتسمعي فیيھها كلامم على االتحرشش االجنسي ااكتر،٬ وو سمعت\ما ھھھهي االاماكن االلي بتسمع
 
 11	  . : االعمر
 21	  . االاجتماعیية: االحالة 
  : عندكك ااططفالل؟ كامم ططفل؟ ااوولادد وولا بناتت وو أأعماررھھھهم. 31 	  	  	  
  : االعمل .41
  : ططالبة،٬ ااذذكر مدررستك ااوو جامعتك\ططالب. 51
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Semi-­‐structured	  Interview	  Questions	  	  	   1. Why	  did	  you	  start	  working	  at	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]	  or	  participating	  in	  its	  programs?	  How	  did	  you	  learn	  about	  the	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]?	  	  2. How	  long	  have	  you	  worked	  at	  the	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]	  or	  when	  did	  you	  begin	  participating	  in	  its	  programs?	  	  3. What	  did	  you	  think	  about	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  or	  mu3aksa	  before	  you	  joined	  the	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]?	  	  4. How	  would	  you	  define	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy?	  	  5. What	  is	  your	  opinion	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  in	  Cairo?	  Do	  you	  believe	  that	  violence	  is	  a	  reality	  for	  women	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Cairo?	  If	  so,	  what	  are	  the	  causes	  of	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  in	  Egypt?	  	  6. How	  has	  your	  involvement	  in	  sexual	  harassment	  programs	  changed	  your	  ideas	  about	  violence	  against	  women?	  	  7. Has	  your	  involvement	  in	  sexual	  harassment	  programs	  changed	  your	  relationships	  with	  family	  and	  friends?	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  8. Do	  you	  face	  any	  opposition	  from	  family	  members	  in	  participating	  in	  sexual	  harassment	  programs	  or	  going	  into	  public?	  If	  so,	  why?	  	  9. Why	  was	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  chosen	  rather	  than	  mu3aksa	  in	  the	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]	  program?	  	  10. When	  did	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  first	  come	  into	  use	  in	  the	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]	  	  program	  or	  when	  did	  you	  first	  hear	  of	  the	  term	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy?	  	  11. How	  else	  has	  the	  term	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  been	  used	  in	  the	  past?	  	  12. What	  was	  the	  initial	  public	  response	  to	  the	  use	  of	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy?	  	  	  	  13. Do	  you	  believe	  the	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]	  program	  on	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  is	  successful,	  why	  or	  why	  not?	  	  14. How	  does	  [INSERT	  NGO	  NAME]	  find	  venues	  to	  run	  information	  and	  training	  sessions?	  	  15. Do	  you	  run	  into	  resistance	  from	  location	  managers	  when	  arranging	  such	  events?	  	  16. How	  have	  opinions	  changed	  in	  Egypt	  toward	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy?	  What	  reasons	  do	  you	  think	  are	  contributing	  to	  changing	  opinions?	  	  17. How	  has	  media	  attention	  affected	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy?	  	  18. How	  are	  the	  attacks	  in	  Tahrir	  Square	  changing	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  in	  the	  streets,	  if	  at	  all?	  	  19. What	  has	  the	  police	  response	  been	  toward	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy,	  before	  and	  after	  the	  revolution?	  	  20. What	  strategies	  to	  combat	  el-­‐taharush	  el-­‐ginsy	  do	  you	  think	  work	  well?	  21. What	  strategies	  don’t	  work	  well?	  	  	  22. What	  new	  or	  better	  approaches	  would	  you	  like	  to	  take?	  	  23. What	  community	  connections	  does	  your	  NGO	  have?	  	  24. How	  has	  your	  NGO	  included	  the	  community	  in	  its	  programs?	  	  25. Does	  your	  NGO	  have	  any	  connection	  to	  the	  activists	  that	  have	  started	  taking	  action	  against	  sexual	  harassment	  using	  social	  media?	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  ?tpygE	  ni	  ysnig-­‐le	  hsurahat-­‐le	  ot	  dne	  na	  gnirb	  ot	  dedeen	  era	  kniht	  uoy	  od	  snoitulos	  tahW .63	  	  ?tpygE	  ni	  tnereffid	  yeht	  era	  woh	  ,erehwyreve	  emas	  eht	  ton	  era	  sthgir	  s’nemow	  fI .53	  	  ?erehwyreve	  emas	  eht	  eb	  sthgir	  s’nemow	  dluohS .43	  	  ?tpygE	  ni	  ecalp	  a	  evah	  sthgir	  s’nemow	  no	  sdradnats	  lanoitanretni	  taht	  kniht	  uoy	  oD .33	  	  ?nemow	  tsniaga	  ecneloiv	  tabmoc	  ot	  smargorp	  labolg	  ni	  devlovni	  neeb	  OGN	  ruoy	  saH .23	  	  ?evah	  OGN	  ruoy	  seod	  snoitcennoc	  lanoitanretni	  tahW .13	  	  ?noitulover	  eht	  retfa	  dna	  erofeb	  ,sOGN	  rehto	  dna	  OGN	  ruoy	  ta	  smargorp	  tnemssarah	  lauxes	  ot	  neeb	  esnopser	  etats	  eht	  sah	  tahW .03	  	  ?noinipo	  cilbup	  no	  sah	  tnemhsilbatse	  suoigiler	  eht	  kniht	  uoy	  od	  tcapmi	  tahW .92	  	  dna	  ,noitulover	  eht	  retfa	  dna	  erofeb	  ,ysnig-­‐le	  hsurahat-­‐le	  no	  ytinummoc	  suoigiler	  eht	  morf	  neeb	  esnopser	  eht	  sah	  tahW .82	  	  ?evah	  OGN	  ruoy	  seod	  tnemhsilbatse	  suoigiler	  eht	  ni	  snoitcennoc	  tahW .72	  ?stsivitca	  eseht	  htiw	  pihsnoitaler	  s’OGN	  ruoy	  fo	  erutan	  eht	  si	  tahw	  ,os	  fI .62
إإززيي عرفت    االبرنامج؟  في  تشارركي/تشارركك  ااوو  [االمنظمة  ااسم]  في  تشتغلي/. لیية بدآآتت تشتغل١۱
  دديي؟  االمنظمة 
عن االتحرشش   تشارركي في برنامج /ااوو تشارركك  [مھهاالمنظ  ااسم]  تشتغلي في/. بقالك اادد اایيھه تشتغل٢۲
  االجنسي؟
  . اایية ھھھهو االتحرشش االجنسي / ااززاايي تعرفي االتحرشش االجنسي ؟٣۳
تشتغلي /سمعتي اايي حاجة عن االتحرشش االجنسي قبل ما تشتغل/ھھھهل سمعت  . ٤
  تشارركي في االبرنامج؟/تشارركك  ما  ااووقبل  [االمنظمة  ااسم]  في
ھھھهناكك عنف ضد االمرآآةة في شوااررعع   مصر؟ھھھهل  . في ررآآیيك االتحرشش االجنسي ھھھهل ھھھهو مشكلة في٥
  تفتكريي اانن في عنف ضد االمرااةة في شوااررعع؟ لو في عنف،٬ اایية ھھھهو االسبب ؟\االقاھھھهرةة؟ ھھھهل تفتكر
ااتستغلتي في برنامج االتحرشش االجنسي،٬ غیيرتت اافكارركك عن االعنف /. من ساعة ما ااتشتغلت٦
  ضد االماررةة؟
نسي،٬ ھھھهل تغیيرتت علاقاتك بیينك وو ااشتغلتي في برنامج االتحرشش االج/. من ساعة ما ااتشتغلت٧۷
  بیين ااسرتك ااوو ااصحابك؟
تشارركي في برنامج االتحرشش /تشتغلي ااوو تشارركك/مش عایيزكك تشتغل  في حد في ااسرتك  ٨۸. 
  لیية؟  االجنسي ؟ لو حصل ددهه في ررآآیيك 
  . لیية ااختارروواا ااسم االتحرشش االجنسي في االبرنامج وو مش معاكسة؟٩۹
  سي في االمنظمة )ااسم االمنظمة(؟. اامتي ااوولل مرةة إإستعمل ااسم االتحرشش االجن٠۰١۱
   . ھھھهل تم ااستعمالل ااسم "االتحرشش االجنسي" من قبل؟ ااززاايي تم ااستعمالھه؟١۱١۱
  االتحرشش االجنسي؟  . اایية رردد فعل االناسس علي ٢۲١۱
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  . في ررآآیيك ھھھهل برنامج االتحرشش االجنسي ]ااسم االمنظمة[ ناجح؟٣۳١۱
  االتحرشش االجنسي ؟االاماكن االلي بتعمل االتدرریيب وو ندووااتت االمعلوماتت عن   . إإززاايي بتلاقي ٤١۱
  . لما بتنظم ندووااتت عن االتحرشش االجنسي ھھھهل في اايي مشاكل من مدیيریين االاماكن؟٥١۱
  . ھھھهل االافكارر إإتغیيرتت عند االمصریيیين عن االتحرشش االجنسي؟ اایية ااسبابب تغیير اافكاررھھھهم؟٦١۱ 
  بالتحرشش االجنسي؟  . إإززيي ووسائل االاعلامم بتآثر علی معرفة االناسس ٧۷١۱
    آثر االتحرشش االجنسي في االشوااررعع االآخریی؟. ھھھهل االانتھهكاتت في االتحریير بت٨۸١۱
  .اایيھه رردد فعل االبولیيس علي االتحرشش االجنسي قبل ووبعد االثوررةة؟٩۹١۱
  . في ررآآیيك آآيي ططریيقة اافضل توقف االتحرشش االجنسي؟٠۰٢۲
  في ررآآیيك آآيي ططریيقة مش مفیيدةة؟  . ١۱٢۲
  . ھھھهل تفضلي/تفضل ططریيقة معیينة آآوو جدیيدةة في االتعامل مع االتحرشش؟٢۲٢۲
  ھها علاقاتت ااجتماعیية ؟.ھھھهل ]ااسم االمنظمة[ ل٣۳٢۲
  . ااززيي بتجذبب االناسس یيشتركواا معاكك في ]ااسم االمنظمة[ ؟٤٢۲
  . ااززيي ]ااسم االمنظمة[ بتشتغل مع االنشطاء في محارربة االتحرشش االجنسي علي االانترنت ؟٥٢۲
  . اایيھه ططبیيعة االعلاقة بیين منظمتكم وواالنشطاء ؟٦٢۲
  .اایيھه ططبیيعة االعلاقاتت بیين ]ااسم االمنظمة[ وواالمؤسساتت االدیينیية؟٧۷٢۲
  . اایيھه ھھھهو رردد فعل االمؤسساتت االدیينیية علي االتحرشش االجنسي قبل ووبعد االثوررةة؟٨۸٢۲
  . ااززيي االمؤسساتت االدیينیية بتآثر في ااررااء االناسس عن االتحرشش االجنسي؟٩۹٢۲
.اایيھه رردد فعل االحكومة علي برنامج االتحرشش االجنسي في منظمتكم ووآآيي منظمة تانیية قبل ٠۰٣۳
  ووبعد االثوررةة؟
  ماتت االتنمویية االدوولیية؟.اایيھه االعلاقاتت بیينكم ووبیين االمنظ١۱٣۳
  . ھھھهل منظمتكم بتشارركك في آآيي برنامج ددوولي عن االعنف ضد االناسس ؟٢۲٣۳
  . ھھھهل تفتكر/تفتكريي اانن االمعایيیير االدوولیية لحقوقق االمرآآةة لھها مكانن في مصر؟٣۳٣۳
  من االمفرووضض تكونن في كل االدوولل ززيي بعضھها ؟  . ھھھهل حقوقق االمرآآةة ٤٣۳
مختلفة،٬ ااززاايي في ررآآیيك تكونن مختلفة في . لو االمعایيیير بیين االبلادد بخصوصص حقوقق االمرآآةة ٥٣۳
  مصر ؟
	    .اایيھه االحل في ررآآیيك للقضائئ علي االتحرشش االجنسي في شوااررعع مصر؟٦٣۳
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SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS CODEBOOK 
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Number:	   1	  
Code	  Name:	   Child	  Molestation	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  physical	  or	  sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18;	  often	  generically	  described;	  separate	  from	  child	  rape;	  Often	  described	  with	  references	  to	  negative	  impacts	  
Exemplars:	   Exploitation;	  Violating	  kids	  bodies;	  Sexually	  Assaulted;	  Sexual	  Harassment	  of	  Boys;	  Children	  Left	  Home	  Alone;	  Touching	  Genitals;	  Child	  Sexual	  Abuse	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
Number:	   2	  
Code	  Name:	   Child	  Rape	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18	  that	  involves	  forced	  penetration;	  Often	  a	  specific	  mention	  of	  rape	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  children;	  Does	  not	  include	  discussions	  of	  molestation	  without	  specific	  mention	  of	  rape	  	  
Exemplars:	   Child	  Rape;	  Rape	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  discussion	  on	  child	  molestation);	  Sexual	  Intercourse	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  	  If	  one	  of	  the	  above	  codes	  is	  utilized,	  one	  of	  the	  below	  codes	  must	  also	  be	  selected,	  except	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  harasser	  is	  not	  specified:	  	  
Number:	   1/2a	  
Code	  Name:	   Incest	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18	  by	  members	  of	  the	  child’s/individual’s	  immediate	  or	  extended	  family/relatives	  
Exemplars:	   Father,	  Brother,	  Uncle,	  Family,	  Cousin,	  Relative,	  Stepfather,	  Grandfather	  
Close	  But	  No:	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Number:	   1/2b	  
Code	  Name:	   Servants/Domestic	  Help	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18	  by	  domestic	  help	  
Exemplars:	   Servants,	  Nannies,	  Maids,	  Drivers	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
Number:	   1/2c	  
Code	  Name:	   Schools	  and	  Other	  Public	  Venues	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18	  by	  professionals	  in	  education,	  medicine,	  
Exemplars:	   Teachers,	  Doctors,	  Female	  Teachers	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
Number:	   1/2d	  
Code	  Name:	   Neighbors	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18	  by	  individuals	  living	  in	  the	  same	  building,	  street,	  or	  area	  
Exemplars:	   Neighbor	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
Number:	   1/2e	  
Code	  Name:	   Religious	  Leaders	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  children/individuals	  under	  18	  by	  members	  of	  the	  religious	  establishment	  –	  clergy,	  such	  as	  priests,	  imams	  and	  rabbis.	  
Exemplars:	   Neighbor	  
Close	  But	  No:	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Number:	   3	  
Code	  Name:	   Sexual	  Harassment	  of	  Women	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  females	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse	  or	  rape;	  Not	  courting,	  flirtation	  or	  muaksa;	  May	  co-­‐occur	  with	  flirtation	  or	  muaksa;	  May	  include	  assault;	  Not	  mob	  assault	  or	  group	  harassment;	  May	  include	  verbal	  interactions	  that	  are	  not	  benign	  in	  nature;	  Verbal	  harassment	  is	  only	  harassment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  aspects	  of	  harassment	  described;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized	  	  
Exemplars:	   Harassment;	  Groping;	  Rubbing;	  Touching;	  Physical	  Violence;	  Moral	  Violation;	  Sexual	  Violence;	  Vulgar	  Talk;	  Vulgar	  Jokes;	  Oral	  (Words);	  Virginity	  Testing	  	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Flirtation,	  Courting,	  Teasing,	  Muakasat;	  	  	  If	  the	  above	  code	  it	  utilized,	  one	  of	  the	  below	  must	  also	  be	  selected,	  except	  in	  cases	  where	  location	  is	  not	  specified:	  
	  
Number:	   3a	  
Code	  Name:	   Workplace	  Sexual	  Harassment	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  females	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse,	  or	  rape;	  Does	  not	  involve	  courting,	  flirtation	  or	  muaksa;	  May	  include	  verbal	  interactions	  that	  are	  not	  benign	  in	  nature;	  Verbal	  harassment	  may	  be	  generically	  described	  –	  it’s	  only	  harassment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  aspects	  of	  harassment	  described;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized;	  Occurs	  specifically	  in	  the	  workplace	  setting	  	  
Exemplars:	   	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  	  
Number:	   3b	  
Code	  Name:	   Public	  Sexual	  Harassment	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  females	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse,	  or	  rape;	  Does	  not	  involve	  courting,	  flirtation	  or	  muaksa;	  May	  include	  verbal	  interactions	  that	  are	  not	  benign	  in	  nature;	  Verbal	  harassment	  may	  be	  generically	  described	  –	  it’s	  only	  harassment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  aspects	  of	  harassment	  described;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized;	  Occurs	  in	  any	  street/public	  venue,	  such	  as	  transportation,	  stores,	  parks,	  etc.	  	  
Exemplars:	   Women	  in	  public	  places;	  Drivers;	  Downtown	  
Close	  But	  No:	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Number:	   3c	  
Code	  Name:	   Domestic/Familial	  Abuse	  &	  Incest	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  females	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse,	  or	  rape;	  Does	  not	  involve	  courting,	  flirtation	  or	  muaksa;	  May	  include	  verbal	  interactions	  that	  are	  not	  benign	  in	  nature;	  Verbal	  harassment	  may	  be	  generically	  described	  –	  it’s	  only	  harassment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  aspects	  of	  harassment	  described;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized;	  Occurs	  specifically	  in	  the	  home	  and	  may	  involve	  relatives/family	  members	  or	  strangers/family	  friends	  that	  visit	  the	  home.	  	  
Exemplars:	   Son’s	  wives;	  Stepfather’s	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  	   	  
Number:	   3d	  
Code	  Name:	   Other	  Individual/Location	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  females	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse,	  or	  rape;	  Does	  not	  involve	  courting,	  flirtation	  or	  muaksa;	  May	  include	  verbal	  interactions	  that	  are	  not	  benign	  in	  nature;	  Verbal	  harassment	  may	  be	  generically	  described	  –	  it’s	  only	  harassment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  aspects	  of	  harassment	  described;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized;	  Occurs	  with	  those	  outside	  of	  the	  home	  and	  in	  other	  locations,	  such	  as	  schools,	  doctors	  offices,	  police	  stations	  	  
Exemplars:	   Doctors,	  Teachers,	  Neighbors,	  Servants,	  Drivers,	  Police	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  	  
Number:	   4	  
Code	  Name:	   Rape	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  or	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  individual	  over	  18	  that	  involves	  forced	  penetration;	  Often	  a	  specific	  mention	  of	  rape	  
Exemplars:	   Rape	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Child	  Rape	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Number:	   5	  
Code	  Name:	   Flirtation/Teasing/Courting/Muakasat	  
Code	  Description:	   Verbal	  or	  Visual	  interaction	  of	  a	  sexualized	  nature	  with	  individuals	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse	  or	  rape;	  Does	  not	  involve	  physical	  interactions,	  such	  as	  touching,	  groping,	  rubbing,	  etc.	  May	  co-­‐occur	  with	  sexual	  harassment;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized;	  specific	  mention	  of	  muaksa	  
Exemplars:	   Muaksa	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
	  
Number:	   6	  
Code	  Name:	   Sex/Sexual	  Intercourse/Adultery	  (Zina)	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical	  or	  Sexual	  Interaction	  by	  Adults;	  Often	  vaguely	  utilized;	  Occurs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  discussions	  of	  illicit,	  but	  consensual	  sexual	  relations;	  Not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  child	  molestation	  or	  rape;	  Not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  non-­‐consensual	  harassment	  of	  women	  and	  men	  EXCEPT	  in	  cases	  where	  women	  are	  harassing	  men	  (their	  husbands).	  May	  be	  the	  context	  of	  actual	  adultery	  or	  secretive	  relations.	  	  
Exemplars:	   Sexual	  Intercourse,	  Sexual	  Relations,	  Problems	  with	  Mixed-­‐Gendered	  Settings	  (Work	  and	  School);	  Illicit	  Sex;	  Zina;	  Desire	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Looks	  lustfully	  at	  women	  and	  esp	  daughters;	  sexual	  inclination	  (in	  context	  of	  harassment)	  
	  
Number:	   7	  
Code	  Name:	   Teen/Youth	  Sexual	  Interplay/Exploration	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical	  or	  Sexual	  Interaction	  by	  underage	  individuals;	  Often	  vaguely	  utilized;	  Occurs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  discussions	  of	  illicit,	  but	  consensual	  relations	  among	  young	  individuals;	  May	  include	  context	  of	  sexual	  play	  or	  exploration,	  feeding	  sexual	  curiosity;	  Not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  children	  hurting	  other	  children	  	  
Exemplars:	   Youth	  Sexuality;	  Harassment	  Between	  Teens;	  Kissing/Hugging	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Children	  harass	  other	  children	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Number:	   8	  
Code	  Name:	   Parental	  Awareness/Responsibility/Response	  	  
Code	  Description:	   Role	  of	  parents	  in	  watching	  and	  protecting	  their	  children,	  teaching	  their	  children	  about	  sexual	  harassment	  and	  sex	  relations,	  and	  helping	  their	  children	  who	  have	  been	  the	  victims	  of	  sexual	  harassment,	  assault,	  or	  rape.	  Also,	  parents	  not	  knowing	  or	  paying	  attention	  to	  what	  is	  happening	  to	  their	  children	  	  
Exemplars:	   Responsibility	  of	  Parents,	  Role	  of	  Socialization,	  Absence	  of	  Mother,	  Absence	  of	  Father;	  (Un)awareness;	  (Family	  Member)	  Doesn’t	  Believe…;	  Parent	  Unaware;	  Mothers	  Should	  Watch	  Their	  Children;	  Parents	  Should	  Watch	  Their	  Children;	  Left	  Child	  Alone;	  Don’t	  Blame;	  Keep	  Silent;	  Parents	  Don’t	  Talk	  with	  Children	  About	  Sex;	  	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
Number:	   9	  
Code	  Name:	   Homosexuality	  
Code	  Description:	   The	  result	  of	  sexual	  harassment,	  assault	  or	  rape	  on	  children;	  often	  generically	  utilized;	  Attempts	  to	  overcome	  this	  result	  through	  psychological	  assistance	  or	  religious	  means	  
Exemplars:	   Homosexuality;	  Trends	  Toward	  Females	  and	  Sometimes	  Males;	  Thinking	  Sexually	  of	  Males;	  Become	  Gay	  	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  
	  
Number:	   10	  
Code	  Name:	   Sexual	  Deviation	  
Code	  Description:	   The	  result	  of	  sexual	  harassment,	  assault	  or	  rape	  on	  children	  that	  does	  not	  result	  in	  homosexuality;	  Includes	  sexual	  acts	  listed	  as	  deviant,	  abnormal,	  or	  socially	  unacceptable.	  Attempts	  to	  overcome	  this	  result	  through	  psychological	  assistance	  or	  religious	  means;	  Not	  physical	  trauma/disjunction	  relations	  to	  sexual	  harassment,	  assault	  or	  rape	  	  
Exemplars:	   Sodomy,	  Abnormal,	  Bisexuality,	  Masturbation,	  Deviation;	  Anal	  Sexual	  Assault;	  Anal	  Intercourse;	  Mouth	  sex	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Premature	  	  Ejaculation	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Number:	   11	  
Code	  Name:	   Sexual	  Harassment	  of	  Men	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  Sexual	  interaction	  with	  males	  over	  18	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  sexual	  intercourse	  or	  rape;	  Does	  not	  include	  child	  molestation	  accounts	  from	  adult	  men;	  	  	  
Exemplars:	   Devoured	  male	  members;	  happens	  to	  some	  men	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  	  
Number:	   12	  
Code	  Name:	   State	  Violence	  
Code	  Description:	   Government,	  police,	  military	  use	  of	  sexual	  harassment,	  assault	  and	  rape	  on	  prisoners,	  or	  to	  disburse	  public	  protestors	  in	  squares	  
Exemplars:	   American	  soldiers,	  dogs,	  prisons,	  Abu	  Ghraib,	  Frighten	  Girls	  Down	  in	  Squares;	  Political	  Tool	  For	  Fighting	  Demonstrations;	  Political	  Harassment	  
Close	  But	  No:	   	  	  
Number:	   13	  
Code	  Name:	   Power/Authority/Control	  	  
Code	  Description:	   Exploitation	  based	  on	  differences	  in	  structural	  positions;	  Patriarchal	  order;	  Not	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  exploitation	  of	  children;	  Usually	  men	  over	  women,	  sometimes	  men	  over	  men;	  Not	  women	  over	  men;	  	  Exists	  in	  work	  contexts	  with	  bosses	  over	  subordinates	  	  
Exemplars:	   Power	  to	  Humiliate	  and	  Insult;	  Exploitation;	  Men	  think	  they	  deserve	  what	  they	  face;	  Society	  Blames	  Her;	  Control	  over	  others;	  Power	  Deficient;	  Women	  Turned	  into	  Product;	  Fear	  of	  Being	  Fired;	  Vulnerable;	  Can’t	  stop	  men;	  Authoritarian	  System;	  Masculine	  Society;	  Want	  to	  Support	  His	  Confidence;	  the	  System;	  Inferiority	  of	  women	  	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Parental	  control;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 363 
Number:	   14	  
Code	  Name:	   Mob	  Assault/Harassment	  	  
Code	  Description:	   Bodily,	  Physical,	  Sexual	  interaction	  by	  a	  group	  with	  (a)	  female(s)	  over	  18;	  Group	  numbers	  unspecified;	  Sexual	  Intercourse	  or	  Rape	  may	  be	  Unspecified;	  Does	  not	  include	  individual-­‐level	  assault;	  May	  be	  generically	  utilized	  	  
Exemplars:	   Mob	  Assault,	  Mob	  Attack,	  Mob	  Harassment;	  Mob	  Sexual	  Harassment;	  Downtown	  Cairo/Eid	  ;	  Gangs	  	  
Close	  But	  No:	   Parental	  control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
